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McGRAW-HILL PUBLICATIONS IN SOCIOLOGY
EDWARD BYRON REUTER, CONSULTING EDITOR

THE DEVELOPMENT OF SOCIOLOGY

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PREFACE

The account of the history of sociology offered in the following pages is intended to be comprehensive but not exhaustive. It is inevitable that, in the preparation of such an account, considerable reliance will be placed upon secondary sources; although sociology is, relatively, a "new science," it is old enough to have a literature too extensive for any one person to have first-hand acquaintance with all of it. Largely because such secondary sources are much more adequate for the development of general social thought down to the latter part of the nineteenth century than for the recent period, Part II of this book is admittedly a more complete treatment of the subjects covered than the subsequent parts. The excellent volumes of W. A. Dunning's *Political Theories*, and J. P. Lichtenberger's *Development of Social Theory*, in particular, have done much to lighten the task of all subsequent writers in their field; while P. A. Sorokin, in *Contemporary Sociological Theories*, has brought together in conveniently accessible form a large amount of information concerning modern sociological literature. The extent of my dependence upon the volumes of the *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences* will be apparent to anyone who scans the footnotes in the following pages.

The serious student who may wish to use this book as a guide to further study is warned that there are several significant recent and contemporary developments in scientific sociology that are omitted or only barely mentioned in the following pages, owing chiefly to the author's lack of acquaintance with them. Among these are the German *Wissens-soziologie* (sociology of knowledge) school, established by Max Scheler, Franz Jerusalem, Karl Mannheim, and others; the *Kultursoziologie* school founded by Alfred Weber, brother of the better known Max Weber; the recent work of Morris Ginsburg at the University of London; the activities of the Solvay Institute at Brussels; the recent activities of the International Institute of Sociology

under the executive secretaryship of G. L. Duprat. Some recent American contributions to the general theory of culture are very inadequately treated in the following pages; and one or two interesting publications of very recent date are not even mentioned. Contemporary sociology is a protean phenomenon, and very imperfect communication exists between the exponents of some of the specialized phases into which the sociological movement has differentiated. An appreciable degree of nationalistic and linguistic isolation still exists among sociologists, too. Recent political developments in Germany have made it particularly difficult to assess the present status and prospects of scientific sociology in that country.

The sources and authorities for statements made in the following pages have been indicated by footnotes. Special acknowledgments are due to Mrs. Hilda Price Jarvis for assistance with the collection of data and the preparation of copy, as well as the reading of proof; to the secretarial staff of the Institute for Research in the Social Sciences of the University of Virginia for typing parts of the manuscript; and to Professors A. G. A. Balz and T. R. Snavely of the University of Virginia for suggestions on particular points. Also, I cannot allow the opportunity to pass to express my lasting indebtedness to the late Professor Albion W. Small of the University of Chicago, from whom I received my first formal instruction in the history of sociology and by whom I was first encouraged to hope that I might write something in that field worthy of publication. For the general development and guidance of my own sociological thought I owe more to Professor Robert E. Park than to any other one person, but he is in no way to be held responsible for critical opinions expressed in this book.

In the arrangement of chapters, Part II and, on the whole, Part III have followed the chronological order, but in the remaining parts it has been felt necessary to shift to an order which is primarily topical and only roughly or secondarily chronological.

FLOYD N. HOUSE.

UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA,
April, 1936.

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PART I
INTRODUCTION

CHAPTER I

SOCIAL CHANGE AND SOCIAL SCIENCE

It has been asserted by some sociologists of repute, and it has been clearly implied in the writings of others who have not made the express assertion, that the fundamental objective of social science, including sociology, is to explain the facts of social change. The proposition can be defended at least to this extent and in this sense: In a society in which little change is going on or has gone on for some time, there is little or no interest in social science or in any other kind of science, for that matter. In a very stable society, custom and tradition comprise the only kind of knowledge that is needed, and they are, consequently, about the only kind of knowledge that exists. When the things we have to deal with undergo change, we are led to think about them reflectively and critically. One can explain in this way, in part, the fact that social science, strictly so-called, appears to be something that has come into existence, almost *de novo*, within the period of western history usually referred to as "modern times." Culture and social organization, which are the objects of study in the social sciences, have changed more rapidly in modern times—since about 1500—than in any other period in the history of the Western world, with possibly one exception.

The period that we call the Middle Ages was one in which very little development of the social sciences took place; indeed, it was a period in which practically no attention was paid to questions of social science. But it can be described also as an era in which little social change was going on, other than the consolidation and extension of a social order the foundations of which were laid down at the beginning of the period. The principles of that social order were formulated by the Church Fathers and by St. Augustine and were made official at the Council of Nicea. Throughout this period, scholars and thinkers occupied themselves with the elaboration of these principles, which

constituted the official theology and philosophy of the Church, in their bearing on law, government, and the obligations of social classes to each other. At the close of the Middle Ages, on the other hand, social changes began to take place rapidly; feudalism was progressively replaced by nationalism; commerce began to expand; and a bourgeois trader class grew and attained prominence and influence. An increasing proportion of the population of Europe lived in towns and cities; and, as a result of such changes as these, old customs, traditions, and morals began to lose their fitness and, therefore, their force. This was a time of social transition and disorganization, and it was the time when modern social science originated.

There has been one other great epoch in the history of the Western world in which a great deal of reflective thinking and discussion concerning what we now call the problems of social science went on; it was that period in Greco-Roman history which began approximately in the fourth century B.C. This was the period of Plato and Aristotle and of the pioneer historians Herodotus and Thucydides; and it may be said to close either with the lives of Polybius and Cicero or with the great Roman jurists, who are scarcely to be classified as social theorists, much less as social scientists in the modern sense. This Hellenic age, like the modern age, was one of change and social transition and to no small extent a period of social disorganization, when the old regime of city-states was giving way to an all-inclusive empire. It is probably not far wrong to regard the political writings of Plato and Aristotle as the attempts of these great thinkers to rationalize and justify a crumbling regime; for it is when our institutions are falling that we become conscious of them and reflective concerning them.

The foregoing observations may be summarized and generalized, from one point of view, in the thesis that the social science of a time and place represents the attempt of thoughtful people to make intelligible, to themselves and their associates, the circumstances in which they are placed, particularly as those circumstances are thrown into relief by change. If this is true, it means that the concepts and theories that constitute a social science gain meaning for us when they are studied in the context of history, *i.e.*, in the light of some knowledge of the circumstances in which they first took shape. The study of the history

of social science or of any other science or discipline has a different purpose from that of ordinary historical inquiry. So far as the establishment and interpretation of historical facts are not undertaken as an end in themselves, *i.e.*, as a kind of amusement or diversion, the underlying objective of ordinary historical inquiry is the preservation and transmission of the social heritage; professional historians are the agents upon whom we depend to help us maintain some reasonable degree of continuity in our civilization, by means of the preservation of the memory of the past.¹ 'The classical objective of historical scholarship is to depict the past "as it actually happened," *i.e.*, accurately, vividly, and concretely.' When we study the history of a science, however, extreme accuracy of historical detail is not our principal concern, nor should we be too greatly concerned about giving credit exactly where credit is due in our accounting of the contributions made to a science by its pioneers. Our ultimate interest is in the science and not in its history; we study its development for the sake of gaining a better understanding of its present condition and problems.

It was Auguste Comte, often referred to as the founder of sociology, who, in his *Positive Philosophy*, first made the point that any subject can be studied and taught in two ways—the historical and the dogmatic. As a science or discipline becomes well developed and systematized, Comte said, it becomes more or less unnecessary to study its history; we can teach it quite effectively by the dogmatic method of presentation, *i.e.*, by proceeding from first principles to derivations and ramifications.² As an example, he cited a subject that still serves as a good illustration, *viz.*, geometry. It is not so many years ago that geometry was commonly taught by a more or less historical method; even within the memory of persons now alive, youngsters in the secondary schools studied "Euclid" rather than "geometry," the conventional designation of the subject being a vestige of the time when the study of geometry was the study of what a

¹ Cf. Wilhelm Windelband, Strassburg inaugural address (1900), quoted by Robert E. Park in R. E. Park and E. W. Burgess, *Introduction to the Science of Sociology*, pp. 8–10, Chicago, 1924.

² *Cours de philosophie positive*, vol. I, pp. 77ff., Paris, 1830; see also Harriet Martineau's translation of Comte, *Positive Philosophy*, 2d ed., vol. I, pp. 18–20, London, 1875.

certain man had written about it; the propositions were associated with the names of those Greeks who were credited with having worked them out. In some cases, rival solutions of the same problems were known, and there was some dispute concerning their relative validity or merit. Today, however, we think of geometry, in its ordinary elementary forms, as a subject to be taught and studied quite dogmatically, by proceeding from definitions and postulates to the propositions that can be derived from them. No knowledge of the history of geometry is considered necessary for the elementary student. Although some recent high-school textbooks of plane geometry have been illuminated by the inclusion of bits of historical information concerning the great mathematicians who are credited with having formulated the proofs, this has evidently been done with the motive of making the subject more interesting to the ordinary student and linking it to his other studies. Physics, chemistry, and biology also serve fairly well as examples of disciplines that are taught, in the main, by what Comte called the "dogmatic" method, rather than historically. One might conceivably hold a doctor's degree in biology from a leading university without knowing very much about the history of biology; and it is even more likely that a well-trained chemist will not know much about the history of chemistry.

When, however, we turn from the relatively old, well-established, and systematized disciplines to those that are relatively new, not well established or systematized, those the very elements of which are more or less in dispute among supposedly competent persons, it becomes less possible, or at any rate less advisable, to rely mainly upon the dogmatic method of study and teaching. In order to grasp the issues in certain fundamental but disputed questions, in order to appreciate the meaning of certain important concepts and theories, it is necessary, or at least highly desirable, to know something about the history of these matters. To the extent that things are still in process of development, and the trend or outcome of that development is still more or less in doubt, it is necessary, in order to know them as they are, to know something about the process of development by which they have come to be what they are; and of no kind of things is this more strikingly true than those that are intrinsically "social" or cultural. The sciences, like all forms

of human knowledge, are things of precisely this social or cultural type; they have come into existence by a long and gradual process of development. Of no fairly well-recognized science is this need for a knowledge of its history more evident than it is of sociology, though it is perhaps equally a need of other social sciences—economics and political science—and of such subjects as psychology, philosophy, and anthropology. In fact, as everyone knows, the course in history of philosophy is ordinarily made a basic feature of the curriculum of a university department of philosophy.

In this book, then, we shall be concerned with the history of sociology, but our purpose will not be quite the same as that which often seems to animate the study of history in the ordinary sense. We shall not be greatly concerned in the end with the establishment of historical facts—names, dates, and the exact sequence in which certain developments took place—except as means to an end. The end and aim of our inquiry will be the establishment of an understanding of sociological theory in its present status and of its concepts, problems, and controversial issues. A great deal of discussion, some of it rather acrimonious, goes on continually in sociological circles concerning the fundamentals of the subject; and in much of this discussion there is a patent failure of the persons involved to understand one another; they do not use terms in the same sense. Under such circumstances, it would be of some help if the parties to the discussion could illuminate their respective contentions by careful attention to the historical connotations of their terms.

Since it may be argued with considerable force that sociology as such did not exist until the middle of the nineteenth century and that political science and economics had no existence as sciences before the middle of the eighteenth century, we shall devote nearly all of our attention to developments that have taken place within the last one hundred fifty years. It is possible, however, to trace the antecedents of anything whatever as far back as human knowledge can reach; and no one who is familiar with the story will deny that certain ideas which took shape at the hands of Plato and Aristotle, the Roman jurists, and the Fathers and philosophers of the Church had a considerable part in the shaping of modern social science when it emerged as something distinct from theology, ethics, and philoso-

phy. In a series of introductory chapters, accordingly, we shall be concerned chiefly with what may be termed the prescientific development of social thought, *i.e.*, with the history of social theory before it took on, at about the end of the first quarter of the eighteenth century, the form we may regard as modern and, in a fairly strict sense, "scientific."

PART II
SOCIAL THEORY BEFORE 1700

CHAPTER II THE BEGINNINGS OF POLITICAL THEORY

The development of the social sciences, as of the physical and biological sciences, may be described as a drive toward objectivity.¹ Men's earliest ideas about the environment in which they lived were undoubtedly a mixture of magic and crude, uncritical common sense. Only in a comparatively late stage of development of the human race did they begin to think about the things around them, either physical or social, in the spirit of reflective and critical inquiry into their nature and working, relatively free from religious or magical presuppositions. "Objectivity" may be interpreted, in fact, as the attitude of mind that develops when people first become able to regard features of their environment as "objects," or "things," behaving according to the laws of their nature and in response to the impact of external forces, rather than as animate beings behaving in an unpredictable fashion but subject to human control or manipulation through religious rites or magical procedures. This objectivity was achieved earlier, on the whole, in the realm of physical science than in that of social science. It is obviously easier to maintain an attitude of detachment toward physical objects than toward human beings.

Just as physical science is older than social science, and for somewhat the same reasons, politics is, in some respects, the oldest of the social sciences. One of the earliest achievements of mankind in the realm of social thought was the discovery of the state as an object which could be observed and studied with some detachment. So far as we know from the literature that has survived to our times, this was first accomplished by Greek thinkers fairly late in the classical, or "Hellenic," period and specifically, first of all, by Plato.² There is reason to think that

¹ Cf. Albion W. Small, *Origins of Sociology*, Chicago, 1924. Preface, p. v; see also Chap. I, *passim*.

² Plato lived, chiefly at Athens, from 427 to 347 B.C. It is probable that his writings may be dated, in practically all cases, from after the death of

the appearance of definitely reflective political theory in Greece at about this time is no mere accident of history but was a natural outcome of the circumstances of the period. It is a significant fact that Plato made quite definite and considerable use of the method of comparison in his political dialogues, including the earliest of them, the *Republic*. The possibility of comparison is more or less prerequisite to the detached observation and study of anything. It is difficult, in the beginning, to achieve an attitude of intellectual detachment toward anything that one believes to be unique and incomparable. Up to about the time of Plato, the state, in so far as it was an object of reflective thought at all, was conceived as a sacred object, something to be dealt with by the thinker in the spirit of religion and morality rather than in the spirit of science.¹ In the *Republic* of Plato, however, and still more plainly in the *Politics* of Aristotle, we find the state beginning to be regarded as a secular object, something that can be studied comparatively and can therefore be subjected to a kind of critical examination which it is not possible to apply to sacred things. The fact that Plato and Aristotle did use this comparative method evidently reflects the state of affairs existing in the Mediterranean world in their time. Classical Greece seems to have been the first situation in all human history in which a number of independent political societies existed in close juxtaposition to one another and in relatively free communication with one another. A Greek gentleman of Plato's time, of an inquiring mind, might inform himself rather accurately, by travel and from the reports of other travelers, concerning the form of government that existed in all of the

Socrates in 399. Some of his earlier *Dialogues* are supposed to be fairly accurate reports of the teaching of Socrates; however, the *Republic*, the earliest of the political dialogues, is not of that number; in it Plato's theory of "ideas" is quite definitely formulated, and this theory is definitely non-Socratic.

According to one conception, such documents as the Laws of Manu and the Code of Hammurabi, the Egyptian *Book of the Dead*, and parts of the Old Testament form part of the literature of social theory. It is the assumption of the present discussion, however, that such documents, while they constitute important source materials for the study of the evolution of government and law, are not properly regarded as part of the literature of social and political theory.

¹ See Gilbert Murray, *Rise of the Greek Epic*, pp. 27-60, Oxford, 1924, for a suggestive account of the development of the city-state as a sacred object.

Greek city-states at the time or had existed within, say, a century previous to his own time. Thus Plato had at his disposal what no student of politics and government who lived much earlier or outside the Mediterranean world could very well have had, *viz.*, a body of data to which the comparative method could be applied. Neither the *Republic* nor either of Plato's later political dialogues, the *Statesman* and the *Laws*, can be classified as political science in the strictest sense of the term, nor for that matter can we classify the *Politics* of Aristotle as a scientific treatise, without reservations, but at any rate we may speak of these writings as works of political *theory*, as distinguished from codes of law or morals and from religious and moral exhortations relating to law and the state. It seems to be no serious exaggeration or distortion of the facts to say that the history of political theory begins with Plato.

What kind of social theory is it that we find in the works of Plato, particularly in the *Republic*, which is by common consent regarded as the most important of his political dialogues? In the first place, it is primarily and chiefly concerned with politics and government; only by straining a point can we classify the *Republic* as a contribution to economics or to any other variety of social theory than the political. It deals with the state and with forms of government, or constitutions, with the individual as citizen, and with other aspects of social organization only quite incidentally.¹ In other words, for Plato and, as we shall see, for Aristotle social theory is political theory; and the need for any other kind of social theory is scarcely felt at all. The reasons for this are evident: in the period that ended in the time of Plato and Aristotle, community and state were practically one and the same thing throughout all Hellas, and any other forms of human association that might exist within the city-state were easily and naturally regarded as mere parts of the structure of the state. This view reflects the fact that the state was still, even to these great thinkers, something of a sacred object; that a distinction might be made between the religious organization and the political or governmental organization of the community had scarcely occurred to anyone. Economics was an art rather than a science—the art of managing an estate or carrying on commerce—and occupational groups, if any, were purely incidental features of the communal life. The family was in part a

religious institution and in part, especially for men of the aristocratic classes, a purely private and personal arrangement. Under such circumstances, it was possible and natural to form a general theory of the state which seemed adequate as an all-inclusive theory of society. Indeed, the state is to this day quite commonly conceived as the form of social organization that includes all others; and the idea that politics is the fundamental or ultimate social science persists, especially among British writers.¹

The political theory of Plato and, to a degree only slightly less, that of Aristotle also may be characterized as the rationalization and idealization of an existing political and social order. As philosopher, Plato is known especially for his so-called idealism, or theory of ideas. Like all philosophers, he engaged in a "quest for certainty," for absolute, final truth; and this endeavor he conceived as an effort to define ultimate reality. His solution of the problem was expressed in the theory that our general ideas or concepts reflect the ultimate reality of things; the apparent variety and change of the world of sense experience is a kind of illusion, due to the fallibility of human nature.) The aim of philosophy is to discover and formulate accurately these "ideas" which are the true reality of the universe. In keeping with this general tendency of his philosophy, Plato's discussion of the state is, in effect, an attempt to describe the ideal state and to define the essence of political organization. To express the same thought somewhat differently, we may say that Plato conceived society as an artifact—something that man can shape artificially, within limits, in the light of intellectual knowledge. The underlying animus of Aristotle's *Politics* is the same. In this respect, both men exemplify the preoccupation with ideal, stable form which is said by authorities to be so invariably characteristic of Greek culture. In other words, what Plato and Aristotle contributed to the development of social theory was, in the main, political philosophy rather than political science.

Both did, to be sure, attempt to describe a natural cycle of change in the constitution or general form of the government of a state; to this extent they anticipated the modern conception of

¹ Cf. George E. G. Catlin, *A Study of the Principles of Politics*, p. 74, New York, 1930.

natural process in the social order. They conceived of political change, however, as a process that went on in closed cycles; they seemed quite unable to imagine political change that would result in a form of government not actually known to them from the history of the Greek city-states. Even Plato's ideal polity is a sort of idealized abstraction from the traditional constitution of Sparta, modified by the inclusion of elements drawn from what he knew of other Greek states. States, in this view, simply swing around a circle of forms, eventually returning to a type of constitution that they have had before. The concept of evolution, in the post-Darwinian sense, and the concept of progress, as it had been cherished in the Western world since the eighteenth century, are entirely lacking in their writings. The same limitation of their thought is illustrated by the fact that, although according to tradition Aristotle was for some time the tutor of the Macedonian prince who became Alexander the Great, and although the rise of the Macedonian empire took place almost entirely within his lifetime, he did not recognize at any point in the *Politics* that such a form of government as empire could exist.

There is in the political dialogues of Plato, however, an implicit acknowledgment of the principle that governmental forms must be adapted to conditions set by human nature and other circumstances. This is indicated in the progressive modification of his ideas from the *Republic* through the *Statesman* to the *Laws*. In the *Laws*, which was written in the old age of Plato, there is much more concession to the demands of human nature and other empirical forces. The same tendency in Plato's social thought is suggested by the striking contrast between his description of a simple ideal community, in the early part of Book II of the *Republic*, and the much more elaborate ideal society depicted in the remainder of the dialogue. To this extent, Plato the idealist was a realist in the modern sense of the term.

To reiterate, the political writings of Plato, in spite of their preoccupation with the quest for an ideal, demonstrate to a certain extent the possibilities of considering political phenomena reflectively, critically, and objectively, instead of merely perpetuating the custom and tradition of the past. It is, then, unfair to say in response to the question What did Plato contribute to the development of modern social science? "He

contributed nothing."¹ The reflective and critical approach to human problems was a relatively new thing in the time of Plato; and from the merely speculative and dialectic attack upon such problems to the systematic labor of checking concepts and theories against all available empirical evidence was a long road to travel. It has required over two thousand years for the thinkers of the Western world to travel as far as they have traveled on this road. We should give Plato credit for having helped to guide an early stage of the journey.²

In considering the work of Plato, we have anticipated to some extent what may be said in a brief survey concerning the place of Aristotle in the development of social thought.³ The two philosophers can scarcely be thought of separately except to a limited extent and by abstraction, so to speak. The political theories of Aristotle may be regarded with almost no reservations as the direct continuation of those of Plato, whose pupil and associate he was for many years, and it has been aptly said that Aristotle was "a Platonist in spite of himself." It is in the *Politics* of Aristotle that one finds the earliest clear-cut example of systematic political theorizing after the manner of a modern university lecture—at least it is the earliest such treatise that has survived to our times; for there is some reason to think that Plato composed similar works which have been lost. In the *Dialogues* of Plato we have a polished literary, indeed almost dramatic, presentation of certain political speculations and reflections; while Aristotle's *Politics* is, in form, if not altogether in substance, a scientific treatise. By temperament and habit, Aristotle seems to have been inclined to base his generalizations

¹ Cf. A. W. Small, "Sociology and Plato's Republic," *American Journal of Sociology*, vol. 30, pp. 513-533, 683-702, 1925.

² For a more specific and detailed account of the content of Plato's political works than is given here, see, in addition to the original sources, i.e., the *Republic*, *Statesman*, and *Laws*, J. P. Lichtenberger, *The Development of Social Theory*, Chap. I, New York, 1923.

³ Aristotle lived from 384 to 322 B.C. Born on the island of Stagira, he lived at Athens as a student under Plato for twenty years, acted as counselor to the tyrant Hermias for three years, was tutor to the young Alexander for eight years, and founded a school at Athens, known as the Lyceum, which he conducted until shortly before his death, or for twelve years altogether. Aristotle is sometimes referred to in literature as "the Stagirite." *Politics* is his work of chief importance to the student of the history of social thought; however, the *Nicomachean Ethics* and the *Logic* or *Organon* should also be considered.

upon the concrete facts known to him, but he had been so thoroughly indoctrinated with the "dialectic" of Plato—reasoning from highly generalized "ideas," or principles, to the more specific propositions that could be deduced from them—that he wrote his own works according to this pattern and referred to the facts only by way of illustration or secondary evidence in support of his theories.

The factors of social and cultural background, or context, with reference to which the *Politics* should be studied are of course in large part the same as those which have to be taken into account in reading the works of Plato and include the following: (1) the traditions of the Hellenic world—nominal democracy in some states, but actual aristocracy everywhere, slavery, relatively complete self-sufficiency of the individual city-state, a rather high stage of intellectual and artistic attainment, and the habit of falling back on metaphysical or religious ideas for the solution of all difficult problems, rather than preserving an attitude of skepticism, agnosticism, and investigation—(2) a condition of relatively free cultural intercourse and communication throughout the Hellenic world and, to a lesser degree only, throughout the entire Mediterranean region; (3) considerable disorganization and uncertainty in the Greek political system; and (4) a relatively new but growing usage of critical discussion and inquiry, brought to a rather high degree of development by the Sophists, Socrates, and Plato. In addition, several new factors entered the situation by the time that Aristotle reached his productive period. In the first place, it should not be forgotten that Aristotle was the pupil of Plato and could, therefore, "stand on the shoulders" of the latter; he could begin his political inquiries where Plato left off. In the second place, the Greek world underwent particularly grave political transitions during the lifetime of Aristotle; it was during this period that Philip and Alexander of Macedon built up their spectacular, though ephemeral, world empire. Though Aristotle must have been influenced by these changes, he ostensibly ignored them in his writings. In the third place, Aristotle lived just enough later than Plato to come under the influence of a growing empiricism in intellectual circles. It is probably a significant fact that he was the son of a physician and was perhaps himself trained for that profession, which requires one to deal with human ills in the concrete and

in a practical way. He is credited—not very authentically—with having devoted considerable attention to the collection of concrete material for his studies, both physical and social.¹

Our interest in the contribution of Aristotle to the development of social theory must be chiefly an interest in his methods. As to its specific content, the *Politics* has little interest except to the historian. It is true that Aristotle's distinctions between types of government or constitution are fundamental and, in part, the same that are conventional to this day. These distinctions are, however, obvious and were probably commonplace when he formulated them. It is chiefly with his point of view and his methods of inquiry that we ought to concern ourselves, if it is our purpose to arrive at some understanding of present-day social science through the study of its development. Looking at the *Politics* in this spirit, we may note, first, several basic preconceptions with which Aristotle approached the study of government, as follows: (1) the assumption that the particulars of a science must be susceptible of being deduced by logical reasoning from simpler, more general truths which are "more knowable by nature." Here the influence of Plato is clearly visible; as we have seen, he held that the ultimately real, which is the ideal or general, is something that we can know by skillful introspection and truth-seeking discussion, or "dialectic," not merely by systematic observation or experience. (2) Visible in the works of Aristotle is a half-hearted assumption that the qualities of particular kinds of things and their relations to other things and to general categories or tendencies are discovered through sense experience, though not so proved. (3) He makes fundamental use of a concept of nature and the natural, both as an instrument of analysis and as an ethical criterion. His inquiries are directed in considerable part to the discovery of what is according to nature. Dunning points out that, while Aristotle seems to connect his concept of nature with his doctrine of the end, or "final cause," in dealing with slavery he seems to assume that the primitive or undeveloped is the natural.²

¹ Aristotle's collections of specimens for the study of natural science seem to be attested by legend only; however, there is some internal evidence in the *Politics* of the collection of constitutions of various states which he is reputed to have made with the aid of students.

² W. A. Dunning, *Political Theories, Ancient and Mediaeval*, pp. 61-62, New York, 1916.

(4) Implicit in the writings of Aristotle, including the *Politics*, is the assumption that generalizations must be subjected to the test of observation and experience, *i.e.*, of established empirical fact. This assumption and his evident practice following it are not very successfully reconciled in his works with his Platonist idealism. (5) A feature of Aristotle's social theory which is perhaps of minor importance but of considerable interest, is his naïve participation in the current Greek notion that Greeks are inherently superior, on the average, to all other—"barbarian"—peoples.

Only in a quite arbitrary way can one distinguish among Aristotle's preconceptions, his generalizations, and his methods. It is true of anyone engaged in some undertaking of sustained and more or less systematic reflective thought that the generalizations at which he has arrived up to a certain point in his reflections and inquiries become the presuppositions of any further inquiries that he may carry on with reference to the same subject. These generalizations become the hypotheses which direct his subsequent investigations, and accordingly they determine in large part his methods of research; for methods of research, in the most fundamental sense, are simply ways of looking at things.

The principal generalizations at which Aristotle arrives in his *Politics* may be briefly indicated, in part, as follows: (1) There is a "pure science" and a "practical wisdom" pertaining to human nature and politics; however, Aristotle does not develop the relation between them very systematically.¹ (2) The association and cooperation of human beings rests upon human nature; "man is by nature a political animal." (3) The division of labor and the tendency of population to increase are recognized quite objectively as forces to be taken into account in the study of the nature and possibilities of states. There is also in the *Politics* a clear and sophisticated recognition of the principle of monopoly. To this extent, and in these respects, the *Politics* deals with topics that we should now regard as lying in the field of economics.

¹ *Nicomachean Ethics*, Book VI, Chap. VIII, pp. 139 ff., in Everyman's Library ed., trans. by A. D. Lindsay. The *Ethics* and the *Politics* of Aristotle were conceived by him as two parts of the same treatise. Like Plato, he did not think of personal ethics and political ethics, or politics, as two fundamentally distinct realms of inquiry; the good life could be lived only in a good state, and the two were practically aspects of the same thing.

(4) Forces that we should now call political in the strictest sense of the term are discussed in an objective manner in the passages where Aristotle points out the necessity of a state's being large enough to maintain an army, and where he treats the balance of power among classes in the state. (5) He recognizes in quite objective manner the existence of a plurality of forces of nature—fundamental desires of men—which must be taken into account in studying states or in planning an ideal constitution.

What can be said, in summary, concerning Aristotle's achievements in method? Where can we place him on a scale of variation running from speculative political philosophy to empirical political science? In the first place, he approaches scientific, or at least objective, inquiry through the discussion of ethical questions and problems of public policy. His *Politics*, after all, resembles modern science rather than pure philosophy in the sense that it is a quest for knowledge that shall be of some practical utility, rather than of merely intellectual or aesthetic satisfaction. A principal object of his inquiry is the accurate definition of concepts; in this he is the faithful follower of Socrates and Plato. As a rule, his tendency to check his generalizations by experience data proceeds only to the point of reference to facts or simple generalizations, relatively near the concrete, which are assumed to be matters of common knowledge. There is, apparently, little effort to find out whether "common knowledge" is correct. In Book II of the *Politics*, however, Aristotle examines a number of the ideal commonwealths pictured by earlier writers, and, following this, he describes the constitutions of a number of existing states, always, however, with an attitude of evaluation rather than of disinterested comparison and objective description and analysis. His array of fundamental types of government or constitution, although more elaborate than that of Plato, is not much more objectively handled; nevertheless, he displays some tendency to formulate his categories in the light of his study of actual constitutions.

Having in mind the major background factors previously listed as affecting the development of Aristotle's social thought, we may describe him as a person in whom, because of his erudition and, perhaps, his temperamental inclinations and capacities, the several principal factors in the development of social thought down to his time are brought to a focus. As a result of the interaction of these factors in his thought, and as a result of his

interests, which were rooted as we have seen in the practical problems of his day, we may regard his *Politics* as the symbol of the emergence of a new and distinct factor, and indeed a central one, in the evolution of social thought, that factor being "political theory." With due reservations in reference to the political dialogues of Plato, the *Politics* may be named as the oldest treatise on political theory that has survived to our day.

All through the *Politics* we find indications of Aristotle's hesitation between idealism—apriorism—and empiricism. We may conjecture that the actual procedure by which he arrived at the generalizations recorded in this treatise was fairly empirical, but as a result of his early studies with Plato he was distrustful on principle of empiricism, and this distrust caused him to express his methodological theses, in the *Organon*, and his findings in a form that was to embarrass as much as it aided the development of objectivity in the social sciences. For more than a thousand years after his death, political and social inquiry, which took its form and direction mainly from what was known of the work of Aristotle, was pursued primarily by the method of syllogistic reasoning from propositions of Christian theology or from other ideas assumed to be self-evident and beyond criticism, including the propositions laid down by Aristotle himself.¹ The content of *Politics* and the *Ethics* was often made by the scholastic philosophers to serve as the starting point of discussion of political and governmental questions, for Aristotle was taken as an absolute authority in so far as his generalizations did not patently conflict with Christian doctrine.¹ The problem of such discussion was simply to show how certain more or less novel conclusions or practical applications could be reached by logical deduction from Aristotle's dicta. Thus the influence of Aristotle on subsequent social thought was both stimulating and stultifying; it stultified the social thought of the Schoolmen in so far as they followed primarily his formal logic, which was shaped by his Platonistic preference for dialectic; it was stimulating when, in the period of the Renaissance and later, it was accepted in the light of a fresh appreciation of the spirit and tendencies of the period in which Aristotle lived and wrote.

¹ During a long period of medieval history, Aristotle was commonly referred to by the Schoolmen simply as "the philosopher." By modern commentators on medieval history he is often spoken of as the "official philosopher of the medieval church."

CHAPTER III

SOCIAL THEORY FROM 300 B.C. TO 1300 A.D.

Except as was briefly indicated at the close of the preceding chapter, the heritage of political theory, left to the world by Aristotle, was not cultivated to any great extent until some sixteen hundred years later. The revival of interest in questions of political theory may for convenience be dated from Dante (born, 1265; died, 1321). Between the death of Aristotle in 322 B.C. and the publication of Dante's *De monarchia* about 1300 A.D., we may say that, with certain exceptions to be noted, little development of social theory took place in the Western world. The question naturally arises, however, as to the nature of the social thought that did characterize this long interval and the causes of its restricted scope.

For convenience of discussion, the interval in question may be divided into four parts. First, the period from the death of Aristotle in 322 B.C. or, for greater accuracy, from 338 B.C., when the Greek city-states merged in a Macedonian federation as a result of the conquests of Philip and Alexander, to about 200 B.C., when Greece began to come under the effective control of Rome, may be regarded as a period of the transition and decline of the classical Hellenic polity and culture. The political independence of the city-states was gone, and their future was uncertain. For this reason chiefly, it was a period of waning interest in social and political problems. The existing political situation was difficult to define, and particularly in terms consistent with the frame of reference constructed by Plato and Aristotle. The literature of social and political theory that has survived to our own times, from this period, is practically nil. It appears, however, that Zeno, founder of the Stoic school of philosophy, composed a *Polity*, only fragments of which have descended to us, in about 300 B.C. This work seems to have differed radically from the *Politics* of Aristotle in that it envisaged an extensive empire as the fundamental political order.¹ This view was

¹ W. L. Westerman, *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*, vol. 1, p. 36.

suggested, no doubt, by the empire of Philip and Alexander, which was already disintegrating when Zeno wrote. His conception of a polity that would include all the known civilized world is in keeping with one of the conceptions for which the Stoic philosophy became known—that of universal brotherhood. This conception was supported by the pantheistic theology or metaphysic which was one of the fundamental doctrines of Stoicism. This period may be further characterized, for our purposes, by the fact that in it at least three philosophical ideas took shape which had considerable influence on later social thought. (1) Not only did the Stoics develop a doctrine of universal brotherhood, but also, from the same pantheistic premises, they evolved (2) a conception of nature that was an extremely persistent influence in social philosophy. It may perhaps be held to be more or less continuous with the concept of nature which, as we have noted, is implicit in the writings of Aristotle, but, at any rate, the Stoics made it more explicit and developed a specific metaphysical support for it. In the form of a conception of a law of nature, or a body of “natural law” or “natural rights,” it not only played a prominent rôle in Roman legal history, as we shall see, but it recurs again and again in medieval and modern social thought, even down to our own times. The consensus of opinion among present-day social scientists seems to be that all such concepts are essentially sterile; natural law, or natural rights, are easily identified with the custom of one’s own group or the interests of one’s social class. (3) A third conception, less definite in character, which is traced to the philosophy of this period is credited to the Epicureans, *viz.*, a pronounced humanitarian tendency, based on the doctrine that human happiness is the measure of all value. The social thought of Plato and Aristotle, it will be recalled, was rather definitely aristocratic; the criterion of the good life, both in its individual and its collective aspects, seems to be the well-being of citizens, meaning, by implication, Greek freemen. Barbarians and slaves were really not taken into account, except as utilities or enemies. On the other hand, in the school of thought that, according to tradition, was founded by Epicurus, the measure of goodness is the happiness of individuals, and, by implication, this includes all individuals. In this period, and subsequently, these three concepts of the so-called “later ethical schools” of Greek philoso-

phy were combined with Christian theological and moral doctrines and were brought to bear upon the practical social problems of the Roman Empire and the medieval church and state.

The second period to be distinguished for our purposes, within the interval that we are considering, may be dated from about 200 B.C. to about 476 A.D., the latter being the date of the merging of the Western Empire into the Eastern, followed, shortly, by a succession of barbarian emperors in the west. It may be thought of as the period of the Pax Romana, the era during which a single political order was maintained by the Roman authority throughout the known civilized world. It may be described as a period when religion was conceived in part as a purely private and personal matter and in part as a mere ritual adjunct of the authority and prestige of the state; in either case, religion did not afford so great a stimulus to social criticism or constructive thought as it has in some other periods of human history. Philosophy was pushed into the background by practical concerns and by the pursuit of pleasure, fostered by a degree of personal immunity from the turmoil of the times. Political theory, after the pattern of Aristotle's *Politics*, was replaced by attention to practical questions of governmental policy and administration and, in turn, by an interest in problems of law and legal theory. By 325 A.D., Christianity had become the state religion of the Empire, and the Council of Nicea had formulated its main tenets in an authoritarian creed. The later part of this period, say from 325 to 476, was the time of the establishment of the Papacy, *i.e.*, the dominance of the Bishop of Rome over the entire Western Church. During this period, St. Augustine was developing, for the first time, a broad system of Christian theology and polity, which was to be perfected and elaborated by St. Thomas Aquinas 850 years later.

At least four episodes of some importance in the history of social thought may be identified with this period. The *General History* of Polybius was published during the first century of the period. It is the oldest piece of historical literature in which a noticeably philosophical and reflective interpretation of the events recorded can be discerned. The title of the work is suggestive of its character in this respect, though, to be sure, it is concerned mainly with the Punic Wars. Polybius, who lived in Rome for a number of years as a hostage for one of the Greek

cities, conceived the idea of writing a "general history," *i.e.*, a history of the Roman dominion, which, by that time, included most of the known civilized world. His point of view is stated quite explicitly in his opening chapter:

The circumstances of this great event [the formation of the Roman empire], which so greatly raise the admiration of the present age, will also afford one eminent advantage to my work, which will also distinguish it from every other history; for as all the great transactions of the world were now forcibly attracted to one side and compelled to move in one direction toward the same end, I shall thence be able to connect together, and dispose into one perfect body, the series of different events, and to exhibit, in one point of view, the whole variety of action. It was this, indeed, which first gave me the inclination to write the history of these times. Another motive was that no one had hitherto composed a General History; for if this task had ever been attempted, I should myself have been less solicitous to engage in such an undertaking. . . . I therefore judged it to be a task that might prove highly useful to the world, to rescue from oblivion this great and most instructive act of fortune. . . . It might with equal reason be thought that, by visiting all the noted cities of the world, or from a view of each, delineated on paper we should be able to acquire a right notion of the figure of the earth, with the due order and arrangement of its parts. But surely this must be thought a most absurd conceit. In a word, whoever is persuaded that the study of particular histories is alone sufficient to convey a perfect knowledge of the whole may very properly be compared with one who, on surveying the divided members of a body that was once endued with life and beauty, should persuade himself that he had from thence obtained a just conception of all the comeliness and active vigour which it had received from nature.¹

In other words, what Polybius saw, and attempted to use as a point of view in writing his book, was that the formation of the Roman Empire made it possible to describe the known world as a whole, and the interrelations of its parts. It was this possibility, defined with more precision long afterward by Robert Flint,² which Polybius saw and exploited, for the first time so far as we know. It may also be noted that in his work there is visible a recognition of the role of geographic factors in human

¹ Polybius, *General History*, trans. by Hampton, Book 1, Chap. 1, pp. 2-13, J. Davis, London, 1811.

² *The Philosophy of History: France and Germany*, p. 14, London, 1874.

affairs which is, perhaps, more objective and more definite than is displayed in the work of any earlier writer.

The second outstanding feature of the development of social thought during this period was the publication of the political writings of Marcus Tullius Cicero (106-46 B.C.). His *Republic* was published in 51 B.C., and his *Laws* appeared posthumously. These works seem important to our inquiry chiefly as evidence of the weakening force of political theory in a time when such speculative and critical thought appeared lacking in practical effect. With government securely and stably maintained by an established authority, speculative political theory could be only the rationalization of the existing order, or a kind of intellectual amusement. Cicero is sometimes classified as a representative of the "eclectic" school of Greco-Roman philosophy; and authorities agree that it is a very superficial, complacent sort of eclecticism which is embodied in his writings.

The third significant episode in the development of social thought during the period of the greatness of Rome, and probably by far the most significant, was the evolution of the Roman law and legal theory. Generally, scholars are agreed that the Romans' law and their theory of law were the outstanding intellectual contributions made by them to subsequent generations. To this day, the law of several continental European countries and, to a lesser extent, that of England and America reflect the influence of the Roman law. The *Corpus Juris Civilis*, as perfected in the Justinian Code, was the first highly systematized and unified body of law, resting on a fairly consistent body of legal theory, that took shape in the Western world. In a general survey of the development of social theory, space limitations forbid the examination of this development in detail; nevertheless, a few relevant observations are worth while.

The fact that the Roman jurists perfected such an impressive system of law reflects in an obvious way certain aspects of the situation in which they found themselves. Called upon to deal with cases arising in various cities and involving the people of so many semi-independent states, each of which had its own laws, they naturally envisaged the desirability of a code of laws that should be of fundamental and universal validity. Since the

Roman state, in the conception of its own leaders, ruled all mankind, it had to have laws applicable to all peoples, regardless of the divergence of the local, traditional codes of these peoples. Specifically, it seems that the principal stimulus to the later evolution of the Roman law came from the problem faced by the courts and lawyers at Rome and in other administrative centers of the Empire, in dealing with cases involving those who were not Roman citizens and who, furthermore, were not citizens of the same nation. Cases involving citizens of the same dependent or alien state were tried under the laws of that state; cases involving only Roman citizens were tried under the traditional body of Roman law evolved directly from the ancient law of the Twelve Tables. But a case involving the citizens of two different states called for some other code, if it were to be adjudicated equitably. In practice, as is well known, the Roman courts developed the idea, and the content, of a law of nations, *i.e.*, a body of rules that they supposed to be common to the codes of all the nations, citizens of which frequented the Roman cities as traders or travelers. Eventually, however, when this law of nations had evolved in the hands of the courts and the juriconsults to a rather high degree of unity and consistency, the theorists brought to bear upon it the Stoic concept of Nature; and the Law of Nations began to be regarded as an approximation to the Law of Nature. Just what effect this had upon the further evolution of the Roman law is beyond the scope of this discussion to try to discover. It can scarcely be doubted, however, that this conception exerted an influence in the direction of further unification and systematization of the law. It afforded, at any rate, a single fundamental principle, even though it was a rather vague one, around which the whole body of the law could be integrated. This became in turn the point of departure for the development of a tendency to regard the law as a body of general principles, from which one might reason, to an application in a particular case, rather than as a body of separate, specific rules which could be applied categorically in carefully defined types of cases. At all events, that is the direction that the evolution of the bodies of law most directly derived from the Roman law has taken; and it is the general direction of the corresponding school of legal theory or philosophy. The Anglo-American law,

in contrast, has been on the whole a "strict law," a law of specific rules, not one of general principles.¹

It is scarcely necessary to supplement the foregoing discussion by the remark that legal theory or philosophy of law is one phase of social theory, a phase rather closely related, in the nature of the case, to political theory. In fact, the effort has never been made to distinguish sharply between political science and the theory of law. Students specializing in political science in the universities of the United States today study constitutional law and other legal subjects.

The fourth of the significant episodes in the development of social thought during the period that we are considering, and the last to which we shall devote particular attention, consists of St. Augustine's contribution to the literature of social philosophy. St. Augustine, bishop of Hippo in northern Africa, who lived from 353 to 430 A.D., is best known as the earlier of two great theologians of the Church of the West; the other is St. Thomas Aquinas. Having been in his youth a pagan, and having reached the church by way of a transitional interest in Neoplatonism, Augustine brought to his theological and moral speculations a somewhat different attitude and preparation from that which most of his predecessors in the Church had had, and he wrote in a correspondingly more intellectual vein. His *City of God* (*De civitate dei*) contains his principal contributions to social theory, if such they may be called. It is also classified with the utopian writings that comprise one distinctive phase of the literature of social thought. In this work, St. Augustine sets forth a standard of justice and righteousness, the "city of God," and then considers earthly kingdoms as closer or remoter approximations to the standards thus defined. This can scarcely be regarded as a contribution to social science, but it is a significant episode in the development of the actual social thought of the Western world, which followed for about a thousand years the general trend thus inaugurated. The whole story of the development of social thought in the following period is the story of the continuation of the tendencies of which Augustine was the earliest outstanding representative, i.e., the subordination of political and other social questions to religious and ecclesiastical considerations. In the

¹ Cf. Roscoe Pound, *The Spirit of the Common Law*, pp. 17-22, Boston, 1925.

subsequent period, social thought was occupied chiefly with the struggle to liberate itself from theological and ecclesiastical domination.

We may distinguish as a third period within the era we are considering the years between the termination of the original Empire of the West in 476 and the coronation of Charlemagne as emperor of Rome by Pope Leo III in 800 A.D. Although the term is customarily used with a somewhat different reference, we may speak of this period, in the context of the present discussion, as the Dark Age. From the time of Charlemagne, some beginnings of a cultural and intellectual revival in Western Europe may be noticed. This Dark Age was the period of the consolidation and organization of the barbarian power in Western Europe, the Christianizing of these same barbarians through the missionary enterprise of the Church, and the Moslem invasion of the West, culminating at the battle of Tours in 732, when the Franks and their allies under Charles Martel defeated the Mohammedans and put a stop to the expansion of their power west and northward. It was a period of political and economic insecurity and regression, a time when the scholarship and culture inherited from the Greeks through Rome declined to their lowest point and were replaced by a crudely authoritarian ecclesiastical interpretation of human problems. The literature of political or other social thought which appeared during this period and which is worthy of our attention is practically nil. During this time, however, the seeds of the Renaissance were sown, through the instrumentality of the Mohammedan penetration of Western Europe with a more adequate collection, and a more tolerant interpretation, of the works of Aristotle and the other Greek classics.

The fourth period that we shall consider in this connection may be dated from the coronation of Charlemagne at Rome in 800 to the death of Dante in 1321 or later. It is the period of feudalism and of the greatest strength of the Papacy. During this period there took place the perfection of the scholastic culture and philosophy, the life and work of St. Thomas Aquinas, the struggle of the popes with the emperors for supremacy, and the Crusades. So far as our present interests are concerned, the period may be said to close with the so-called Babylonian captivity of the Papacy at Avignon, the Great Schism (1305-

1377), and the Italian Renaissance, of which Dante is sometimes considered an early representative.

In the history of social thought, this period is notable chiefly for two developments, which stand in an antithetical but reciprocal relation to each other: the perfection of the Scholastic philosophy, which included a general theory of government; and the development of the antipapal conception of the independence of civil governments from the Church. Only in a limited sense may the Church Fathers and the Schoolmen be said to have formulated theories of politics or of government. The persistent sociological problem of the one and the many, the individual and society, was met by them with a conception of individuals who were viewed primarily as souls to be saved and brought as near as possible to moral perfection and a corresponding conception of the Church Universal as the one outstanding society, through membership in which individual salvation and regeneration were to be effected. It may also be remarked that, in this view, the unity of the Church was somewhat mystically conceived, as is illustrated, for example, by the theological description of the Church as the Bride of Christ. The tendency to conceive the unity of society mystically is not peculiar to Scholasticism; it is found also in nineteenth century German theories of the state. But when the Church is conceived to be the one significant society in which individuals may be united, it naturally and logically follows that the state must be conceived to be subordinate to the Church; or, in medieval Catholic terminology, the secular power is in the last analysis secondary and subordinate to the spiritual authority; the emperor and princes, to the church, *i.e.*, to the pope. The history of political discussion throughout the Middle Ages is largely the story of discussion and argumentation between the intellectual champions of the pope and those who argued for the pretensions of the emperor and kings.

The two outstanding Schoolmen whose works should be considered as especially representative and important in the development of social thought are St. Thomas Aquinas and Dante Alighieri.¹ We shall also need to consider the work of Pierre

¹ In the discussion of these men I have made very free use of J. P. Lichtenberger's excellent chapter (Chap. V) in *The Development of Social Theory*, New York and London, 1923. Dante was not a schoolman in the strictest sense of the term; *i.e.*, he was not connected with one of the medieval schools or universities as a teacher.

DuBois, a contemporary of Dante, who was in no sense or degree a Schoolman; his writings seem to anticipate the birth of a new spirit in political thought.

In contrast with Dante and with most other medieval writers, St. Thomas Aquinas formulated a fairly systematic and comprehensive body of political theory, including a theory of law, a theory of political origins, and what might be termed a theory of sovereignty. Accepting Aristotle's assertion that man is a political animal but adding to "political" the words "and social," he finds in this proposition a point of departure for his rather complex theory of law. That man is by nature formed for social life and cannot realize his nature outside society is restated by Thomas to mean that society rests on natural law, i.e., on the laws of nature, approximately in the sense in which we now refer to gravitation as a "law of nature." For its development, however, society requires human law, the law imposed by a government. Human law, in turn, is supplemented by divine law, which is given to men by revelation and preserved by the church. St. Thomas also distinguished eternal law from natural law, but this rather abstruse and metaphysical distinction need not concern us here. He evidently makes use of a psychological theory of social and political origins; government and the state are explained by their roots in human nature and not, on the whole, by particular historical facts. In this respect, Thomas is strikingly different from Dante. His conclusions are, first, that governmental authority is natural and proper; and, second, that the church is ultimately superior to the state in all things spiritual and temporal, since natural law and human law as adumbrated by the reason from eternal and divine law are not sufficient to secure human happiness. He states clearly the doctrine of the divine right of kings and emperor but qualifies it by the doctrine of the ultimate supremacy of the church as the custodian and interpreter of divine law.

St. Thomas Aquinas was the principal medieval authority on the papal view of politics and government. His writings may be regarded as the finished exposition of one of two general points of view which ultimately came into conflict. Dante Alighieri (1265-1321), on the other hand, was the outstanding intellectual champion of the party of the emperor in this long and fundamental struggle. His works develop the point of view opposed to that of St. Thomas Aquinas; however, his contribution to the

literature of political theory is not nearly so comprehensive as that of Thomas but is little more than an *ad hoc* formulation of the case for the independence and supremacy of the emperor in matters temporal.

The features of Dante's principal treatise, the *De monarchia*, of interest to a student of the general history of political and social thought, have been set forth in considerable detail by Lichtenberger.¹ For the purposes of the present discussion they may be briefly stated. First, making the assumption that humanity is one and not many and citing the Biblical saying "Every kingdom divided against itself shall be brought to desolation," he argues for one supreme monarch of all mankind, i.e., the Emperor of Rome. Second he reasons from historical and theological considerations that empire was conferred upon the Romans by divine right and that the authority of the Roman imperial government came direct from God and not from the Pope, the "Vicar of God." There are touches of empiricism in his reasoning; he points out the obvious fact that the empire existed before the church and therefore could not have derived its sovereignty from the church. On the other hand, Dante had recourse to arguments that seem to us today little better than appeals to sheer superstition; for example, he contends that divine approval of the Roman Empire was shown by the fact that the Savior was born in its dominion and in the reign of its greatest emperor, Augustus, the founder of the imperial line. As Lichtenberger remarks, it required a great stretch of the imagination on Dante's part to identify the Holy Roman Empire of his day with the empire of Augustus. Granting his premises, the general conclusion of his reasoning is of course obvious: that the power of the emperor is independent of that of the pope.

As an epilogue to this story, we may briefly consider the place of Pierre DuBois in medieval political theory. As we have said, he may properly be regarded as the forerunner of a new epoch in political thought, rather than as one of the later of the medieval writers. The historical setting was changing; the claims of both the emperor and the pope to supreme temporal power were challenged by a new force, the national French monarchy under Philip the Fair. Up to about this time, there had really been no such thing as a national state, of the modern type, in Western

¹ *Op. cit.*, pp. 115-121.

Europe. Between the empire, with its pretensions to universal sovereignty, and the admittedly limited claims of the feudal barons, princes, and "kings," each conceding, in principle if not in practice, some responsibility to emperor or pope or to both, there was no middle ground. But now the French kings had built up an old feudal structure into a sovereign state. Philip the Fair was perhaps the first sovereign who was able to make an unqualified stand against papal interference in the temporal affairs of his kingdom, similar to the resistance to papal authority attempted by a long line of emperors. The courts of law were, nominally at least, the arena of the struggle; however, the case was really tried before the court of public sentiment and opinion. During the preceding period, the courts of the church had gradually assumed jurisdiction over a very wide array of cases, including many types that would seem to us purely secular, for example, cases in which church property was involved in some way. Philip the Fair and his advisors, among them Pierre DuBois, proceeded to take jurisdiction for the royal courts over a good many of these types of cases, notably those involving questions of the exemption of the property of the church or its dignitaries from taxation by the secular power. Pierre DuBois (*ca.* 1255–*ca.* 1322) was a lawyer attached to the service of the king, like a modern crown prosecutor or attorney general. It became his task to try some of these cases in the courts. Naturally, since no monarch can carry through his purposes in entire indifference to the sentiments and beliefs of his subjects, particularly where matters of religion are involved, the practical and legal struggle was accompanied by considerable theoretic and political controversy. DuBois had to make out some sort of rational support for his assertion of jurisdiction for the royal courts in these cases, and, to this end, he wrote several pamphlets, the most famous of which had as nominal subject the conquest of the Holy Land from the Turks (*De recuperatione Terre Sancte*). He supports his contentions with some show of reasoning after the fashion of the Scholastics, as is illustrated by the following passage:

Does not Averôes say that the Arabs suffered many evils because they believed that their laws were to be universally maintained and never modified? Was not all civil and statute law made in order to be right and fitting? For there can hardly be anything in the world which

should be right and fitting in all places, at all seasons, and for all persons. Therefore the laws and statutes of men vary with the varying places, seasons, and persons; and many philosophers have taught that this should be so, because expediency clearly demands it, and the Lord and Master of all sciences, of the Holy Fathers, and of the philosophers, in order that he might teach us to do so without fear, changed many things in the New Testament, which He had ordained in the Old.¹

In its reliance upon persuasive deductive reasoning, in its reference to the authority of "many philosophers," and in its citation of Biblical authority for its claims, this passage conforms to the pattern of medieval scholasticism. In its appeal to considerations of practical expediency, however, it anticipates a new era in political and social thought. Dunning has compared DuBois to Machiavelli, and, as we shall see, Machiavelli was another late medieval or early modern thinker whose distinguishing characteristic was the appeal to expediency and empirical reality. It was, in fact, by turning to considerations of practical expediency that social and political theory made the transition from Scholastic dialectic and appeal to authority to a more scientific and objective method of inquiry. As a matter of fact, in other passages DuBois frankly puts aside all appeal to authority, Biblical or Aristotelian, and reasons in terms of expediency pure and simple. The popes, he says, have usually been old men, lacking in the sort of family and other connections that would enable them to exert effective leadership in temporal affairs. By meddling in matters for which they are not equipped, they have caused great suffering and sent many men to hell.² Temporal power should be vested in the one who is able to exert it; right without might is empty. All this, of course, tended to support the claims of Philip the Fair, who was at the time a powerful and capable monarch, in fact able to ignore the emperor and the pope alike, provided his subjects did not fail him on account of superstitious fears.

With this we come to the close of the first main step in our inquiry, the examination of the development of political theory,

¹ *De recuperatione Terre Sancte*, sec. 48, quoted by Eileen Power in F. J. C. Hearnshaw, ed., *Social and Political Ideas of Some Great Mediaeval Thinkers*, pp. 162-163, London, 1923.

² W. A. Dunning, *Political Theories—Ancient and Mediaeval*—pp. 228-229, New York, 1916.

which was on the whole the earliest form of social theory to take shape, down to the close of the Middle Ages. From about the time we have been considering—the thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries—may be dated, roughly, the beginnings of modern political thought, and of other forms of modern social thought, particularly in the realm of economics. Ancient and medieval thinkers had taken certain steps toward the formation of an independent and systematic body of social theory. At any rate, they had defined government and related topics as a realm of experience in which rational discussion was possible; and they had formulated a number of concepts, some helpful and some misleading, which were to play their role in the social thought of later periods.

CHAPTER IV

OBJECTIVITY IN POLITICAL THEORY

In the beginning of the second chapter of his *Origins of Sociology*, Prof. Albion W. Small remarked that since 1800 social science in Europe has been engaged in an increasingly conscious and cooperative "drive toward objectivity."¹ It may be plausibly argued that Small made this phrase do duty far beyond its apparent meaning; and it is possibly true that some of his students have used it as an incantation with which to cleave their way through all kinds of obscure problems relating to the development of social science. Nevertheless, Small's remark has considerable suggestive value. The social and political theory and historical writing of the Greeks, the Church Fathers, and the Schoolmen were not characterized by much objectivity of treatment of the data of human experience. It can be shown, however, that a drive toward objectivity began in political theory considerably before the nineteenth century; and it is with some of the earlier phases of that transition that we shall be chiefly concerned in the present chapter.

The development of modern social science may be described as a social movement.² It is rarely if ever possible to name and date a particular event which may be accurately designated as the beginning of such a movement; and certainly it is impossible to say that any particular publication marks the beginning of this movement in political theory. For convenience, however, we may think of the writings of Pierre DuBois as one of the manifestations of the movement toward objectivity in political science.³ DuBois made a rather bold attempt to define certain rather fundamental problems in terms of what was practicable;

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 37.

² *I.e.*, using the term "movement" in the sense that is becoming standard in sociology—*i.e.*, in the sense implied in such expressions as "the temperance movement," "the labor movement," and the like. So here we may speak of the modern social science movement.

³ *Supra*, Chap. III.

and this, if it is not quite equivalent to scientific objectivity, is at least a step in that direction when compared with the a priori theological bias which had characterized the work of the schoolmen and their contemporaries. To argue in terms of practicality implies, even if it does not necessarily involve, a disinterested scrutiny of existing circumstances. In fact, it seems possible to discern in the writings of DuBois a step in the direction of that inquiry into the working, or "process," of social happenings which is generally regarded as one of the essential features of twentieth century social science. From the time of DuBois onward, one may find in the history and literature of social thought some indications that the movement of which he was an early representative did not altogether die out.

In the plan of the present work it is necessary to tell the story very briefly. Without attempting to demonstrate any continuity in the early movement, therefore, we may turn to Machiavelli (1469-1527) as the next representative of the drive toward objectivity in political thought. In his best known work, *The Prince* (1513), and to a degree only slightly less in his *Discourses on Livy* (1521) and other writings, we find the viewpoint of Pierre DuBois again, somewhat refined and embodied in more systematic compositions. *The Prince* was obviously written as a manual on the practical arts of statecraft; in other words, it has a remote resemblance to German cameralism, but it is written with much more sophistication and appreciation of underlying problems than can be found in most of the cameralistic writings. Machiavelli's *Discourse on Livy* and his *History of Florence* were written not primarily in the spirit of the historian but rather in the attempt to derive from the data of history a kind of knowledge that will show what can and should be done by the ruler of a state to maintain his power and defend his domain against external and internal dangers.¹ It has become a convention of the history of social thought to refer to Machiavelli in depreciatory terms; he is spoken of as a cynic par excellence. It seems equally valid, however, to think of him as one who, like Du Bois, attacks certain important problems of politics in the spirit of realism, asking what is practicable and, therefore, adopting an attitude that paves the way for an inquiry into poli-

¹ *Discourses on the First Decade of Titus Livius*, trans. by N. H. Thompson, pp. 4-5, London, 1883.

tics as a natural process, one to be described and, so far as may be, understood.

In the popular conception of the history of their time, no two men are represented to hold more antithetical social and political views than Machiavelli and his contemporary Sir Thomas More, author of the famous *Utopia*. Machiavelli's *The Prince* and More's *Utopia* were published only two years apart, in 1513 and 1515, respectively; yet *The Prince* has the form of a practical handbook for rulers, severely utilitarian in spirit and apparently little concerned with religious or moral considerations, except incidentally, or with the depiction of an ideal social order. The *Utopia* is the description of an ideal commonwealth; it is inevitably compared with Plato's *Republic*, St. Augustine's *City of God*, and Campanella's *City of Sol*. Machiavelli seems to anticipate the political science of our own time; while More's *Utopia* is written in the style of the Middle Ages. We must remember, however, that Machiavelli lived and wrote in a land where the Papacy, though corrupt, was taken for granted, where the existence and claims of a Church Universal were not disputed, and where the pressing public problems involved questions of governmental policy and administration. It was to the solution of some of these latter questions that Machiavelli addressed himself. He closed *The Prince* with an appeal to Lorenzo the Magnificent to deliver Italy from the barbarians; and throughout the book it is asserted as a matter of course that a prince should prefer justice, righteousness, and benevolence to their opposites. Taking these desiderata for granted in the main, however, Machiavelli devotes his inquiry primarily to questions concerning ways and means of maintaining authority and a secure political order.

The emphasis in the *Utopia* of Sir Thomas More is quite the reverse, but he wrote with a different situation in view. In his day, England had achieved national unity and security with a fair degree of completeness; the questions that concerned him were those relating to the maintenance of justice, righteousness, and a good life generally within the state. One should remember that More was a faithful Catholic, that he wrote on the eve of the revolt of the English Church from Rome under Henry VIII, and that he ultimately lost his life for his religious convictions. In short, the *Utopia* is no less a practical book, when studied in

the light of the situation in which it was written, than is *The Prince*. It contains an explicit comparison between the ideal commonwealth which the author is imagining and the England of his day. The essential purpose of the comparison, however, is to show how a state may be Christian; while Machiavelli undertook to show how Christians might have an effective government and a stable political order in which to live. It requires some strain on the imagination to conceive of More as a representative of the drive toward objectivity in political theory, and doubtless he is not so representative of that drive as is Machiavelli; yet as one of the political theorists of an age he is not entirely unrepresentative of its tendencies.

Only two years after More wrote his *Utopia*, and four years after Machiavelli wrote *The Prince*, occurred an event of the utmost historical importance, one that exercised considerable direct influence upon the development of political and social thought. It was in 1517 that Martin Luther nailed his famous Ninety-five Theses to the door of the church at Wittenberg and thereby precipitated the Protestant Reformation. The Roman Catholic Church had been under criticism for two or three centuries, and certain heretical sects and subversive movements had taken shape in various parts of the territory over which the Church claimed spiritual jurisdiction, but these sects had not become very large or had not flourished in important parts of the Empire, while the criticisms of the Papacy and the subversive movements within the Church seem to have been, on the whole, conciliatory rather than revolutionary in tendency. None of these things had very important immediate effects. Luther's action, on the other hand, was so challenging, and so prominent, that it proved impossible to crush or to ignore, and, although such was not apparently his original intention, it resulted in the formation of a number of independent ecclesiastical organizations where previously only one Church had existed.

The sixteenth century, accordingly, became a period of ecclesiastical revolution, and men's minds seem to have been correspondingly preoccupied with theological questions—questions of church polity and questions concerning the relation of church and state. It was a period of the redirection of attention within the field of thought which had occupied men's minds during the Middle Ages; also it was a period in the history of the

Western world when religion and topics connected therewith formed the principal matter for discussion among educated men. At all events, there were no very noteworthy publications in the field of political theory between 1517 and 1576, the date of Bodin's *Six Books of a Republic*.¹ The great and persistent problem of the relation of church and state had to be settled more decisively than had been possible up to this time, before other social or political questions could command much attention. However, the development of several religious faiths where only one had been gave the problem of sovereignty a new content: could a personal sovereign compel his subjects to adhere to the church of his choice? In order to answer the question in the negative, it was desirable to find a substitute for the principle of divine right.

In the last quarter of the sixteenth and the beginning of the seventeenth centuries, accordingly, there appeared a number of works on politics which are classified as antimonarchic.² These writings were connected in a quite definite way with the events of the Protestant Reformation; at least they were rooted, in part, in the fact that a number of the states of Western Europe had been divided by the Reformation into Catholic and Protestant parties, or factions, and were correspondingly involved in civil war or at any rate in a considerable degree of internal turmoil. Such circumstances, as Dunning points out, were likely to bring forth a body of speculative and controversial writings dealing with the issues involved. In this case the controversy took the form, eventually, of an argument concerning the nature and limitations of monarchical power and the nature and location of sovereignty in a state. The doctrine that the authority of a monarch is not absolute but is relative to the rights of his subjects was not an absolutely new one at this time, but it had not previously been formulated so explicitly or emphatically or with so much relevance to existing conditions. At all events there

¹ In F. J. C. Hearnshaw, ed., *Social and Political Ideas of Some Great Thinkers of the Renaissance and the Reformation*, [New York and London, n. d. (about 1924)], there are chapters on Erasmus, Luther, and Calvin, but the authors of these chapters are quite unanimous in their opinion that none of these great thinkers can be considered to have concerned himself with social or political questions except incidentally.

² William A. Dunning, *Political Theories: From Luther to Montesquieu*, Chap. II, New York, 1905.

appeared between 1573 and 1610, in France, Scotland, the Netherlands, and Spain, a notable series of distinctly antimonarchical publications, in several of which the contentions advanced were based upon searching theoretic analyses of the nature of the state, government, and sovereignty. One of the first of these, but not the most important, was *Franco-Gallia*, by Francis Hotman, published in 1573. It was followed by the anonymous *Vindiciae contra tyrannos* (1579); *On the Sovereign Power among the Scots* (1579), by George Buchanan; *De rege et regis institutionae* (1599), by Juan de Mariana; and *Systematic Politics, Confirmed by Examples from Sacred and Profane History* (1610), by Johannes Althusius.

It is not within the scope of this work to make an extensive analysis of these writings.¹ We should notice, however, that in them we find clearly expressed the theory of the social contract, which is commonly credited to Hobbes and Rousseau who wrote some years later. It is interesting to discover that several of these earlier writers based the social contract theory definitely upon the Old Testament precedent of the covenant entered into between Yahweh and the Hebrews. From the contract theory the antimonarchists drew the inference that the sovereignty of a king is not absolute but limited—limited ultimately by the terms of an express or implied contract between him or his predecessors and the people as represented by the magistrates or other duly constituted officials but limited more immediately by the basic law of the land. This theory that monarchical sovereignty is limited by law was supported by reference to the Roman doctrine of natural law or law of nature.

It was Jean Bodin (1530–1596), rather than the antimonarchists, who made the most lasting impression on political theory from the period of the Reformation. His *Six Books of a Republic* (1576) is regarded as one of the classics of early modern political thought.² It is written in the style of a disinterested scientific treatise, rather than as a practical manual or handbook, like *The Prince*, or a semiethical critique of contemporary political institutions, like More's *Utopia*. Bodin has been cited by his

¹ Cf. Dunning, *loc. cit.*

² English translation by Richard Knolles, London, 1606, entitled *The Six Books of a Commonweale*. See also R. M. MacIver's article on Bodin in *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*, vol. 2.

tory of social thought as a pioneer in the use of a theory of the physical and geographic conditioning of social phenomena. His discussion of these factors, however, is relatively matter of fact; he does not emphasize them so much as Montesquieu did later. He dealt with the problem of sovereignty, stressing the need for a strong sovereign power rather than its qualifications, as the antimonarchists had done. In his fourth book, which may be taken as an example of his method and point of view, Bodin discussed at length the rise, decline, and other changes of commonwealths, together with some of the typical circumstances that give rise to changes in the fortunes of a state and the wisdom or unwisdom of certain governmental policies. The general pattern of his reasoning here, as in the other "books" of the treatise, is deductive, but the main line of thought is amplified with numerous illustrations from history. These historical illustrations, chosen to support the generalizations, are frequently of doubtful authenticity; however, that fault is excusable when we take into account the general status of historiography at the time. Bodin's generalizations are so complex and so carefully qualified that they afford ground for the belief that they were actually built up in large part by induction from concrete materials. The deductive form may have been a mere convenience of presentation and is, after all, not far different from the style of many more recent treatises. The facts justify us in naming Bodin as the earliest of a series of important modern writers on political theory, among whom we may include Hobbes, Locke, Vico, and Montesquieu. Vico and Montesquieu stand somewhat more directly in the line of descent which runs from Bodin than do Hobbes and Locke, for the latter had English conditions in mind and wrote with reference primarily to English political problems.

If we are to maintain a chronological order in this inquiry, the writer to whom we ought to turn our attention briefly next is Richard Hooker (1554-1600), author of *Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity*. Hooker belongs, in the main, to a different tradition from that of Hobbes and Locke; he represents the continued influence of religious conditions on political thought or, more accurately, the tendency of ecclesiastical developments to give rise to a special type of political theory. It is what might be termed "ecclesiastical politics" and church government, as well

as the problem of church and state, with which Hooker is concerned.¹ The *Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity* may be described as an early example of an otherwise quite recent tendency in political theory, viz., the development of the idea that "politics" and government are not phenomena connected exclusively with the activities of states but are found also in other realms of social life. Today it is commonplace to speak of "church politics," "lodge politics," "office politics," and the like, meaning the struggles and maneuvers for personal or group advantage that take place inside churches, lodges, business offices, etc. It is the phase of political science involved in the study of these things that is faintly anticipated by Hooker.

Still following the chronological order, we may notice briefly at this point the work of Thomas Campanella (1568–1639), an Italian friar of the Dominican order, author of several books having some bearing on political topics. His best known work, *The City of Sol*, was published in 1623. Aside from the interest that we may have in this book as a well known example of early modern utopian literature, Campanella concerns us chiefly as a late exponent of the medieval ideas and attitudes relative to political problems. *The City of Sol* is generally interpreted as an argument for the complete and absolute supremacy of the Pope in matters spiritual and temporal. The influence of Plato seems to be visible in the scheme for thoroughgoing communism of family and property, but in the division of the population of Campanella's ideal state into three classes with distinct functions, the middle class has been assigned to industry rather than to war.

The next important contribution to political theory to appear after Bodin's *Six Books of a Republic* was the *De jure belli ac pacis* of Hugo Grotius (Huigh De Groot, 1583–1645), published in 1625 and subsequently revised by the author during his lifetime. This book, the influence of which has been great, belongs primarily in the history of international law. It was the first systematic modern treatise in this field and, as such, may be said to mark the beginning of the proliferation of political theory into special fields of inquiry. Since, however, international law is a highly technical subject, it is not so much the foundations that Grotius laid in this specialized field of inquiry that should interest

¹ See the article on Hooker by Norman Sykes in *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*, vol. 7.

us as it is his contribution to the systematization of general and fundamental political theory. In this respect, he stands in direct line of sequence from the antimonarchical writers, although he takes a point of view directly opposed to theirs. It was they who were the first to outline the field of political science more or less as it is conceived today, although, to be sure, their ideas were crude, distorted by the effort to make out a case against absolute monarchy and affected by the medieval tendency to theological and authoritarian reasoning. The phase of the development of political theory that comes into prominence with the antimonarchists and Grotius may be termed the systematic and analytical phase. To reiterate what we have noted elsewhere, there is a sense in which it is true that a science consists of a body of concepts, so defined as to fall into a more or less logical order and system, by means of which the phenomena of some general realm can be brought under a single consistent point of view and made intelligible. It might be said that a science is about as well developed, at a time and place, as is its conceptual system. The development of the social-contract theory, the definition of sovereignty, and the discussion of the location of sovereignty by Grotius and contemporaries are the earliest clear manifestations of the evolution of such a conceptual system for the study of politics beyond the point where Aristotle left it.

Grotius' main interest was directed toward the formulation of a system of international law, particularly an international law of war. His treatment of topics of general political theory in *De jure belli ac pacis* is purely subsidiary to that end. Since he was a man of considerable academic training and logical mind, however, he felt constrained to develop a considerable body of general political theory as a foundation and background for his system of international law. Such a theory he elaborated in two main directions: in the reiteration and application of the Roman "law-of-nature" and "law-of-nations" concepts; and in the definition of sovereignty and its location as a basis for determining who may lawfully make war. It is in this discussion of the nature and location of sovereignty, particularly, that Grotius set a precedent for the subsequent development of formal political and legal theory. For more than two hundred fifty years after Grotius, the subject of sovereignty was a major preoccupation of political theorists. He also set a precedent by subordinating the

discussion of problems in general political theory to his interest in international law. His work became the starting point for the formation of a school of writers who treated international law, or the law of nations, as the central theme of political inquiry and made all other problems quite secondary in importance. As recently as the first decade of our own century, "theory of the state" was an important academic subject; and Grotius' *De jure belli ac pacis* was regarded as the first great modern classic of the subject.

CHAPTER V

POLITICAL THEORY FROM HOBBS TO PAINE¹

In the seventeenth century, political theory flourished in Western Europe as it had not in any previous period. The movement continued and may be said to have reached a climax in the eighteenth century, but since the early part of the nineteenth, persons interested in fundamental questions of politics and government have lapsed into a somewhat decadent attitude of simply rehearsing and discussing the ideas formulated in the eighteenth century. If this is true, it is probably due in part to the fact that, by the nineteenth century, economic science had become rather completely differentiated from political theory, and the former, owing to the importance of commercial and industrial change during these recent times, engrossed most of the attention that might otherwise have been devoted to the study and discussion of political problems. Indeed, it might almost be said that political economy came to be regarded in the United States and in England from early in the nineteenth century as an adequate substitute for political science. At all events, beginning with Grotius, we find in the annals of political and social thought for the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries a series of great political thinkers whose reputation has been equaled by that of few men who have lived and written since that time.

Of the more outstanding of these men, the next to come into prominence after Grotius was Thomas Hobbes (1588-1675), whose most famous political treatise, *The Leviathan*, was first published in 1651. Like some of his more immediate predeces-

¹ The period covered by this chapter extends beyond the date 1700, indicated in the title of Part II as the close of the era under discussion. The choice of this date as a main dividing line between periods is intended to emphasize the fact that, beginning in the eighteenth century, social *theory* began to assume the form of social *science*. On the other hand, the political theorists treated in this chapter, except for Montesquieu, can scarcely be regarded as political scientists.

sors, he does not seem to be so objective in his political theory as Machiavelli, to whom he is sometimes compared. His contribution to the development of the science, like that of Grotius, consists chiefly in systematization and fundamental analysis. The nature of Hobbes's work is best understood when considered in the light of a brief account of his life. The son of an English clergyman, he was educated at Oxford and acted for a time as secretary to Francis Bacon. During the greater part of his adult life he was tutor and companion to the earls of Devonshire, of the famous Cavendish family, a rather characteristic occupation, at the time, for an educated man of little or no personal fortune. Hobbes prided himself on not having devoted much of his time, in his mature years, to reading, saying that if he had read as many books as other men, he would be as ignorant as they. For a time, he was tutor to the Prince of Wales who became Charles II. Thus he was classified by the Puritans with the Stuart party. When the Stuarts were ousted from the throne by the civil war which resulted in the establishment of the Commonwealth, he became a political refugee in France, where he lived for eleven years. Eventually he became embroiled with the French royalist party, because in *The Leviathan*, which had been published meanwhile, he did not endorse the doctrine of the divine right of kings. He then returned to England and gained the favor of Cromwell, who had by that time become Lord Protector of England. After the Stuart Restoration, he received a pension from Charles II but lived under constant criticism from adherents of the Stuarts during the remainder of his life, because his doctrines tended to lend support to Cromwell when the latter was in power. Thus Hobbes's personal role in public affairs was an unhappy one from the time of the publication of *The Leviathan* onward, for in this work he held that any existing effective government deserved the loyalty and obedience of its citizens. He was indicted by the Puritans as a royalist and adherent of the Stuarts; by the French royalists as a half-hearted monarchist; and, eventually, by the friends of the restored Stuart dynasty for his support of Cromwell.

Hobbes's principal works are four: *De corpore*, a physiological treatise; *De anima*, which is concerned with psychology; *De cive*; and *Leviathan*. Although the last is by far the best known, a logical line of reasoning runs through the four works in the order

mentioned.¹ In the *De anima* and again, more briefly, in the *Leviathan*, Hobbes laid down a mechanistic psychological theory. Behavior, he held, is determined by the impact of environmental forces upon a human nature which consists only of simple traits, especially pleasure, pain, and the desire for power. Like Rousseau and other "contract theorists" of the general period, he founds his political theory upon a hypothetical state of nature in which, since men are moved solely by impulse and self-interest, every man's hand is against every other (*homo homini lupus est*). Nevertheless, through their reason, men are led to escape from this brutish state of nature by means of a contract or compact. According to the terms of this contract, they agree to submit to an authority competent to maintain order and security among them. Such a contract may establish any one of various types of government, but Hobbes expresses a definite preference for monarchy as the purest and best form. He holds that the social contract, once made, is irrevocable; children born into the social order resting upon it accept its terms by accepting the benefits of the order and security that it provides. There is no right of rebellion, and a personal monarch does not reign under law but absolutely. However, sovereignty endures only so long as the existing legal sovereign is a *de facto* sovereign, able to maintain order and to defend the state against external aggression. In other words, a *de facto* sovereign is for Hobbes a *de jure* sovereign in the only practical sense and as such is entitled to the allegiance of citizens. Obviously this is an ingenious doctrine, and, though it has been widely criticized, it seems to be a somewhat realistic and illuminating interpretation of government, suggesting the thesis that the essential function of government and politics is the maintenance of order and security of life and property. It seems to imply also that government, or the state, is only one among a number of possible institutional phases of human society, each existing to perform some function. However, Hobbes did not recognize this implication of his theory.

Hobbes's *Leviathan* shares with Grotius' *De jure belli ac pacis*, and later publications of other writers whom we shall consider, the reputation of a first-rank classic of modern political thought;

¹ See G. E. G. Catlin, article on Hobbes in *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*, vol. 7. This article has been used to a great extent for the preparation of the present account.

it is cited and its propositions are discussed by practically every European and American writer on general political and social theory since Hobbes's day. In method, or at least in manner of presentation, it is formal and deductive. Hobbes is said to have read Euclid for the first time at the age of forty and to have been greatly impressed by the logical coherence of the work. The influence of Euclidean geometry is clearly reflected in the organization of his argument in the *Leviathan*.

Hobbes may be thought of as one of three writers of outstanding reputation who set forth the contract theory of governmental origins with characteristic variations, the others being John Locke and Jean Jacques Rousseau. Since Locke (1632-1704), was a younger contemporary of Hobbes, and, as an Englishman, had the same point of view, the latter had a considerable influence on him. On the other hand, the whole episode of the interregnum, the Stuart Restoration, and the Revolution of 1688 transpired after Hobbes wrote the *Leviathan* and before Locke wrote his *On Civil Government* in 1690, and accordingly the latter work differs from the *Leviathan* in important respects.¹ Locke based his theory of the social contract upon somewhat different premises from those adopted by Hobbes; specifically, he laid down a different account of the state of nature. It may be questioned whether, in the thinking of both men, the conclusions were not actually antecedent to the premises. The conception of the state of nature—which is purely conjectural, after all—was perhaps evolved in each case to afford logical support for the author's opinion concerning the desirable type of government and the limitations of sovereignty.

Where Hobbes represented the state of nature as one of universal strife, Locke regarded it as one of freedom and equality, in which men respect one another's rights under the law of nature, which is known to them through their reason. He concluded, however, that owing to the corruption of human nature, society is unstable, property is insecure in the state of nature, and men form the civil state by a compact, for the sake of the advantages to be derived therefrom. According to Locke, the contract by which government is instituted is limited and revocable; men do not relinquish entirely their natural rights. Evidently this is the conclusion that he wished to reach and unconsciously

¹ J. P. Lichtenberger, *Development of Social Theory*, p. 183.

manipulated his premises to achieve. Locke's theory of the social contract is in effect a rationalization of constitutional and limited monarchy such as had been established at the accession of William and Mary in the revolution of 1688.

We may reserve our consideration of the general significance of the social-contract theory until we have reviewed Rousseau's version of it. Let us note, however, that Locke's version had a much greater direct influence upon the subsequent development of political theory, particularly in England and the United States, than did that of Hobbes. It was in harmony with the trend of actual political evolution, the movement toward limited monarchy, and, eventually, the republican form of government. There is reason to believe that the fathers of the American Constitution were widely familiar with the political ideas of Locke and were, in many cases, greatly impressed by them.

By following the chronological order, we should examine next the contribution of Vico (1688-1744), whose *La scienza nuova* appeared in 1725 and seems to have influenced Montesquieu considerably. But it is possible to classify Vico with the political theorists, with the philosophers of history, or with the forerunners of the science of sociology. For present purposes we shall place him in the last mentioned category and relegate the detailed consideration of his work to another chapter.

Possibly the most outstanding in long-run prestige and influence of all modern political theorists is Montesquieu. Charles de Secondat, Baron de la Brède et de Montesquieu, was born in 1689 of noble lineage, on the family estate in Gascony near Bordeaux. He was educated in a small French-Catholic college and then studied law privately. Through inheritance and by his marriage to a wealthy woman, he became one of the richest men of the region. At the age of twenty-six, in 1714, he became the councilor and, at the death of his uncle a year later, the hereditary president of the Parliament of Guienne, which sat at Bordeaux. Because he had an ambition to be elected to the Académie française and was ineligible in that his residence was not in Paris, he sold his presidency of the Parliament at Bordeaux and established himself at Paris. There he spent the latter part of his life, except for extensive travels in foreign countries to gather material for his great works, which include the *Persian Letters* (1721) and *Considerations upon the Causes of the Grandeur*

and Decadence of the Romans (1734). His reputation rests chiefly, however, on *The Spirit of the Laws*, published in 1746, which is a comprehensive treatise on political and social theory. He died in Paris in 1755 at the age of sixty-six.

The Spirit of the Laws is an original and creative work. This is not so apparent in its details as it is in the synthesis which it effects of a wide range of ideas that had been adumbrated, and in some cases explicitly formulated, by previous writers. Commentators agree that the influence of many predecessors can be detected in *The Spirit of the Laws*; the author evidently drew material, directly or indirectly, from Locke, Vico, Bodin, and others. In the combination of breadth of scope with vigor and clarity of presentation, and in the fresh light in which he placed many of the topics that he treated, Montesquieu is equaled by no political theorist who wrote before his time and by few of his successors down to the present. Few of his conclusions are accepted today without qualifications, for they have been modified by the thought and investigation of many capable men who have worked on political problems since his time and by the logic of history. In view of the nature and limitations of the data with which he had to work, however, the achievements of Montesquieu are remarkable. As a representative of what we have termed the "drive toward objectivity," he may be ranked with DuBois, Machiavelli, Bodin, and Vico; and in general merit *The Spirit of the Laws* perhaps surpasses any of their works. Certainly it has had a greater direct influence.

The space limits of the present volume prevent an extended summary of *The Spirit of the Laws*; the reader is referred to the original, which is not unreadable on the whole, or to Lichtenberger's excellent summary.¹ Nevertheless, a few of the most important features of the treatise may be briefly described. The idea that Montesquieu intended to express by his title "spirit of the laws" is rather novel and suggestive. The implication is that every nation, or people, has at a time a characteristic "spirit," due to their government and other institutions, customs, manners, occupations, wealth, numbers, social structure, and the climate and resources of their country. He is emphatic in his opinion that the type of government and laws that are good for one people are not necessarily best for another. Each country

¹ *Op. cit.*, pp. 215-228.

has a distinctive spirit, and its laws should embody that spirit. The book is frequently cited for its emphasis of climatic influences, in which the influence of Bodin on Montesquieu is believed to be apparent. Little that Montesquieu had to say concerning these factors is accepted by the best authorities today, however, owing to the limitations imposed on his interpretation by the existing state of scientific knowledge of psychology and physiology. He displayed a decided preference for the monarchical form of government, which he distinguished carefully from "despotism." Probably in this he was trying to show how the French monarchy might be saved and reformed at the same time, *i.e.*, by becoming less despotic. In any case, he scarcely conceived the possibility of extending any appreciable political powers to the masses of the people. He elaborated a penetrating and ironical critique of slavery, parts of which are to this day of suggestive value as a commentary on race relations.

The best known and perhaps the most influential of Montesquieu's ideas is his theory of "checks and balances." This theory apparently served to some extent as a guide to the formation of the Constitution of the United States. It was formulated primarily as an interpretation of the government of England, and, as such, it is, in the well-nigh unanimous opinion of present-day political scientists, erroneous. The strength and moderation of the government of England probably lie in its Cabinet system, *i.e.*, in the principle of ministerial responsibility, rather than in the division of powers; in fact, the English government is not in reality one of checks and balances but rather one of strongly unitary character. Thus, it turns out that Montesquieu's most distinctive contribution to later political thought was probably an unfortunate one. Nevertheless, this fact does not detract from the reputation that he deservedly enjoys for the advance that he made upon the political theory of his times.

Because of the fame that attaches to his name, though in some circles it is an ill fame, passing mention should be made at this point of François Marie Arouet de Voltaire (1694-1778). He cannot be classed strictly among the political theorists, for he was primarily a skillful and spirited pamphleteer. By his writings he did much to popularize the ideas originated by other writers concerning the defects and abuses of existing political institutions and the possibilities of a greater responsiveness of

government to the needs of the people. In these days, when the press and its relation to public opinion and politics are recognized as topics for research by political scientists, he deserves to be remembered for his pioneer battles for liberty of publication.

Jean Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778) shares with Montesquieu the distinction of a wide and persistent reputation as a great political theorist of modern times, but, it is probably safe to assert, Rousseau was by no means the equal of Montesquieu in ability or achievements. He was the last and best known of the great social-contract theorists of the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries, whose essential point of view has vitally affected what might be termed the "official," or conventional, political philosophy of the Western world. The notion that governmental authority rests upon, and is sanctioned by, an express or implied contract to which all citizens are parties serves in effect today as the standard rationalization of law enforcement and particularly of the enactment and enforcement of laws that receive considerable criticism in terms of "freedom," "personal liberty," and the like. To all those who are inclined to deplore harsh treatment of political dissenters, the stock rejoinder is, "If they don't like our government, let 'em go elsewhere," the clear implication being that by remaining in this country one subscribes to the terms of a contract among the stipulations of which are that no one shall criticize existing laws, and particularly that no one shall criticize the existing government or the main principles on which its laws are supposed to be based.

Rousseau's formulation of the social-contract theory is more libertarian, or "democratic," than that of Hobbes, Locke, or any of the antimonarchic writers of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. His general ideal of good government might not unreasonably be referred to as anarchistic. His attitude is strikingly indicated by the opening sentence of his *Social Contract*, "Man is born free, but everywhere he is in chains." This has a flavor that suggests the Communist Manifesto of Marx and Engels, rather than the Declaration of Independence. In part, of course, this difference between the doctrines of Rousseau and those of his predecessors can be interpreted as the result of a natural progression, or evolution, from one contract theorist or critic of monarchy and absolutism to the next. In part.

however, Rousseau's theories need interpretation in the light of what is known about his personal history and characteristics.

Biographies of Rousseau have been written by a number of people; he told the story himself, with significant omissions, in his *Confessions*. Without reviewing it in detail here, we may note that it is obviously the story of a very eccentric and even psychopathic person. Pursuing a decidedly indolent mode of life except for bursts of energetic literary effort; sustaining distinctly neurotic relations with a number of people; choosing a woman of low social status and mentality as paramour and eventually as wife; abandoning their children successively to the care of an orphan's home: Rousseau had a personal career that few would admire or care to emulate. Nevertheless, he left the world several books in which considerable talent of a sort is displayed; the most important are his *Social Contract* and *Émile*, both of which were first published in 1762. *Émile*, which is usually classified as a contribution to the philosophy of education rather than to general political or social theory, sheds some light on the author's conception of "nature" and the "state of nature." It is the story of a young man, Émile, and, more briefly, of a young woman, Sophie, who have been reared in the manner that Rousseau presumably conceived as ideal, i.e., as much isolated as possible from the corrupting influences of civilization. The implied conclusion is that under such circumstances but with simple, wise guidance and counsel, young people would develop almost ideal personalities.

Critics agree, on the whole, that Rousseau's *Social Contract*, supplemented by his other writings, sets forth a body of political theory which combines in rather disconcerting fashion some very suggestive and more or less original political ideas with a great deal of loose and specious reasoning. Dunning's severe criticisms of this reasoning,¹ however, seem to the writer to be unduly extreme in some respects. In keeping with the plan of the present volume, only two or three important features of the theory set forth in the *Social Contract* will be mentioned here. The most important and fundamental of all of Rousseau's contributions to social and political theory is his concept of the general will (*volonté générale*), which he takes pains to distinguish carefully

¹ *Political Theories*, vol. III, Rousseau to Spencer, Chap. I, *passim*, New York, 1920.

from the mere will of all (*volonté de tous*). This, which was a relatively original idea when Rousseau expressed it, has become a commonplace of sociological theory since then, although the implications of the general-will concept are not accepted as valid or realistic by all reputable social theorists. A similar concept is fundamental in the works of Émile Durkheim and his followers. The essential point that Rousseau sought to express by this terminology was that, by a social contract or, as later writers would express it, by the formation of a social consensus, a number of persons form one group, or society, characterized, in some measure, by community of purpose—a group purpose that can be distinguished from the individual purposes of any of them. At least, it is held that a common purpose may be different from what the purposes of the individual members of the group would be if they did not share in the consensus, which is at the same time a process of interaction and a substantive fact. Rousseau's theories of sovereignty and government and his concept of law (*loi*, rather than *droit*) are closely related to this concept of the general will. He was perhaps the earliest writer to assert with no apparent reservations the doctrine of popular sovereignty, continuous and unqualified; nevertheless, it may be questioned whether in ascribing sovereignty to the total body of the citizens of a state, Rousseau did not have in mind unexpressed limitations upon citizenship. It is rather obvious from *Émile* that he would not approve of woman suffrage; and he probably shared with most of the people of his day who had some pretensions to gentility the assumption that the masses were unfit for citizenship. At any rate, he expressly holds that sovereignty properly resides in the citizens and that by subscribing to the social contract they renounce none of their sovereignty, which they can assert at any time and which, in an ideal government, they should assert through assemblies of all citizens to be held at intervals, independently of the call or authority of the regular government, in which they should express themselves on at least two questions: (1) whether or not the existing general form of government should be continued and (2) whether or not it should continue to be entrusted to the same officials who have been administering it hitherto. He also contends that only the sovereign, *i.e.*, the total body of citizens, can make law. Evidently, in the government that Rousseau would regard as ideal, the scope of law in the

ordinary Anglo-American sense would be rather restricted, and the scope of "administration" would be correspondingly wide, a principle that, incidentally, is applied today on the whole in the government of France as contrasted with that of England or the United States. As Dunning aptly remarks, in Rousseau's treatment of the functions that are to be reserved to the assembly of citizens are foreshadowed the two principles that have been incorporated in the constitutions of many states since his day, *viz.*, the approval of the fundamental law, frame of government, or "constitution," by vote of the people; and the popular election of the principal officers of government. Indeed, in his suggestions for the practical improvement of government, Rousseau displays a great deal of insight and ingenuity or at least a striking anticipation of some of the changes that were actually to take place.

To what extent Comte was influenced by Rousseau's concept of the general will, in the latter's more adequate and extended treatment of the problem of society and the individual, it is impossible to say. It seems significant, however, that most of the great pioneers in this particular line of social thought—Comte, Tarde, and Durkheim being prominent among them—were French like Rousseau and therefore were presumably more familiar with his writings than English or German writers would be.

The drive toward objectivity in political thought is of course not complete at the time when these words are written; in a sense, we may never expect it to become complete. However, it is the purpose of the opening chapters of this volume to lay a foundation for the study of modern sociology primarily, rather than to present in detail and in proper proportion the stories of all the social sciences down to the present time. For our purpose, we need not concern ourselves greatly with the history of political theory beyond the early part of the nineteenth century. A few incidents of that history will be mentioned in later chapters. In concluding the present account, we may turn our attention to one more writer, whose contributions to political thought symbolize very well a transition that was taking place in political affairs during the first part of the nineteenth century and one that was, naturally, reflected in the literature of the period. The latter part of the eighteenth and the early part of the nineteenth centuries constituted an age of revolution in

the western world, followed, in the latter part of the nineteenth and the opening years of our own century, by an era of comparative stability.¹

Thomas Paine (1737–1809) will serve to represent, for our purposes, the political theory of this revolutionary era. Although he was, like Voltaire, a pamphleteer rather than a writer of systematic treatises on political theory, and although he resembled Voltaire further in that he acquired during his own time and subsequently the reputation of an atheist and a person of subversive tendencies generally, Paine was a man of well-developed and coherent political ideas. His two most famous publications, *Common Sense* (January, 1776) and *The Rights of Man* (two parts, 1791–1792), set forth a well-organized body of political theory.² The former of these was written with particular reference to the conditions existing in the American colonies of Great Britain just before the American Revolution and influenced the leaders of that revolution; while *The Rights of Man* played a similar role in the French Revolution.

In these works, the following ideas are central: Paine makes an express distinction between “society” and the state; he treats the former as the natural product or growth which results from the pressure of human wants, while he regards the latter as a negative arrangement, developed for the restraint of the vices of humanity. In other words, Paine, like Rousseau, was an “individualist,” or libertarian, in his attitude toward government, inclined to regard that government as best which governs least. He developed a definite argument for representative government, which was one of the earliest clear formulations of this idea. He regarded a formal written, i.e., enacted, constitution as the only real one and denied that England had any constitution. Such a written constitution he defended as an essential of good government. He criticized the logic of the Constitution of the United States and therefore by implication the political theory of Montesquieu, in one respect; Paine found

¹ Cf. F. J. C. Hearnshaw, ed., *The Social and Political Ideas of Some Great Thinkers of the Revolutionary Era*, London, n. d.

² W. A. Dunning, *Political Theories*, vol. III, *From Rousseau to Spencer*, pp. 110 ff. See also Ernest Barker, article on Paine in *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*, vol. 11. In the brief summary of Paine's ideas which follows, I have relied chiefly on Dunning's treatment of them.

only two kinds of power, instead of three, inherent in the nature of government; these were the making and the executing of laws. In other words, the judiciary, in his view, is simply one aspect of the executive power and function. It remained for later writers to point out that in a government like that of England or the United States the judiciary shares the legislative power. While he advocates a formally adopted written constitution, Paine admires especially in the Constitution of the United States its provision for its own amendment. He distinguishes between law and those legislative transactions, really of a business or executive character, that do not in fact have the character of law. Today this distinction is regarded by political scientists as obvious; Paine, however, was one of the first to formulate it clearly.

PART III
SOCIAL SCIENCE IN EUROPE, 1700-1914

CHAPTER VI

THE DIFFERENTIATION OF ECONOMIC FROM POLITICAL THEORY¹

For the most part, early social theory was confined, for its subject matter, to what we now regard as the special province of political theory or political science. It is true that Aristotle composed a book which is sometimes designated as "Economics," though it seems doubtful whether he gave it that title; and it is also true that there are, in the *Politics*, a few scattered passages relating to topics that we now conceive as the province of the economist. On the other hand, it is quite certain that Aristotle regarded his so-called "Economics" as a work in the field of "practical wisdom" and not a contribution to science at all; and it was in this spirit that economic questions were dealt with, almost exclusively, for two thousand years. When what we now think of as the topics and problems of economics first received some separate, systematic, and reflective attention, they were thought of as special problems of politics and government, a conception reflected in the name that the new science presently came to have—"political economy." The same point of view is indicated by the title of Adam Smith's great book *The Wealth of Nations*.

In short, before men could conceive of a science of wealth in the abstract, before they could grasp the idea of economic science as something different and distinct from political science on the one hand and common-sense principles of private enterprise on the other, it was necessary for certain developments to take place. Of these the most fundamental was the mobilization

¹ Secondary literature dealing with the history of economics is abundant. Books dealing with the subject in much greater detail than is here attempted can be found in any good-sized general library; hence, no list of them is offered. See particularly, however, for a concise up-to-date treatment, the articles on "Economics" and "Economic History," in *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*, vol. 5.

of wealth. Up to the period that we call "late medieval" or "early modern," wealth was scarcely susceptible of being amassed, without limit, in the hands of private citizens, of being transferred freely from one man to another, from one country to another, or from the members of one social class to those of another. As late as the fifteenth century, the principal form of wealth known to human experience was land; and land was associated in a fundamental and indisputable way with the facts of sovereignty and government. In fact, during the feudal period, governmental authority was to a large extent derived from the ownership of land; to own or hold in feudal tenure an extensive tract gave one virtually sovereign authority over the people who lived there. During the thirteenth century, however, there was a considerable increase of commerce in Western Europe and, later, a considerable development of manufacturing. Within a relatively short space of time, it came about that among the people of wealth were included not only the great landowners but also the prosperous merchants. Wealth had assumed a mobile form; it could pass freely from one person to another, and, what was more disconcerting to begin with, it could flow freely from one state across the boundaries of another. Circumstances were arising that would make it possible to study the attributes of wealth and the processes of its production, distribution, and valuation in abstraction from the interests and activities of states.

Before this could happen effectively, however, something else had to happen: the concept of science must be more clearly defined than it had been heretofore. It is generally agreed, today, that social science presents greater difficulties to the student than do the physical and biological sciences; just why this is we need not stop to inquire, but it seems to be true, in the main, that the development of social science has followed that of the other sciences and has taken its methods and point of view from them, perhaps with rather unfortunate results in some respects. However, the development of physical and biological science, as science in the modern sense, has been of recent date. Although Aristotle is often referred to as a pioneer natural scientist, he can scarcely be said to have arrived at the idea of science in the modern sense; still less did he develop a rigorous method for the pursuit of any kind of science. In his view, a

science was simply a division of fundamental human knowledge. Little or no advance was made upon the achievements of Aristotle in this respect for fifteen hundred years after his death. In the thirteenth century A.D., however, there began to take shape, in scholastic circles, a new movement, or tendency of thought, called "nominalism" which was prophetic and perhaps causative of some of the features of the development of modern scientific thought. Nominalism was a theory of knowledge or metaphysical doctrine, developed by some of the Schoolmen on the foundation of the supposed teachings of Aristotle and in contrast to the Platonic idealism, which was then called "realism." By the medieval realists it was contended that the only true realities of this world are those represented by our abstract and general concepts, the "ideas" of Plato. By the nominalists, on the other hand, it was asserted that the particulars of immediate experience are the true realities; general ideas or conceptual terms are only names—*nomina*. The important thing about nominalism, for our purposes, is that it afforded a logical reason for the shift of attention, on the part of scholars and intellectuals, from general ideas which were in fact little more than the time-honored traditional beliefs of Western Christianity and culture to the particulars of sense experience and observation. Among the prominent nominalists of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries were several men who are also known to us as forerunners of modern science. Possibly the most important of these, conspicuous, at any rate, for the influence that he exerted on later thought and the prestige that came to be attached to his name, was Roger Bacon (*ca.* 1214–1294), who was interested in the possibilities of something that resembled experimental science and who, in this respect, anticipated some of the ideas of his better known successor and namesake Francis Bacon.

Beginning approximately in the thirteenth century, then, there developed in Western Europe a body of ideas approaching more and more closely to the character of science in the modern sense, as contrasted with Aristotle's less discriminating conception. When this development had reached a sufficient stage of advancement, it was natural, and probably inevitable, that it should, by a sort of cultural contagion, exercise an influence on social thought. For some time, however, social thought lagged behind physical and biological science, especially the former; for

since it was concerned with human beings and their behavior, it was felt to fall within the realm of religion and morality, rather than that of natural philosophy. What are cited as the "economic" writings of the Church Fathers and the Schoolmen are in fact, with certain exceptions, ethical discussions concerning just price, a fair wage, the moral right to receive interest for money loaned, and the like. Only at a comparatively late date did it become possible to discuss and inquire into topics of political and social import with the same sort of disinterested objectivity that had been achieved in the realm of physical science. In fact, with one exception presently to be mentioned, no phase of economic thought may be said to have become genuinely scientific until the middle of the eighteenth century, although, as will be seen, some interesting antecedents of scientific political economy took shape as early as the middle of the sixteenth century.

There was one exception. The earliest to develop of those phenomena that we now call "economic," to differentiate them from the general life of communities and states, was money. And the earliest type of economic theory to attain scientific form was the theory of money. Thus we find Nicole Oresme (*ca.* 1320-1382) discussing the nature and function of money and stating certain relevant principles with considerable exactness; and it appears that he did little more than report the views current among the Schoolmen of his day.¹ It was about four centuries later before any economic phenomena other than money were described with equal objectivity. The conclusion, that this objective treatment of questions and topics pertaining to money was made possible by the circumstances of its actual use, is almost inescapable. It was possible even at this early date to think of money as a means, or instrument, the working of which could be described objectively. Meanwhile, practically all other forms of economic activity still lay bound up in the general organic life of the community in such a manner that they could be discussed only in the mood of evaluation. Up to this time, however, the study of money, too, had been biased by

¹ Karl Worth Bigelow, "Economics," in Harry Elmer Barnes, ed., *History and Prospects of the Social Sciences*, pp. 341-342, New York, 1925. See also Arthur E. Monroe, *Early Economic Thought*, Cambridge, Mass., 1924, for translations from Oresme, as well as other source materials for early economic thought.

similar forces, particularly by ecclesiastical writers' moral condemnation of the love of money as an evil—the root of all evil.

Granting this one partial exception to the statement, it may be said that early modern economic thought took shape in the beginning as the formulation of principles of state economic policy and rules and miscellaneous items of information to guide the administration of public and private business. This type of economic thought is exemplified by the body of doctrines called mercantilism, by the early precursor of mercantilism called bullionism, and by the more variegated content of those works of German and Austrian writers which came to be known as cameralism or cameralistics. These schools of thought flourished in Western Europe from the middle of the sixteenth until the last quarter of the eighteenth century; indeed, Small states that cameralism did not disappear in Germany until well into the nineteenth century.¹ Bullionism was primarily a sixteenth century phenomenon and, apparently, did not carry over into the eighteenth century to any great extent, being replaced by the somewhat more complex and realistic doctrines of mercantilism.

The whole movement of thought of which bullionism, mercantilism, and cameralism are phases may be interpreted as a product of the historical fact of emergent nationalism. All three of these bodies of doctrine are concerned with the problems confronting the monarchs and ruling classes of the several independent states which began to emerge from the old Holy Roman Empire and the marked economic and political localism which had existed through the Dark Ages. All are alike in that they are concerned with the problems of national wealth and prosperity and in each case that concern arises from problems of public finance. It was, in general, characteristic of these doctrines that they assumed, or seemed to assume, that money is the form of wealth most to be desired.²

¹ *Origins of Sociology*, pp. 122 ff., 1924.

² Neither in the article on "Mercantilism," by Eli F. Hecksher, nor in that dealing with "Cameralism," by Louise Sommer, does the *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences* accept the conventional conception of mercantilism and cameralism as the doctrine that as much money as possible should be accumulated in a country, by measures designed to bring about the excess of exports over imports in monetary value and by other means. The conception nevertheless, seems to be true enough as a statement of tendency and as the basis of a partial interpretation, to serve a purpose here. Nothing is

The background of these movements of politico-economic thought, then, is the newly developed nationalism of a number of the countries of Western Europe. This nationalism brought into fresh prominence the problems of war and international competition; and it placed war in a new light. So long as the fact and the concept of empire, and the spiritual unity of Christendom under the Papacy, defined the situation, it might be reasoned that the chief problem constituted by the fact of war was one of preserving the peace, as nearly as might be, through the recognition of a single ultimate authority, whose business it was to maintain the peace; whether that power ought to be vested in the emperor or pope was, as we have seen, a moot question. But with the emergence of national states, acknowledging in practice no allegiance to emperor or pope in temporal matters, war became a practical problem in government and politics. From the point of view of the monarch and his ministers in a state that was in fact simply one of a number of similar states in competition with one another, the problem of war was largely one of ways and means of maintaining the independence of one's kingdom in a world in which war was, more or less, a chronic fact. The introduction of gunpowder into the west, moreover, had given war a new character; it was no longer fought by armored knights and their auxiliaries, recruited and organized under the feudal principle, but by forces of armed troops who were generally, in some sense, "mercenaries." At all events, in the struggle for a strong central power in the state, the king and his advisors generally preferred to rely upon troops who served the crown directly rather than through their feudal overlords. This meant that such troops had to be paid or, at all events, that they had to be fed and otherwise provided for at the expense of the royal treasury. The maintenance of that treasury in a flourishing condition, accordingly, came to be a basic preoccupation of those who were concerned about the strength and stability of these new national states. So long as troops were provided by the

gained, for the understanding of how present social science has taken shape, by the enlargement of such terms as "mercantilism" and "cameralism" to the point where they virtually apply to all the writings of a historical period that are concerned with social and governmental problems. For the purposes of the present discussion, these terms will be assumed to have primarily a doctrinal connotation.

chief feudal tenants of the crown, they were maintained "retail," so to speak, by their immediate commanders, and the wealth that might be needed by a country to meet the exigencies of war might be considered mainly as consumable goods. But now, to carry on war successfully, the king needed money. This seems to be an underlying explanation of the preoccupation of the early modern writers on economic topics with the "wealth of nations" and particularly with monetary wealth.

The connotations of the terms "bullionism," "mercantilism," and "cameralism" are somewhat indefinite. They may be thought of, however, as the names of certain roughly distinguishable movements of political and economic thought in Western Europe during the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries. Eventually, they became rather definite bodies of doctrine. The doctrines of mercantilism, however, cannot be sharply distinguished from other currents of social and political thought of the times; and cameralistic ideas are even harder to define, having been, at all times of their prevalence, extremely vague and amorphous. In fact, cameralism was a term equivalent, at a time in Germany, to the contemporary American expression "social science" in its least restricted usage.

The bullionist movement and teaching may be dated approximately as a sixteenth century phenomenon. It was an early crude response to the problems of emergent nationalism which have just been outlined and is of interest in the present context chiefly as an antecedent of mercantilism. As a doctrine, bullionism may be defined as the theory that it is desirable for any country to accumulate as much as possible of the precious metals—"bullion"—within its boundaries and that this end may be achieved by specific governmental regulations. Stimulation of the mining of the precious metals, prohibition of export of such metals, stimulation of industries and business enterprises that will tend to bring money into the country: these are among the characteristic devices of the bullionists. The doctrine sometimes attributed to them, that gold and silver, or "treasure," is the only real wealth, probably needs some interpretation. It is unreasonable to assume that any of the leading minds of the sixteenth century were so naïve as to fail to see that the precious metals did not directly meet any of the fundamental needs of mankind, that one could not eat or drink them and that they

did not afford any shelter from the weather. Rather, the bullionist conception must have been, as previously intimated, that it is desirable to accumulate as much bullion in a country as possible, when possible, because it can be exchanged for whatever goods and services may be needed in an emergency, such as war, when the ordinary peace-time currents of trade are interrupted. The simple and dogmatic statements, concerning the value of bullionism, or treasure, which are quoted from the bullionists' writings ought probably to be regarded as rhetorical exaggerations or simplifications of the truth that the writers were seeking to express, abstracted from their qualifications for the sake of emphasis.

Bullionism differed from mercantilism mainly in having been simpler, less circuitous, in the methods relied upon to achieve the desired end. In time, it came to be realized that prohibition of the export of gold and silver, for example, was not an effective way of accumulating these metals in a country; that a more complex procedure must be relied upon. It was the work of the mercantilists to elaborate such procedures. The high point of their ultimate conclusion was the conception of the "favorable balance of trade," *i.e.*, the development of a commerce which should be rich and abundant in both imports and exports, to be sure, but which should involve a net excess in value of exports over imports, so that a net inflow of money should result. As in the case of bullionism, it is probable that the mercantilist writers have been somewhat misrepresented. They were probably aware that, in the long run, it is impossible for exports to exceed imports in value except under certain conditions which were not likely to exist to a significant extent at that time, *i.e.*, immigrants' remittances to friends and relatives in the "old country" or development of extensive property rights or investments in foreign countries, resulting in a one-way flow of income from such investments. They undoubtedly realized, too, that the accumulation of gold and silver without limit in a country was not particularly to be desired. But they must have felt that the accumulation of as much "treasure" as possible, when possible, was desirable as a means of preparing for contingent and probable emergencies, particularly wars, just as their predecessors, the bullionists, had felt before them. Of course mercantilist thought was doubtless continually affected by the

naïve human tendency to identify money with wealth because it is, in a developed commercial economy, the universal symbol of wealth, the universal medium of exchange, the standard of all exchange value, and because in ordinary thinking the symbol tends to be accepted in place of the thing symbolized.

Mercantilism is also identified, by students of the period, with excessive and paternalistic governmental regulation of private business and industry. In this respect, it may be contrasted with the doctrines of *laissez faire* and individualism, which were presently formulated by the physiocrats and, eventually, by the so-called "classical" economists. This is the feature of mercantilism that constitutes the main reason for identifying it in part with German and Austrian cameralism. So far as it is possible to confine so amorphous a phenomenon as cameralism within the limits of a simple definition, it may be defined as a loose body of teaching and information pertaining to the administration of governmental activities in a centralized and paternalistic state. From the Middle Ages, the part of Europe that we know as Germany and Austria was occupied by a number of small, more or less independent states which were characterized by highly centralized and paternalistic government. The general pattern seems to have been carried over from the feudal era; for feudalism survived longer in the German-speaking territory than in other parts of Northern and Western Europe. With the rise of commerce and something approaching a modern type of industry, however, some improvement upon the simple personal rule of the medieval feudal lord became necessary; and cameralism was the body of thought that evolved to meet the need for guidance in the new and complicated situation. In the beginning, as Small has stated,¹ it was essentially concerned with fiscal problems, *i.e.*, problems of taxation and public finance. Eventually, however, there was injected into cameralistic study and writing the idea that the prosperity of the ruler and the state are dependent upon the prosperity of the people, and cameralism, which had been essentially a branch of political theory, concerned especially with political administration, became an approach from the practical side to the problems of economics. That it finally degenerated into a preoccupation with all sorts

¹ Albion W. Small, *The Cameralists*, Chicago and London, 1909; see also *Origins of Sociology*, Chaps. VIII, IX, Chicago, 1924.

of details, and a concern with administration virtually as an end in itself, need not greatly matter to us in the present inquiry. The important thing is that, just as mercantilism served as an approach to the problems that eventually became differentiated from political problems as "economic," so cameralism, by a somewhat different route, reached the same goal.

The trend of the development of cameralism was only approximately the same as that of mercantilism. The evolution of political economy in England and France has taken, to this day, a different course from that taken by *Nationalökonomie* in Germany. As has already been suggested, British economic thought became strongly individualistic, basing its analyses upon the assumption of a minimum of interference by government in private business and industry, save for the strict protection of property rights. German economic thought, on the other hand, has retained to this day the tendency to reason from the presupposition of active governmental supervision of private business to promote the general welfare and prosperity. Economic thought in France and Austria in the nineteenth century followed still other peculiar trends of development, but on the whole, the struggle for systematic and objective economic science in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries lends itself to interpretation in terms of the contrast between British individualism and German paternalism.

The development of economic thought in France involved another episode, before the modern tendency appeared, *viz.*, the appearance of the *physiocratic* doctrine. The physiocrats, also referred to as *les économistes*, dominated French economic thought for a short period in the latter part of the eighteenth century. As a school—and according to Seligman the only real "school" of economic thought that has existed up to the present time¹—they were characterized by their insistence upon agriculture as the only truly productive form of economic activity; by their related concept, the "net product" (*produit net*); and by their contention that government should practice a minimum of interference in private economic activity, in which last respect they were in rather sharp opposition to the mercantilists. The founder and most important exponent of the school was François

¹ Articles on "Economics" in *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*, vol. 5; see especially p. 347.

Quesnay (1694–1774). It is held by some commentators that the physiocrats may be credited with the first general approach to economic problems in the spirit of science, although none of their teachings is now accepted without grave qualifications. They may be said to have made the departure that is involved in taking wealth and its production, per se, rather than fiscal questions, as their object of attention. Physiocratic theories were, however, obviously based in part on fiscal considerations; the theory that land is the only source of real wealth is connected with the other theory that its cultivation may yield a net product, over and above all costs of production, and that, therefore, it constitutes the most reliable source of taxation. One reason for taking some interest in the place of the physiocrats in the development of economic thought is that Adam Smith was rather obviously influenced by them; in fact, he explicitly refers with respect to certain of their ideas.

It is generally agreed that with the first publication of Adam Smith's *Wealth of Nations* in 1776, economics first came of age as a distinct and systematic science. As we have seen, there had been many writings dealing with economic topics and problems in an intelligent and more or less objective way that had been published within the two centuries preceding, and such topics had not been altogether neglected in earlier centuries. However, economic thought before Adam Smith had been something less than a systematic science in either or both of two respects: the topics and problems had been considered from an ethical, theological, and practical point of view, rather than from the viewpoint of objective inquiry; and, as in the case of the theory of money, special topics had been treated without an adequate consideration of the broader array of phenomena of the same general order which ultimately came to be regarded as the subject matter of the science of economics. While *The Wealth of Nations* is not written in quite so systematic or logical a style as some of the standard treatises on "principles of economics" that have appeared in the past forty years, nor, as its title suggests, is it entirely free from the bias involved in taking the wealth of *nations*, i.e., national states, as the principal object of inquiry, still it contrasts strikingly in comprehensiveness and in objectivity with practically all the works that predate it. By the publication of this book, Adam Smith is sometimes considered to have

founded a "school" of economic thought, known as the "classical" school. The classical political economists certainly did not constitute a school in nearly so definite a sense as did the physiocrats; the former are much less doctrinaire in their writings, and their theories are not dominated by a single concept like the physiocrats' idea that agriculture is the sole source of real production. Nevertheless, it is possible to state a comparatively brief and simple list of notions which formed the core of the classical political economy, especially as it developed at the hands of the more immediate and direct successors of Adam Smith, including David Ricardo, Thomas Malthus, James Mill, John Stuart Mill, John Elliott Cairnes, and the French economist Jean Baptiste Say. Many other names might of course be included in the roster. In a rough way, the period of the classical political economy may be dated from 1776 to 1875 (death of Cairnes). After an interval when its doctrines were thrust into the background as a result of the critiques of the German historical school of economics, the Austrian psychological school, and others, it was revived in somewhat modified and refined form by the publication of Alfred Marshall's *Principles of Economics* in 1890. Marshall's *Principles* is generally considered to have been, in turn, the principal foundation for F. W. Taussig's *Principles of Economics*, which was for about twenty years (say, 1911-1931) the principal textbook for the more substantial courses in general economic theory offered in American colleges and universities. In recent years, this so-called neoclassical school of economic thought has fallen into some disfavor in the United States, owing primarily to the criticisms of the "institutional economists" and others who seem inclined to make of economics first and foremost a practical and fact-finding discipline.

In the hands of Adam Smith and his successors of the classical, marginalist, and neoclassical schools, economics became chiefly a theory of the market value, or price—of commodities, services, land, capital, and entrepreneurial activity. In the light of its general theory of the determination of market value, it dealt also with production, the distribution of wealth and income to individuals and classes, the distribution in space of industrial and commercial enterprises, and the spatial movement of goods, capital, and population. A theory of competition, usually not

explicitly expressed, was implicit in the theory by which the classical economists sought to explain all these things. The theory was, briefly stated, that if individual enterprise is left unhampered by government and by combinations in restraint of trade, the competition of the market—for goods, for labor, for capital, for managerial service, etc.—will bring about a natural, dynamic equilibrium of these factors of production, in such a manner that the maximum utility to all is established. The doctrine was briefly stated in a much quoted passage in *The Wealth of Nations*:

As every individual . . . endeavors as much as he can both to employ his capital in the support of domestic industry, and so to direct that industry that its produce may be of the greatest value; every individual necessarily labors to render the annual revenue of the society as great as he can. He generally, indeed, neither intends to promote the public interest, nor knows how much he is promoting it. By preferring the support of domestic to that of foreign industry, he intends only his own security; and by directing that industry in such a manner as its produce may be of the greatest value, he intends only his own gain, and he is in this as in many other matters, led by an invisible hand to promote an end which was no part of his intention.¹

David Ricardo is known as the second great founder of the classical political economy, to which he added two fundamental theories: that of economic rent, which subsequently became the foundation of the theory of marginal utility; and the so-called "iron law of wages," which may be stated in brief as follows: Wages cannot be raised greatly or for long above the cost of subsistence of the wage workers. Both of these theories, but particularly the latter, were founded in part on the theory of population developed by Thomas Malthus, who is, accordingly, regarded as a third great founder of the classical school.²

¹ Book IV, Chap. II.

² *Essay on the Principle of Population as It Affects the Future Improvement of Society*, 1798 and subsequent rev. ed. Ricardo's *Principles of Political Economy and Taxation* was first published in 1817. The Ricardian theory of rent, though commonly credited to him, was stated in 1815 by two other writers.

CHAPTER VII

THE PROGRESS OF HISTORIOGRAPHY¹

In surveying the development of social thought during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, one cannot but be impressed by the fact that the emergence of social science from the matrix of philosophical speculation was conditioned by the development of a more adequate and accurate body of factual material. Each political theorist or publicist wrote with reference to the facts and problems with which he was personally familiar; and many sought to supplement their knowledge through travel and reading. But travel yields knowledge of conditions at one time only, and in any case the scope of the information that one person can get together by travel is obviously limited. By reading, the seventeenth century political theorist could become acquainted with other men's ideas, which might be very suggestive, but he could not gain reliable information concerning the experience of the past; for such information, well authenticated, had not been published to any great extent. There must be more, and better authenticated, data before the reflections and speculations of the social theorists could be checked and controlled by the facts of experience. And to explain the facts of experience is one of the distinguishing characteristics of science as compared with mere speculation.

The development of reasonably accurate and comprehensive written history was, in short, an essential precondition of the development of social science in the strict sense of the term. For at the present time the initiated, following the ideas of Windelband, Rickert, and others, usually make a distinction between history and social science. To the general public, however, history is one of the social sciences, and even the most

¹ This chapter is based mainly on the following (secondary) sources: Albion W. Small, *Origins of Sociology*, Chaps. II-VII; "History and Historiography" in *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*, vol. 7; "Romanticism" in *ibid.*, vol. 13; Robert Flint, *The Philosophy of History*, vol. I (only vol. published in this ed.), London and Edinburgh, 1874.

discriminating student of the logic and classification of the sciences will admit that there is much in common between history, on the one hand, and such subjects as economics, sociology, and political science, to say nothing of anthropology, on the other. Under such circumstances, it is not surprising to discover that history and the other social studies have been closely associated in their evolution; and that each has exercised considerable influence upon the other.

The improvement of historiography that was needed at the time we are considering depended not only upon the preservation of the tradition of the past but also upon the evolution of methods and a point of view for the critical evaluation of that tradition. History must be purged of myth and legend, or, to be precise, myth and legend must be seen for what they were, *viz.*, special forms of tradition which embodied the attitudes of the past but did not accurately report past happenings. Although the writing of history, as distinguished from the mere keeping of records, is a practice that has existed for two thousand years at the least reckoning, we shall not do violence to the facts if we follow in the main the interpretation of Small and assume that historiography as we know it is largely the product of a process of development that began not long before the nineteenth century. Very creditable histories were written in Rome during the period of the Empire and even earlier, but the standard that the Roman historians set was largely forgotten, or pushed into the background under the influence of theological preconceptions, during the Middle Ages, and critical historiography had to be practically developed anew in modern times. Furthermore, the Greek and Roman historians did not develop very high standards of historical criticism; they mingled legend and travelers' tales indiscriminately with authentic fact in their compositions; indeed, they seemed scarcely to have an idea of the difference between the two kinds of material.

Naturally, an attempt to describe in brief compass the beginnings of modern historiography, upon the assumption that those beginnings do not date far back of 1800, meets with difficulties. History, as some one has aptly said, has a history, and that history, it cannot be too strongly emphasized, is a long one. We cannot, without reservations, give any particular historian credit for having originated this or that feature of modern

historical method. Subject to one important qualification, however, we may represent modern historiography as the product of the work of a series of great German historians, of whom the most outstanding were B. G. Niebuhr and Leopold von Ranke.

Although of course medieval Europe inherited from Greece and Rome some tradition of historical writing, the historiography of the nineteenth century may be said to have its more immediate antecedents in the "annals" and "chronicles" which were the product, for the most part, of monasticism. The annals which began to take shape in the Middle Ages were at first merely the records that were kept in some of the monasteries incidentally to the keeping of the calendar of church festivals and holy days. Some note of an outstanding event which took place at about the same time as the festival might be set down beside its date. Gradually these records, especially in certain famous monasteries, were made fuller and more accurate, and some of them were amplified by a process of passing along the annals from one monastery to another and adding what each one had recorded. Then, here and there, monks of a literary turn of mind began to compose narrative accounts of the happenings recorded in these annals, thus formulating what came to be known as chronicles. The most famous of these is what is known as "the great chronicle of France," prepared at the Abbey of St. Denis. Occasionally, too, a biography of some outstanding lay or clerical personage was composed by a monk; the most famous of these was Einhard's *Life of Charlemagne*.

The first great influence working for the development of something that may properly be called "history" from these chronicles was the romantic movement, which may be dated roughly as of the last part of the eighteenth and the first part of the nineteenth century. Romanticism, which in this connection may be more precisely designated as French and German illuminism, was in turn rooted in an incipient movement of historical scholarship which arose under the influence of the Renaissance and the Protestant Reformation. The Renaissance, which involved a new enthusiasm for the heritage of classical antiquity, stimulated an interest in the recovery of the historical literature of Greece and Rome and in the writing of history that was less biased by ecclesiastical and theological considerations than medieval chronicles and historical narratives had been. The general

purpose of this early modern historiography was to bring the story down to date from the point where the classical historians had left it. The events of the Reformation stimulated a lively interest in the assembling and study of the sources of church history, for the purpose of bolstering up the claims of the respective parties to the religious divisions and controversies which then beset the Western world. Some standards of historical research and criticism and some effort to recover the source materials of history had taken shape, then, when history came under the influence of the romantic movement, which was by no means exclusively a German movement and which forms the chief exception to our thesis that the principal beginnings of modern historiography can be sufficiently traced in the accomplishments of a series of nineteenth century German scholars. For present purposes, the romantic or illuminist movement in historiography may be briefly characterized as a change in the direction of a greater emphasis on the historical narrative as a polished and interesting literary composition.¹ To disentangle the diverse currents of this movement from one another and to distinguish its effects upon historical writing from those of other influences is a task beyond the scope of the present discussion. The remark may be ventured that to this day historiography bears the marks of this influence which, to be sure, was not altogether an unfortunate one, although historians of the romantic school are sometimes accused of adopting the attitude that it does not make so much difference whether a history is strictly true, provided it is interesting and written in a pleasing style. What is more important is that the romantic movement brought into historiography a greatly enlarged conception of the possibilities of interpretation of the facts presented, by means of the organization of the events into a continuous narrative, in which one followed after the other in a more or less intelligible fashion. This same movement may also be regarded as the seedbed of the nineteenth century philosophy of history, with which we shall be concerned in a later chapter.

¹ Actually, romanticism was something quite different from this in the beginning. See G. A. Borgese, article on "Romanticism" in *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*, vol. 13; also discussion of medieval historiography by G. G. Coulton and that on modern Europe by Walter Goetz, under the general title "History and Historiography," *ibid.*, vol. 7.

Reduced to a simple and artificially abstract formulation, the development of historiography during the latest century and a half may be described as a cyclical movement from fact finding to interpretive narrative and back again, the cycle being traversed at least twice since the Middle Ages. The romantic movement brought about the first shift to interpretive narrative; then nineteenth century German scholars directed attention upon the task of establishing the facts; while quite lately the composition of readable historical narratives has flourished once more, particularly in the United States.

The critical tendency in historiography in Germany after 1800 may be conceived as having two main phases: the critical examination and evaluation of sources, in which Niebuhr was an important pioneer; and the "documentation" of the narrative, a method for which Ranke is given particular credit. Neither of these men was in any sense the exclusive originator of the methodological tendencies with which his name is associated.

B. G. Niebuhr (1776-1831) was born in Copenhagen, the son of a man who had made a name for himself by his accounts of travels in Arabia. From an early age, he displayed an inclination to scholarly pursuits. After attending the University of Kiel for two years he entered the public service in Denmark in 1796 and was engaged in such service in Denmark and in Prussia until 1824. Throughout this period, however, he maintained an active interest in his favorite subject, Greek and Roman antiquities. He lectured on Roman history at the University of Berlin while still attached to the Prussian government service. Niebuhr is known particularly as the author of an ambitious work on Roman history, which he was able to complete to the time of the First Punic War only. More fundamentally, however, his reputation rests upon the advances in historical method which he made in this great work. He never wrote a systematic treatise on historical method; in so far as his ideas on the subject are not sufficiently indicated by the nature of his own completed historical writing, one must glean them from brief remarks which he incorporated in his works. In general terms, his contribution to the development of historical method may be described as a fresh and vigorous emphasis on the critical examination of sources. As Small has expressed it, Niebuhr asked two questions concern-

ing any historical tradition which had been previously accepted as true: (1) What grounds are there for accepting this tradition as correct? (2) To what extent, if at all, have we a right to believe it? In other words, he emphasized both the negative and the positive sides of historical criticism. He pointed out that purely negative and destructive criticism of received tradition leaves us, as a rule, only a heap of fragments, not a coherent story of the events of a time and place; but that the latter is precisely the business of the historian to construct, as best he can.¹

Specifically, Niebuhr's method involved (1) the exclusion of all mythological factors from direct consideration; (2) the attempt to discover or to reconstruct the original sources or documents which had been used in preparing all other accounts of particular happenings; (3) scrutiny of such oldest existing sources to discover the relation of their presumptive authors to the actual events and thereby to evaluate their reliability; and (4) checking up the testimony of given documents by all available collateral evidence, archaeological or documentary. Such procedures as these have become standard in twentieth century historical scholarship, but in Niebuhr's day, although they had been approached by others, they were by no means commonplace, and historical writing usually proceeded with comparatively little critical attack upon the credibility of the traditions that the historian incorporated in his finished composition. Since his day, these have become to a great degree the standards of all scholarship and not merely of historiography. In every kind of scholarly or scientific inquiry that proceeds through the use of some form of written or printed evidence, rather than by laboratory experiment or direct field observation, it has become a criterion of merit to seek out the primary sources, rather than to rely upon "secondary" ones. The principle is subject to the qualification that no one can form an acquaintance with the primary sources of knowledge in more than a limited field of inquiry, typically some very narrow specialty; and that for practical purposes we need histories and other comprehensive treatises which are by no means so limited in their scope. The ordinary educated person has not built up his knowledge of most subjects, and could not have built it up, by the reading of a

¹ *Op. cit.*, Chap. IV, *passim*; see particularly pp. 83, 87.

great number of specialized monographs such as are the immediate result of research on the primary source materials.

An interesting application of the methods of historical criticism which Niebuhr did so much to initiate, and one which has been provocative of considerable controversy, has taken place in the field of biblical scholarship, where the critical methods introduced in the past century or more have become known by the familiar term "higher criticism" and the less familiar "lower criticism." By the latter is meant the type of investigation that seeks simply to reconstruct the exact original text of some particular book of the Bible; while the higher criticism undertakes, chiefly from internal evidence of style, language, and the like, to establish the authorship, date, and original purpose of each of the writings that compose the Bible.

The name of Leopold von Ranke (1795-1886) is especially connected with an advance in historical method which can be distinguished from that made by Niebuhr, although closely related to it, *viz.*, the development of "documentation," the precise citation of documentary evidence for statements of fact. This is patently implicit, and even to some extent explicit, in the work of Niebuhr, by whom Ranke was greatly influenced; the contribution of the latter is, after all, little more than the refinement and emphasis of one aspect of Niebuhr's method. With the drive for documentation has been closely and inevitably associated a movement for the recovery, preservation, editing, and publication of important historical documents, or "archives." As Small, among others, has shown,¹ Ranke's great contribution was his vigorous emphasis of the proposition that historical writing should be verified and supported by "documents," *i.e.*, written records, made at the time of the events in question or shortly thereafter. It has become a characteristic feature of this drive for documentation that *official* documents are preferred to all others, and in this, too, Ranke was a pioneer. Since his time, however, the term "official" as used in this connection has been given a fairly liberal interpretation, so that it may now be understood to include not only the official records and papers of governments but also the official records of any organization or bureau, for example, the official records of a church, a lodge, or a trade union, or even the original books of account of a

¹ *Op. cit.*, Chap. V.

business firm. Any particular body of such records, reasonably complete and authentic, and systematically arranged and made available to proper persons, are termed "archives."

A natural consequence of the emphasis on documentation was the movement that took shape in several European countries early in the nineteenth century for the systematic recovery, preservation, and making available for scholarly research of the archives of the various states of Europe and where financially possible, the publication of carefully edited and authenticated copies of the archives of early periods. A number of great series of published source materials for historical research have resulted from this effort. The practice of publishing, with notes and other interpretive material, the collected letters and other papers of prominent persons may be regarded as a related tendency. The names of two other distinguished German scholars, Georg Heinrich Pertz and Georg Waitz, are especially connected with the progress of this movement for the collection and publication of archives.

When, in the latter part of the nineteenth century, economics and political science became differentiated from history and won recognition as independent university disciplines, they took over from historiography, to a considerable extent, the interest in documentation and the preservation of archives. Political scientists had a natural and obvious interest in governmental documents and in research into the origins and antecedents of the political institutions of a time. In fact, this interest was cultivated to such an extent that political science, as a field of research, has sometimes seemed to become little more than a branch of history. Similarly, economists have been interested in the preservation and study of government documents relating to economic matters—legislative archives relating to economic legislation, court records of cases affected with an economic interest, the official records of public finance, and the like. The economists have also interested themselves in the establishment of archives, and the study of documents, of other than governmental origin, notably the official archives of trade unions.

Among the sociologists the movement for documentary research has been the object of some controversy. On the one hand, it is pointed out that there are few or no official documents in existence that are useful as sources for the study of some of the matters

in which sociologists are interested; hence there has been a movement to collect, preserve, publish, and study "documents" of a strictly nonofficial character. In this connection considerable discussion has developed concerning the nature and value of "intimate documents," i.e., personal letters, autobiographies of the less formal sort, diaries, and exact records of people's remarks in particular situations. We shall recur in a later chapter to some of the problems relating to the use of such material. On the other hand, sociologists of repute have held, explicitly or by implication, that sociology must in no way be restricted to documents in its research but must make free use of other, less ponderable and objective sources, e.g., the "acquaintance knowledge" that the student of a particular topic gradually builds up by direct contact and observation.

Since the close of the World War, or from an earlier date, European and American historiography has developed new tendencies to some extent. Prominent among these are, first, a renewed emphasis on coherent and readable historical narrative, somewhat in the manner of the histories written under the influence of the earlier romantic tendency; and, second, an effort to give written history a broader scope, so that it shall adequately depict the economic, intellectual, and in general the "social" as well as the political, military, and diplomatic features of past happenings. In the work of such American writers as Frederick J. Turner, James Harvey Robinson, and Charles and Mary Beard, for example, there is clearly apparent a fresh attempt to make history the account of "how things have come to be what they are," on the assumption that the factors of this development have by no means been exclusively or preponderantly political and military. With this tendency to make history serviceable as an interpretation of the present and future has gone a tendency to introduce into historiography something of the comparative and generalizing methods of sociology. For good or ill, history and the abstract social sciences seem to have drawn closer together in recent decades.¹

¹ Harry Elmer Barnes, *The New History and the Social Studies*, New York, 1924; *History and Social Intelligence*, New York, 1926.

CHAPTER VIII

THE PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY

It is a thesis of the present inquiry that sociology, considered as a distinct science or discipline, had its origins in part in the older sciences of politics and economics. It seems to be true that in the United States sociology became established as a recognized university subject more by differentiation from economics than in any other way, although, as we shall see, the demand for a rational basis for social work and social reform also played a considerable part in the development of the new department of social science. In European countries, however, a very important factor in shaping sociology as a new science was the effort on the part of various thinkers to achieve a science or a philosophy that would generalize the findings of historical research. A number of important approaches to a general science of sociology, sometimes offered under that name but not in other cases, were made by writers who were definitely and obviously striving to derive some kind of generalized knowledge from the data of history. Some of these efforts were reviewed from a single point of view by Paul Barth in 1897 in a book entitled *Die Philosophie der Geschichte als Soziologie*¹ (*The Philosophy of History as Sociology*).

"Philosophy of history" is a term that has acquired a quite definite meaning. It refers to a type of inquiry and speculation which has been pursued, chiefly in Germany, since about the time of Goethe and Schiller and was brought into great prominence by Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, who achieved a high degree of personal and academic prestige during his lifetime and communicated this prestige, in no small measure, to the subject of his greatest interest, the philosophy of history. In England, on the other hand, philosophy of history of the Hegelian type has never had much following, but considerable important scholarly work has been done in a field marginal to sociology and history

¹ 1st ed., Leipzig, 1897; 4th ed., rev. and greatly enlarged, 1922.

which is recognized by no distinctive name, but which has been characterized by certain American commentators as "the natural history of institutions."¹ In the present chapter, we shall be concerned chiefly with the first of these currents of development of modern social thought.

Although the philosophy of history has been a distinct and definite feature of the intellectual life of Germany for some time, it is scarcely possible either to date the beginning of the movement precisely or to define the margins of this particular form of social thought accurately. The first prominent use of the term "philosophy of history" seems to have been made by Herder, whose *Auch eine Philosophie der Geschichte zur Bildung der Menschheit* was first published in 1774.² For practical purposes, it will not be far wrong to regard the publication of this book as the start of the modern philosophy-of-history movement in Germany, although it can be argued that there was a medieval scholastic philosophy of history. The modern movement may be said to extend from the last quarter of the eighteenth century throughout the nineteenth and has not entirely disappeared in our own century, having been given a fresh impetus by the publication of Oswald Spengler's *Untergang des Abendlandes* in 1918. In its origins, this movement cannot be marked off sharply from the general philosophy of the German idealists or from the philosophical elements in the writings of such literary artists as Goethe. In its latest manifestations, on the other hand, the philosophy of history can scarcely be distinguished from the "sociology" of the school that has been founded by Alfred Weber and Karl Mannheim. Nor has it been entirely distinct from the early nineteenth century German patriotic state philosophy and propagandist history which is represented particularly by the writings of Fichte and Treitschke.

This modern philosophy of history, with which we are primarily concerned here, may be said to have two principal antecedents.

¹ Robert E. Park, "Sociology and the Social Sciences," *American Journal of Sociology*, vol. 27, pp. 1-21, 169-183, 1921-1922, reprinted as Chap. I of R. E. Park and E. W. Burgess, *Introduction to the Science of Sociology*; see particularly in the latter printing pp. 16 ff. See also Isabella McLaughlin, "History and Sociology: A Comparison of Their Methods," *American Journal of Sociology*, vol. 32, pp. 379 ff., 1926-1927.

² J. B. Bury states that the term was invented by Voltaire (*The Idea of Progress*, American ed., p. 153, New York, 1932).

On the one hand, it stands in an obvious relation of continuity with the attempts made by the Church Fathers, particularly St. Augustine, and the scholastic writers to interpret history as a manifestation of the workings of divine Providence in human affairs. In fact, St. Augustine's *City of God* has been definitely identified by commentators as the original from which some of the eighteenth and nineteenth century philosophies of history took their pattern in part. Throughout the historical works of medieval scholastic writers runs the idea of a divine plan, a destiny, or at least a long-run trend in human affairs. The same idea, secularized in some cases, inheres in the modern philosophy of history; it is the implicit purpose of the philosophy of history to distinguish this trend in such a way as to establish its direction and project it into the future, so that men may have some way of making present circumstances and recent happenings intelligible by reference to their outcome.

On the other hand, modern philosophy of history is undoubtedly also rooted in the fact of social change. What are conventionally known as "modern times" have been characterized by more rapid and general social change than have most other epochs of human history. Such conditions are disturbing and unsettling; they give men the feeling of having lost their security and their values. Old interpretations and old creeds no longer suffice to explain happenings or to define and justify a way of life. Thoughtful men, accordingly, set about it to formulate a new philosophy of human society and its history. Such seems to have been the immediate occasion of the development of a mode of thought and writing which, beginning in the last quarter of the eighteenth century, was called the "philosophy of history." It may be said to have originated elsewhere than in Germany at about the same time, or even earlier. Vico's *New Science* (1725) and Condorcet's *Progress of the Human Mind* (1795) may be regarded as early modern Italian and French examples. Nowhere, however, has the philosophy of history run so persistent and distinct a course as in Germany. Whatever has been done since Vico in Italy has been relatively lacking in influence upon the development of the philosophy of history in other countries; and, while it is possible to classify the work of Condorcet, Montesquieu, Bossuet, Comte, and other French writers as philosophy of history, the beginnings made by them in the eight-

eenth and early nineteenth centuries do not seem to have inaugurated so definite or persistent a movement of thought as did the early German philosophy of history. We shall consider later the comparable developments of British and American thought.

Although they are not considered to have contributed directly to the philosophy of history, the great continental rationalist philosophers Descartes, Spinoza, and Leibnitz stand in the direct line of antecedents of the later movement. Robert Flint, author of an early comparative study of the philosophy-of-history movement, credits Leibnitz (1646-1716) with having influenced the movement in at least two ways: by his own work in the field of historiography, in which he was one of the first to combine historical with philological studies; and by the ideas developed in the *Monadologie*, to which his successors gave a historical application.¹ In so far as they all offered highly generalized theories to account for the way things happen in the world of human experience, all of these great rationalist philosophers may be said to have provided intellectual instruments which later writers could use in the interpretation of world history; and it is a significant fact that several of the later German idealist philosophers did, as we shall see, make definite contributions to the philosophy of history.²

As we have noted, the earliest well-known German work that can be definitely classified as philosophy of history was *Auch eine Philosophie der Geschichte zur Bildung der Menschheit*, by Johann Gottfried von Herder (1744-1803), first published in Riga in 1774. Herder, who is classified as "historian, littérateur, and social philosopher," was influenced by Rousseau and Kant, among others, although his early book on the philosophy of his-

¹ *The Philosophy of History: France and Germany*, p. 345, London, 1874. Flint's *Philosophy of History* is still one of the few available general references on the subject. Only the early edition cited here deals with the German writers; the projected volume on Germany was never written for the later revised and enlarged edition. See also, however, articles on "History and Historiography" in *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*, vol. 7; see J. B. Bury, *The Idea of Progress*, *passim*.

² On the general bearing of philosophy upon problems of social science see John Dewey's article "Philosophy," in *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*, vol. 12. One may also read with profit in this connection Dewey's larger works, e.g., *Experience and Nature* and *The Quest for Certainty*; see also Morris R. Cohen, *Reason and Nature*, New York, 1931.

tory antedates Kant's specific treatise on the subject by ten years. He is counted as one of the pioneers of the *Sturm und Drang* movement in German literature.¹ He is also credited with having been the originator of the concept "historical sense" in Germany. The investigation of history, he held, should proceed from a sympathetic understanding of life rather than according to abstract principles. Events and personalities should be considered in the light of their historical setting. History, in his view, is irrational, divine, a superpersonal whole in which the individual lives and moves. Herder was the first to apply Leibnitz' concept of development, one of the antecedents of Darwin's concept of evolution, to the interpretation of history. Each civilization, he said, buds, flowers, and fades according to natural laws of growth. All these ideas are set forth in *Auch eine Philosophie der Geschichte*. Ten years later, in 1784, Herder began the publication of his *Ideen zur Philosophie der Geschichte der Menschheit*.² In this later work, which was preceded by writings of Lessing and others in the same field, the author introduced normative principles of interpretation, especially the concept "humanity" which had been originated by Shaftesbury. In the light of this concept, Herder now undertook to evaluate personalities, institutions, and empires. The general thesis was that the development or history of mankind has "humanity" as its goal. The philosophy of history thus became affected by the idea of progress, an idea that played a very prominent role in English and French social thought in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Flint remarks of Herder that he was not highly successful in the attempt that he made in his *Ideen* to sum up his philosophy of history in general propositions; his theorems, according to Flint, were neither sufficient to constitute a philosophy of history in the proper sense nor adequately supported by facts and reasoning.³ It is said, however, that both Ranke and Hegel learned from Herder the "religion of becoming," i.e., the idea that historical facts must be regarded as the result of a process of growth or development.⁴

¹ See Rudolf Stadelmann, article on Herder in *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*, vol. 7. Stadelmann's account has been chiefly relied upon here.

² 4 vols., Riga, 1784-1791.

³ *Op. cit.*, pp. 386-387.

⁴ Stadelmann, *loc. cit.*

Next in order of time after Herder, among the German writers who made significant contributions to the philosophy of history, was Gotthold Ephraim Lessing (1729-1781). Herder's senior by birth but publishing his first work on the philosophy of history several years later, Lessing was even more than his younger contemporary a man of letters primarily and a philosopher incidentally, as every poet and dramatist of the time was inclined to be. He is classed with the writers on philosophy of history on account of his *Erziehung des Menschengeschlechts* (*Education of the Human Race*) which was first published in 1780. Though it appeared later than Herder's *Auch eine Philosophie der Geschichte zur Bildung der Menschheit*, this book is written in the spirit of an earlier period. It is the author's essential thesis that the education of the human race is accomplished by the progressive revelation to mankind of the divine will and wisdom.¹ Lessing was, however, by no means a conservative adherent of established religion; on the contrary, he aroused a storm of protest during his lifetime, even from liberal theologians, by the advanced and critical, not to say skeptical, views that he expressed.²

Among the German idealist philosophers who contributed to the philosophy of history was the greatest of them all, Immanuel Kant (1724-1804). His essay on the subject, *Idee zu einer allgemeinen Geschichte in weltbürgerlicher Absicht* (*Idea of a Universal History on a Cosmopolitical Basis*, 1784), is one of his less well-known works and is generally regarded by students as one of the least valuable or important of them. In general viewpoint and reasoning, it is based to a considerable extent on his *Critique of Practical Reason* and his earlier *Metaphysic of Morals*, the two works in which he grapples most directly with the general problem of ethics. In the *Critique of Practical Reason*, Kant laid down the two alternative formulations of his famous "categorical imperative": (1) "Always act so as to treat humanity, whether in your own person or in that of another, in every case as an end withal and never as means only"; and (2) "so act that the rule that determines your conduct might serve as a universal law." He held these propositions to be logically equivalent to each other, and he believed that he had established

¹ Flint, *op. cit.*, pp. 366 ff.

² Fritz Brüggemann, article on Lessing in *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*, vol. 9.

the validity of the principle that each expresses by purely deductive reasoning from a priori considerations. This principle, he argued, implies an end to be attained. That is, Kant established by a line of reasoning which he believed he had demonstrated from strictly a priori grounds the proposition that human life moves toward ends, or goals; it is intrinsically purposive, or teleological. Unless we proceed on this assumption, he contended, conduct can have no rational determination; behavior not carried out with reference to ends is irrational, or nonrational. Human history, he inferred, is teleological, and its ends are determined by final causes. The task of the philosopher of history is to trace the operation of these final causes in the apparently confused and meaningless sequence of human events.¹

Kant's own essay on the philosophy of history is not a very substantial or impressive demonstration of the possibilities of his method for the illumination of the actual course of human history. It appears from collateral evidence, however, that his system of philosophical ideas, as set forth in the famous *Critiques*, had a great influence upon the development of the philosophy of history in Germany after they were published. In fact, the philosophy of Kant has been a powerful influence in practically every phase of German philosophy and social thought down to the present day.²

Although he is usually regarded as a philosopher and German patriot, rather than as a contributor to the philosophy of history, Johann Gottlieb Fichte (1762-1814), in one of his less known works, dealt with questions pertaining to the subject and laid

¹ J. B. Bury holds, in *The Idea of Progress*, that Kant does not assert that civilization is actually moving toward a goal because we are compelled by reason to assume such a goal but seeks to show by reference to human experience, i.e., to actual history, that such movement is taking place. It is at least open to argument, however, whether the interpretation set forth above is not fair to Kant and whether the appeal to actual history was not made by Kant purely for persuasive purposes, to support an argument that really rests on other grounds. At any rate, as we shall see in considering Fichte, the attempt to establish a philosophy of history on a purely a priori, deductive foundation was characteristic of the German writers, and it is repeated in the recent work of Spengler. (*Op. cit.*, p. 247.)

² See the excellent article on Kant by Ernst Cassirer in *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*, vol. 8. In this article, however, the author does not trace out so fully as he might have done the influence of Kant and the neo-Kantians in recent social thought.

down a particularly radical thesis concerning the philosophy of history. It is in his *Die Grundzüge des gegenwärtigen Zeitalters*, published in 1806 from lectures delivered at the University of Berlin in 1804 and 1805, that his chief contribution to the subject is found. Fichte is best known for his *Reden an die deutsche Nation* (1808), in which he emphasized the distinction between society and the state, asserting that the state had as its end its own annihilation and would eventually be absorbed into society. According to Gurvitch, Fichte is wrongly identified as an apostle of Pan-Germanism, a tendency that in fact he sought to combat.¹ Late in his life he became definitely a socialist; he was one of the most prominent men in Germany at the time to take this position.

Fichte's treatment of the philosophy of history is notable for its assertion in extreme form of the thesis implicit in the work of Kant, that a complete philosophy of history may be deduced a priori from self-evident principles.

The philosopher [he says in his first lecture] must deduce from the unity of his presupposed principle all the phenomena of experience; but it is obvious that in the fulfillment of this purpose he does not require the aid of experience—that he proceeds merely as a philosopher, paying no respect whatever to experience, but absolutely a priori describes Time as a whole and all its possible epochs.²

The social philosophy and philosophy of history of Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831) have been so influential, and his writings are so voluminous, that entire volumes have been written in commentary upon them and interpretation of them. It is impossible for us to review here the whole scope of his thought and works. Among his works, those that are most important in the history of social thought are the following: (1) *Phänomenologie des Geistes* (1807); (2) *Wissenschaft der Logik* (2 vols., 1812-1816); (3) *Encyclopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse* (1817);³ (4) *Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts* (1833); and (5) *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte*. His philosophy of history is not

¹ Article on Fichte in *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*, vol. 6.

² *Die Grundzüge des gegenwärtigen Zeitalters*, quoted by Robert Flint, *op. cit.*, pp. 410-411. See also Bury, *The Idea of Progress*, pp. 250-253.

³ An outline of Hegel's whole system of philosophy, translated in parts by William Wallace as *The Logic of Hegel*, 2d ed., Oxford, 1892; *Hegel's Philosophy of Mind*, Oxford, 1894.

exclusively, or perhaps most adequately, set forth in the last mentioned volume but permeates the whole body of his writings. Like his predecessors among the German idealist philosophers, Hegel regards the course of historical change as something that moves by a natural process, susceptible of explanation in metaphysical terms. No one before him, however, had asserted quite so radically the equivalence of the changes of human history to the logically necessary movement of thought by which the material changes can be made intelligible.¹ In other words, Hegel's logic and his philosophy of history are closely connected aspects of the same system of thought. His formula for the movement of thought and of history—thesis, antithesis, synthesis—is widely known and has probably influenced the course of social and historical philosophy a great deal, though it finds little explicit acceptance today. The formula expresses succinctly Hegel's theory that an existing general state of society, conceived as the incarnation of an idea, tends to give rise to a different and contrasting one, the "antithesis," which in turn interacts with the original state to form a new and more inclusive one, the "synthesis." Cohen has remarked that some such general theory as this is implicitly inherent in the present-day conception that human institutions, in their evolution, pass through certain necessary stages.²

Hegel gained enormous prestige in Germany and elsewhere, in his own lifetime and thereafter. His work gave a distinct trend to German social and historical scholarship for a generation or more and has been promulgated in England, with some qualifications, by Bernard Bosanquet. Perhaps the most important fact concerning the work of Hegel as a factor in the development of social theory, however, is that it gave Karl Marx a basic idea for his materialistic interpretation of history, or "economic determinism."

Although he was a slightly younger contemporary of Hegel, Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von Schelling (1775-1854) published some of his important writings a few years earlier than any of the

¹ A similar assumption seems to underlie the "positive philosophy" of Auguste Comte, which appeared in publication a few years later.

² Morris R. Cohen, article on Hegel in *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*, vol. 7. This is a very illuminating brief account of Hegel's contributions to social thought.

works for which the former is best known. Schelling is to be classified primarily as one of the German idealist philosophers; he made no explicit contribution to the philosophy of history. Like other writers of the same general period and school of thought, however, he devoted considerable attention to questions of social philosophy. His system of thought may be said to be organized around the concepts of nature and mind; and he asserted the identity of the two as stages in the evolution of absolute mind. The congruity of this with the other writings of the idealistic school is evident; and in fact Schelling developed a "dialectic" resembling that set forth later by Hegel but with reference primarily to nature, rather than to human history. He held that life in society and the state is a precondition of self-consciousness and freedom; the highest stage in the development of self-consciousness, however, is in his conception attained in art.¹

The interest of German thinkers in the philosophy of history may be said to have reached its first great climax in the theories of Hegel and those directly influenced by him, including Ludwig Feuerbach and Karl Marx, in whose hands the philosophy of history took a new direction, changing into a kind of Hegelian antithesis to the philosophy of Hegel himself and becoming self-consciously "materialistic." In the second half of the nineteenth century, although the philosophy of history never entirely lost its standing as a proper subject of scholarly research and speculation, it was pushed into the background by other interests, including particularly the German nationalist movement, which led to preoccupation with questions of the present and future. The philosophy of history gave nationalism some of its intellectual foundations, but once the new movement was well under way, the rise of Pan-Germanism and of the new German Empire, thanks to the statecraft of Bismarck, could not help drawing attention away from questions of history and focusing it upon problems of politics and diplomacy. Later still, particularly in the period since the World War, the philosophy of history has enjoyed a fresh prestige, due partly to the influence of the impressive work of Spengler and partly to the logic of the situation.

¹ See Frank Thilly, *A History of Philosophy*, p. 455, New York, 1914. Works of Schelling particularly interesting to the student of the history of social thought are *Ideen zu einer Philosophie der Natur*, 1797; *Von der Weltseele*, 1798; and *System des transcendentalen Idealismus*, 1800.

Before the interlude that occurred in the last half of the nineteenth century, however, the philosophy of history was given a new and widely influential formulation by the "materialists," of whom the most prominent were Feuerbach, Marx, and Engels. Ludwig Andreas Feuerbach (1804-1872) began his philosophical career under the influence of Hegel but revolted from Hegelian idealism in the general direction of materialism because he regarded Hegel's philosophy as an unwarranted simplification of the manifold facts of history; in effect, he said, it was a theology. In *Das Wesen des Christentums* (1841), he substituted for the orthodox Christian theology a vague materialistic humanism and interpreted theology as the result of man's effort to meet his feeling of need for some inclusive explanation of his world. Feuerbach supported his materialistic philosophy of history by a psychological doctrine which represented mind as the product of the impact of the forces of the external world upon the sense organs. Only in a limited sense, of course, is there a philosophy of history in such ideas; however, the ideas of Feuerbach, like those of Schelling, have obvious implications for the interpretation of history. He is said to have laid the foundations, in certain features of his published work, for the interpretation of religion later developed by Durkheim.¹

The expressions "historical materialism," "materialistic interpretation of history," and "economic determinism," the three terms being used as synonyms in much of the recent literature, have come to have a very specific meaning, which belies the words to some extent, and which was developed in the writings of Marx and Engels. Influenced by Hegel and also by Feuerbach, they criticized the radical materialism of the latter, taking a position that is in reality idealist in some sense of the term. The "materialist interpretation of history" expounded by Marx and Engels may be simply described as a philosophy in which the phenomena of culture and social organization are said to evolve according to the laws of their own nature. To be sure, being preoccupied with practical problems of economic and political reconstruction, they placed extreme emphasis on the economic and political aspects of culture and social organization, seemingly but perhaps not actually to the exclusion of all others.

¹ This brief account of Feuerbach is based on Sidney Hook's article on Feuerbach in *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*, vol. 8.

It is difficult if not impossible to separate the contributions of Marx from those of Engels. Although Friedrich Engels (1820-1895) had published significant works before he became associated with Karl Marx (1818-1883), he is best known as the collaborator of the latter on the *Communist Manifesto* (1848) and *Capital* (first volume by Marx, 1867; second and third volumes edited by Engels from manuscripts left by Marx, 1885-1894). The later writings of Engels show a complete continuity of thought with that developed in these classical works. Engels' *Condition of the Working Class in England* (first published in German, Leipzig, 1845, only about a year after Engels' intimate association with Marx began), his *Ludwig Feuerbach und der Ausgang der klassischen deutschen Philosophie* (1888), his *Herrn Dührings Umwälzung der Wissenschaft* (1878), and his *Ursprung der Familie, des Privateigentums und des Staats* (1884) are from his own pen with little or no collaboration by Marx, though greatly influenced by their joint thought except in the case of the first mentioned work. On the other hand, Marx' *Zur Kritik der politischen Ökonomie* (1859) consists of the first two chapters of a massive work which is believed to represent the thought of Marx virtually uninfluenced by Engels.¹

Marx and Engels are best known as the founders of the school of socialist thought that has had a greater following than any other in most countries of the Western world since their day. Marxian socialism has reacted upon social science in many ways in recent decades. It has been the stimulus to frequent searching reexaminations of the orthodox, or "classical," economic theory of value, for Marx set forth a quite different theory—the "labor theory" of value and the theory of "surplus value"—which he deduced from the presuppositions of the orthodox economics. For the purposes of a survey of the main lines of development of social science, the philosophy of history of Marx and Engels is perhaps the most important feature of their work. It is to this aspect of their work that the terms "economic determinism" and "materialist interpretation of history" are applied, both being somewhat inept designations of the actual content of the theory referred to. Perhaps the best name for the specific

¹ The remainder of the *Kritik der politischen Ökonomie* has never been published except for a book entitled *Theorien über den Mehrwert* (1905-1910), prepared by Karl Kautsky from the manuscript left by Marx.

philosophy of history developed by Marx and Engels is "historical materialism." In this doctrine, materialism has a character so remote from what most educated people understand by the term that it might well be called something else. Marxian historical materialism, as we have noted, may be regarded as a kind of idealism.¹

The essentials of this historical materialism have been stated by Sidney Hook, on the basis of scattered and little-known philosophical writings of Marx and Engels, somewhat as follows:² Culture is an interrelated, evolving whole, rooted in the material conditions of life, or the economic structure of society, which is the independent variable in terms of which the other aspects of the process may be explained. By "the economic structure of society" is meant the "material relations of production," *i.e.*, those social relations, as of employer and employee, lord and serf, master and slave, in which human beings find themselves as they participate in the economic life of a society of given general type. Property relations are the formal symbol of these relations of production. The economic structure of society, in the sense in which the term is used by Marx and Engels, is not a matter of technology primarily; in fact, some of the same technological devices of production may be used in societies of quite different economic structure. The economic structure of a society is essentially a matter of the division of the society into classes. Ideologies, political, ethical, religious, and philosophical, arise to express this class system and to justify it or, eventually, to undermine it.³ In general, however, ideologies tend to buttress the existing economic structure. In every society, there is a continuous change in the forces of production, due in modern societies to the development of new technical instruments of production; and at a certain point in their development the forces of production come into conflict with existing property relations. It is then no longer possible under the existing economic system to permit the forces of production to function at their full capacity.

¹ See Sidney Hook, article on materialism, in *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*, vol. 10.

² The following sentences are in the main a very brief summary of a much longer statement presented by Hook in the article previously cited.

³ Marx referred to the ideology, institutions other than economic, etc., of a society, in some passages, as the "social superstructure," in contrast to the "economic basis."

Property relations are then recognized by people of the underprivileged class as an obstacle to their further development, and this class becomes revolutionary in attitude. Eventually, a revolution takes place which overthrows the old economic system and establishes a new one in which the economic structure of society is in harmony with productive forces and with other features of the "social superstructure" which has arisen on the foundations of the old economic basis.

In this Marxian philosophy of history, the influence of the Hegelian formula thesis-antithesis-synthesis is apparent. In spite of the fact that, in certain of their writings, Marx and Engels criticized the method of Hegel sharply, their "dialectical materialism" is usually regarded as an application of the Hegelian formula.

There was soon to appear, however, a book by a younger writer in which the whole Hegelian apparatus was discarded, and the objectives of historical interpretation were quite differently stated from the way they had been by any of the men whom we have considered. Logically, the *Philosophy of History as Sociology* of Paul Barth (1858-1922) should be discussed only after some mention had been made of a phase of German social thought with which we shall be concerned in later chapters, *viz.*, the systematizing, natural-scientific tendency which was first specifically proclaimed by Wilhelm Windelband and Heinrich Rickert and continued, in effect, by Max Weber, Georg Simmel, and others. Barth introduces his book¹ with a critique of the thesis laid down by Windelband and Rickert, that sociology is properly a "natural" science and as such is concerned with the discovery of laws of an entirely different character from the trends of change that the philosophers of history seek to establish. Barth combated the distinction between history and natural science and sought to identify the philosophy of history with sociology. The book is notable chiefly for the review that it contains of the literature of sociology and philosophy which he considered most important for his purpose. It is conceivable that his work has had some influence in transmitting the concept of sociology as the interpretation of history to a later generation of German scholars, for example, Alfred Weber and Karl Mann-

¹ *Die Philosophie der Geschichte als Soziologie*, 1st ed., 1897; 4th ed., 1922. The later editions were revised and greatly enlarged over the first.

heim, who have been developing what they call *Kultursoziologie*, a school of thought that seems to be more in the tradition of philosophy of history than in that of the scientific sociology of Simmel.

At about the same time that Barth's *Philosophy of History as Sociology* was first published, there appeared also a book by Ludwig Stein entitled *Die soziale Frage im Lichte der Philosophie* (1897), which may be mentioned here simply as evidence of the continuing interest in the marginal field between scientific sociology, history, and philosophy. Professor Stein visited the United States in 1923 and delivered lectures at several American universities, subsequently collecting them in a volume with the title *Evolution and Optimism*,¹ which continues the same general tendency exemplified in the earlier work.

The most conspicuous and influential contribution to the philosophy of history that has been made since the turn of the century, in Germany or anywhere else, is without doubt Oswald Spengler's *Untergang des Abendlandes*. Since it was first published in Germany in 1918, this massive work has provoked a great deal of discussion in the countries of the Western world and has given rise to a considerable amount of secondary literature.² There is much that should interest a student of the history and range of social thought in Spengler's first great work, particularly in his approach to his subject as outlined in his opening chapters. For present purposes, we may limit ourselves to two main features of his thought: First, he accepts explicitly and formulates very clearly the distinction between natural-scientific and historical truth which had been previously made by Windelband and Rickert; in this respect, his attitude contrasts with that taken by Paul Barth. Spengler, however, makes no attempt to conceal his unqualified preference for the method and viewpoint of history as a means of getting at the vital facts of human experience. Natural science, he asserts, is suitable only for dealing with the problems of the physical world and not in any sense for

¹ New York, 1926.

² An English translation of *Untergang des Abendlandes* by Atkinson appears under the title *Decline of the West*, 2 vols., New York, 1926-1928; 1-vol. ed., 1934. Among the more useful of the commentaries is *Civilization or Civilizations*, by E. H. Goddard and P. A. Gibbons, London and New York, 1926.

the interpretation of human history, for it deals with time only by reducing it to a kind of space; the method of natural science can never yield a truthful account of human history and social change. Second, the most important feature of Spengler's philosophy of history as regards its content is his theory of culture. He conceives that world history, excluding the story of those uncivilized peoples who may be said to have had virtually no history up to now, is composed of the life histories of a few great "cultures." Each such culture is, in his view, an organism which is born, grows, declines, and eventually dies. Each has its own distinctive character and "destiny," but they resemble each other in general time profile, or life history. The main text of *Untergang des Abendlandes* seeks to demonstrate the applicability of these ideas in the interpretation of actual world history. A noteworthy minor feature is Spengler's thesis that the late stage in the life history of a culture, which he terms "civilization" in a strict and technical sense, is characterized by the dominance of great metropolitan centers. In this respect, his philosophy of history resembles to some extent one of the main currents of contemporary sociological thought in the United States.

It may reasonably be contended that, in spite of all that Spengler and others have said about the difference between natural science and history, his philosophy of history resembles natural science to a certain extent. This is especially true in that he makes the assumption, implicitly, that the great "cultures" have been such that each of them might be lifted out of its place in historic time, so to speak, and laid down alongside of another for purposes of comparison. Precisely this is implied by the natural scientist's use of the term "natural process"; and it may be held to involve treating time as a kind of space.

One of the latest prominent manifestations of scholarly attention to the philosophy of history centers in the work of Prof. Kurt Breysig of the University of Berlin, who has published in recent years a work in several volumes under the general title *Vom geschichtlichen Werden* (literally, *On Historical Becoming*). In the second volume of this work, *Die Macht des Gedankens in der Geschichte* (*The Power of Thought in History*)¹ the author indicates his belief that it is only by some such analysis of his-

¹ Stuttgart and Berlin, 1926.

torical data as he undertakes that a valid social science can be developed. In view of the fact that he takes this attitude, it is of interest to discover that he treats historical events and movements comparatively, *i.e.*, as types rather than as unique data. A fundamental thesis developed by Breysig is that the only true creative, or originative, forces operative in the history of human society arise in individuals, in fact in a small number of gifted individuals. He holds that such words as *Gemeinschaft* (community) and *Zeitgeist* (spirit of the age) designate at most a product of historical becoming and not a creative factor. Collective behavior is, in his view, the result of the transmission of activities and ideas from a few leaders and innovators to the masses, who imitate the leaders. The contribution of the creative individual has the greatest social and historical effect according to Breysig, however, when its force is exerted in the direction of some previously developed historical trend, which may be depicted by the historian as the *Zeitgeist*. He regards it as legitimate to analyze the acts of individuals into motives (*Triebe*), which are common to all men and are in some sense realities, or facts.¹

Professor Breysig takes his departure from the philosophy of history of Marx, of whom he speaks with great respect, and from that of Hegel. He takes great pains, however, to distinguish his own view from those of Marx and Hegel and also from those of Kant. His work seems to have launched a school of thought in Germany; at least some of his students have developed his ideas in later publications.

¹ In this brief account of Breysig, use has been made of a review of his "Die Macht des Gedankens in der Geschichte," written for the *American Journal of Sociology*, vol. 32, pp. 660-661, 1927.

CHAPTER IX

SOCIETY AND THE STATE

In the foregoing chapters, we have surveyed the development of political science and of economics down to the middle of the nineteenth century, with brief glances at even more recent developments. We have proceeded on the assumption that politics was the first of the social sciences to appear; that economics originated, chiefly in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, by differentiation from political theory; and that sociology has been the latest of the really fundamental social sciences to take shape, up to now, as a separate and independent discipline. This assumption is based on the antecedent postulate that the existence of a separate science is dependent upon the existence of fairly clear and definite conceptions of the objects with which it is concerned. Thus, we have said, politics became a science when, and in the measure that, "the state" and related terms were understood to refer to things that could be studied comparatively and with some detachment. Similarly, political economy may be said to have come into existence, as a science more or less distinct from general political theory, when "money" and "price" were sufficiently well defined as terms referring to phenomena that might be studied objectively. Following the same principle of interpretation, we can account for the appearance of sociology as a more or less distinct science in the middle of the nineteenth century by the fact that, by this time, philosophers and statesmen had begun to conceive "society" as an entity that could be distinguished from the state. Up to this time, the technique of formulating the problems of social science was still essentially that of Plato and Aristotle. The task of the social sciences was conceived primarily as one of defining fundamental "ideas," or concepts. There had been something of a drive toward objectivity, as we have seen, notably in historiography; but this movement, in the abstract, or general, sciences of politics and economics, was quite secondary to the drive for

clearer conceptualization. This was perhaps as it should be; the collection and scrutiny of data for the social studies are a relatively unprofitable occupation except as it is guided by hypotheses suggested by the concepts that have been formulated.

It is impossible to date the origin of the distinction between "society" and the state; it was developed gradually from the status of a common-sense notion, not worth any particular emphasis, to that of a fundamental distinction. The word "society" can of course be traced to the Latin *societas*; and this Latin term occurs in medieval scholastic literature, notably in the writings of St. Thomas Aquinas. The equivalent German term *Gesellschaft*, according to Theodor Geiger,¹ was first used to designate the retainers of a feudal lord who lived with him and were counted as members of the "round table." By the end of the eighteenth century, Geiger finds *Gesellschaft* employed in a sense approximating our common use of the term to designate those who assemble for purposes of sociability and polite intercourse in some one's home. From about the same time, furthermore, the German term had also a legal meaning; in this connection, it referred to the citizens of a state collectively, in their role as "subjects." Presently it acquired still another meaning, *viz.*, a body of persons bound together by some contract. This latter meaning of the term, as we shall see, was used by Ferdinand Tönnies as the starting point for his famous distinction between *Gemeinschaft* (community) and *Gesellschaft* (society). Finally, Geiger reports that, during about the same period, *i.e.*, during the eighteenth century or early in the nineteenth, *Gesellschaft* sometimes referred to the people of a nation who are united by common customs and morals.

So far as the use of the term *Gesellschaft* by the writers of systematic treatises is concerned, it may be said, first, that the distinction between "civil society" and the state is clearly implicit in Jean Bodin's *Republic*.² No doubt it would be possible to demonstrate the continuity of the idea in the literature of social and political theory from the time when this treatise

¹ "Gesellschaft," *Handwörterbuch der Soziologie*, pp. 201-211, Stuttgart, 1931. See also article on "Society" in *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*, vol. 14.

² *Six Books of a Commonweale*, pp. 46-47; see also Book III, Chap. VII; also J. P. Lichtenberger, *Development of Social Theory*, pp. 166-168.

was written (1576). At any rate, we find it appearing explicitly in 1792, in Wilhelm Humboldt's *Ideas for an Attempt to Determine the Limits of the Activity of the State*. Assuming the origin of the state in a contract, Humboldt deduces from this premise that the state is simply one among many means existing for the promotion of human welfare and distinguishes specifically between the "social union" (*Nationalverein*) and the state.¹ By this time, however, the concept "society" was becoming rather common and well recognized as a technical one. Thomas Paine, as we have noted in a previous chapter, had made the distinction between society and the state in his revolutionary pamphlets.

At the beginning of the nineteenth century, then, under the influence, as Geiger believes, of a tendency on the part of English writers to secularize social and political thought,² German writers began the distinction between society (*Gesellschaft*) and the state (*Staat*), with reference especially to the newly developing concept of civil (*bürgerliche*) society as the free, naturally evolving association of citizens which the state must take into account, but which has its own nature and destiny. Up to this time, the state had remained, for most thinkers, a sacred object, and nowhere more so than in Germany. The conception of the state as a sacred thing was supported, of course, by the doctrine of the divine right of kings; however, the eighteenth and nineteenth century German philosophers of history and state philosophers formulated a more or less mystical concept of the state which tended to endow it with an odor of sanctity independently of its representation by a divinely appointed sovereign. English thinkers, on the other hand, with their glorification of individualism and liberty and the doctrine of constitutional monarchy which they eventually evolved, developed the concept of the state as a secular object, an artifact which men may shape at will, much as the Greek thinkers had conceived it two thousand years before.

In the beginnings of modern German political theory, following in a general way the political theory of the Middle Ages, the state was conceived as an all-inclusive social organism; no form of association other than the state, the family, and the church

¹ W. A. Dunning, *Political Theories*, vol. III: *From Rousseau to Spencer*, pp. 148 ff.

² *Loc. cit.*

was even deemed worth the notice of philosophers. On the other hand, they conceived the state as an entity from which authority emanates, but in which citizens have no important part to play except as subjects who owe obedience to the sovereign. The notion of "society," as a technical concept injected into this discussion, had its roots in an effort to assert the rights of ordinary citizens, especially, in the beginning, the newly forming burgher class. This particular technical conception of society was, in short, a product of the democratic movement. The development of the concept, however, gave rise to the idea that this entity, society, might be made the object of systematic study, that it developed and behaved according to natural laws and by a natural process, not necessarily the same that operated to shape the state. The concept of society, clearly differentiated from the concept of the state, became the source of a science of society.

In other words, just as it has been shown that political theory developed roughly in proportion to the development and differentiation of political phenomena which could serve as the object matter of such speculation, and just as economic thought differentiated from political theory and became scientific when economic phenomena had sufficiently differentiated from the activities of governments, so it happened that the concept "society" was distinguished from the concept "state," and the possibility of a science of society more or less separate from the theory of the state was conceived, when there began to exist in the Western world associations of persons other than the family, the state, and the church. Conceivably, a science or theory of the family and a theory of the church might have come into existence long before the nineteenth century. But it seems that the family was too closely bound up with deeply rooted sentiments and beliefs to become the object of detached, reflective consideration until other phases of social science were developed to the point where they suggested the point of view and the method. There was, in fact, a theory of the church in the Middle Ages and, in the writings of the Church Fathers, the Schoolmen, and Richard Hooker, it may be studied as one of the antecedents of modern social science. This theory of the church, however, was theology, or at best it was something closely connected with theology, as in the case of Hooker's *Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity*;

hence it could scarcely become the immediate prototype of social science in the modern sense of the term. This was seen and clearly stated by Auguste Comte in the period with which we are now concerned.

At all events, the distinction between society and the state began to be commonplace by the middle of the nineteenth century. As we have seen, it had been expressly made by a number of writers before that time, among them Thomas Paine, Wilhelm Humboldt, the Marquis de Bonald, and Hegel. Among the earliest German writers who developed the distinction, however, were Lorenz von Stein, Heinrich Ahrens (1808-1874), and Robert von Mohl (1799-1875).¹ The distinction made between society and the state by Stein is in effect the same that other writers of the period developed, but by a curious line of reasoning he arrives at a definition of the two terms which practically reverses their meaning from that attached to them by other writers. The conception of society set forth in his earliest important work, *Der Begriff der Gesellschaft und die französischen Revolution bis zum Jahre 1830*, published in 1849, is a characteristically German interpretation of the theories of economic freedom and individualism developed by the successors of Adam Smith. Society, he says, expresses the principle of blind, unintelligent self-interest; while the state operates to make everyone free to achieve the satisfaction of his desires by his own intelligent efforts. If class distinctions prevail, the state is destroyed, and the community becomes "absolute society."² Ten years later, in his *Principles of Social Science*,³ Henry C. Carey employed a similar concept of society; i.e., he regarded the progressive differentiation of its parts, or in other words the division of labor, as the most characteristic mark of society.

Heinrich Ahrens seems to have been one of the first writers to pay attention specifically to the fact that there are, within the state, associations of people who cooperate for various pur-

¹ See Albion W. Small, "The Sociologizing Movement within Political Science," *Origins of Sociology*, Chap. XVIII; also W. A. Dunning, "Societarian Political Theory," *Political Theories*, vol. III: *From Rousseau to Spencer*, Chap. IX. Articles on the men discussed will be found in the *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*.

² Dunning, *op. cit.*, pp. 377-379.

³ Pp. 198 ff., 291, Philadelphia, 1858.

poses of their own; that these associations are to a certain extent self-determining; that they behave and evolve according to forces inherent in their nature; and that they play a role that a realistic theory of the state will have to take into account. Robert von Mohl, impressed by the reasoning of Ahrens, von Stein, and others, developed their ideas into a systematic discussion of the need for social science (*Gesellschaftswissenschaft*), which should be something distinct from political science (*Staatswissenschaft*). This view was attacked sharply by the famous historian and political theorist Heinrich von Treitschke, who upheld the theory of an absolute, all-inclusive state. As a matter of fact, none of these writers managed to conceive of a social order in which the state would not be the supreme fact; and accordingly in their terminology sociology was designated as one of a family of disciplines called "political sciences" (*Staatswissenschaften*). This tendency persists in German social theory and academic organization to this day. The work of these political theorists, however, operating in conjunction with that of the philosophers of history and supplemented, in the United States particularly, by the efforts of social reformers and philanthropists to rationalize their activities, prepared the way for the development of a new science which was to receive at the hands of Comte the name "sociology."

CHAPTER X

THE "NEW SCIENCE"

The various beginnings of modern social science and historiography, which for convenience we are considering here in a series of separate chapters, actually took place during much the same period of time. Broadly speaking, some movement toward the present condition of the social sciences took place during the eighteenth century; and really spectacular progress was made in the nineteenth. Political economy, as we have seen, reached a comparatively advanced stage of development with the publication of *The Wealth of Nations* in 1776, and its progress was rapid after that date. Modern sociology, on the other hand, is essentially a product of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Beginning about 1875, the publication of significant sociological works went on at a rapid rate; up to that time, the development of a more or less distinct and separate science such as sociology was to become had been foretold, but it had scarcely taken place. It is the purpose of this chapter to survey the anticipations of a science of sociology which can be detected in the writings of a series of eighteenth and early nineteenth century authors, beginning with Vico. Although the distinction between society and the state was adumbrated earlier than the time of Vico, and although the making of this distinction may be taken as one of the reasons for the differentiation of sociology from political theory, no one seems to have announced definitely the possibility of such a "new science" earlier than he.

Giovanni Battista Vico (1668?-1744) lived throughout his life in Naples, a man of obscure status. Little has been published about his personal history, and apparently little can be discovered about it.¹ Although he left a considerable body of

¹ There is a short autobiography of Vico in the four-volume collection of his minor writings which was published in Naples in 1814. There is no English translation of *La Scienza Nuova*. The principal secondary treatments of his work are the following: Robert Flint, *Vico*, Edinburgh and London, 1884; S. H. Swinny, "Giambattista Vico," *Sociological Review*,

writings, his importance and influence on the subsequent development of social thought are due almost entirely to one book, *La scienza nuova* (*The New Science*), first published in 1725 and revised in 1730 and 1744.

It may plausibly be contended that Vico contributed to the philosophy of history rather than to sociology. Because he announced a "new science" which was to deal with the development of society in general and not of the state alone, however, he seems to have anticipated what has come to be known as sociology. Since he conceived his ideal historical cycle in terms of the rise and decline of states, he might be classified as a political theorist; however the scope of his work is sufficiently comprehensive to justify us in placing him with those who stand in the direct line of forerunners of modern sociology. There can be little doubt that Vico would have labeled what he wrote "philosophy of history" if he had lived a century and a half later when the phrase was current. It was his expressed intention to arrive at a representation of "eternal, ideal history, according to which the history of all nations transpires, with definite origins and definite continuity."¹ He postulates a natural, eternal, and universal law of nations and supports the postulate by the conception that the nations are united in a great "world city." This natural law of nations has developed along with the customs of the people, which are regarded by Vico as constant factors in history, and their usages, which change slowly and gradually. He treats this process of development as one of moralization; he was a devout Catholic and undertakes with considerable skill to reconcile the religious and moralistic with the disinterested, scientific point of view. His interpretation of world history starts from the concept of a universal human nature, common to all peoples. This is in the beginning simply an assumption, but Vico tries to support it by empirical evidence.

vol. 7, No. 1, 1914; Benedetto Croce, *The Philosophy of Giambattista Vico*, trans. by Collingwood, New York, 1913; Richard Peters, *Der Aufbau der Weltgeschichte bei Giambattista Vico*, Stuttgart and Berlin, 1929. See also J. P. Lichtenberger, *Development of Social Theory*, pp. 210-213; Werner Sombart, *Die drei Nationalökonomien*, pp. 156 ff., Munich and Leipzig, 1930.

¹ Translated from the German of Richard Peters, *op. cit.*, pp. 10-12. I have relied on Peters chiefly for the brief summary of *La scienza nuova* given here.

The nature of man, he holds, is known to us directly and subjectively, because we are human. Indeed, he contends that human society is a more suitable subject of scientific investigation than the physical world, for the latter is known to God alone, who created it, while we ourselves are the creators, in part, of society, and hence we know its nature.

The idea of divine providence runs through the entire text of *La scienza nuova*; in fact, it is the heuristic device by which the author's treatment of his subject matter is chiefly effected. Vico's ostensible purpose is to describe the working of providence in human history. He held, however, that God directs the course of human affairs through natural causes rather than by miraculous intervention in particular cases. His inquiry into the operation of divine providence, therefore, assumes the form of an inquiry into the natural sequence of events; and thus Vico's point of view makes possible a secular interpretation of history.

His interpretation of history is distinctly collectivistic. In his conception of historical causation, the masses are everything, and the great man is a mere instrumentality whereby the natural tendency of a society manifests itself. This, which is commonplace today though not universally accepted, was a novel idea in Vico's day. The last chapter of *La scienza nuova* is entitled "Concerning an eternal, natural state which, according to the wisdom of divine providence, is completed in every way." The title suggests a brief utopian sketch, but the chapter is really that only in a very limited sense and degree. For the most fundamental theme in Vico's philosophy of history is that of the eternally recurrent cycle, *corso-ricorso*. He regards a monarchy as the ideal final stage of the cycle but treats the republican state as an only slightly inferior form of the same general type and stage of development. When one of these forms has been reached in the course of evolution of a state, there is no possibility of change for the better; hence, Vico contended, as change is eternal and inevitable, there will be a change for the worse, which will tend to take the form of a return to a relatively primitive condition of society. From this, the ascent will again be slowly made.

Particularly interesting features of the book are the discussion of "poetic wisdom," which is involved in Vico's interpretation of myth, and his solution of the Homeric problem, which is regarded by many students as his greatest accomplishment. To

him, however, these were incidental to his treatment of the first two stages of his cycle of historical recurrence—the age of the gods and the heroic age. He seems to have been the first to lay down the theory that myths, while they cannot be accepted literally as history, nevertheless may be said to contain history preserved in a special form; they are the type of wisdom by which mankind lived and acted in the earlier stages of social development. This wisdom was not rational; it was "poetic" and given to the shaping of phantasies as interpretations of whatever was not entirely self-explanatory. Myth requires interpretation if it is to be used as source material in historical inquiry. In Vico's opinion, Homer was at most the human instrument through whose efforts an early body of "poetic wisdom" was formulated; more probably, he says, Homer is a somewhat mythical or legendary figure himself, like the heroes whose exploits are recounted in the works attributed to him.

Vico conceived his own method to be "comparative," but the term as he used it requires definition. It was his theory, as we have seen, that peoples in the course of their history pass through the same cycle of development and decadence, over and over. Accordingly, the method of inquiry by which the general form of this cycle is established should be comparative, the histories of different nations being compared to discover their parallelism, but this parallelism is something that can be established only by abstracting the story of each nation from historic time and comparing its cycles with the analogous stages in the history of other nations. This suggests the philosophy of history of Oswald Spengler; Peters holds, however, that the resemblance is superficial; Spengler thinks of nations (cultures) as being born, maturing, growing old, and dying, while in Vico's theory the nation is continually reborn, like the phoenix, from its ashes.

The influence of Vico is unmistakably discernible in Montesquieu's *Spirit of the Laws*; and it would not be unreasonable to treat Montesquieu (1689–1755) as the second outstanding figure in a series of great social and political thinkers which begins with Vico. For present purposes, however, we have chosen to regard Montesquieu as one of the important pioneers in the development of modern political science and have examined his work in some detail in that connection. In the present context, we shall proceed directly from Vico to Condorcet, a

writer whose work followed that of Vico after a generation, for Condorcet was born in the year before that in which Vico died. Vico, Condorcet, Saint-Simon, and Comte may be regarded as social philosophers whose work falls into a natural sequence, in the order in which their names have just been mentioned. All of them were interested in the "progress," or social evolution, of mankind, a topic which, reinforced by the biological theories of Darwin, Wallace, and Huxley and by the philosophy of Herbert Spencer, became one of the dominant preoccupations of sociologists in the latter part of the nineteenth century and the opening years of our own. Since 1920, there has been some difference of opinion among sociologists concerning the propriety of treating social evolution, or progress, as a primary topic of scientific sociology, but down to about that time, the question was scarcely raised. It was taken for granted that the most important problem of sociology was the interpretation of social evolution, or progress; and in the formation of this point of view, Vico, Condorcet, Saint-Simon, and Comte were pioneers.

Marie Jean Antoine Nicolas Caritat, Marquis de Condorcet, was born in Picardy in 1743. His early training was Catholic and conservative, but, becoming interested in the social and political questions that were agitating France in his youth, he repudiated entirely his clerical background and became, eventually, a radical freethinker and anticlerical propagandist associated with the groups known as the Encyclopedists and the philosophists. He was a member of two governmental bodies during the French Revolution, the Legislative Assembly and the Convention, but his ideas and attitude were such that he was acceptable neither to the radicals nor to the conservatives. He was proscribed during the Terror and died in prison, according to tradition a suicide by poison, in 1794. His principal work, *Esquisse d'un tableau historique des progrès de l'esprit humain* (*Outline of Historical Table of the Progress of the Human Mind*), was published posthumously by his friends in 1795, having been written during the last year of his life.¹

¹ J. Salwynn Shapiro, article on Condorcet in *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*, vol. 4; also same author's *Condorcet and the Rise of Liberalism*, New York, 1934. See also J. P. Lichtenberger, *Development of Social Theory*, pp. 238-240. An edition of *Esquisse d'un tableau historique des progrès de l'esprit humain*, Paris, 1822, has been used here.

From its title, Condorcet's chief work appears to be a contribution to psychology, rather than to social science, but if one knows what he meant by the "progress of the human mind," the case appears quite different. The main text of the book is in fact an interpretation of world history, or "human progress" in the ordinary sense of the term; and, to this extent at least, it resembles the "new science" of Vico more than it does the work of Montesquieu. Condorcet's *Historical Sketch of the Progress of the Human Mind* begins, however, with the succinct statement of a thesis which he calls "metaphysical," but which would be termed "psychological" by most writers of today. It is in part a reiteration of the doctrine of Hobbes and Locke:

Man is born with the faculty of receiving sensations, of perceiving them, and of distinguishing in those which he receives the simple sensations of which they are composed, of retaining them, combining them, conserving or recalling them in his memory, of comparing the combinations with one another, of seizing that which they have in common and that which distinguishes them, of attaching signs to all these objects, in order to recognize them better, and to facilitate new combinations.

This faculty develops in him by the action of external things, that is to say, by the presence of certain compound sensations, the constancy of which, in the identity of their totality, or in the laws of their changes, is independent of him. He exercises it equally by communication with individuals like himself and, eventually, by artificial means which, after the first development of this faculty, men have been able to invent.

Sensations are accompanied by pleasure and pain; and man has the faculty of transforming these momentary impressions into enduring sentiments, pleasant or painful; of experiencing these sentiments at the sight or recollection of the pleasures or misfortunes of other sensible beings. Finally, there are born of that faculty, combined with that of forming and combining ideas, relations of interest and obligation between him and his kind, to which nature has attached the most precious part of our happiness and the most unhappy of our ills.

If one limits himself to observing, to learning the general facts and the laws which are manifested in the development of these faculties, in whatever is common to different individuals of the human species, the resulting science bears the name of metaphysics.

But this same development in its results, is relative to the mass of individuals who coexist at the same time in a given space, and if one follows them from generation to generation, he presents then the description of the progress of the human mind. This progress is subject to the same general laws which can be observed in the individual development

of our faculties, since it is the result of that development, considered at one and the same time in a great number of individuals united in society. But the result manifested at each instant depends on that which the preceding instant offered, and influences that of the time to follow.

This description is historical, then, subject to perpetual variations; it is formed by the successive observation of human societies at the different epochs through which they have passed. It ought to present the order of the changes, make clear the influence which each instant exercises upon that which replaces it, and show thus, in the modifications which the human species has undergone . . . the path which it has traveled, and the steps it has taken toward truth or goodness. These observations, on what man has been, on what he is today, lead next to the means of insuring and accelerating fresh progress to which his nature permits him to aspire.

Such is the aim of the work I have undertaken.¹

These introductory remarks are followed by a concise review of human history, which Condorcet divides into nine "epochs," and a concluding chapter, or section, entitled "Tenth Epoch, The Future Progress of the Human Mind." The book reminds one of Vico's *La scienza nuova*, not only in general but in these details of organization; however, Condorcet's concluding chapter is much more optimistic than that of Vico; Condorcet entertains no idea of an inevitable relapse of society to a primitive stage, from which it must begin its progress over, but rather defends the idea of continuous progress. This became a popular idea in France and England from about this time but has also been subjected ever since to considerable criticism and unfavorable comment.²

Condorcet is known for his views, which were quite radical for his time, on equality of the sexes, social classes, races, and nations. This equality, he holds, should be promoted by equalizing opportunity, which can be done by the state through education. He may be regarded as a contributor to the eventual development of scientific sociology chiefly through his expression of the theory that society is a realm in which natural causation operates, according to laws which can be known and formulated.

¹ *Op. cit.*, trans. from Paris ed., pp. 1-3, 1822.

² See J. B. Bury, *The Idea of Progress*, London, 1920; American ed., New York, 1932.

Because his efforts were directed toward the discovery of a general trend of human progress, however, rather than to the formulation of "laws" which state in general terms the processes by which change takes place in society, he must be classified primarily as a writer of philosophy of history.

This tendency to view the problem of a "new science" primarily as a task of describing the general trend of human social change, or progress, is continued by Saint-Simon and Comte. Indeed, it was continued still further, with modifications, by Spencer, Gumpłowicz, Ratzenhofer, Lester F. Ward, Carver, and other early sociologists. In the writings of Spencer, however, another emphasis begins to be visible.

Claude Henri, Comte de Saint-Simon (1760-1825), is known to history chiefly as the originator of utopian schemes for the construction of a new social order, rather than for his contributions to scientific methodology, but it is an established fact that Comte derived his concept "positivism" almost completely from the teachings of Saint-Simon. Saint-Simon laid down definitely the proposition that social reform and reconstruction should be based on scientific ("positive") knowledge; and, less definitely, he anticipated Comte's law of the three states. None of Saint-Simon's published works has been read by later generations to the same extent as Condorcet's *Progress of the Human Mind* or Comte's *Positive Philosophy*. In a history of utopian thought, Saint-Simon would occupy a position of much greater importance than can be assigned to him in a survey of the development of social science.¹

Isidore Auguste Marie François Xavier Comte (1798-1857) was born at Montpellier, France, of middle-class parents who were devout Catholics and royalists. The story of his personal development reminds one of that of Condorcet. Presumably trained in early youth as a Catholic, he soon became a freethinker and was thus placed in a position of opposition to the established social order, but as the revolution progressed, it became less of a handicap to him to hold such ideas. From his late youth he attracted a circle of personal hearers and pupils who were interested in his ideas and attended lectures which he gave in

¹ See Harold A. Larrabee, article on Saint-Simon in *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*, vol. 13; also J. P. Lichtenberger, *Development of Social Theory*, pp. 240-243.

his home. Most critics consider his later work, particularly the *Système de politique positive, ou traité de sociologie instituant la religion de l'humanité* (1851-1854), unimportant except as an illustration of the trend that may be taken by a brilliant mind that has become disorganized; however, this judgment may be extreme and unwarranted. Certainly Comte's influence on science, philosophy, and the social studies has been exercised chiefly through his *Cours de philosophie positive*, which was published serially in Paris during the years 1830-1842 and in abridged English translation by Harriet Martineau in 1855.¹

The writings of Comte are voluminous, particularly in view of the magnitude and difficulty of the task that he undertook, for it had been attempted by no previous writer since Aristotle and by only one other person since Comte began his labors, viz., his younger contemporary Herbert Spencer. It was, in short, the review and analysis of the whole range of human knowledge, particularly in its systematic, abstract, and generalized aspects. His ultimate purpose was to formulate the basic principles of a science of society, but as a preliminary to this task he found it necessary to develop a philosophy of the sciences. In the execution of these undertakings, Comte eventually wrote his *Cours de philosophie positive* in six volumes of over seven hundred pages each and four volumes of his *Système de politique positive*, besides a number of incidental and lesser works; his death forestalled the composition of a final volume of the *Politique positive* which he had planned. When one realizes that recorded in these volumes is a great deal of well-thought-out abstract reasoning, in addition to the concrete material by which the author supports his generalizations and abstractions, and when it is known that Comte progressively modified his theories during his life, it is apparent that only a very inadequate and superficial characterization of his contributions to social science and philoso-

¹ Abridgments of the *Positive Philosophy* have been published in French and in German by other persons, and the secondary literature on Comte is abundant. For a favorable interpretation of the *Système de politique positive* see McQuilkin de Grange, *La courbe de mouvement sociétal*, Paris, 1923. Probably the best succinct summary and critical evaluation of the work of Comte is the same author's chapter "The Method of Auguste Comte," in Stuart A. Rice, ed., *Methods in Social Science, A Case Book*, Chicago, 1931.

phy can be given here, owing to limitations of space. No account of the sociological theories of Comte and their philosophical foundations much shorter than the excellent analysis prepared by McQuilkin de Grange¹ can be really adequate. So involved and voluminous are Comte's own works, however, that such a competent analysis and summary is more serviceable to the average student than are the primary texts.

Three of Comte's ideas which are not, ostensibly, a part of his contribution to the methodology of social science should nevertheless be kept in mind as a framework for the latter, viz., his "law of the three states"; his theory of the classification and filiation of the sciences; and his conception of the nature of fundamental science, based on the distinction between events and things. He made the generalization that "from the nature of the human intellect, each branch of knowledge in its development has to pass through three different theoretical states: the theological, or fictitious, state; the metaphysical, or abstract, state; and . . . the scientific, or positive." The first two of these states, however, he regarded as closely similar to each other; the real advance is made when the positive state is reached. The theological state is that in which all questions of causation are answered in terms of the activity of supernatural beings; the metaphysical state is that in which abstract forces or entities are conceived as the causes of phenomena; while in the positive state a branch of knowledge abandons the search for absolute causes and seeks simply to establish laws of coexistence and sequence. As the advance to the positive state is made, imagination is systematically subordinated to observation. In short, by "positive," as the term is applied to a science or branch of knowledge, Comte meant much the same thing that we usually express by the term "scientific." He held that the basic sciences necessarily attain the positive state in a certain order, each being dependent upon those that precede it. This order of the basic sciences, as Comte gave it in the *Positive Philosophy*, after setting aside mathematics as an instrument of all the sciences, was as follows: astronomy, physics, chemistry, biology or physiology (of which psychology was, in his conception, a branch), and sociology. In the *Positive Polity*, he revised this classification, adding "morals" (ethics?) to the list; and De Grange thinks

¹ Stuart A. Rice, ed., *Methods in Social Science*, loc. cit.

that, had he lived to write the projected fifth volume of this latter work, he might have added still another term to the list.¹

It is a postulate of Comte's philosophy that the basic sciences deal only with attributes of things, which are arrived at by regarding events abstractly or generally, rather than with things, or "beings," as such. As De Grange has shown, this postulate came to have, in the course of Comte's work on the *System of Positive Polity*, an important influence upon his classification of the sciences lying beyond biology in his scheme.² We should recall also, among the preliminaries and presuppositions of Comte's proposals for a science of society, his distinction between the historical and "dogmatic" methods of presenting a science, which we touched on in the opening chapter of this volume.

When, in volume IV of the *Positive Philosophy*, Comte finally arrived at the point where he was ready to consider at length the new science of social physics, or sociology, as he named it for the first time in 1839, he did not have much to contribute after all. In fact, he did not pretend to be able to contribute much, for he held that the attempt to write a preliminary treatise on a science before it has been studied must be futile. His treatment of sociology, accordingly, resolves itself largely into a discussion of methods. Methods, however, cannot, in Comte's view, be separated from doctrines; hence he formulated the proposition, now commonplace but not always well understood, that when one formulates preliminary or hypothetical doctrines for a science, one is, in effect, outlining methods for it. The most fundamental and distinctive methods employed in a science, in short, are the ways of conceiving, or abstracting from the phenomena of experience that characterize that science. The phenomena that a science studies are not, in their common-sense apprehension, necessarily distinct or different from those studied by other sciences; the particular science is distinguished from others by its direction of attention and by the character of the abstraction that it makes of certain attributes from the things, or, as Comte termed them, "beings" with which it starts.

Comte attempted to state a few preliminary sociological abstractions and generalizations and a few remarks concerning

¹ McQuilkin de Grange, "The Method of Auguste Comte," *loc. cit.*, pp. 45-48.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 46-58.

the methods, in the narrower sense of the term, which sociology would have to use. He distinguished two main divisions of the science: social statics and social dynamics. The term "statics" had for Comte, as it has had for other theorists since his day, a somewhat different meaning from that which it has in ordinary discourse. It involves "the investigation of the laws of action and reaction of the different parts of the social system—apart, for the occasion, from the fundamental movement which is always gradually modifying them."¹ "Dynamical study," then, becomes the study of the "movement," *i.e.*, the change that takes place in the social system with the passage of time. It is characteristic of the whole trend of Comte's thought that he regards social dynamics as the more interesting and important part of sociology and devotes much more space to it in *Positive Philosophy* than to social statics.

The essential theme of social statics, as he outlines the topic, is "social consensus," by which he means not a distinctively psychic relationship but the fundamental solidarity of human society, each of the parts of which is continually influencing all the others. Comte was emphatic in his judgment that, because of this universal consensus of phenomena, they cannot be rationally separated for purposes of study. Carried to its logical conclusion, this would mean that abstraction and generalization are impossible in sociology. How Comte reconciled with this his manifest disposition to formulate quite general propositions of social statics and dynamics is not altogether clear. Space limitations preclude our giving further attention to his treatment of social statics, beyond mentioning the topical outline of his discussion, as it appears in Martineau's translation, *viz.*:

1. The individual
2. The family
 - The sexual relation
 - The parental relation
3. Society
 - Distribution of employments
 - Inconveniences
 - Basis of the true theory of government
 - Elementary subordination
 - Tendency of society to government²

¹ Martineau's translation of *Positive Philosophy*, Book VI, Chap. III.

² *Op. cit.*, Table of Contents, Book VI, Chap. V.

In the treatment of social dynamics, Comte proposed to use chiefly the "historical method," which he defined as the study of human history in the light of a conception of the whole of the fundamental evolution of mankind. The comparative method, which he regarded as in a certain sense a more fundamental and logical procedure, could, he held, be used in sociology only when guided by some such conception of human social evolution. As a methodological device, he proposed Condorcet's fiction of a single people to whom might be ascribed all the successive modifications observed in the history of different peoples.¹ The law of the three states, which was developed as a basic part of his account of the development of the sciences, forms an important element in his treatment of social dynamics. Space limits preclude our reviewing his treatment of the matter in detail. The avowed aim of Comte's social dynamics is the establishment of prevision, by which social practice, including particularly government and politics, may become more intelligent and efficient.) He held that the scope of deliberate human intervention in social evolution is limited by the fact that the general direction of progress and its eventual outcome are determined by positive law; the utmost that intelligence can do is to modify the secondary effect of forces and thus to accelerate somewhat the rate of natural change. The succession of the theological and metaphysical states by the positive he regarded as natural and, ultimately, inevitable.

The influence actually exercised by Comte upon the subsequent development of the social sciences is more difficult to determine than is the case with some of the other nineteenth century pioneers. John Stuart Mill was admittedly impressed and

¹ It is characteristic of Comte, in distinction, on the whole, from most of his predecessors, that he mentions a number of those whom he regards as his predecessors, frequently speaking with approval of their contributions and giving them credit specifically for ideas that he borrows from them. In a footnote to the Preface to vol. VI of *Cours de philosophie positive* (Paris, 1842), however, Comte states that he has never read Vico, Kant, Herder, or Hegel and that he has only a quite insufficient knowledge of their ideas. This negligence, he says, has been voluntary, and he is convinced that it has contributed to the "purity and harmony" of his social philosophy. He now proposes (1842) to learn the German language in order to appreciate better the relation of his system to those of the principal German schools. (*Op. cit.*, Preface, pp. xxxv-xxxvi.)

influenced, but it is noteworthy that Herbert Spencer and A. W. Small, outstanding English and American sociological pioneers respectively, were definitely critical of Comte's ideas; and Comtean influences in other important sociological writings cannot readily be specifically traced. His general conception of positive philosophy, or positive science, based on observation and experiment rather than on speculation, came to have great prestige; indeed, the question arises whether it did not acquire an exaggerated and unfortunate prestige, to the prejudice of the proper use of trained imagination in science. To what extent Comte should be credited with the influence of a pioneer in the expression of this idea, however, it is impossible to say. It can easily be traced to Francis Bacon, to whom, indeed, Comte refers with respect. That he invented the name "sociology" is not disputed, and without doubt the appearance of the name had something to do with later efforts to give content to such a science. On the other hand, it may be plausibly contended that Spencer would have written his works substantially as he did if Comte had never lived. In other countries than France it seems to have been the case that the early development of sociology as a separate, recognized "science," or discipline, followed the pattern set by Spencer rather than that of Comte. There are passages in the works of Comte, however, particularly those which discuss the methodological presuppositions of social science and the basic logical concepts and distinctions upon which such science must be based, which are still worth study.

CHAPTER XI

THE ORGANIC ANALOGY

When sociology began to command attention, in the latter half of the nineteenth century, its earliest development took the form of a series of doctrines which might be termed "sociologies of one idea." That is, each of the pioneers sought to illuminate the problems that they regarded as sociological by some one fundamental conception which was seen as a kind of magic key to open all doors. There were several of these conceptions, each of which was elaborated by one or more authors as the solution of all sociological problems. Thus in the works of Gabriel Tarde and the earlier writings of E. A. Ross, "imitation" was put forward as the one basic sociological concept; Gumplowicz, Ratzenhofer, Novicow, and others were inclined to regard conflict and the equilibration of opposing social tendencies as the fundamental social process; Durkheim and his followers held, in effect, that the control of the group over the individual was the basic "social fact"; while Giddings, in his earlier writings, virtually built a whole system of sociological theory around the concepts of like-mindedness and "consciousness of kind." Of all one-idea sociological theories, however, the most influential was the analogy of a society to an organism, which was developed in considerable detail by Herbert Spencer and was emphasized even more by Paul von Lilienfeld, Albert Schaeffle, and René Worms. The popularity of this concept was due no doubt to the fact that it was one of the first in the field; it appeared at a psychological moment. It had the advantage also of suggesting in a rather obvious way a comprehensive system of sociological generalizations based on the elaboration of the comparison of a society to an organism and on the distinction that at once suggested itself between social anatomy and social physiology. It is but fair to Spencer to add that his sociological system was by no means so completely dependent on the organic analogy as has sometimes

been asserted or implied by his commentators. He would probably have claimed that his ¹general theory of evolution was much more fundamental to his system of sociology than was the organic analogy.

On subjects requiring a vast amount of knowledge acquired by laborious study Spencer was one of the most prolific writers that the world has ever had. His works comprise twenty volumes besides the folios of the enormous collection of materials compiled under his direction and published as *Descriptive Sociology*. An extended university course, or a very substantial volume, might profitably be devoted to the review and critical consideration of his sociological theories and their relation to the background of the times in which he lived. Unfortunately, we must restrict ourselves to a relatively brief treatment. The reader is referred to the two volumes of Spencer's very full and illuminating *Autobiography*; the original text of *Social Statics*, *The Study of Sociology*; and *Principles of Sociology*. *First Principles*, also, ought not to be overlooked by any student. These works include some four thousand pages of text; hence the ordinary student will hardly find time to read them in full, but fortunately, considerable passages of illustrative matter may be skipped without serious loss of the thread of the reasoning.¹

Herbert Spencer was born of middle-class English parents in Derby, England, Apr. 27, 1820. His father was a teacher and, during part of his life, conducted a small private school. One of his paternal uncles, Thomas Spencer, was a clergyman and also a scholar and teacher. Herbert Spencer's education was chiefly private, directed by his father and his uncle. He never attended any of the great English "public schools" or universities. The peculiar nature of his own training, which reminds one of that received by John Stuart Mill and recounted in his *Autobiography*, was doubtless responsible for the fact that Spencer became, following ideas received from his father, a pioneer in the advocacy of more rational, useful, and realistic methods of education than those prevailing in his day in England.² After assisting for a time in his father's school, he became, at the age

¹ Lichtenberger's excellent summaries in *The Development of Social Theory*, Chap. XII, are helpful.

² Elsa Peverly Kimball, *Sociology and Education: An Analysis of the Theories of Spencer and Ward*, New York, 1932.

of seventeen, an apprentice to a civil engineer engaged in the construction of railways in England. He followed this occupation, but with some interruptions, for about eleven years. During this time, he became interested in social and political problems and public affairs and began to contribute articles on such topics to periodicals, thus gaining a reputation which led in 1848 to his appointment to the position of subeditor on the *Economist*, a London weekly dealing with financial and economic topics. From that date, his life was primarily that of a man of letters; the publication of his long series of books began with *Social Statics* in 1850. Spencer never married; he traveled little and spent the latter years of his life in comparative isolation from ordinary human society. The project for his great series of books called *Synthetic Philosophy*, of which the three volumes of the *Principles of Sociology* form a part, was formulated in 1858, when Spencer was nearing the age of thirty-eight, and was perfected within a year or so. The execution of this project, with, to his regret, the omission of some parts, occupied the remainder of his life; the last part of the *Principles of Ethics* was published in 1893. In view of his remarkable accomplishments, it is surprising to learn that Spencer's health was poor and that he was forced to rely upon secretaries, to a great extent, to aid in his work. He was also handicapped by financial difficulties; the publication of the latter parts of his *Synthetic Philosophy* was made possible only through advance subscriptions to works still to be written and by the aid of substantial contributions from interested persons, including John Stuart Mill, who entertained a high opinion of Spencer's ability, although he did not agree with some of his ideas. Spencer died Dec. 8, 1903, at the age of eighty-three.

It is noteworthy that Spencer was a contemporary of Charles Darwin. In fact, he anticipated in part Darwin's theory of natural selection and was in turn aided in the development of his own theories by the publication of Darwin's works. The general idea of organic evolution was commonplace among educated men long before Charles Darwin and Alfred Russel Wallace presented a specific hypothesis to account for the differentiation of species, and Herbert Spencer is prominent among those who helped to shape this larger concept of evolution; his system of sociology, like the other parts of his *Synthetic*

Philosophy, is distinctly evolutionary. His fundamental philosophical theory of evolution was, like that of Vico, cyclical; he did not believe it possible for any process of evolution, or "progress," to continue forever in one direction but thought that it must eventually end in the dissolution of the organism or system that had been built up.

The study of Spencer's sociological theories should begin with his earliest substantial contribution to this field of thought, his *Social Statics*, which contains an early formulation of his theory of social evolution. In his *Autobiography*, he gives a careful statement of his reasons for choosing the title *Social Statics*, which was intended to refer to the practical implications of the theories set forth, and states that at the time he was entirely unacquainted with Comte's use of the term, which he says is entirely different from his own. In fact, Spencer takes great pains to deny that Comte had any influence upon his own work, except quite incidentally, as in the choice of two technical terms, one of which was the name "sociology," to express general concepts. *Social Statics* is founded on the utilitarian doctrine that the object of human effort is happiness. Spencer argued, however, that happiness cannot be directly measured; nor can we depend upon some supposed "moral sense" or upon any common-sense notions of expediency to show the effective means of attaining the greatest happiness for the greatest number. He laid down the postulate that happiness results from the adaptation "of constitution to condition." This principle he believed valid for the whole realm of nature and not only for the social realm. Thus he really enunciated in *Social Statics* the doctrine that he was later to place at the foundation of his whole system of "synthetic philosophy." He explained the lack of adaptation of man to his present social state as the effect of his adaptation to an earlier state, which was competitive and predatory, as contrasted with the cooperative society that is beginning to exist. However, a society, in the struggle for existence, tends to gain advantage from cooperativeness; the societies that have solidarity will displace or conquer the others. Progress, therefore, is ultimately inevitable. The greatest happiness can be promoted only indirectly and then only by hastening the adaptation of constitution to condition upon which happiness rests.

Spencer was a firm and persistent advocate of the noninterference of government in private activities, except in so far as intervention is necessary to guarantee that the freedom of every man shall be limited to the point where it does not encroach upon the equal freedom of every other. He apparently did not anticipate how far governmental supervision and control of individual activity and "private business" might have to go, as social and economic evolution advanced, in order to insure to every man this equal freedom, though he saw clearly enough that some of the privileges claimed by certain classes in the name of individual freedom could not be logically defended on that principle. Spencer has been known, from the time when he published *Social Statics*, as the champion of laissez faire, and the reputation is on the whole well merited. In *Social Statics*, *The Study of Sociology*, *Principles of Sociology*, and his lesser writings, he constantly reiterates arguments to support his belief that, in general, human ills cannot be corrected by legislation. In place of direct legislation to correct the "structure" of society, he advocated education to develop the appropriate types of character and ideas in the individual members of society; he held that social structure, as defined by laws, cannot develop faster than ideas.

The theories set forth in *Social Statics* formed the nucleus of Spencer's whole system of sociology and of synthetic philosophy. In a relatively short paper called "The Development Hypothesis" (1852), and in his *First Principles* (1862), which was the first volume of the *Synthetic Philosophy*, he elaborated and systematized his theory of evolution, which at first he preferred to call "development." This theory of evolution was for him a doctrine of cosmology, or a principle of universal mechanics, stated in terms of equilibration. He regarded the development and equilibration of the social order as a specific manifestation of a generic tendency or process which operates throughout the universe. In *First Principles*, he sums up the theory in a single definition, which occurs, with minor variations, throughout his later writings: "Evolution is an integration of matter and concomitant dissipation of motion: during which the matter passes from an indefinite, incoherent homogeneity to a definite, coherent heterogeneity; and during which the retained motion undergoes a parallel transformation."¹

¹ 4th ed., Part II, Chap. XVII, Philadelphia. n. d.

Granting, however, that Spencer's highly generalized conception of "evolution" was laid down by him as the fundamental principle to be developed in his whole system of synthetic philosophy, we are constrained to say that it was not, apparently, this feature of his system which had the greatest influence upon the development of sociological thought in the Western world during the seven or eight decades following the appearance of *Social Statics*. In fact, he contributed a number of more specific doctrines to the growing body of sociological knowledge which became the common possession and preoccupation of a considerable number of scholars. Although the attention that they merit cannot be given here to these doctrines, a concise statement of the more important of them may be attempted.¹ If the *Principles of Sociology* is taken as the finished expression of Spencer's system of sociological theory, the notable concepts and doctrines set forth briefly in the following paragraphs will be found in it.

Probably the most fundamental of all Spencer's sociological concepts is the "superorganic," as expressed, for example, in the phrase "superorganic evolution." It forms the basis, in fact, for the logical distinction between sociology and other sciences.² The idea, which the term is clearly intended to express, is that while no sharp distinction can be made between the organic and the superorganic, the latter, which is the realm of somewhat stable relations between individuals, comprises an order of phenomena sufficiently distinctive to be the object matter of a separate science.

Having developed this idea, Spencer proceeded to elaborate, though not at great length, a concept that has probably had more influence on the subsequent development of sociology, particularly in the United States, than any other feature of the sociological theories of the great pioneers, the idea of "factors of social phenomena." Spencer indicates by this term the main types of elemental influences, or forces, into which social phenomena may be analyzed.³ He recognizes four general categories of these

¹ For a more extended summary, see, in addition to Lichtenberger, *op. cit.*, *loc. cit.*, Albion W. Small, *General Sociology*, Part II, Chaps. VII-IX, Chicago, 1905, and later—identical—impressions.

² *Principles of Sociology*, vol. I, Part I, Chap. I, New York and London, 1916.

³ *Ibid.*, vol. I, Part I, Chaps. II, III, IV.

factors: original internal factors; original external factors; secondary, or derived, internal factors; and secondary, or derived, external factors. The term "original internal factors" suggests some such treatment of fundamental human desires, interests, or wishes as was later undertaken by Ward, Small, and Thomas, but Spencer did not develop this implication of the term. His chapter on the original internal factors is simply a brief discussion of the subject of race. In a series of subsequent chapters, however, he proceeds to discuss "primitive man, physical"; "primitive man, emotional"; "primitive man, intellectual"; and "primitive ideas," with the obvious implication that by the study of these topics we approach, as closely as one may, to a knowledge of the original or inherent nature of human beings.

In his introductory chapter on the factors of social phenomena, Spencer formulates the thesis that the characteristics of any society are due to the character of its units and the conditions under which they exist, just as the behavior of an inanimate object depends upon the interaction of its intrinsic characteristics with the forces to which it is exposed, and an organism is affected by the combined influences of its intrinsic nature and the environment forces, organic and inorganic. If the matter is looked at in this light, the obvious task of sociological analysis is to resolve social phenomena into factors of human nature and factors of environment. In his treatment of "secondary, or derived, factors," Spencer emphasizes the fact that in the course of their interaction, both "internal" and "external" factors are considerably modified. This plan of beginning the study of sociology with the attempt to resolve social phenomena into factors, particularly factors of human nature and environment, set the pattern for sociological thought, especially that followed in the United States, for several decades.

With these preliminaries disposed of, Spencer turned, in a section entitled "The Inductions of Sociology,"¹ to the famous comparison of a society with an organism, which was his principal device for the generalized description of social structures and functions. It is not feasible to summarize the comparison; however, it should be emphasized that Spencer noted two important differences, as well as several fundamental likenesses,

¹ *Op. cit.*, vol. I, Part II.

between a society and a plant or an animal. One difference is that while plant and animal organisms are "concrete," i.e., the parts of such an organism are in close physical contact with one another, a social organism is "discrete," its parts being free and not in immediate contact.¹ Another important difference noted by Spencer is that in the plant or animal organism, consciousness is located in a small part of the aggregate, i.e., in a brain, or "sensorium," while in a social organism it is located in the units, or parts, of which the aggregate is composed. He asserts, "The society exists for the benefit of its members, not its members for the benefit of the society"; and "there is no social sensorium."² The emphasis and explicitness with which Spencer states these distinctions seem to support the opinion of Small and others, that in comparing a society to an organism he intended to present only a suggestive analogy, not an identity.

Another important feature of the argument of Spencer's *Principles of Sociology* is the discussion of militant and industrial societies, which occurs under the general heading of "Political Institutions." Spencer held that the two, in their extreme forms, were quite different types of social organization and that in the course of social evolution the militant type of society tends to be transformed into the industrial type. Just how, or by what process, the transition was effected he does not seem to have shown clearly at any stage in his discussion of the topic. In the chapters in which the comparison between militant and industrial societies is developed, he contends that the transition from a militant to an industrial society is eminently desirable; social progress is dependent upon the cessation of war between nations and upon the emergence of that form of social organization which can take shape only when the danger of war has largely disappeared.³ (Spencer was quite confident that in the industrial society there would be a minimum of corporate activity and a maximum of individual freedom and enterprise.)⁴

Although the aspects of human society that Spencer described most successfully were those which he himself called "structural," and although this emphasis in his work involved, seem-

¹ *Ibid.*, vol. I, Part II, Chap. II, Sec. 220.

² *Ibid.*, Sec. 222.

³ *Ibid.*, vol. II, Part V, Chaps. XVII, XVIII.

⁴ *Loc. cit.*, Sec. 563.

ingly, a tendency to preoccupation with the facts of division of labor, he may be given credit for pointed discussions of the more imponderable, psychic aspects which Simmel, Durkheim, John Dewey, and others were to describe later in terms of communication, social interaction, social control, and the like. Particularly noteworthy are Spencer's discussion of the role of communication, and psychic interaction generally, in social life,¹ and his treatment of the general problem of social control. He used the term "government" to refer to the general topic with which he was concerned in the latter connection, but the nature of his discussion, and the way in which he employed the term "control" in this discussion as a common-sense term, are sufficient to show his appreciation of the nature and importance of the problem that Ross, Park and Burgess, and Lumley, among others, were later to treat under the title of "social control." His chapter entitled "Ceremonial Government"² and his comparison of religious and political control³ are particularly important. He regarded ceremonial as an undifferentiated form of government, from which all other forms are evolved.

In his treatment of "domestic institutions," Spencer not only laid down a very interesting theory of the trend of development of the relations of the sexes, and particularly of the relations of parents and offspring, but also, recapitulating a theory that he had previously developed in *Principles of Biology*,⁴ he expressed what has come to be known as the Spencerian theory of population, which is, briefly stated, "Genesis varies inversely as individuation."⁵ This theory became the inspiration for an important book, *The Evolution of Sex*, by Patrick Geddes and J. A. Thompson, in which the authors undertook to review in detail the biological evidence relative to the truth or falsity of Spencer's theory and reached conclusions on the whole favorable to it. The trend of recent thought and research relative to human population problems seems, in the main, to oppose the Spencerian theory of population, but, to say the least, it has been provocative

¹ *Op. cit.*, vol. I, Part II, Sec. 221.

² *Ibid.*, vol. II, Part IV, Chap. I.

³ *Ibid.*, *loc. cit.*, Chap. II.

⁴ Sec. 319-351.

⁵ *Principles of Sociology*, vol. I, Part III; see especially Chaps. I, II.

of considerable thought and research. Spencer pointed out, in his *Principles of Biology* and again in Part III of his *Principles of Sociology*, that the interests of the species, of parents, and of offspring are in some respects divergent and opposed. The continued life of the species, he said, is the end to which all others are secondary; for if the species disappears, all other purposes of the individuals will fail. But the continuation of the species may be brought about (1) by the production of a large number of progeny, most of which perish, and in the production of which the life of the parent is more or less completely destroyed;¹ (2) by the production of a relatively small number of progeny, the individuals of this progeny being relatively well provided with nutriment and tending, accordingly, to survive in relatively large numbers; the species is then preserved through the preservation of the offspring but still without reference to the interests of the parent; or (3) the survival of the species may be secured, in an advanced stage of evolution, by the preservation of the offspring, which are relatively few, through the care given to them by the parents after birth; this care, furthermore, may be a form of activity that is pleasurable to the parents. Thus, in a sufficiently advanced stage of evolution, the species tends to survive by means that do not oppose but rather support the interests of individuals, both parents and offspring. Spencer also suggested that in the later stages of human social evolution, a final adjustment is reached, in which parental care of the offspring is supplemented by the children's care of the parents in the latter's declining years. He explicitly held that the birth rate tends to diminish as, in the course of evolution, the characteristics of the individual become more highly developed. This proposition has been challenged; however, it is doubtful whether Spencer himself would have insisted upon it as a purely biological explanation of the variations of the human birth rate.

The study of "population theory" or "population problems" has been developed since the time of Malthus as an important specialty within the general field of the social sciences and has become practically a separate discipline. As such, it will engage our attention briefly at a later point in this volume.

¹ In the case of very simple organisms, which reproduce by simple fission, the progenitor may be said to disappear completely by the same event in which the progeny come into existence.

The comparison of societies to organisms and the elaboration of sociological description and analysis on the basis of this "organic analogy," which has rightly or wrongly been thought of as Spencer's chief contribution to the formation of modern sociology, were also developed, with even more emphasis, by a number of his successors, among them Paul von Lilienfeld (1829-1903), whose *Gedanken über die Sozialwissenschaft der Zukunft* was published in German in five volumes, successively (1872-1881) and at about the same time in Russian; Albert Schaeffle (1831-1903), whose sociological works began to appear in 1875; Jacques Novicow (1849-1912), whose important works date from 1896; and René Worms (1869-1925), whose adherence to the organic analogy was first indicated at length in his *Organisme et Société* in 1896.¹

These writers vary among themselves as to the extent to which they rely upon the analogy of a society to an organism as a method of sociological description and as a method of explanation and prediction. The organic analogy has been useful in suggesting descriptions of the features of social structure and functional interdependence for which no standard technical terminology existed when the science of sociology was taking shape. Furthermore, the extent and significance of the functional differentiation and resulting interdependence of the parts of a highly evolved society were not sufficiently realized until they were emphasized by means of the organic analogy. It seems to be true, also, that the use of the organic analogy has helped to reveal certain characteristics of social organization and collective behavior which are not easily seen in the direct study of societies, since, in the latter case, we are prone to approach the data with the bias carried forward from the individualistic social and economic philosophy of the eighteenth century. It is generally agreed by critics of the organic analogy that it has been overworked, notably by Lilienfeld and Worms; these writers have manifested a disposition to infer that any generalization that

¹ For a brief comparative and critical discussion of these "organicists," see Pitirim A. Sorokin, *Contemporary Sociological Theories*, pp. 200-213, New York, 1928. Albion W. Small has discussed Lilienfeld briefly and Schaeffle at greater length in *Origins of Sociology*, Chap. XVII. He has also summarized and discussed Schaeffle's use of the organic analogy in *General Sociology*, Chaps. X, XI.

could be made concerning plants and animals must also hold for societies. In other words, they were inclined to minimize the differences between societies and organisms instead of emphasizing them as Spencer did.¹ As will appear, however, the organic analogy has yielded some fruitful hypotheses to sociology quite recently, particularly in the specialized phase of social research that has come to be known as "human ecology."²

¹ Sorokin, *op. cit.*, p. 205.

² Human ecology has drawn suggestions from C. M. Child, *Physiological Foundations of Behavior*, New York, 1924.

CHAPTER XII

THE DEVELOPMENT OF HUMAN GEOGRAPHY

According to current American conceptions of the scope and viewpoint of sociology, the study of human geography, in the strictest sense of the term, is not part of the former science. Sociology may be briefly described as the study of several things, *viz.*, human groups and their behavior, social relations and social interaction, the processes of social change, personality and human nature in their social aspects, and culture. It does not include the study of the interaction between human beings and their physical or geographic environment, although of course a sociologist should be informed about these matters. The conception of the scope of sociology has not always been so restricted; in a number of textbooks of sociology that were published in the second decade of our century, the influence of the geographic environment upon the life of society will be found treated in some detail. On the other hand, recent sociological thought, while the study of physical-environmental influences is excluded from its scope, is being elaborated to include a topic that is closely related to the interests of geographers, *viz.*, the spatial distribution and movements of human beings and institutions.

It becomes relevant to the purposes of the present survey, then, to inquire briefly into the origins and development of the science of human geography, or anthropogeography, which has taken shape in Europe and America since the latter part of the nineteenth century. The great pioneers in this field were Friedrich Ratzel, Ellen C. Semple, and Paul Vidal de la Blache, and for present purposes we may confine ourselves in the main to their work. However, the "anthropogeography" of Ratzel and the "human geography" of Vidal were based upon the work of earlier predecessors. The science of human geography grew out of the science of general geography which had taken shape early in the nineteenth century and, to some extent, before that time.

General geography may be said to have had two principal sources: As cartography, the art of map making, it developed to meet the needs of travelers and particularly navigators; as a more or less comprehensive and systematized body of knowledge about the different countries and regions of the earth, on the other hand, it grew out of the tales that these same travelers brought back from their journeys. Geography has had these two aspects from its earliest beginnings, the cartographic aspect, characterized by the effort to attain mathematical exactitude; and the descriptive, or informational, aspect. The atlas and the gazetteer may be regarded as the two characteristic types of early modern geographic publication. In these simple and relatively uncritical forms, geography began to take shape in the period of classical antiquity at the hands of a number of investigators whose reputation has been preserved to our own times. The greatest of them, apparently, was Strabo (ca. 63 B.C.—ca. 21 A.D.), who wrote a comprehensive treatise on geography, containing not only more or less accurate maps and information but ingenious speculations and generalizations concerning the relation of physical environment to human life.¹ Similar publications appeared at intervals during the late ancient and medieval periods; among these the work of the Arabian writer ibn-Khaldun deserves particular mention.

In the nineteenth century, the gradually developed geographic tradition was brought into more systematic and critical form by the great pioneers of modern geography, Johann Georg Kohl and Karl Ritter, and in the next generation by Oskar Peschel (1826–1875) and Jean Jacques Elisée Reclus (1830–1905), then, somewhat later, by Alfred Hettner, author of *Geographie: ihre Geschichte, ihr Wesen und ihre Methoden* (1927). During the latter part of the century, too, Hermann Wagner contributed

¹ *Geography*, 3 vols., trans. by Hamilton and Falconer, London, 1854–1857. See also Franklin Thomas, *The Environmental Basis of Society*, New York and London, 1925. This book by Franklin Thomas is one of the most useful secondary sources for the student of the history of geography; others are R. E. Dickinson and O. J. R. Howerth, *The Making of Geography*, especially "Human Geography," Chap. XVII, Oxford, 1933; Jean Brunhes, "Human Geography," in Harry Elmer Barnes, ed., *History and Prospects of the Social Sciences*, Chap. II, New York, 1925; Carl O. Sauer, "Recent Developments in Cultural Geography," in E. C. Hayes, ed., *Recent Developments in the Social Sciences*, Chap. IV, Philadelphia 1927.

materially to the systematization of geographic science through his *Lehrbuch der Geographie*, which was perhaps the most logical treatise on geography that had been written up to that time. Until these nineteenth century writers gave to geography a systematic and analytical tendency, it was conceived chiefly as a compendium of facts, represented on maps so far as was feasible and arranged in convenient order in books.

The development of sociology stands in a relationship of historical continuity with the earlier development of systematic geographic inquiry in two respects: first, sociology was greatly influenced, in a general way, by the Darwinian revolution in biology; and, second, it was particularly shaped by a pattern of interpretation of social phenomena set by Herbert Spencer. One result of the publication of the hypothesis of natural selection was to bring about, presently, a marked development of interest in the "genetic" aspects and problems of the humanistic and social studies. It began to be asserted that conduct could not be explained solely in terms of human "reason" and "will," as had been attempted by the philosophers of the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. But as the viewpoint of psychology and sociology became more deterministic and naturalistic, it naturally took into account the factors of physical environment. At any rate, in the last half of the nineteenth century and subsequently, when the sociologists were groping about for a general plan of operations for their "new science" and a definition of its scope, it was no more than natural that they found in the contemporary writings of the geographers much that seemed relevant. Then, in his *Principles of Sociology*, Spencer took an important and influential step when he indicated that the ultimate factors of social phenomena were the "internal" factors and the "external" factors, *i.e.*, factors of human nature and factors of physical environment. This implied that it was part of the task of the sociologist to investigate the influence of environmental factors upon human life.

Spencer did not devote much attention to the "external" factors of social phenomena; he seems to have felt intuitively that the science of sociology should be concerned primarily with social relations, social organization, and culture and only indirectly with questions of environmental causation. The outline that he gave to the science of sociology, however, was widely

accepted by American authors at the beginning of the twentieth century; most of their books that made any pretense to outline the science as a whole dealt with the effect of environmental factors upon the life of society.¹ Like Spencer, these writers did not give much space to the discussion of these factors, perhaps because they did not find much available and suitable material. In the general plan of any one of these textbooks, however, one can see clearly the influence of the assumption that sociology should deal with the effects of physical and geographic environment.

It seems to have been Friedrich Ratzel (1844–1904) who, more than any other one person, should be credited with having taken the step of focusing attention specifically on human geography, or, as he named it, “anthropogeography.” Although he was trained in his early youth for the calling of a pharmacist, Ratzel became interested in biological questions and pursued studies in this field at the universities of Heidelberg, Jena, and Berlin. After serving in the Prussian army during the Franco-Prussian war of 1870, he became a newspaper correspondent, and in this capacity he engaged in extensive travel in Europe and America to prepare descriptive articles for his paper. In the latter part of his life (from about 1880) he served as professor of geography, first at the polytechnic institute in Munich and then at the University of Leipzig. Besides his *Anthropogeographie* (vol. I, 1882; vol. II, 1891), with which we are particularly concerned here, his important works include *Völkerkunde* (3 vols., 1885–1888; trans. by A. J. Butler as *History of Mankind*, London and New York, 1898); *Politische Geographie* (1897); and *Die Erde und das Leben* 1901–1902).²

More definitely than any of his predecessors, Ratzel attempted to organize geographical knowledge and particularly knowledge of the influences of the geographic environment upon the life of mankind, under general categories and concepts, such as migra-

¹ See, for example, Small and Vincent, *An Introduction to the Study of Society*, 1894; Giddings, *Elements of Sociology*, 1898; Ross, *Foundations of Sociology*, 1905; Blackmar, *Elements of Sociology*, 1905, rev. as Blackmar and Gillin, *Outlines of Sociology*, 1915, 1923, and as Gillin and Blackmar, *Outlines of Sociology*, 1930.

² Ludwig Gumplowicz, *Geschichte der Staatstheorien* (vol. I of the *Ausgewählte Werke* of Gumplowicz, Innsbruck, 1926), pp. 530–540; see particularly footnote p. 540.

tion and mobility, geographical position or location, natural areas and boundaries. In this respect, one may say that he built on the foundations that had been laid by Hermann Wagner, but Wagner was interested primarily in the techniques of geographic investigation, while Ratzel shifted his attention to the conceptualization of the data established by the techniques. It is a significant fact that Ratzel is usually counted as one of the pioneers of modern cultural anthropology, as well as anthropogeography. Implicit in his anthropogeography is the assumption that the facts of human geography, *i.e.*, the spatial distribution of people and their works, may be explained in terms of natural processes of spatial movement and segregation. Ellen C. Semple (1863-1932), the most outstanding of Ratzel's students, was instrumental in making his ideas familiar to the American academic public, through her *Influences of Geographic Environment* (1911), which is little more than a freely adapted translation of Ratzel's *Anthropogeographie*.¹

Although important pioneer work in geography, particularly in the sense of *Erdkunde*—the orderly assembling of geographic data—had been done in France by Reclus,² it is from the work and teaching of Paul Vidal de la Blache (1845-1918) that recent French contributions to human geography have chiefly originated. Vidal published during his lifetime no general treatise on human geography;³ however, his son-in-law, Emanuel de Martonne, edited, from the manuscripts left by Vidal, the volume entitled *Principles of Human Geography*, which though imperfectly organized and incomplete, is a very suggestive book.⁴

It may be said of Vidal de la Blache, as of many other great scholars and teachers, that he is important chiefly for the influence that he exercised on a number of students who, in their turn, have made important contributions to the literature of

¹ Miss Semple's other books are *American History and Its Geographic Conditions*, Boston, 1903; *The Geography of the Mediterranean Region*, New York, 1931.

² *L'Homme et la terre*, 6 vols., Paris, 1905-1908; *Nouvelle géographie universelle*, trans. by Ravenstein and Kean, 19 vols., New York, 1884-1895.

³ His *Tableau de la géographie de France* was written and published as vol. I of the *Histoire de France*, ed. by Lavisse.

⁴ Paris, 1921, trans. by Millicent Todd Bingham, New York, 1926.

their teacher's chosen field of research. He is succeeded by a number of distinguished pupils, the best known of whom is Jean Brunhes (1869—), whose *Human Geography*¹ has possibly had more influence than any other one book upon American students who have been interested in the possibilities of generalization and abstraction in the field. Besides what he has contributed along this line, Brunhes has done something to define the possibilities of a science marginal to human geography and history, "the geography of history."²

Geography is becoming established in the universities of Europe and America, as a recognized part of their general program of teaching and research and as a separate and independent science. At least two American universities, the University of Chicago and Clark University, have well-developed departments of geography, and chairs of geography have been established in several other institutions. Under these circumstances, geography has tended to become affiliated with the physical and biological sciences, rather than with the social sciences. However, departments of economics have shown a persistent interest in economic and commercial geography,³ and among the university teachers and writers who are not connected with departments of economics there are champions of "human geography" as well as geographers who concern themselves primarily with physical geography and cartography. Among these latter, Prof. Carl O. Sauer of the University of California has developed a notable line of reasoning concerning "cultural geography," which he regards as a specialty marginal between general and physical geography, on the one hand, and human geography as conceived by Ratzel, on the other. If geography is defined as the study of "landscapes," as some have suggested, and if human geography is conceived to start from the study of the "human landscape," then Sauer would emphasize that the human land-

¹ Paris, 1910, trans. by Bowman and Dodge, Chicago, 1920. See also Jean Brunhes and Camille Vallaux, *Géographie de l'histoire*, Paris, 1921.

² *Op. cit.*; see also the book on the same subject by Lucien Febvre, published in Paris in 1922 and subsequently translated in the United States as *A Geographical Introduction to History*.

³ Perhaps the most eminent American writer and teacher of economic geography is J. Russell Smith, author of a number of textbooks and other works, of which his *North America* (New York, 1925) is outstanding.

scape is constituted by features that may be accurately designated as "cultural."¹

Even when geography is conceived in this way, as "human" or "cultural" or "economic" geography, sociologists have been disposed to leave it to a distinct guild of geographers to study the subject, rather than claiming it as a branch of sociology. On the other hand, sociologists have taken over from writers on human geography a number of conceptual terms which are felt to have an obvious sociological value and meaning, including the concepts of location, or position; migration; mobility; the spatial distribution of population and institutions; segregation; and natural regions. To these they have added at least one concept of related significance, the concept of dominance, as applying to the relation between a center of economic and social activity and a surrounding territory.² Sociologists have also shared the interest of geographers in the frontier, or in "pioneer belts," which have recently been the object of comprehensive research efforts sponsored by the American Geographical Society, the National Research Council, and the Social Science Research Council.³

It is evident that these interests have a somewhat different context of meaning for the sociologists from that which they have for the geographers. To the geographer, the essential subject of study in human geography is "man and environment," or, in other words, the way in which the physical environment conditions human life and, incidentally, the ways in which the physical environment is reciprocally modified by the activities of human beings. Sociologists, on the other hand, are interested primarily in social groups and social interaction. The spatial aspects of these phenomena are of interest to them, chiefly, as convenient and accessible indexes of something else, *viz.*, the

¹ "Recent Developments in Cultural Geography," in E. C. Hayes, ed., *Recent Developments in the Social Sciences*, Chap. IV, Philadelphia, 1927. See also Sauer, "Geography, Cultural," also "Geography, Human," and "Geography, Economic," in *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*, vol. 6.

² R. D. McKenzie, "The Concept of Dominance and World-organization," *Publication of the American Sociological Society*, p. 138, vol. 21, 1927; see also *American Journal of Sociology*, pp. 28-42, vol. 33, 1927.

³ Isaiah Bowman, *The Pioneer Fringe*, and Twenty-six authors, *Pioneer Settlements*, published by the American Geographical Society in 1931 and 1932, respectively.

phenomena of culture and human association, collective behavior, and personality. To the geographer, for example, population is something that can be measured and located by enumeration, by a census. Population, in his view, stands in a biological relationship to an environment, however complex and obscure that relation may be; and it is that relation which he is interested in investigating. To the sociologist, on the other hand, the distribution of population is of interest mainly as an index of the intensity of social contact and interaction. Similar remarks might be made regarding the geographical and sociological conceptions, respectively, of migration. The geographer is likely to conceive of "regions" as entities that are set off from one another by physiographic barriers; while the sociologist views as a region that territory which is inhabited by a more or less unified human group—unified by forces of commerce and communication—such as the people of a great city and its "environs," or "trade territory." The sociological concept of dominance is really the concept of a special and elemental form of leadership, one which it happens to be convenient to study through its spatial manifestations. A "frontier," or "pioneer belt," is of interest from the viewpoint of sociology as an area in which a somewhat distinctive type of social and cultural life is found, a place the inhabitants of which are related in a peculiar and dynamic way to the people of centers of dominance. It is a significant fact that Prof. R. D. McKenzie has discussed dominance and the frontier as interrelated concepts.

The recently developed interests of American sociologists in the spatial manifestations of social phenomena have received a degree of integration and a name as "human ecology," which is beginning to be recognized as one of the special branches of sociology. Ratzel, taking his clue from the biological use of the term "ecology," once suggested that anthropogeography is, in effect, human ecology. From his point of view, as from that of biology, human ecology would be defined as the study of the interaction of man and environment; *i.e.*, it would be that phase of animal ecology which is particularly concerned with the human species. In recent American sociological usage, however, the term human ecology has been used with a meaning which perhaps does violence to its biological origin, but which fits into the general scope of sociology better; it is conceived as the study

of the spatial distribution and movements in space of human beings, groups, and institutions.¹

¹ This new sociological specialty is not yet represented by much systematic literature; there are no general treatises on human ecology as understood by sociologists. See R. D. McKenzie, "The Ecological Study of the Human Community," in R. E. Park and others, *The City*, Chap. III, Chicago, 1925; also same author, "The Scope of Human Ecology," *Publication of the American Sociological Society*, vol. 20, pp. 141-154, 1926. (See *infra*, Chap. XXVII.)

CHAPTER XIII

THE NATURAL HISTORY OF INSTITUTIONS

For a combination of reasons, sociology has never been popular in Great Britain, in spite of the fact that Herbert Spencer, the most influential of the pioneers and the first to formulate a comprehensive system of sociology, was an Englishman and wrote all his works in England.¹ There is, however, one strand of the complex web of influence in the development of sociology to its present status that is chiefly of British origin. One simple and obvious conception of sociology is that it studies human institutions; and the development of sociology naturally owes much to the work that has been done by scholars, primarily historians or anthropologists by training, who have studied the history of human institutions and, in some cases, have sought to reduce their findings from purely historical to scientific, non-historical form. The net result of such efforts, besides considerable literature which may properly be classified as "history of institutions," includes a number of important works which may be said to deal with the "natural history of institutions." Though such works are by no means lacking among German publications, notably in the special field of economic institutions, particularly important contributions to this literature have been made by British writers, beginning with Buckle and Maine.

The study of history, except as a discipline closely associated with the classics, and therefore limited mainly to the study of ancient history and the textual sources for such history, did not become established in the English universities until about 1850 and did not acquire much standing in the university curriculum until two or three decades later. However, historical research and writing seem to have been recognized as a suitable leisure-time pursuit for a gentleman from about this same time or earlier,

¹ Cf. Vivien M. Palmer, "Impressions of Sociology in Great Britain," *American Journal of Sociology*, vol. 32, pp. 756ff., 1926-1927.

historians of the time and of a previous period may be said to have written institutional history in the sense that the state is commonly regarded today as a major human institution, it may be added that for these writers of "political history" the state was not so much a human institution, a natural object, which could be studied and described objectively, as it was a sacred object, the story of which ought to be faithfully narrated for the edification of the rising generation and the maintenance of proper piety. Maine, in writing the history of legal institutions, found himself inescapably concerned with the subject of political institutions, but the fact that he studied the legal and political institutions of ancient Greece and Rome and those of India permitted him to achieve a detached and secular attitude toward his object matter. There is a difference between the "political history" written by Freeman and other writers of the orthodox historical school of the times and that written by Maine. One basis for the difference, no doubt, was Maine's use of comparison. When political and legal institutions sufficiently different from those of an author's own country are studied in comparison with them, he is enabled to conceive his task as one of explanation and description in the spirit of naturalism and even science, rather than in the spirit of one who reverently tells the story of the formation, transmission, and conservation of one's own government and law.

Maine's earliest important work, and the one for which he is most widely known, is *Ancient Law* (1861), which is primarily a study of the early development of legal institutions in Greece and Rome, particularly the latter. When he published this book, he was professor of civil law at Cambridge University, but it was instrumental in winning for him the recognition that resulted in his appointment as legal member of the viceroy's council in India, a capacity in which he served from 1862 to 1869. Returning, he taught jurisprudence at Oxford and published further works dealing with this general subject.¹ In these latter works (*Village Communities*, 1871; *Lectures on the Early History of Institutions*, 1875; and *Dissertations on Early Law and Custom*, 1883), he drew upon the knowledge of the law and legal institutions of India which he had gained during his residence there and

¹ K. Smellie, article on Maine in *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*, vol. 10.

placed these data in comparison with what he could learn of early German and Irish legal institutions.

The impressive thing in the works of Maine is that they are not purely historical; they are not even specialized history. Here, as at other points in the moving current of the development of social thought, we can see an author beginning to compare, to lift the objects with which he is concerned out of the realm of events and treat them as things with a somewhat stable and persistent nature. Maine's works on the history of legal and political institutions represent a step in the shift of method and objectives from history in the direction of sociology. They are scarcely sociology yet; we may classify them in the marginal category "natural history of institutions," though they do not exemplify this category so well as do certain later works. To be very precise, we may classify Maine's *Ancient Law* and his other works on the margin between *history* of institutions and *natural history* of institutions. By the natural-history method the development of an institution is described as a concrete example of the working of a natural process, in which a certain kind of thing undergoes characteristic transformations. In some passages in his writings, Maine seems to have achieved this point of view; in others, he does not seem to have done so. At any rate, those of his works which have been cited are so well done that they are still worth reading, and it is unfortunate that some of the other titles have not been so widely known and studied as his *Ancient Law*.

Although he lived and wrote during the same period as Maine, William E. H. Lecky contributed to institutional history and the study of the natural history of institutions to a much lesser degree than Maine. Lecky's *History of the Rise and Influence of Rationalism in Europe*¹ and *History of European Morals from Augustus to Charlemagne*² are now classics of the literature of "intellectual history," or the "history of ideas." They cannot be classified as contributions to the history of institutions. Lecky was a convinced rationalist, a believer in the theory that ideas and beliefs are important determinants of social change; and he wrote these books to demonstrate his theory. Professor Schapiro has described their theme as "the warfare between

¹ 2 vols., London, 1865.

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reason and theology," a theme that was to be treated later by Draper and White.¹ While the philosophy that inspired these works may be "trite and commonplace," as Schapiro says, it was relatively original when Lecky publicized it; and the writings of Lecky have had a great vogue until quite recent times. One suspects that they may have had something to do with Westermarck's subsequent attempt to deal with the "origin and development of the moral ideas." Lecky succeeded in treating moral rules and practices with some degree of objectivity, an accomplishment in which he was doubtless aided by the fact that he wrote, ostensibly, about the morals of a period considerably earlier than his own day and did not, accordingly, feel called upon to treat them as sacred. It may be a fact of some importance that he was an Irish Protestant.

Frederic William Maitland (1850-1906), who, in collaboration with Sir Frederick Pollock, wrote *History of English Law before the Time of Edward I*,² and who was the author of various monographic studies of English legal history, differs in his work from Maine in much the same way as Lecky does. Maitland was primarily a jurist and historian; he did not deal with the "natural history" of legal institutions, but such concentrated researches as his, in a special institutional field, must have some effect in the long run on the refinement and correction of our knowledge of the natural processes of institutional development. Obviously, an adequate and sound knowledge of the natural history of institutions can be built only on the foundation of correct accounts of the history of institutions, or at least considerable segments of that history must be known. In this connection, however, Maitland's contributions are the more valuable in that they represent the development of law in England as a part of the whole process, or stream, of history.³

Not all of the advances of social thought that took place in Great Britain during the period that we are considering (late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries) were the work of historians. British philosophers, also, had been developing

¹ J. Salwyn Schapiro, article on Lecky in *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*, vol. 9.

² 2 vols., Cambridge, 1895.

³ H. D. Hazeltine, article on Maitland in *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*, vol. 10.

interpretations of the life of human society which resembled somewhat, and were in part derived from, the contributions of German writers whom we have previously considered, particularly those of Hegel. A marginal figure between Lecky and the social philosophers, Henry Sidgwick (1838–1900), of Cambridge University, besides contributing a textbook or treatise in ethics entitled *The Methods of Ethics* (1874) which exemplifies the empirical, commonsense point of view which was characteristic of most British handling of problems of individual and social ethics after Locke, also wrote a *History of Ethics*, i.e., a history of ethical theories and doctrines. His teaching and writing seem to have exercised considerable influence on the younger social and political theorists of the latter half of the nineteenth century.¹

The philosophers who loom up most prominently in nineteenth century British social thought, however, are Thomas Hill Green (1836–1882), Bernard Bosanquet (1848–1923), and Leonard T. Hobhouse (1864–1929). Because he was for many years connected with Balliol College at Oxford University, Green was, during this time, probably the most influential figure in British social philosophy. In his *Lectures on the Principles of Political Obligation*,² he grappled with the problem which continued to be a chief preoccupation of English thinkers for a long time, and which is rather well suggested by the title of this work. It is, in other words, the problem of authority, which Harold J. Laski has sought to clarify in recent years. Green took a position resembling that of Hegel; i.e., he accepted the concept of the state as an organic society superior to its component individuals. Man, he held, is a political animal; and the antithesis, "individual and the state," is as false as that of the whole and its parts. This formulation of the matter has often been repeated but does not seem to be illuminating. The real question is, How do the parts interact to form the whole, and what sort of unity is the social organism? At any rate, Green held that the state is usually right because it draws upon the whole social heritage of past experience. The individual ought to conform to the decrees of the state; there is no right of civil disobedience except where there are no channels of peaceful agitation through which one may seek

¹ See J. N. Keynes, article on Sidgwick, in Palgrave, *Dictionary of Political Economy*, Appendix to vol. III.

² R. L. Nettleship, ed., *Works*, vol. II.

to change the acts of the state that he considers to be wrong. Green asserted that sound ethics requires that the state attempt to insure a good life to all its citizens. He stopped short of Hegel's identification of the state with absolute right.¹

Bernard Bosanquet was even more Hegelian than Green in his social-philosophical position and is usually regarded as the official apostle of Hegelianism in modern British thought. He is also, however, classified with the idealistic school of English political philosophy of which T. H. Green is the foremost representative.² His *Philosophical Theory of the State* (1899) is his most important work in this connection.

Unlike Green, he placed the acts of the state in a wholly different moral sphere from those of the individual because the state is "a supreme power which has ultimate responsibility for protecting the form of life of which it is the guardian." His absolutism, however, was tempered in one direction by his emphasis on the value of the individual, as expressed in *The Value and Destiny of the Individual* (London, 1913), which led him to oppose old-age pension legislation on the ground that it might lessen the individual's responsibility in providing against the period of his dependence; and in another direction, by his growing awareness of the excesses of patriotism which he expressed in "The Duties of Citizenship" in his *Aspects of the Social Problem* (London, 1895, pp. 1-27), and *Social and International Ideals, Being Studies in Patriotism* (London, 1917). True patriotism, according to Bosanquet, is not a hankering for heroics but a "sober daily loyalty"—a constant consciousness of duty and obligation to our fellow citizens and to the world at large.³

Undoubtedly, in recent years the most outstanding and influential social philosopher of Great Britain has been Leonard Trelawney Hobhouse (1864-1929). He was educated at Oxford and taught there until 1897; from that time, he was engaged chiefly in journalistic work until 1907. Then he became professor of sociology at the University of London and remained in that position until his death. He was one of the two first men to bear

¹ See Crane Brinton, article on Green in *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*, vol. 7.

² W. H. Dawson, article on Bosanquet in *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*, vol. 2.

³ Dawson, *loc. cit.*

the title "professor of sociology" in a British university; nevertheless, Hobhouse appears in all his writings as a moral philosopher primarily and as a social scientist only in a broad or secondary sense. At any rate, his writings, wherever they deal with social questions, are characterized by the subordination of purely impersonal inquiries to questions of value. He was interested chiefly in describing the evolution of society (societies) rather than in the description of social processes. Like several of his contemporaries in England and America, he made free use of ethnological materials. He was a prolific writer, and his works are well worth careful reading.¹

Economic history is perhaps not necessarily or invariably the history of economic institutions; however, as certain German writers and the American economists of the "institutional" school have contended, it tends to be such. Great Britain has had its share of competent writers on economic history, although their work is not in all cases concerned primarily with the development and changes of economic institutions. Among these writers may be mentioned James Edwin Thorold Rogers (1823-1890), Drummond professor of political economy at Oxford during parts of his later life and author of *History of Agriculture and Prices in England* (6 vols. published at intervals during Rogers' lifetime), *The Economic Interpretation of History* (1888), *The Industrial and Commercial History of England* (posthumous, 1892), and other works. Rogers seems to have been the most influential English pioneer in the study of economic history, but, according to W. J. Ashley, one of his younger contemporaries and successors in the same field, he "wrote as a politician rather than as a scholar" and "transplanted the conception of the

¹ The important works of Hobhouse are as follows: *The Labour Movement*, 1893; *The Theory of Knowledge*, 1896; *Mind in Evolution*, 1901; *Democracy and Reaction*, 1905; *Morals in Evolution*, 1906; *Liberalism*, 1911; *Social Evolution and Political Theory*, 1911; *Development and Purpose*, 1913; *Questions of War and Peace*, 1916; *The Metaphysical Theory of the State*, 1918; *Social Development, Its Nature and Conditions*, 1924.

Secondary sources: article by Morris Ginsberg in *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*, vol. 7; J. A. Hobson and Morris Ginsberg, *L. T. Hobhouse, His Life and Work*, London, 1931; Hugh Carter, *The Social Theories of L. T. Hobhouse*, Chapel Hill, N. C., 1927; J. A. Nicholson, *Some Aspects of the Philosophy of L. T. Hobhouse*, University of Illinois Studies in the Social Sciences, vol. XIV, No. IV, Urbana, Ill., 1928.

economic man from the analysis of economic phenomena to the history of these."¹

William Cunningham (1849-1919), economic historian and churchman, wrote several volumes on economic history which are better known than those of Rogers but possibly are of less scholarly quality. He is best known for his *Growth of English Industry and Commerce*² and his *Western Civilization in Its Economic Aspects*.³ He seems to have modified his own ideas of the proper method of studying economic history during his lifetime; he wavered between the view that it should be treated as a part of general history and the contrary position, that it should be studied separately.⁴

In recent years, other economic historians have been active in England, among whom Henry de Beltgens Gibbins (1865-1907) achieved some fame as a popularizer but cannot be said to have contributed anything very new either to scholarly knowledge or in the way of interpretive ideas. On the other hand, William James Ashley (1860-1927) won high reputation both for scholarship and for interpretation, notably for his definition of economic history as a marginal discipline between theoretic economics and history and for his attention to the work of German economists of the "historical schools." His works are still regarded as authoritative; the most important of his general treatises are *An Introduction to English Economic History and Theory* (2 vols., 1888-1893) and *The Economic Organization of England* (1914). During his lifetime, Ashley was connected successively with Oxford, the University of Toronto, Harvard, and the University of Birmingham, England.

The economic historians, who have been considered to this point, were concerned, on the whole, with history and theoretic economics; they had relatively little idea of economic history as the study of the development of economic institutions. The limitation of scope inherent in their work is indicated by their

¹ Article on Cunningham, Appendix to vol. I; article on Rogers, vol. 3, in Palgrave, *Dictionary of Political Economy*, 1925

² Cambridge, 1882, revised from time to time and enlarged to 3 vols. in 5th ed., 1910-1912.

³ 2 vols., Cambridge, 1898, 1900.

⁴ See articles by M. M. Knight in *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*, vol. 4; W. R. Scott, in Palgrave, *Dictionary of Political Economy*, Appendix to vol. I, 1925.

almost exclusive preoccupation with the economic history of England, with all that this implies as to the absence of the attitude of comparison. When we turn to Sidney Webb (1859—) and his wife Beatrice (Potter) Webb (1858—), we find that we are concerned with students of the development of economic and political institutions. It is still history of institutions mainly, rather than natural history of institutions, which the Webbs have sought to depict; for example, their voluminous work on English local government, which was eventually published in fourteen volumes, is primarily a historical, or at any rate a fact-finding study, involving little comparison or classification, except within the limits of English conditions. In spite of this qualification, however, the Webbs may be said to have concerned themselves with the natural process of change in local government, at least in the sense that they persistently sought to peer into the mechanism by which institutions of local government operate and change. In other words, they treated local government institutions as "things" having a somewhat stable existence; and that is halfway toward the treatment of institutions as types of things, functioning and changing according to laws that might be stated in quite general, nonhistorical terms.

In their other great field of research, trade-unionism and industrial relations, the Webbs's tendency to move from historical and fact-finding inquiries to more narrowly systematic or natural-science methods is even more apparent. Thus, as the result of some years' research in this field, they published in 1894 *The History of Trade-unionism*, which, as the title indicates, is primarily historical and furthermore is limited for the most part to the history of British trade-unionism. In 1897, however, they brought out *Industrial Democracy*, which is a nonhistorical, analytical treatment of the same subject. Sidney and Beatrice Webb have always been actuated by a lively practical and ethical interest in the problems that they studied. They are strongly disinclined to recognize a distinction between evaluative and natural-scientific viewpoints or methods in the study of social phenomena.¹ It is a significant fact that they were early mem-

¹ See the Webbs's footnote on p. 12 in *Methods of Social Study*, London and New York, 1932, in which they expressly oppose the distinction made by Heinrich Rickert, Max Weber, and others between *Naturwissenschaft* and *Kulturwissenschaft*.

bers of the Fabian Society, which was frankly organized for reformist, not to say revolutionary, purposes. Sidney Webb has been active in politics throughout his life. Furthermore, in their later years, the Webbs have published a number of books of thoroughly reformist and even revolutionary character, the most important of which, probably, are *A Constitution for the British Socialist Commonwealth* (1920) and *The Decay of Capitalist Civilization* (1923). Their biographer, Mary Agnes Hamilton, points out that the Webbs prefer to classify themselves as "sociologists" and contends that, except for the two works just mentioned and certain others written to support the *Minority Report* of the Poor Law Commission, they have consistently maintained a descriptive, rather than a doctrinal, attitude.¹

Since they have had independent means and have been free from the claims of any routine work except what they set themselves about in connection with their researches, the Webbs have been able to publish an amazing amount of work. The bibliography of their works, down to 1934, includes twenty-two books, besides a number of minor reports, some of them unsigned. Of these unsigned works, the most famous is *Labor and the New Social Order*, an eighteen-page manifesto issued by the British Labour Party in 1918, which is now acknowledged to have been written entirely by Sidney Webb. By no means the least significant features of their work, for our purposes, are the statements that they have made concerning methods of investigation. These appeared first as appendices to various of their writings but have now been collected and amplified in *Methods of Social Study* (1932).

Any well-informed person would naturally think of John Lawrence LeBreton Hammond (1872-) and his wife Barbara Bradby Hammond in connection with the Webbs, for the Hammonds have worked in a related field. The important books on which they have collaborated since their marriage are

¹ *Sidney and Beatrice Webb*, a study in contemporary biography, p. 163, Boston and New York, 1933. Besides this biography, which is as revealing an account of the personal characteristics of the Webbs as their persistent reticence would permit any one to write, we have available also, as an aid to the study of their life and work, Beatrice Webb's *My Apprenticeship* (1926), which is of interest for the light that it sheds on her early experience and training, including her association with Herbert Spencer, and (later) Charles Booth and her first contacts with Sidney Webb.

as follows: *The Village Laborer, 1760-1832* (1911), *The Town Laborer, 1760-1832* (1917), *The Skilled Laborer, 1760-1832* (1919), and *The Rise of Modern Industry* (1925). The last-mentioned volume is essentially a summary of the other three. The Hammonds have done careful and informative work, but their contribution belongs in the field of economic history, rather than in that of natural history of institutions.

As we turn from those British writers who have worked in a field marginal to old-fashioned "history," but with special reference to economic history, to certain others whose books are also affected with the historical character, we find even more striking exemplifications of the tendency for history to become "natural history." After the time of Maine, the first man in Great Britain to do this sort of thing quite consciously and deliberately was not an Englishman but a Swedish Finn, Edward Alexander Westermarck (1862), who has spent much of his life in England and has taught sociology at the University of London since 1904.¹

Westermarck was born at Helsingfors in Swedish Finland; his father was the bursar of the University of Helsingfors, and his mother was the daughter of a university professor. As an undergraduate in the University of Helsingfors, Edward Westermarck studied modern literature, Greek, general history (Buckle, Macaulay, Taine), philosophy (Spencer, John Stuart Mill), and psychology. He recalls that he had a distinct preference for the British empiricist over the German idealist philosophers but adds, "Facts in themselves leave me as a rule rather cold; but they become a different matter, component parts, indeed, of a person's mentality, as soon as he thinks he can extract from them something which they do not directly express."² Westermarck also became interested in the religious controversies of the time and states that, while still an undergraduate, he became definitely an agnostic and has remained one ever since. After taking his Ph. B. and Ph. M. from Helsingfors in 1886, he continued his interest in philosophy. He read some of the writings of Haeckel,

¹ The biographical facts in the following account are taken almost entirely from Westermarck's autobiography, *Memories of My Life*, trans. from Swedish by Anna Barwell, New York, 1929; original published in Stockholm, 1927.

² *Op. cit.*, p. 28.

Spencer, Darwin, L. H. Morgan, McLennan, and Lubbock—the last three being pioneers in the study of anthropology. Through this reading, he became interested in the hypothesis of primitive promiscuity and decided to write a book on the history of marriage. He writes:

I perceived that marriage must be studied primarily in its connection with biological conditions and that the tendency to interpret all sorts of customs as social survivals, without a careful investigation into their existing environment, is apt to lead to the most arbitrary conclusions. This was the first principle I established in my method of work, and one to which I have remained faithful to this very day. I find it needful to emphasize it; for not only an older but more modern sociologists have sinned against this principle and thus been led to formulate hypotheses which I cannot help but consider completely untenable.¹

During his later student years, and at intervals thereafter, Westermarck spent his summers in the more strictly rural and mountainous parts of Finland, partly from taste for the country and partly for reasons of health. He writes of these experiences:

When I spent my summers alone amongst the Skärgård folk I did not do so with any idea of studying them; on the contrary, I let excellent opportunities for folklore research slip through my fingers. . . . I simply went to live among them in ordinary human fellowship for the pleasure it gave me. . . . In one respect, however, my stay among the peasants may have helped me in my researches. It freed me of that want of ease—awkwardness it might almost be called—which is the natural inheritance of gentry in all more familiar intercourse with those of lower social rank. And that proved of great advantage to me in later years, when my work brought me into close touch with simple people of another race in another part of the world, whose confidence I had to win before I could use them for my scientific studies.²

In 1887, when he was approaching the age of twenty-five, Westermarck went to England to collect material from the library of the British Museum for the book on marriage that he had planned. During his stay, he renewed his acquaintance with the psychologist James Sully, whom he had previously met in Finland, and became acquainted with Alexander Shand, Alfred Sidgwick (the logician), the economist F. Y. Edgeworth, and the biologist Romanes. He read Darwin's *Life and Letters* at this

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 68.

² *Op. cit.*, p. 70.

time and states that he objected to the hypothesis of natural selection as a purely negative explanation of evolution but was greatly impressed by what Darwin had written concerning his method of study, particularly his attention to negative cases, which would tend to disprove a theory that he was considering. This influence probably had something to do with the guarded way in which Westermarck later drew inferences from data. The tendency to content himself with the exhibition of facts is particularly prominent in his latest important work, *Ritual and Belief in Morocco*.

In the summer of 1888, Westermarck returned to Sweden and Finland, and during the following year he worked on his book, while serving also as the secretary of a society to promote tourist travel in Finland. In the autumn of 1889, he published the first chapters of his book, under the title *The Origin of Human Marriage*, as his thesis for the doctorate at the University of Helsingfors. A year later, he returned to England and arranged for the publication of the whole book, with an introduction by Alfred Russel Wallace. Then he filled in gaps in the manuscript, prepared the index, and otherwise perfected the book for the press. It appeared in 1891, under the title *The History of Human Marriage*.

Westermarck states that before completing the book on marriage, as a result of his philosophical studies he had conceived the idea of a book on morals, and when the first work had been published he immediately plunged into studies looking toward the next, which was to occupy him, as other activities permitted, until 1908. With reference to this new project, he writes:

Evidently they were great questions that I had resolved to try to answer to the best of my power, and not only great but difficult as well. It meant nothing less than investigating man's moral consciousness in the forms which it has assumed among different peoples and at different periods, and discovering the factors that have produced and influenced it. Such an investigation had not been made before, at least not on so wide a scale as I purposed. . . . In collecting my material I started out from the point of view that the moral ideas of people are most plainly expressed in their customs and laws. . . . It took a full two years before my ideas of the nature of the moral emotions had become more or less settled, and in some other important questions my

views did not clear up until much later. . . . I have always found that it takes less time to collect the material for a book than to write it.¹

As a matter of fact, a friendly but impartial critic might say, with some justice, that Westermarck never did manage to "write" his books; they became little more than compilations of materials relevant to the subjects announced.

In 1890, Westermarck was appointed docent at his alma mater and was occupied primarily with his teaching duties until 1893, when, having been granted a "traveling bursary" by the university, he left for England once more to collect material for his new book and to carry on other studies. He worked for a time at the British Museum, then went to Oxford, where he met E. B. Tylor and R. R. Marett, whose counsel he found helpful, and whose influence was doubtless a factor in stimulating him to undertake ethnological field studies on his own account. In the summer of 1896, he attended the Third International Psychological Congress in Munich. An amusing episode which he relates from this event shows the direction that his studies of "moral ideas" were taking. On being introduced to Henry Sidgwick, and expressing to him compliments on his *Methods of Ethics*, he was asked by Sidgwick, eagerly and modestly, whether he had any criticisms that might be taken into account in the preparation of a new edition. Westermarck, with some temerity, stated that he did not believe that anything was objectively right or wrong—to which of course Sidgwick could not agree, as his whole system of ethics was based on the postulate that valid judgments of value can be made and that it is the task of the moral philosopher simply to analyze the grounds of such judgments. Regardless of the merits of the question, Westermarck's position is a significant example of the transition exemplified by his *Origin and Development of the Moral Ideas*.² He considered this to be a sociological treatise, and in a sense it was; at any rate, it was an attempt to illuminate the subject of morality by showing how moral ideas, as manifested in customs and laws (mores) actually have taken shape and changed.

Beginning in 1899, Westermarck spent considerable time in Morocco, acquainting himself with the culture of the people.

¹ *Op. cit.*, pp. 100-102.

² Part I, 1906; Part II, 1908.

He drew on this material heavily in the preparation of the *Origin and Development of the Moral Ideas* and in the thoroughgoing revision and expansion that he undertook of the *History of Human Marriage*.¹ Finally, he wrote a thoroughly objective, factual account of some aspects of the culture of the Moors, as he had learned to know it through his own field studies, in *Ritual and Belief in Morocco*.²

Meanwhile, he had been appointed to the faculty of the University of London (as lecturer in 1904 and as professor in 1907) as a part-time teacher of sociology. In 1906, he was appointed professor of practical philosophy (part time) in the University of Helsingfors; and in 1918 he became rector of the new Finnish University of Turku.

The foregoing rather detailed review of Westermarck's life and of the development of his viewpoints and methods has been presented here because the information that he has furnished us in his autobiography makes it possible for us to exemplify by this one case an important transition which went on in the field of social science at about the turn of the century. Up to about 1900, social science was still strongly affected with the a priori speculative character, although, as we have seen, a trend toward greater objectivity began several centuries before. From about this time, on the other hand, the social studies became noticeably more factual and less theoretical. An important factor in this trend was the growth of ethnological research, with which we shall be further concerned in a later chapter. Westermarck was hardly a pioneer of modern ethnology, but he was one of the first to make sociology strongly inductive by basing its generalizations on ethnological data which he had subjected to rigorous critical scrutiny, and which he had, in considerable part, collected in the course of his own field studies. Whether the marked reluctance to make generalizations or speculations that are not strongly supported by empirical data, which is so characteristic of the later work of Westermarck, is a completely desirable feature of sociological thought may be open to question. That he exerted a wholesome influence at a time when it was needed, however, cannot be doubted.

¹ 5th ed., 3 vols., 1921.

² 2 vols., 1926.

CHAPTER XIV

SOCIAL DARWINISM

One of the more or less distinctive and separate tendencies that may be distinguished in the sociological theory of the formative period which begins with the work of Spencer is the tendency sometimes referred to by the phrase "social Darwinism." Not every sociological writer has attached precisely the same meaning to this phrase, but it will be understood here as the type of theory that attempts to describe and explain social phenomena chiefly in terms of competition and conflict, especially the (competition and conflict of group) with group and the equilibrations and adjustments that ensue upon such struggles. (Social Darwinism is, in short, the use of the Darwinian theory, mainly by analogy, rather than directly, to explain human social organization and social evolution.) This tendency has not disappeared from the sociology of the present day and probably never will disappear. It is prominent in the works of the late Professor Giddings, and it is developed in a sophisticated form in F. H. Bushee's *Principles of Sociology*.¹

(Social Darwinism flourished in the last quarter of the nineteenth century and the opening decade of the twentieth.) Since then, the prevailing sociological theories have shown less tendency to rely upon any one conception of social causation; and social Darwinism has been absorbed into a more comprehensive and many-sided body of social theory. The specialized theory was popular in its day because it apparently served to explain the racial and national rivalries and the wars that had constituted so conspicuous a feature of European history in modern times. It rationalized the individualism, the laissez faire, and the glorification of competition which had become the central features of early modern economic thought.

(For present purposes, social Darwinism may be thought of as a movement of sociological thought which is represented by the

¹ New York, 1923.

in the United States, however, for Albion W. Small drew heavily upon *Wesen und Zweck der Politik* and *Die Soziologische Erkenntnis* in the preparation of his *General Sociology* (1905), a book that represents the main trend of Small's graduate instruction in general sociological theory and its history at the University of Chicago. Since the Chicago department of sociology became, from the time of its foundation in 1893, the leading department for graduate study in sociology and has given more doctorates in sociology than any other university department, it is evident that Small's teaching affected the development of sociological thought in the United States enormously. To what extent Small emphasized to his students the same features of the sociological thought of Ratzenhofer that the latter would himself have emphasized is another question. Since in the present inquiry we are especially concerned with the development of sociology in the United States, we may, in the following brief characterization of Ratzenhofer's sociology, rely chiefly upon Small's version of it.¹

In Chap. XIII of his *General Sociology*, Small presents "Ratzenhofer's Epitome of His Theory," freely translated from *Die Soziologische Erkenntnis*. Space limits preclude the full reproduction of this epitome here; the following statements will serve to indicate the general trend of the reasoning: Ratzenhofer asserts that social phenomena exhibit conformity to law; in this, he is evidently following Gumpłowicz. All social contacts, he says, have as their underlying motive forces the instinct of self-preservation (*Brotneid*) and the sexual instinct (which gives rise to the blood bond, *Blutliebe*). Originally, all creatures have the tendency to follow their instincts without hindrance; but owing to the limitations imposed by conditions, men find themselves compelled to make some form of accommodation. In general, this accommodation will take the form either of culture or of organized compulsion upon other men. The origin of social relations is the blood bond, while subordination to rulers is the beginning of the state. Through the evolution of culture and the development of commerce, social structures undergo a progressive differentiation or individualization; i.e., they are adapted to individual want or need. There is also a continuous

¹ *General Sociology*, Chaps. XII-XXVII, incl.: see particularly Chaps. XIII, XX.

tendency to the socialization of structures; they become adapted to the demands of group life, and this involves the restriction of individual activities. With the increasing density of society, the culture state tends to replace the conquest state, and this leads to an equalization in the satisfaction of men's interests.

In Ratzenhofer's epitome of his theory, he did not bring out either of two rather important features of his system. The first of these we can express in the general statement that, in comparison with Gumplowicz, Ratzenhofer pays much more attention to the social process as it goes on within states and relatively less to the struggle of state with state.¹ Like Gumplowicz, he treats sociology definitely and expressly as the study of social process, but where Gumplowicz had emphasized the "nation-making" process, *i.e.*, the struggle between once distinct groups and the eventual subjugation of one by the other to form the conquest state, Ratzenhofer is interested chiefly in politics (*Politik*) in the conventional sense of the term, *i.e.*, a process that goes on inside a state already existing. The second feature of Ratzenhofer's system of sociology which is not emphasized in the epitome is his use of the term "interests."² He was the first person ordinarily classified as a sociologist who stated emphatically that the social process, particularly as it takes place within states, may be described as a struggle of men to satisfy their interests. As we have noted, he may have been influenced in this interpretation by Ihering, and the germ of the idea is in Gumplowicz' writings, but Ratzenhofer elaborated it and gave it a prominent place in his own works. In his treatment, the term "interests" seems to have the connotation which it has in such familiar English expressions as "the liquor interests," "the manufacturing interests," "the big banking interests," and the like. That is, it is a term referring primarily to certain rather loosely articulated groups the members of which have more or less consciously similar outlook and purposes. The reduction of this relatively concrete conception to the more generalized and abstract form expressed in the familiar sixfold list "health, wealth, knowledge, beauty, sociability, and rightness" was entirely the work of Small.³

¹ Small, *op. cit.*, p. 226.

² *Ibid.*, Chaps. XV, XX; see especially p. 252.

³ *Op. cit.*, Chap. XIV.

If we undertake to state very concisely the nature and scope of Ratzenhofer's contribution to modern sociology, we may express it as follows: He was on the whole the first to give a rich and definite content to the concept "political process," though to be sure he did not use the term, and he described this phase of the social process as the conflict and adjustment of the conscious interests of various categories and groups of persons in a sovereign state. This conception of politics has been persistent in social theory since he first formulated it.

"Social Darwinists" in a strict and narrow sense of the term were numerous and vociferous at the turn of the century. Most of them, however, were so patently motivated by propagandist aims for particular racial or pseudoracial groups that their writings influenced the long-run development of social science only indirectly. Some mention should be made, however, of Jacques Novicow (Yakov Alexandrovich Novikov, 1849-1912), the Russian-French sociologist whom we have mentioned as an exponent of the organic analogy. His principal work, *Les luttes entre sociétés humaines et leurs phases successives*, published in Paris in 1893, develops the thesis that struggle is universal in human society, but violence is not its necessary concomitant. He held that the struggles of human beings take place on four levels: physiological, economic, political, and intellectual and that the fourth of these does not involve bloodshed. His writings have to a considerable extent the character of propaganda for the establishment of a society in which violence would have no place. His latest book, *La critique du Darwinisme social*, is, as its title implies, an adverse criticism of social Darwinism in its most restricted interpretation.¹

Finally, brief mention should be made of a writer whose relatively original and elaborate treatment of "social selection" has probably exercised considerable influence in directing the thought of sociologists along similar lines, G. Vacher de Lapouge (1854-). More than any of the others whom we have specifically considered in this connection, he is a proponent of the doctrine that the Nordic, or Aryan, race is inherently superior to the two other races that can be detected in the population of Western Europe. In his early work, *Les sélections sociales* (1896),

¹ See Theodor Abel, article on Novicow in *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*, vol. 11.

however, he made a definite distinction between natural and social selection, the latter being effected through the operation of the social environment. This distinction was implicit in Bagehot's *Physics and Politics*, but Vacher de Lapouge made it explicit and thus contributed something to clarity of thought on the subject. He differentiated between eight forms of social selection: military, political, religious, moral, juridical, economic, occupational, and rural-urban, all of which, he thought, except military selection in its early stages, operate adversely to the survival of the Nordic elements in the population. Hence he concluded that there is no scientific foundation for the optimistic concept of progress; for progress is, in his view, dependent chiefly upon the racial composition of a population.¹

If we inquire what the net effect of social Darwinism on modern sociology has been, we can of course answer the question only very tentatively and incompletely. Most sociologists of today will probably concede that it is possible and, to a certain extent, helpful to describe social change in terms of competition, conflict, and selection. The general tendency, however, seems to be in the direction of sociological explanation which runs in terms of subtler processes of adjustment, rather than in terms of selection simply. It is pointed out that a struggle between two groups, or one between two persons, tends to result in the modification of both and probably leads to the appearance of quite novel social phenomena. Sociological theory is still very much in flux; hence one cannot say what place in the science concepts of social, institutional, or cultural "selection" will ultimately have. One remark can be made with some confidence: the work of Gumpłowicz and Ratzenhofer, if not that of the social Darwinists as a school or cult, contributed materially to the shift in sociological theory toward a greater emphasis on process. Although the process concept was implicitly present in the sociology of Spencer, that aspect of his work, for some reason, did not make the same impression that the structural aspect did. The fact that Gumpłowicz repeatedly used the term "process" in writing about social phenomena may have had something to do with the attention that his successors gave to the concept.

¹ Pitirim A. Sorokin, *Contemporary Sociological Theories*, pp. 234-244, New York, 1928. Sorokin has also reviewed the writings of several other writers of similar tendency.

CHAPTER XV

SOME ANTECEDENTS OF PSYCHOLOGICAL SOCIOLOGY¹

The use of the phrase "psychological sociology" in the title of this chapter requires explanation. "Social psychology" is a conventional term, but psychological sociology is not. Social psychology, however, is conceived by some authorities primarily as a branch of psychology, and probably the majority of textbooks in the subject treat it on the whole from this point of view. If social psychology is conceived as a branch of sociology primarily, rather than of psychology, and is so developed by teachers and writers of textbooks, then it is presumably much the same thing that is designated here as psychological sociology. In any case, some of the sociologists and other writers whose work we shall consider in this chapter and the following one cannot be said to have been exclusively "psychological" in their theories or points of view; and, on the other hand, some of the men whose contributions we have previously discussed have by no means neglected the psychological aspects of sociology. Nevertheless, it is possible to discern a general trend in the development of modern sociology, from an early stage when its conceptions seem to be derived primarily from those of physics (Spencer) and biology (Spencer, Lilienfeld, Worms, Novicow, Gumpłowicz, Vacher de Lapouge), in the direction of a more psychological interpretation of social phenomena. The tendency to conceive sociology as a psychological science had multiple origins, and all of its antecedents are not being taken into account in the present discussion. It became very prominent and influential in the opening decades of our century; lately it seems to have receded somewhat under the influence of those who emphasize statistical methods and behavioristic concepts. At any rate, the term psychological sociology serves as a convenient heading

¹ For a more extended treatment of some of the topics dealt with in this and the following chapter, see Fay B. Karpf, *American Social Psychology*, especially Part I, New York, 1932.

under which to classify a number of important European and American sociologists, including Tönnies, Tarde, Simmel, Pareto, von Wiese, Ward, Ross, Ellwood, and others. Some of these may, of course, be classified under other headings also. It is with some of the antecedents and beginnings of this trend toward a more psychological interpretation of the life of society that we are concerned here. In subsequent chapters, we shall examine the content of psychological sociology and social psychology.

Doubtless all systems of sociology that are noticeably affected with the psychological character may be assumed to have, in the last analysis, the same foundation; they have been developed on the basis of the common-sense assumption that, in order to understand why people act as they do, we have to take into account their mental processes. This assumption is made, to some extent, in the earliest theories of human society; it is very marked in Plato, and it is implicit in Aristotle's most quoted remark, "Man is a political animal." In order to clarify our discussion of the varieties of psychological theory of society, it will be helpful to distinguish two quite different approaches to such theory that have been made. One of these may be described as an empirical approach, while the other rests upon the unproved but plausible assumption that human beings are actuated in their behavior by a limited number of instincts, which have as their subjective correlates the conscious desires or wishes of individuals. Of course there is no particularly obvious reason why one may not use both of these approaches in constructing a system of psychological sociology, and certain recent writers have done so, but, on the whole, the writings of the pioneers of psychological sociology seem to proceed from the one or the other of these approaches, rather than from both of them together.

The empirical approach to a psychological interpretation of society may be described as one which develops the assumption that the overt behavior of human beings is determined by their concrete and infinitely various ideas, desires, hopes, fears, and impressions of things—in short, by the actual contents and processes of their minds. The instinctivist approach seeks to penetrate beneath the immediate content of consciousness to the underlying elements or sources of mental tendencies and processes. The latter type of psychological theory can, as we have said, be traced to Aristotle and is implicit in medieval social theory. As

will be seen, a conception of human instincts was implicit in the work of Bastian and, less clearly so, in the sociology of Herbert Spencer. Nevertheless, early modern psychological sociology was preponderantly of the empirical rather than the instinctivist variety; the latter flourished most strongly from about 1905 to about 1920 and has been subjected to strong adverse criticism since the latter date.¹

The most evident beginnings of psychological sociology are to be found in the "folk psychology" (*Völkerpsychologie*) that was developed by a number of scholars, chiefly in Germany, between 1860 and 1900. Although he cannot be said to have founded folk psychology, Johann Friedrich Herbart (1776-1841), German psychologist and educator, announced the need and possibility of such a specialty in somewhat the same way that Comte announced the need and possibility of a science of sociology. Lazarus and Steinthal, who actually launched the new subject, are known to have been influenced by the Herbartian psychology. In his psychological writings, the most important of which in this connection are *Lehrbuch zur Psychologie* (1816) and *Psychologie als Wissenschaft* (1824), Herbart taught that man is not born with fixed "faculties," as some of his contemporaries and predecessors had held, but that mental life is largely a product of experience and that psychology, to be a well-rounded science, must study man in society.²

Moritz Lazarus (1824-1902) and Heymann Steinthal (1823-1899) are known chiefly for the *Zeitschrift für Völkerpsychologie und Sprachwissenschaft*, which they founded in 1860 and continued until 1890, when it was converted into a journal of different title and somewhat different scope. Each published books in the general field of folk psychology; Roback states that Lazarus formulated the general principles of his group psychology, as early as 1851, incidentally to the preparation of his *Das Leben der Seele* (2 vols., 1856-1857).³ Of the two men, Lazarus was, apparently, the leader.

In their theories and in the researches that they promoted, Lazarus and Steinthal were influenced not only by the psychology of Herbart but also by the Hegelian philosophy of history, with

¹ See Chap. XIX.

² Karpf, *op. cit.*, pp. 43-44.

³ Article on Lazarus in *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*, vol. 9.

its conception of culture as "objective mind," and by the evolutionary theories of Spencer, Darwin, and others. Their purpose, as announced in the opening number of the *Zeitschrift für Völkerpsychologie und Sprachwissenschaft*, was to promote the investigation of the "folk mind," a concept that they based both on the historical aspects of anthropology and psychology and on the psychological aspects of history. They defined two branches of folk psychology: the study of the folk mind in general and the study of the historical development of the particular folk minds of different peoples. The human individual, they contended, is never a member of society in general but always of a particular nation, or folk; hence they named their specialty *Völkerpsychologie* (the psychology of peoples) rather than *Sozialpsychologie* (the psychology of society). Following Herbart, they expected to find the psychology of peoples conforming to the same general laws as individual psychology, since the folk mind exists only in the individuals who compose the group.¹ Folk psychology, accordingly, was in their view dependent upon individual psychology, of which it was in the last analysis simply a branch.

Wilhelm Wundt (1832-1920), known as one of the founders and pioneers of modern laboratory psychology, was also greatly interested in *Völkerpsychologie* and contributed to the literature of the subject a *magnum opus* of ten volumes,² as well as a later and shorter treatise which was translated into English in 1916 as *Elements of Folk Psychology*. Wundt, faced with the problem of defining a method of studying the higher mental functions, those which are most complex and which are not readily reached by the experimental method, decided that these things must be studied indirectly, in their cultural manifestations. He criticized Lazarus and Steinthal for subordinating folk psychology to individual psychology but finally arrived at theories very similar to theirs. The folk, he said, is made up of individuals and cannot exist apart from the individuals who compose it; hence his folk psychology turns out to be a mere application of the supposed principles of individual psychology, instead of the

¹ Karpf, *op. cit.*, pp. 44-50. Cf. Spencer's dictum, "There is no social sensorium."

² *Völkerpsychologie: Eine Untersuchung der Entwicklungsgesetze von Sprache, Mythos, und Sitte*, 10 vols., 1900 ff.

independent discipline that he had elsewhere declared it to be. In his hands, folk psychology became in effect a study of the evolution of cultures; he conceived it, however, as the study of the general characteristics of the collective mind, just as individual psychology is the study of the general characteristics of the individual mind. Such characteristics of the collective mind he found in language, mythology, and custom. To a study of these he devoted especial attention, particularly to language, which he regarded as the realm where the folk mind and the individual mind overlap.¹

Owing to the prestige that Wundt gained as a psychologist, his folk psychology probably exercised a wider influence than any other work done in the field until quite recently. However, a more sociological treatment of similar topics and materials had previously been outlined by the German ethnologist Adolf Bastian (1826-1905). In *Der Volkergedanke . . . und seiner Begründung auf ethnologische Sammlungen* (1881) and *Ethnische Elementargedanken in der Lehre vom Menschen* (1895), he developed the two concepts suggested by the titles "elementary thoughts" (*Elementargedanken*) and "folk thoughts" (*Volkergedanken*). In all human cultures, he held, there can be discerned the influence of certain elemental ideas or tendencies. These elementary "thoughts" are embodied in the folk thoughts of particular peoples and must be studied there. A "folk" is a geographical group, existing within a particular, though indefinite, boundary. In this, as Goldenweiser has pointed out, Bastian anticipated the culture area concept of modern anthropology.² The influence of Bastian has been exerted chiefly through the ethnologists and anthropologists, rather than in sociological circles directly. In recent years, however, the interests of American anthropologists have centered mainly upon the less psychological aspects of their problems; while American sociologists, on the contrary, have devoted a great deal of attention to ethnological materials and have sought to exploit such source materials in the study of problems in psychological sociology. Thus their researches fall into sequence, more or less, with the work of Bastian.

¹ Karpf, *op. cit.*, pp. 51-65.

² A. A. Goldenweiser, article on Bastian in *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*, vol. 2.

We have remarked that the psychological tendency in modern sociology is of multiple origins; and one may add that some of its origins are obscure. How much the course of sociological thought in Europe and America has been affected by the writings of Alfred Jules Émile Fouillée (1838-1913) no one can say; however, in his doctrine of idea forces, he expressed a psychosociological concept of which several sociologists of a few years ago made use, whether they owed it to him or developed it independently. Fouillée was primarily a philosopher and was interested chiefly in problems of ethics and metaphysics. He is known among French social scientists as a critic of the collectivism of Émile Durkheim; he held that the fundamental basis of morality is to be found in the mind of the individual rather than in the collective mind. His theory of "idea forces" may be briefly expressed in the proposition An idea is a plan of action. This thesis served, at any rate, to connect psychological with social phenomena.¹ At the present time, ideas, as distinguished from sentiments, desires, wishes, and attitudes, do not occupy a very large place in sociological theory. Apparently this is because no one has seen clearly how to bring the concept "ideas" into an intelligible relation with the other concepts of a system of sociology. Whenever this is accomplished, Fouillée's treatment of idea forces will probably be found to have anticipated in part what the new system expresses.

It is widely held that the theories and clinical findings of modern psychiatry are valuable for the purposes of a psychological sociology, although particular psychiatric doctrines, *e.g.*, those of Sigmund Freud, have been unfavorably criticized by many sociologists. As the conception is more and more emphasized that sociology is concerned essentially with psychic phenomena rather than with material events, the ancient problem of the one and the many, society and the individual, receives a new emphasis. Sociology may be the study of groups, and the attempt to develop sociology as a distinct science may presuppose the existence of social groups as real entities of a distinct order, but it is apparent that, in some fashion or other, sociology is also

¹ The principal works of Fouillée were as follows: *La science sociale contemporaine*, Paris, 1850; *Le mouvement positiviste et la conception sociologique du monde*, 1896; *Les éléments sociologiques du morale*, 1905; *L'évolutionisme des idées-forces*, 1890; *Morale des idées-forces*, 1908.

concerned with the individual members of groups. There is, as the folk psychologists recognized, a difference between making the biological individual the object of scientific study, after the fashion of orthodox modern psychology, and the study of the individual as a member of a social group. The latter is a topic that sociology cannot neglect; and, accordingly, there has gone on for several decades the quest for a sociological theory of personality. At times, this quest has been explicit and self-conscious; at other times, it has been implicit and subconscious; but in any case, it has been a persistent feature of the development of sociology.¹ It is particularly to this phase of sociological thought that the findings and theories of psychiatrists have contributed.

The history of psychiatry is itself a complicated story, which it does not fall within the scope of this study to review. We may mention particularly among the early contributors to this field of inquiry, however, Théodule Armand Ribot (1839-1916), whose suggestions toward a general concept of personality seem to have been of assistance to sociologists in their own struggles with the problem. It is a striking fact that psychology, as a separate and self-sufficient discipline, did not contain a concept of personality until quite recently, when it derived one from the study of psychopathology. Ribot was one of the pioneer modern writers on mental diseases, and in his three well-known books on this subject,² he arrived at a general theory of personality which was a considerable addition to current conceptions. In *The Diseases of Personality*, in particular, he developed a doctrine which has been reported as the identification of personality with the physical organism, but which, in fact, is something more than simple materialism. In one passage, he says that the organism, as centered in the brain, is the real personality; and that "conscious personality" is only a part of "physical personality."³ In the opening statement of this book, however, he states that personality

¹ Cf. the writer's *Range of Social Theory*, Chap. XIII, New York, 1929. A sociological theory of personality is implicit in Giddings' use of the term "socius" in his early works; see, for example, *Elements of Sociology*, pp. 6, 10; Chap. V, New York, 1898.

² *The Diseases of Memory*, 1st American ed., 1882; *The Diseases of the Will*, 1st American ed., 1884; *The Diseases of Personality*, 1st American ed., 1887.

³ *Op. cit.*, pp. 154-155.

is "the individual as conscious of itself";¹ later he makes the suggestive remark that self-consciousness is founded on coenesthesia, "the organic sense, the sense of the body, usually obscure, but sometimes very clear in all of us."² This consciousness of self, he points out, is reduced to a minimum when coordination is most complete.

Ribot cannot be classified as a sociologist. As a contribution to the theory of personality which sociology needs, however, his suggestions have their value. There is, even at present, a surprising dearth of scientific literature in which more definite contributions to the formulation of such a concept can be found. A considerable amount has been published in recent years about personality, but only very little of it tends to establish a clear definition of the concept.³

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 1.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 18-19.

³ As an exhibit of the recent status of the subject, R. G. Gordon, *Personality* (New York and London, 1926), is interesting. See also Chap. XXIV of the present volume.

CHAPTER XVI

THE SOCIOLOGY OF GABRIEL TARDE AND FERDINAND TÖNNIES

The men whose contributions have been briefly reviewed in the foregoing chapter have played only a small part in the main trend of sociological thought and have influenced that trend only indirectly. We turn our attention now to authors whose work has been definitely a part of the development of sociology; Tarde and Tönnies were among those pioneers who formulated systems of sociological theory that were quite comprehensive and inclusive, though not so inclusive in the range of topics with which they deal as those of certain more recent writers have been.)

(Born at Sarlat, Dordogne, France, in 1843, Gabriel Tarde was educated at a Jesuit secondary school in his native town and, after studying law in Paris, became *juge d'instruction* in Sarlat, a calling in which he was occupied for twenty-five years, receiving one promotion to a higher grade. He was, evidently, of a philosophical turn of mind and was led by the circumstances of his calling to take an interest in the general problems of criminality, which were treated in his two earliest books,) *La criminalité comparée* (1886) and *Philosophie pénale* (1890). In this phase of his work, (he criticized the then popular criminological theories of Lombroso and advanced evidence in support of the theory that crime is, in the main, due to social causes, and particularly to the influence of other persons upon the offender, rather than to the inherent characteristics of the individual offender.) Thus, the doctrine of imitation which became central in his whole system of sociology was present in the germ in these early criminological works. He outlined some of the main conceptions of his general sociological theory in a series of articles published between 1882 and 1884) in the *Revue philosophique*.¹ This theory he elaborated

¹ F. H. Giddings, Introduction to Elsie Clews Parsons' translation of Tarde, *Laws of Imitation*, New York, 1903.

in the following volumes: *Les lois de l'imitation* (1890), *La logique sociale* (1895), *L'opposition universelle* (1897), and *Les lois sociales* (1898). The last mentioned volume is, as its title suggests, a summary of the others. Subsequently, Tarde published a number of other books dealing with miscellaneous topics, for the most part not closely related to his main system of sociology. Of these later works, the one of greatest interest to the student of sociology is *L'opinion et la foule* (1901), a contribution to the theory of "crowd psychology" which had been previously developed by Le Bon and Sighele.¹ From 1894 until 1900, Tarde was head of the Bureau of Statistics of the Ministry of Justice in Paris, and from 1900 until his death in 1904 he was professor of modern philosophy in the Collège de France.

The antecedents and sources of Tarde's ideas cannot be ascertained, except in part. Apparently, his general system of sociological thought was relatively original with him. His *Laws of Imitation* contains references to a number of earlier works of other writers, among whom are Herbert Spencer and Condorcet, but for the most part these references are quite incidental or are controversial. He gives definite credit to Antoine Augustin Cournot (1801-1877), French mathematician, philosopher, and economist, for having suggested some of his most basic ideas, and Lichtenberger has pointed out that in one of the works of Cournot there is a passage that may be regarded as an anticipation of Tarde's general theory of imitation.¹ Tarde dedicated his *Laws of Imitation* to Cournot. Tarde was no closet philosopher, interested in the development of a system of thought for its own sake, but was quite clearly seeking to formulate the principles of a science that would be useful for the practical guidance of social life. As we have seen, he first developed his theories in a treatment of criminology. In this practical tendency which characterized his work, Tarde was not alone among his contemporaries; it may be said of Gumplowicz alone, among the important pioneer European sociologists, that he seemed to make the formulation of scientific sociology an end in itself.

The concept "imitation" is central and fundamental in the sociology of Tarde. In the *Laws of Imitation*, after extended discussion of the point, he lays down the definition "Society is

¹ *Development of Social Theory*, Chap. XIV, p. 404, in which this point is made, is an excellent treatment of the life and work of Tarde.

imitation.”¹ As he himself recognized in his later writings, however, his use of the term “imitation” requires some explanation.² It is for him first of all a convenient term for the repetition of social phenomena and the fact of the propagation of such phenomena from person to person and from group to group. It is his thesis that the essence of the social is precisely this quality of like thought and behavior, brought about by imitation, not the division of labor and reciprocal dependence of the parts of a society, as Spencer and Espinas had held, or subjection to a common authority, as Durkheim presently asserted. (Imitation was, for Tarde, a sociological concept first and the object of psychological inquiry only secondarily. He realized that the mechanism of imitation is in some sense psychological, and accordingly, in his *Laws of Imitation*, he finally attempted to give a psychological definition of the concept, *viz.*, “By imitation I mean every impression of an interpsychical photography, so to speak, willed or unwilled, passive or active.”³ Also, in the same work there is incorporated a moderately extensive psychological discussion of imitation.⁴ Tarde’s psychology may be faulty; it is certainly not expressed in the terminology of recent psychological writers, and his concept of imitation has been subjected to searching criticism,⁵ but, at any rate, he made a pioneer attempt to base sociology on a definitely psychological foundation.)

(Using the concept imitation as the cornerstone of his system of sociology, Tarde developed this system in two directions. On the one hand, he added to the central concept theories concerning the nature of the elements of social life that are transmitted by imitation; and, on the other hand, he represented imitation as the central, or fundamental, feature of a complex process of social interaction.) In other words, Tarde’s name may be added to those of Gumplowicz, Ratzenhofer, and others, as a pioneer who developed the idea of social process, but, where others had con-

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 68 and preceding part of Chap. II, “What Is a Society?”

² *Ibid.*, Author’s Preface to 2d ed.

³ *Laws of Imitation*, trans. by Elsie Clews Parsons, Preface to 2d. ed., p. xiv, New York, 1903.

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 74–88.

⁵ Ellsworth Faris, “The Concept of Imitation,” *American Journal of Sociology*, vol. 32, pp. 367–378, 1926–1927.

tended that the process is primarily one of competition and conflict and only secondarily one of adjustment and assimilation, his view was that the essential social process is one that produces likeness of thought and action among human beings. He treated differentiation and opposition as incidents or derivatives of this central process./

Regarding the questions that inevitably suggest themselves concerning the content of this process of imitation (What is it that is imitated? What are the elements or units of which the life of society is formed?), Tarde had a very definite answer to propose. Desires and beliefs, he asserted, are the forces underlying all social life. Sensations, which had been described by psychologists as the ultimate elements of the psychic life of individuals, are, according to Tarde, essentially private and incommunicable, but desires and beliefs can be transmitted by imitation.¹ In the last analysis, he does not seem to regard desires and beliefs as separable, except by abstraction; they are, in his theory, two aspects of the same thing. The object of desire is belief; neither can exist without the other. The reasoning turns upon a rather subtle and unusual use of the term "belief," which can scarcely be made clear in a brief discussion. In this phase of Tarde's system, there is a striking anticipation of the doctrine later formulated by Thomas and Znaniecki in terms of "attitudes and values"; Tarde's elaboration of the matter and of related topics in *La logique sociale* suggests also some of the features of the social psychology of John Dewey, particularly in so far as (Tarde seems to say that action is the fundamental fact that shapes belief, besides giving rise to our desires. Tarde's concept of belief seems to refer to our conceptions of things, what they mean to us; and when we understand the term in that sense, we see how beliefs may be treated as the invariable correlates of desires. Desire is the subjective tendency to behave in a certain manner toward anything, whether that thing is a physical object or a figment of the imagination; belief is the idea that one has of the thing in question. Each, in a particular situation, is determined by the other; the two are different phases of the same psychic fact.²)

¹ *Op. cit.*, Author's Preface to 2d ed., p. xvi; see also pp. 24 ff.

² The above sentences are the writer's free interpretation of Tarde's treatment of beliefs and desires, as found in several passages in his works.

The principal question that confronted Tarde, in the development of his theory of social process, concerned the complexity, or differentiation, that is actually found in human society and the fact of social change. Imitation is a plausible explanation of what men have in common, of their ability to act in concert and to understand one another, but a sociologist cannot evade the fact that human society is a thing of differences, of change, and of adjustment between divergent and even opposing forces, rather than of simple homogeneity. Having laid down the general thesis that society is imitation, Tarde was constrained to show how it comes to be something else than a homogeneous mass. (To meet this need, he relied chiefly upon three ideas, which qualify the central concept of imitation: opposition, counterimitation, and invention.) Although his sociological theories evidently took their origin from his idea of imitation, he treated opposition, in the elaboration of his theory, as a fact or datum more fundamental, in a sense, than imitation. The opposition of tendencies is, in his view, a primitive feature of the situation in which society takes shape; imitation is the most elemental process by which it takes shape. The oppositions are there, potentially, and as they become active, they initiate processes of equilibration and adaptation. In cases where the opposing tendencies are consecutive rather than simultaneous, they give rise to rhythms.¹

Tarde's conception of counterimitation may be rather simply stated: The setting of an example, or precedent, sometimes leads to "counterimitation," i.e., to behavior as different as possible from the original example.² This conception is consistent with his detailed treatment of imitation in various passages in which the fact of imitation is brought into relation with the status, or prestige, of the person imitated. This status is a matter, essentially, of other people's attitudes toward the exemplar.¹ Obviously, where the attitude is one of antipathy, the impulse of the others may be toward behavior that is the opposite of the example set.

It is inserted for the sake of bringing out the continuity of thought between Tarde and later writers in the field of social psychology.

¹ *L'Opposition universelle*; see also *Social Laws*, trans. by Howard Warren, pp. 68-84, et passim, New York, 1899; also Lichtenberger, *Development of Social Theory*, pp. 408, 414, 417-421.

² *Laws of Imitation*, trans. by Parsons, Preface to 2d ed., p. xvii.

(The concept of invention plays an important role in Tarde's theory.) To the questions, How does anything new ever find its way into a social order created and maintained by imitation? and How is social change effected? Tarde has one general answer (Social changes originate in inventions. He conceived invention somewhat as he had conceived imitation, *viz.*, as a general term for the first appearance of a social phenomenon (an invention is any bit of behavior that serves as a pattern, or example, and is imitated.¹ Tarde does not assume that it is his business as a sociologist to explain inventions, except in so far as the explanation can be sociological and not psychological or metaphysical; to some extent, he simply takes inventions for granted, noting as a datum of sociology the fact that they appear. However, he does regard the fact of invention as one susceptible in part of sociological explanation. (Imitation, he points out, is not the absolute reproduction of whatever is imitated; imitations are refracted by the social medium in which they are transmitted.) In fact, inventions are invariably compounded, in some one's mind, from old social materials.² It appears that Tarde never decided exactly how much emphasis to place on the role of the personal innovator, the great man. He was inclined to emphasize the social causes of invention, but he admitted and even emphasized that the great man cannot be dispensed with; the same conjunction of social currents would not evoke the same fruitful syntheses in every mind.³

Finally, we should note that, although Tarde's attention was focused upon social interaction rather than upon the long-run aspects of social change, and it was sociology rather than philosophy of history that interested him primarily, he did not omit entirely from his works a theory of social change in the latter sense. He presented a generalized description of the cumulative effect of invention and imitation, in terms of a cycle of adjustment. Every new invention, he says, passes through three stages: a slow advance in the beginning, followed by rapid progress, which gradually slows up until it stops; and there is, in his discussion of this topic, an implication that the smallest

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 2.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 22, 24.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 382.

⁴ *La logique sociale*, pp. 186 ff., Paris, 1896.

inventions into which social innovation may be analyzed combine to form larger ones, which conform to the same general sequence of development and make up the totality of human progress.¹)

(Tarde's works have had considerable prestige in France; and undoubtedly other French sociologists who have written since his time have been influenced by him. His theories have also had a considerable influence in the United States, due in part to the early writings of E. A. Ross, who drew upon Tarde heavily for material and for ideas.)

German sociology of recent decades has had a psychological tendency which, however, has apparently been independent of the beginnings made by Tarde, Durkheim, and other French writers. The outstanding originator of this psychological tendency in modern German sociology was Ferdinand Tönnies, professor in the University of Kiel. (Although he is the author of a number of books) including *Die Sitte* (1902) and *Kritik der öffentlichen Meinung* (1922), (he has been known chiefly for his early book *Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft* (1887). This volume of 250 pages is one of the classics of modern sociology.) A comparison of its date with those of the pioneer works of Spencer, Gumplovicz, Tarde, Ward, Sumner, and others shows that Tönnies was truly a pioneer. In fact, the writings of Comte and Spencer's *Social Statics* are the only important sociological works that antedate *Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft* by more than a year or two.

(This book exemplifies a tendency that has been very characteristic of German sociological works written since it was first published. Recent German writers place their specific findings, hypotheses, and concepts in a carefully formulated context of philosophical and logical definitions, and Tönnies, like his younger contemporaries, took pains to define the implications and objectives of the inquiry in which he was engaged in this pioneer treatise.) The first edition of *Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft* contains an extended Preface (*Vorrede*), omitted in some of the later editions but reprinted in his *Soziologische Studien und Kritiken, Erste Sammlung*,² which is really a brief essay on the logic and philosophy of science and of social science in particu

¹ *Laws of Imitation*, pp. 126 ff.

² Pp. 34-44, Jena, 1925.

lar. It contains a very penetrating analysis of the tendency to quantitative procedure and, in effect, gives specifications for the scientific analysis of social phenomena. The same theme is treated in the main text of the book. In these passages, Tönnies attempted to show that modern scientific method has been shaped by philosophy and by the search for an escape from the theological dilemma of free will and divine omnipotence. He interpreted the concepts of natural law and natural causation as the outcome of this quest and held that the scientific type of thought had its beginnings in the arts of comparing, classifying, and measuring entities and aggregates. Scientific thought appeared first and most easily in these procedures; it had nothing to do, in the beginning, with questions of causation. But subjecting things to enumeration and measurement involves the assumption that they are of only a few kinds or that they can be analyzed into elements of which there are only a few kinds; each element or entity of a certain kind is assumed to be exactly equal to every other one of that kind. Such procedures are readily carried out in abstraction, *i.e.*, by a purely mental operation, since in ordinary language we have a system of words for things and for their supposed elements or qualities, and the habitual use of these words—common nouns, descriptive adjectives and adverbs, and verbs other than those that simply express being or serve as connectives—implies the requisite similarities between things and between their components. Such identically similar entities as modern scientific method presupposes do not exist in the world of sense experience, where we find only things more or less similar to each other; the postulated identically similar entities are the product of a scientific fiction. This procedure of classification, abstraction, and enumeration, which characterizes the scientific method in its strictest forms, is adopted, consciously or unconsciously, to economize the labor of thought, which, of course, has ultimate practical applications in view. When the essential nature of this method is grasped, formal philosophy is seen to be related to it as its general critique; science and philosophy are reciprocally necessary to each other. It is a significant fact that Tönnies dedicated the first edition of *Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft* to Friedrich Paulsen and the second to Harald Höffding, both great teachers of philosophy; and it is even more significant that he found in the epistemology of Kant the back-

ground for his methodology. German sociology has shown a consistent neo-Kantian tendency since his day.

The importance of all this lies in the emphasis that it lends to the proposition that the elements of scientific thought are conceptual; they are not the original data of experience but are fashioned, more or less arbitrarily, for purposes of prevision and control. However, prevision and control can be had only if there can be gained from the experience of the past a kind of knowledge that will enable us to foresee what will happen under similar circumstances in the future. The mere history of past happenings, however accurate, will not serve this purpose; abstracted and generalized knowledge is required. The task of developing such knowledge of social phenomena is complicated and rendered difficult by the fact that in social science thought attacks the realm of the organic. Human beings are not simply machines but organisms, and human communities also have an organismic character, but reducing organic phenomena to mechanistic explanation, by analyzing them into simple elements and describing the behavior of those elements, misrepresents their actual nature. Human social phenomena involve the behavior of thinking organisms, and the task of describing and explaining them is, accordingly, psychological.) This is the task with which Tönnies is largely occupied in *Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft*.¹

The feature of the main argument of this book that is best known and has probably had the widest influence is that explicitly designated by its title, viz., Tönnies' distinction between "community" (*Gemeinschaft*) and "society" (*Gesellschaft*). By community he means the type of group exemplified in a relatively pure form by a simple agricultural household or a simple rural community. Society is a term used to refer to the life of commercial towns and cities. Regarded in the abstract, these two types of situations involve quite different kinds of relationships between individual human beings. ,

(Human wills stand in manifold connections with one another; every such connection is a reciprocal fact which, in so far as it is done or given from the one side, is suffered or experienced from the other. These

¹ The two paragraphs ending here comprise a very free rendering with some interpretive additions, of Tönnies' Preface to the 1st ed. of *Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft* and of pp. 5-7 of the main text of the book.

effects, however, are either such that they tend to the preservation, or such that they tend to destroy, the body or will of the other, affirming or denying.) [The present theory is exclusively concerned with the relationship of reciprocal affirmation as the object of its investigation. Every such relationship represents unity in plurality or plurality in unity.] It consists of demands, facilitations, and actions which transcend (*hinüber und herüber gehen*) [the individual sphere] and are considered as expressions of the will and its powers. (The group formed by this positive relationship, conceived as a unitary being or thing acting inwardly and outwardly, is termed a social unity (*Verbindung*). The relationship as such, and likewise the unity, is conceived either as real and organic life—this is the nature of community (*Gemeinschaft*)—or as an ideal and mechanical structure—the latter is the concept of society (*Gesellschaft*). . . . All confidential, private, exclusive living together (so we find) is understood as life in community. Society is the public, the world. One finds himself in community with his own [people] from birth onward, bound to them in weal and woe. One goes into society as into a strange land. A youth is warned against bad society; but bad community is a contradiction in terms. Jurists may speak of household society, since they know only the societal concept of a unity; however, the household community, with its endless effects upon the human soul, is experienced by everyone who has participated in it. In the same way, a betrothed couple know that they give themselves over to marriage as a complete community of life (*communio totius vitae*); a society of life contradicts itself. One makes society; no one can make community for someone else. One is received into a religious community; religious societies, like other associations for specific purposes, exist only for the state and for the theory which regards them from the outside. We speak of a community of speech, a community of customs, a community of believers; but of a society for profits, a society for travel, a society for science.¹

(It is Tönnies' theory that behavior in the community can be accounted for, in the main, in terms of the organic traits of its individual members and the psychic correlates of those traits. Such behavior is, in other words, instinctive, although it is modified somewhat by custom, which is psychologically very similar to instinct. It is impulsive; behavior in society is purposive. Behavior in the community is to be accounted for by reference to the past; behavior in society, by reference to the

¹ *Op. cit.*, 6th and 7th ed., pp. 3 and 4, Berlin, 1926. The passage translated is the opening of the main text of the book, with the short omission indicated.

future.) Our author elaborates this distinction in terms of two fundamental forms of the will, *Wesenville* and *Kürville*. *Wesenville* is the basic, instinctive, organic tendency which drives human activity as if from behind; it is the form of will that is operative in the community. *Kürville* is the purposive, arbitrary form of volition which determines human activity with reference to an expected future; it is operative in society.¹ Tönnies uses this distinction as a basis and point of departure for his discussion of public opinion in *Kritik der öffentlichen Meinung*.

(It is his thesis that "society" becomes differentiated from the life of the community largely through the objectivation of things and the detachment of persons from things and services when the latter are bought and sold in a free competitive market. Contract is the elemental form of societal, as distinguished from communal, relationship. In societal relationships, people cooperate without really having anything in common.) This development reaches its maximum when goods and services are evaluated in money, particularly in paper money, which is the abstract symbol of value. In the community, value as such may scarcely be said to exist; or at any rate it is purely subjective. In the bourgeois town or city, however, everything is bought and sold in the market place. Tönnies may have gotten the clue for this interpretation from Sir Henry Maine's treatment of the market.² He mentions Maine in the preface to the first edition of *Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft*, along with Comte, Spencer, A. Wagner, Schaeffle, Rodbertus, Otto Gierke, and Karl Marx, as one of those by whom he was consciously influenced in writing his own book. The last calls to mind Maine's much quoted observation that the development of law might be regarded as a movement from status to contract; also, there is something noticeably Marxian in Tönnies' reasoning. Whatever its source may have been, the conception that modern bourgeois economy, with its freedom of trade, freedom of contract, and universal competition, involves a distinctive type of social order has played a prominent part in modern social science. The theme has been

¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 85-86.

² *Village Communities in the East and West*, pp. 192-197, New York, 1889 (1st ed., 1871), quoted by Park and Burgess, *Introduction to the Science of Sociology*, p. 556, Chicago, 1924.

treated at length by Werner Sombart and Max Weber and was adumbrated earlier by Carl Bücher. Assuming that Tönnies found the germ of the idea in the works of his predecessors, it is to his credit that he recognized its importance and gave it a fresh meaning.

From this time onward, it was assumed by many sociologists that the explanation of social phenomena must be, in considerable part, psychological. Sociology was held to be, in a sense, a psychological science. The basic assumption was that only with reference to what people feel, think, and desire can their behavior, in its individual or collective aspects, be made intelligible. Just what distinction, if any, must be made between sociology and psychology is another question.

CHAPTER XVII

THE BEGINNINGS OF COLLECTIVE PSYCHOLOGY

Among the manifold and diverse currents of reflective thought and research which have contributed to the formation of scientific sociology to this time, few are more difficult to distinguish and describe than the one that has come to be referred to as "collective psychology," or the study of "collective behavior." All sociology, and indeed all social science, may be described as the study of collective behavior; for the concept of social science implies that the collective, or associated, behavior of human beings differs from human behavior considered in its individual aspects, to a degree that justifies a separate science dealing with the former. Since about 1895, however, publications have appeared which treat collective behavior, or collective psychology, in a more distinctive sense; and several writers have emphasized collective behavior, or concerted action, to such an extent that they have been designated as "collectivists."

The theory of collective psychology, as thus roughly indicated, may be said to have been adumbrated by early modern philosophers, by Spencer and other exponents of the organic analogy, by Comte with his concept of "consensus," and in fact by all those who have made some effort to answer the questions What kind of thing is a society? By what means or processes is a collection of individuals able, under some circumstances and to some extent, to act as a single being which we call a society or group? Collective psychology, the study of collective behavior in the limited sense of the term, seems to have had two principal origins: one, as exemplified by a specific mode of attack upon certain social problems, begins with the "crowd psychology" of Ferri, Sighele, Le Bon and others; the other, as a special form of general sociological theory, is particularly exemplified in Émile Durkheim's *Elementary Forms of the Religious Life* and, to a somewhat lesser degree, in the works of Gabriel Tarde. Subsequent to these pioneer efforts, publications that may be regarded as contributions to collective psychology have been made by

numerous writers, including Jane Harrison, with her interpretation of the social origins and early developments of Greek religion; Trotter, with his emphasis of the "herd instinct"; and all those who have sought to study public opinion and political action, social movements, and propaganda. In this connection also, some account should be taken of those recent sociologists who tend to emphasize the unity of society, as contrasted with those who give a relatively individualistic explanation of social phenomena. In this category may be mentioned Othmar Spann, Alfred Vierkandt, C. H. Cooley, R. M. MacIver, and, in some respects, E. A. Ross, William McDougall, and Graham Wallas. In the last analysis, studies of "collective behavior" and studies of "social control" have much the same purpose. The sophisticated, systematic treatment of these topics is largely a recent development of sociological thought and research or remains still to be accomplished; hence, only in a limited way does the subject belong to the history of sociology.

There has been some controversy concerning the allocation of credit for priority in the treatment of crowd psychology. The question is really unimportant, but at all events the credit seems to rest between Scipio Sighele (1868-1913) and Gustave Le Bon (1841-1931). "Sighele claims to have been the first to attempt to study the crowd from the standpoint of *psychologie collective* which term he borrowed from his teacher, E. Ferri, who had used it in 1891."¹ Le Bon published *The Crowd* in 1895, having published papers on the subject the previous year.² Whether or not it is true that he had been anticipated in some of his ideas by Sighele, it seems true beyond dispute that Le Bon was chiefly instrumental in popularizing collective psychology in terms of a theory of the behavior of crowds. Le Bon's *The Crowd* is invariably cited by other writers on the subject, while Sighele seems to have gained relatively little attention for his own contributions, which were fragmentary and specialized.

¹ Kimball Young, "Social Psychology," in Harry Elmer Barnes, ed., *History and Prospects of the Social Sciences*, p. 159, New York, 1925, citing the preface of Sighele's *La foule criminelle*, 1901, in which he accuses Le Bon of plagiarism.

² The date given is that of the first French edition, entitled *La foule*; it was translated as *The Crowd* in 1896 and has been reprinted frequently.

Trained as a physician and active as a publicist and author in a number of fields, Gustave Le Bon (1841–1931) is most widely known for the theory that he presented in *The Crowd* and elaborated in two other books,¹ although in a number of publications he set forth, chiefly in terms of race, doctrinaire interpretations of contemporary public affairs. In *The Crowd*, he developed a systematic and comprehensive theory of crowd behavior which has served as the point of departure for practically all subsequent treatments of the subject. This theory may be briefly summarized as follows: By a "crowd" is ordinarily understood simply a number of individuals gathered together, but under certain circumstances such an aggregation of persons assumes characteristics quite different from those of the individuals composing it. Such an aggregation, with which Le Bon's theory is especially concerned, is termed by him a "psychological crowd." It is produced by the turning of the sentiments and ideas of all the members of the aggregation in a single direction, so that the crowd becomes a mental unity or acquires a collective mind. This mind is composed of those traits, and only those traits, which all the members have in common, i.e., the instincts and emotions that are common to all members of the race. Intellectual qualities, in Le Bon's view, are individual; and they vary from one person to another. In the crowd, these individual intellectual traits are submerged, and the crowd, through the nature of the process by which it is formed, is an emotional and instinctive unity, a homogeneous mass. Hence, crowds are always intellectually inferior to the individuals of whom they are composed. The characteristics that the "psychological crowd" has as compared with the individuals of whom it is composed are due, in the main, to three causes: (1) the feelings of invincible power and immunity from punishment which individuals acquire by finding themselves part of a large, like-minded, mass; (2) the contagion by which the characteristics that preponderate in an aggregation of men are communicated to all of them; and (3) the suggestibility which comes into play in the crowd, and of which, in fact, the contagion is the effect.²

¹ *Les opinions et les croyances: genèse-evolution*, 1911; *The Psychology of Revolution*, 1st English ed., 1913.

² *The Crowd*, 16th impression, pp. 25–35, London, 1926.

Such is the general theory of "crowd psychology" which, with various qualifications, has served as a working hypothesis for most subsequent speculations and studies dealing with related topics. Everett Dean Martin, in *The Behavior of Crowds*, has elaborated Le Bon's theory, particularly by adding to it certain ideas drawn from the literature of psychoanalysis. He regards crowd behavior as a psychopathic phenomenon, analogous to the psychoneuroses of individuals.¹ Martin has formulated a very suggestive description of the process by which crowds are formed from mere aggregates of individuals, such as an audience at a meeting.

A logical distinction may be made between inquiries into the forms and functions of collective behavior—in which attention is directed primarily upon the larger entity, the group as such, and its behavior—and the investigation of the processes of interaction among individuals by which collective behavior is created and maintained. As we have seen, Gabriel Tarde is best known for his contributions to the latter sort of sociological theory. The two subjects, collective behavior and social interaction, are, however, closely related; and Tarde published important papers dealing with both. As we noted, his interest in sociological problems was first aroused by certain criminological facts and questions which attracted his attention in his capacity as a judge; and in fact his earliest writings may be said to have collective behavior as their subject. He called attention to the fact that criminality has some of the earmarks of concerted action, in that crime rates are relatively constant. Such facts might be held to imply that crime is rooted in a common human nature, varying within a certain range and subjected to various conditions, so that individuals varying in certain directions from the average and subjected to certain types of influences may be expected to become criminal. However, Tarde drew a different inference from the data available to him and formulated his famous theory of imitation to account for the constant aspects of criminal statistics and other uniformities of human behavior. Imitation thus became a hypothesis to account for concerted action, and, indeed, Le Bon offered much the same explanation to account for the formation of crowds.

¹ *The Behavior of Crowds*, New York, 1920; see especially Chaps. II, III.

It is no surprise, then, to find that, while Le Bon had been publishing papers on the crowd in 1894, and Sighele claimed for himself and Ferri the priority of having advanced similar ideas as early as 1891, Tarde, who had published *La criminalité* in 1886 and *Philosophie pénale* and *Les lois de l'imitation* in 1890, presented in 1892 at the Congress of Criminal Anthropology in Brussels a paper on the crimes of crowds and in 1893 published a lengthy paper entitled *Les foules et les sectes criminelles*.¹ In 1898 and 1899, he also published in *Revue de Paris* papers dealing with the similarities and differences between publics and crowds and with "opinion and conversation." In 1901, he brought these papers together in a small volume entitled *L'opinion et la foule* which, though it cannot be regarded as a systematic treatise, nevertheless constitutes one of the most suggestive volumes on collective psychology that we possess.

Accepting and taking for granted, in the main, some such descriptive explanation of the behavior of crowds as had been formulated by Le Bon,² Tarde undertook, in *L'opinion et la foule*, to elaborate the theory by an analysis of the distinction between crowds and publics and the mechanisms involved in their formation and changes. (Thus, he foreshadowed a comprehensive theory of collective behavior, by which a wide range of phenomena could be brought under a single point of view, and a plan for studying them systematically could be developed) (The term "crowd," he points out, refers primarily to those aggregates of human beings which not only display a certain unity of feeling and action but are gathered in one place at one time; a "public" is, in contrast, a group of individuals who also manifest the capacity for concerted action, but who are widely dispersed, throughout a national state, for example. A public, in this sense of the term, is a characteristically modern phenomenon. Although there were publics of a sort in ancient and medieval cities, national states that existed before modern times contained a multitude of imperfectly communicating publics, several in

¹ *L'opinion et la foule*, 4th ed., footnote p. 159, Paris, 1922. See also footnote p. vi of Preface.

² The name of Le Bon is mentioned but once in *L'opinion et la foule*, on p. 11, and then only incidentally, to emphasize Tarde's disagreement with him on a certain point. Sighele is not cited at all, so far as I can discover. (The book contains no index of authors or subjects.)

each city or town. The public, according to Tarde, is essentially a product of the printing press, and particularly the newspaper, with its facilities for simultaneously placing the same comments on events of the day before a wide circle of readers. These readers, he asserted, become more or less conscious that they are many, sharing the same information and reacting in the same way to the news and editorials placed before them; and thus they become capable of concerted action. In fact, while the public is distinguished from the crowd by the fact that the relative isolation and privacy of its members make for a degree of deliberation before action takes place, it resembles the crowd more than might be supposed; there are criminal publics as well as criminal crowds. ¹ Opinion, which is the characteristic form of the public mind, can be distinguished from tradition and reason, which are the other possible factors of that mind. It is a product of the printing press, but conversation is also an important element in its formation.¹ 2

The difference between Tarde's contributions to a general theory of collective behavior and those of Émile Durkheim can be expressed by saying that Tarde limits himself in the main to an examination of the factors and the process of interaction whereby a number of individuals become one entity, a crowd, public, or sect, acting as a single being; while Durkheim, on the other hand, attempts to describe the unity of a certain type of collectivity, *viz.*, the primitive religious group. He shows, somewhat more clearly than does Tarde, perhaps, and with the aid of a new concept, "collective representation," how the unified action of religious and other groups is possible.

Émile Durkheim was born in 1858 at Épinal in Lorraine, France, of Jewish parents. He completed his formal education at the École Normale Supérieure de Paris and then traveled in Germany, studying national economy, folk psychology, and cultural anthropology. Subsequently he became a member of the faculty of letters at the University of Bordeaux, where he gave courses in social science and pedagogy. In 1892, he received

¹ *Op. cit.*, *passim*. On opinion, see especially pp. 62 ff. Tarde nowhere expressly outlines the elements of the crowd mind which might be compared to opinion, tradition, and reason in the public mind, though it is implied in his discussion that crowds are moved rather directly and simply by "beliefs" and "desires"

his doctorate at the Sorbonne, submitting *La division du travail social* (Paris, 1893) as one of two theses, the other being a formal philosophical essay. In 1895, he published the little book entitled *Les règles de la méthode sociologique*; and in 1897, a volume entitled *Le suicide*, which was largely statistical but contained important theoretic contributions. He began (1898) the publication of *L'année sociologique*, an annual publication devoted mainly to reviews and summaries of current publications which he believed were of interest to sociologists. This and his previous publications won for him the status of a leader of sociological thought and research in France; and in 1902, he was called to the Sorbonne to give instruction in the same fields for which he had been responsible in Bordeaux. *Les formes élémentaires de la vie religieuse* (1912), with a paper entitled "Représentations individuelles et représentations collectives," published in 1898 in *Revue de métaphysique et de morale*, sets forth those aspects of his sociological theory that primarily concern us. Durkheim died in 1917. From the manuscripts and scattered papers that he left, his wife, aided by students, has had the following books published: *Éducation et sociologie* (1922), *Sociologie et philosophie* (1924), *L'éducation morale* (1925), and *Le socialisme* (1928).¹

It was to be expected that sooner or later some one would seek to organize into a single system of sociological thought the existing concepts and theories relating to the two fundamental aspects of the subject: distributive, or individualistic; and collective, the many and the one. Herbert Spencer had done so after a fashion, with his elaboration of a description of social differentiation, on the one hand, and his interpretation of "government" (social control), on the other. Later, Giddings, Small, and other pioneer American sociologists grappled with the problem. Perhaps nowhere else in the existing literature of sociology, however, is it more clearly recognized than in the works of Durkheim,

¹ Secondary and critical material on Durkheim is fairly abundant. See especially Georges Davy, *Émile Durkheim*, Paris, 1927; C. E. Gehlke, *Émile Durkheim's Contributions to Sociological Theory*, New York, 1915; George Em. Marica, *Émile Durkheim: Soziologie und Soziologismus*, Jena, 1932. There is a short "Mémoire" of Durkheim by Marcel Mauss in *L'année sociologique*, n. s., vol. I, pp. 9-19, 1923-24; also a short article on Durkheim by C. Bouglé in *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*, vol. 5. Further bibliography is given in a number of these references.

although he never unified his ideas in a single comprehensive treatise. *La division du travail social* represents his attempt to interpret society in its distributive, or individualistic, aspect; while *Les formes élémentaires de la vie religieuse* contains his most extended treatise of the collective aspect.

La division du travail social is more than an interpretation of the distributive, or individualistic, aspect of human society; in it, Durkheim confronted squarely the more inclusive and fundamental problem, that of "the relations of the individual to social solidarity."¹ He tried to show through an analysis of the progress of the division of labor how the individual not only becomes differentiated from his fellows but also becomes more and more free as a self-determining person, while at the same time he becomes more and more bound up in an interdependent relationship with an ever widening society. In developing this theme, Durkheim devoted Book I of the volume to an elaboration of the distinction between "mechanical" and "organic" solidarity, which he demonstrated by means of an interpretation of the evolution of law. It was his general thesis that, in the earlier stages of social evolution, mankind was divided into many relatively small, separate societies, each characterized by "mechanical" solidarity. He designates by this term that type of social unity which is secured by the conformity of all members of a group to the same customs, laws, and moral ideas. It is a type of solidarity that depends upon the similarity of the individual members of the society; in law, it is safeguarded by the "repressive" sanctions of the penal, or criminal, law.² In a more advanced stage of social development, on the other hand, solidarity is "organic"; i.e., it depends upon the regulated interdependence of unlike persons and functions, such as results from the progressive division of labor. The form of law that chiefly supports this type of solidarity is the law of contract, which has only "restitutive" sanctions; it does not, in general, impose punishments for breaches of solidarity.³

¹ *Émile Durkheim on the Social Division of Labor*, trans., with an estimate of Durkheim's work, by George Simpson, pp. 37-38, New York, 1933. All subsequent citations refer to this recent American translation.

² *Op. cit.*, Book I, Chap. II; first part of Chap. III; but see particularly pp. 69 (end of Chap. I), 105.

³ *Ibid.*, Book I, Chap. III, especially pp. 111-113, 122-123, 129-130.

The progressive preponderance of the organic type of social solidarity over the mechanical is correlated with the displacement of the "segmental" type of social structure, in which each local group is almost self-sufficing, by the "organized" type, which is made up of unlike, coordinated units.¹ This change is also correlated with, and caused by, the growth of the "moral density" of society, symbolized by the growth of material density, and with the growth of the volume (size) of societies. The growth of volume and density mechanically determines the progress of the division of labor by intensifying the struggle for existence.² Also involved are the mobilization of individuals and their consequent emancipation from the control of tradition and of their elders.³

The division of labor in society is very plastic, compared to the physiological division of labor within the body of a biological organism; function is more independent of structure.⁴ The organic type of social solidarity is moral and is effective only in the degree that it has a moral character. It is not an order of things which has developed mechanically from individuals' pursuit of their self-interest, as the economists have held.⁵

Thus, to recapitulate briefly, in his *Social Division of Labor*, Durkheim arrives at the conception of society as an extended aggregate of individuals, endowed with a considerable degree of self-determination, performing different functions, but dependent upon one another because their activities are mutually complementary. At an advanced stage of the division of labor, no one can exist without a required number of his fellows; nor is any local group self-sufficient; interdependence is the pervasive condition. The parts of society cooperate like the parts of an organism; social solidarity is "organic." The coordination of the functions in complete, organismic, social life is not simply automatic, however, nor can it be explained in terms of the traits of the individual members of society; the social order is a moral order. In *The Social Division of Labor*, Durkheim gives only incidental attention to questions of the

¹ *Ibid.*, Book I, Chap. VI, especially pp. 174-175, 181.

² *Ibid.*, Book II, Chap. II.

³ *Ibid.*, Book II, Chap. III.

⁴ *Ibid.*, Book II, Chap. V.

⁵ *Ibid.*, "Conclusion," pp. 396 ff.

nature and origins of morality—the force in the last analysis by which he explains the unity of society. In *Les règles de la méthode sociologique*, another step in the development of this theory is taken; Durkheim now asserts categorically that the essential fact of society is social control, the constraint that imposes itself upon the individual members of society as if from without, and which is essentially social in origin. In the paper “Représentations individuelles et représentations collectives,” the mechanism of this constraint is partially explained; and the thesis, set forth there, is developed at greater length in *Elementary Forms of the Religious Life*. The central idea of these later writings is that the individuals who compose a society are able to act collectively because, and to the extent that, they act in the light of common conceptions of things. A great many elements of experience, but particularly the words of a language and the abstract and general concepts that some of those words represent, are “collective representations”; they are, in other words, symbols that have an identical meaning to all members of the group. They have this common meaning for all because they have been formed by a social process, by communication. In *Elementary Forms of the Religious Life*, Durkheim undertakes to explain the formation of collective representations. His hypothesis is that in the religious life of the primitive group, emotionally toned collective acts, such as group dances, take place spontaneously and that out of the community of feeling and the sense of superhuman power generated by these rites there arise conceptions of supernatural powers and their attributes—conceptions common to all members of the group in so far as they took shape in common experiences and activities. Although he does not precisely say so, one gathers that Durkheim believes that it is from this primitive religious process that all more specialized and sophisticated forms of collective behavior and social control have evolved. Religious symbols and beliefs, in other words, are the simplest and earliest collective representations.

To borrow a phrase formulated later by W. I. Thomas, Durkheim's theory of the unity of society is in the end essentially this: The many are enabled to act concertedly, as one, if and to the extent that they act with reference to common, or identical, “definitions of the situation.” In this theory, however collec-

tive action is cause as well as effect of collective representation. Durkheim asserts, in passages in *The Social Division of Labor*, that society is antecedent to the existence of individuals as self-determining persons. Because he does not explain this assertion to the satisfaction of his critics, Durkheim has frequently been accused of sociological mysticism, or "sociologism."¹

Durkheim's application of his theory to the problem of the origins and early development of religious institutions has been taken over and exemplified brilliantly by Jane Ellen Harrison (1850-1928) in *Themis: A Study of the Social Origins of Greek Religion*.² Miss Harrison, in *Themis*, has formulated a much clearer and more impressive demonstration of Durkheim's essential contentions, with reference to early Greek religion, than he succeeded in making in his own study of the religion of the native tribes of Australia. Her work has been subjected to almost uniformly unfavorable criticism by the professional anthropologists, apparently on the ground that her archaeological scholarship is inaccurate. Nevertheless, until some one offers a more convincing interpretation of the general process of the social origins of Greek religion, perhaps we may be permitted to accept hers, in its main outlines, for what it is worth to us as an illumination of an obscure subject. Miss Harrison's friend and patron Gilbert Murray has accepted her interpretation of origins and built upon it, in *Five Stages of Greek Religion*, an interpretation of the history of Greek religion down to the close of the Hellenistic period.³

From one point of view, it is possible to identify a third general type of theory of collective behavior—counting Tarde as a representative of one type and Durkheim as the representative of another—*viz.*, that represented by William McDougall's hypothesis of a gregarious instinct and W. Trotter's treatment of "herd instinct." Evidently there is a rather close logical connection between these two theories. If William James, McDougall, and others had not made the general concept of human instincts a familiar one, it would never have occurred to

¹ George Em. Marica, *Émile Durkheim: Soziologie und Soziologismus*. See also P. A. Sorokin, *Contemporary Sociological Theories*, "Sociologistic School," CHAP. VIII, particularly pp. 463-480, New York, 1928.

² 1st ed., 1912; 2d ed. rev., 1927.

³ New York, 1925; 1st ed. published as *Four Stages of Greek Religion*, 1912.

Trotter, whose point of view is essentially biological, to attempt to base a rather comprehensive interpretation of collective behavior on the postulate of a "herd," or "gregarious," instinct. Although Trotter gives no credit to McDougall for the instinct doctrine as a basis of social psychology, the latter had, in fact, included a "gregarious instinct" in his rather elaborate list of human instincts set forth in *An Introduction to Social Psychology* (1908). William James, the famous psychologist and philosopher, upon whom Trotter relies for authority, seems to have been the first American to assert specifically the thesis that human beings, like other animals, have instincts;¹ however, McDougall's *Social Psychology* popularized the idea that social science might be based, in some fashion, on certain assumptions concerning human instincts. Few contributions to the literature of social science have had greater popularity; it went through thirteen editions between 1908 and 1918. This book was, in effect, an attempt to catalogue and describe the innate dispositions that are found in all members of the human species, on the assumption that human behavior is dynamic rather than passive, as the associationist psychology had depicted it. Since about 1920, this "instinct theory" launched by McDougall, with much success, has been sharply criticized by a number of American writers, but that controversy is irrelevant to the main subject of the present chapter; it will be mentioned under a later heading.

It is McDougall's later book, *The Group Mind* (1920), that deserves mention in an account of the development of collective psychology. This latter work is much more than an "instinct interpretation" of human collective behavior; it is a comprehensive and systematic treatise, the first to be written on this subject. McDougall explains that his *Introduction* was not intended as an "outline" of social psychology but rather as the statement of some preliminary psychological considerations which ought to be taken into account in any tenable system of social psychology.² The latter specialty, properly conceived, is concerned both with the life of groups as such—that is the field of group, or "collective," psychology—and with the influence of the group on the development and activities of the individual.³

¹ *Principles of Psychology*, New York and London, 1890.

² *Op. cit.*, 2d ed. rev., Preface, p. xi, p. 2, New York, 1920.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 2.

Since the time of Darwin, psychologists have been greatly interested in the genetic aspects of their problems, *i.e.*, in the development of the human mind, in the race and in the individual; and the consideration of these questions has led to the perception that the mind of the individual is shaped by the "mental forces of the society in which it grows up"; these, in turn, are produced in and by social interaction. The system of forces operating in a society at a moment of history is due largely to the past activities of members of that society.¹ Contrary to Spencer's thesis that the structure and properties of a society are determined by the properties of the units of which it is composed, a social aggregate has, owing to its history, qualities that it does not derive from the units that compose it, and it acts upon its units in a manner different from that in which these units interact with one another. Each unit, when it becomes part of a group, manifests qualities that it has, if at all, only in a latent form, as long as it remains outside that group.²

From the reasoning of which the foregoing is a brief summary, McDougall establishes the working hypothesis that collective behavior may be described and explained in terms of a "group mind" which has tendencies of its own and is composed of the traditions and beliefs of the group, derived from its past experience and activity. He defends the use of this term against the criticisms urged by MacIver,³ by the argument that a "mind" is simply an organized system of mental forces; the unity of the mind which we ascribe to an individual is not absolute, and the unity of the mental life of many social groups is real and apparent enough to justify the use of the term "mind" to emphasize that unity and its relative independence of the individuals who compose the group.⁴

Having thus, in a preface and an introduction, sought to define the general viewpoint, scope, and objectives of group psychology—a term that he prefers to "collective psychology"—McDougall proceeds to discuss some of the main topics and problems of the subject. His treatment of the crowd is for the most part the same that had been formulated by Le Bon, although he adds an

¹ *Op. cit.*, pp. 7-8.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 9-10.

³ R. M. MacIver, *Community*, London, 1917.

⁴ *Op. cit.*, pp. 12-27.

interesting discussion of panic as a special case and argues at length against the validity of the "collective-consciousness" explanation of crowd behavior which he imputes to unnamed writers, presumably the followers of Durkheim. The concept of collective mind, as McDougall uses it, does not imply collective consciousness in the sense in which he understands that term to have been employed by others.¹ The distinctive character of his treatise on group psychology, as compared with Le Bon's *The Crowd*, results from the addition to his general introduction and discussion of the crowd, of a series of other chapters in which he describes and seeks to explain collective behavior in other types of groups, particularly the "highly organized group," such as an army or a national state. It is noteworthy that, in this elaboration of the "crowd psychology" of Le Bon, he makes only one passing mention of Tarde.

In his later writings, McDougall has joined forces, to a certain extent, with those who emphasize the role of race in human society, and this emphasis appears in Part III of *The Group Mind*, under the general title "The Development of National Mind and Character." The book is perhaps the best, in that it is the most systematic, general treatise on collective psychology in the English language.

Although, as has been indicated in the foregoing paragraphs, McDougall's group psychology is based on a doctrine of human instincts, and although it is true that he relies upon the "instinct psychology" of his earlier book for details of his analysis of group mind in its various manifestations, nevertheless, the substance of the argument of *The Group Mind* would stand if abstracted entirely from its "instinct" basis. The same cannot be said of Wilfred Trotter's *Instincts of the Herd in Peace and War*.² He describes this book as "an attempt to obtain by a deductive consideration of conduct some guidance for the application of those methods of measurement and coordination of facts upon which all true science is based."³ The important word in this statement is "deductive"; but from what premises Trotter undertakes to deduce his interpretation of the nature and

¹ *Op. cit.*, Chap. II, "The Mental Life of the Crowd."

² 1st ed., London, 1916; the 9th impression, published April, 1924, has been used here.

³ *Op. cit.*, pp. 14-15.

functioning of the "herd instinct," or "gregarious instinct," it is not easy to ascertain. He takes as a starting point the general concept of instinct as set forth by William James. He has little to say concerning the precise nature and mechanism of instinct; however, he is inclined to identify it, by its subjective marks, as something that is manifested in judgments each of which has the character of an "a priori synthesis of the most perfect sort needing no proof but its own evidence," a phrase used by James. Instinctive acts, in other words, are those which we perform impulsively and without the need of rational support. Trotter's reasoning, introducing his treatment of the gregarious instinct, has to do with the necessity of some other instinct than food, sex, and self-preservation to account for some features of the behavior of man and the higher animals. The other motive force that is needed to account for some of these forms of behavior, he argues, is gregariousness, or the herd instinct. He reasons that there are two great advances in animal evolution which stand out above all others: the development of multicellular as contrasted with unicellular organisms; and the development of gregariousness. Each represents a means by which favorable variations have a chance of surviving because the living unit in which they appear—cell in the one case, individual organism in the other—is sheltered by "the existence of some protective enclosure, however imperfect, in which the varying individuals were sheltered from the direct influence of natural selection."¹ From this point, Trotter launches into a moderately extended discussion of the "general characteristics of the gregarious animal," followed by a series of papers, originally published separately, on the "sociological applications of the psychology of herd instinct" and similar topics.

"The cardinal quality of the herd," says Trotter, "is homogeneity." The essential advantage that gregarious animals have over others is, in other words, the capacity for concerted action, the ability to attack and resist attack as members of a group rather than as individuals. The question can be raised whether Trotter's use of the term "homogeneity" in this connection does not beg an important question; the advantage of the herd is its solidarity, which may or may not derive from

¹ *Op. cit.*, pp. 18-23, especially p. 22.

homogeneity. Durkheim's treatment of the division of labor and, indeed, Spencer's handling of the same subject suggest that social solidarity depends at least as much upon the fitting together of unlike individuals as it does upon their "homogeneity," or their likeness to one another. At all events, Trotter starts from the concept of homogeneity and contends that, while leadership is essential to the functioning of the herd, no lead will be followed that departs much from the average behavior of the herd, the behavior with which they are familiar. Originality will be repressed, and conformity will be the supreme virtue. The herd, however, may give to any opinion whatever the quality of an "a priori synthesis" which is the subjective mark of conformity; it is necessary only that the precedent be set. Beliefs which really rest solely upon custom and herd instinct, according to Trotter, are invariably regarded by those who hold them as rational; they are not left uncriticized, but the tendency is to "rationalize" them, *i.e.*, to find more or less elaborate justifications for them.¹

As is implied in the foregoing discussion, the general theory of collective behavior tends to differentiate into several specialties, one of which is the study of politics and public opinion. In this connection, while we are considering contributions to the literature of the subject that have been made by British writers, we should pay some attention to an outstanding book by Albert Venn Dicey (1835-1922). He graduated from Oxford in 1858, was admitted to the bar, participated in the public service for several years, and served as professor of the common law at Oxford from 1882 to 1909. Although he wrote several authoritative books, he is best known for his *Lectures on the Relation between Law and Public Opinion in England during the Nineteenth Century*.² As the title indicates, this book is primarily a study in history, which is likely perhaps, to be classified as a marginal contribution to the "natural history of institutions." In it, however, Dicey included considerable discussion of the general theory of public opinion.

An important feature of Dicey's book is his attempt to explain certain facts of history in terms of general concepts. He surveys the development of opinion and legislation in England during

¹ *Op. cit.*, pp. 29-41, *passim*.

² 1st ed., London, 1905; 2d ed., 1914. The 1930 reprint is used here.

the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries with some care, but at the same time he attempts to make this development intelligible as the result of certain general tendencies that may be expected to characterize public opinion and legislation, and their interrelations, under similar circumstances at any time and place. He does not distinguish clearly between public opinion and public sentiment or between opinion and the mores, as American writers did subsequently. Nevertheless, because he had developed considerable knowledge of and insight into the facts, his generalizations, supported as they were by the exhibit of historical facts, were quite suggestive.

PART IV
AMERICAN SOCIOLOGY BEFORE 1918

CHAPTER XVIII

THE RATIONALIZATION OF PHILANTHROPY AND SOCIAL REFORM

In our survey of the development of sociology, we have now reached the point where we turn our attention to the development of sociology in the United States. Sociology originated in Europe rather than in this country; however, at the present time, it is much more strongly established as an academic subject in the United States than anywhere else. In fact, it is probably true at present that there are more persons occupying full-time teaching and research positions on the sociological staffs of each of several American universities than there are on the similar staffs of all European universities combined. (As we have seen, the beginnings of sociology as a distinct science in Europe may be dated, for most purposes, from the publication of Comte's *Positive Philosophy* in the years 1830-1842. Or, if one prefers, he may think of the development of sociology as beginning at the middle of the century, with the appearance of Spencer's *Social Statics* in 1850. The writings of Comte and Spencer were read by a limited number of interested persons in the United States from the earliest dates that they were available,¹ and a plausible argument can be made out to support the contention that sociology was taught in a few American institutions, and books on the subject were written and published in the United States, in

¹ The writer has in his possession a set of the first edition of Comte's *Cours de philosophie positive* which formerly belonged to George Frederick Holmes, professor of history and literature in the University of Virginia from 1857 until 1897. The volumes contain carefully written marginal notes by Professor Holmes which show that he purchased them in May, 1848, and that he read through the entire work once by the end of the summer of that year; he read parts of it, at least, a second time several years later. Holmes gave instruction in sociology at the University of Virginia, following a precedent which began to take shape from the first session of the university in 1825. In 1884, he had privately printed "for the Class of Historical Science, University of Virginia," a textbook of 220 pp. entitled *A Science of Society*.

the latter part of the first half of the nineteenth century. Practically, however, the publication of Lester F. Ward's *Dynamic Sociology* in 1883 can be taken as the beginning of continuous interest in sociology in this country. There is a record of uninterrupted instruction in sociology at two or three colleges and universities in the United States from about that date.¹

American sociology had at least two rather distinct and separate antecedents. On the one hand, the development of sociology as a subject of instruction in American universities was influenced strongly by Spencer and to a lesser degree by several other European pioneers, particularly Comte, Gump-lowicz, Ratzehofer, Schaeffle, Simmel, and Tarde. On the other hand, the sociology that was taught before 1920 in the colleges and universities of the United States, or what was taught under that name, at any rate, was even more strongly influenced and shaped by the humanitarian, philanthropic, and social reform movements that were actively under way in the country during the nineteenth century. Since we have reviewed some of the more abstract and philosophical European antecedents of American sociology in previous chapters, they may pass without further comment until we have occasion in later chapters to consider the way in which they influenced specific American sociologists. The philanthropic and social reform antecedents of American academic sociology, however, merit further examination.

It is quite impossible to define the American philanthropic and social reform movement precisely or to fix its boundaries or origins exactly. "Charity" in the sense of gifts to the unfortunate is a phenomenon so ancient that its specific beginnings are unknown; and efforts to make the world a better place in which to live, while they were interrupted somewhat under the influence of the otherworldliness of medieval Christianity, can easily be traced back as far as Plato. However, in Western Europe, the eighteenth century, in contrast to previous periods, was characterized by a marked growth of "humanitarianism," i.e., a new and lively concern for the general well-being and happiness of the masses of the people. The writings of Voltaire and other

¹ See Chap. XX, *infra*.

upper middle-class Frenchmen, the utilitarianism of Bentham and the Mills, and the humanitarianism of such English gentlemen as Lord Shaftesbury and Robert Owen may be mentioned as evidences of this tendency. As Small has shown in his *Origins of Sociology*,¹ a similar movement took shape in Germany, beginning about 1871, and was later organized into the *Verein für Sozialpolitik*. Small has asserted, with some show of reason, that this German reform movement was particularly instrumental in transmitting the impulse for enlightened social reform and philanthropy to the United States, through the agency of a number of American scholars, the university professors of a later period, who studied in Germany while the movement represented by the *Verein für Sozialpolitik* was in its formative and most enthusiastic stage. He may have exaggerated somewhat the relative influence of factors of German origin upon the development of social science in the United States, but it cannot be denied that these factors were operative and effective.²

"Humanitarianism," however, was certainly not a new phenomenon in the United States in the last quarter of the nineteenth century. The decade of the 1840's is known as one in which all sorts of social and economic efforts and proposals flourished. Specific agitation for prison reform, improvement in the care of the insane, and more intelligent and adequate treatment of paupers had been prevalent since early in the century.³ Previous to the Civil War, many of these philan-

¹ *Op. cit.*, Chaps. XV, XIX, Chicago, 1924. See also Small, *Fifty Years of Sociology in the United States* [vol. 21, *American Journal of Sociology*, pp. 721-864, entire issue for May, 1916].

² English social reform movements are described by Charles W. Pipkin in vol. I of his *Social Politics and Modern Democracies*, New York, 1931, while French social reform is treated in vol. II of the same work.

³ See Kenneth L. M. Pray, "Charity," *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*, vol. 3; also Stuart A. Queen, *Social Work in the Light of History*, Philadelphia, 1922; Warner, Queen, and Harper, *American Charities and Social Work* (4th ed. of Warner's *American Charities*), New York, 1930, Parts I and II; Frank Dekker Watson, *The Charity Organization Movement in the United States*, especially Chaps. II, III, New York, 1922; Robert A. Woods and Albert J. Kennedy, *The Settlement Horizon*, especially Chaps. I-IV, Russell Sage Foundation, 1922; and, particularly with reference to the development of modern "social case work," Mary E. Richmond, *The Long View*, Russell Sage Foundation, 1930. For various specific names and topics see W. D. P. Bliss, ed., *Encyclopaedia of Social Reform*, 1897, rev. 1908.

thropic and reform efforts were relatively naïve and unintelligent; eventually, however, it became apparent to some of the supporters of these efforts and proposals that such undertakings should be guided and shaped by a body of fundamental knowledge, so that it might be possible to foresee more clearly the effects of what was done in the name of charity or social reform and what could be done to avoid any other undesired results which might be produced in addition to those sought. To a considerable extent, this critical spirit was inspired by the teachings of the classical, laissez-faire, or individualistic, economists, who opposed most reform and charitable proposals on grounds deduced from the population theory of Malthus and the "iron law of wages" which had been formulated by Ricardo. These theories lent rational support to the doctrine that government should not interfere in business, which was in harmony with the general trend of economic development in the Western world from the eighteenth century until well into the twentieth and was, accordingly, an important element of the spirit of the times. The same general critical attitude toward philanthropic and reform efforts was buttressed also by the interpretation that was made of the Darwinian theory of natural selection, which was understood to prove that the principal effect of charity, public or private, was to increase the survival of the unfit and to burden the capable and the prosperous with the support of an increasing number of incapable, poverty-stricken people.

Persons of humanitarian inclinations were not, as a rule, convinced of the futility of their efforts by these supposedly scientific arguments, though they may have been impressed with a sense of need for a more adequate body of social intelligence which would at the same time guide and inform their endeavors and supply rational grounds for them. They could not help feeling the discrepancy between the social order in which they found themselves and that which they could imagine as a possible one. A clue to the trend of social thought during the nineteenth century can be gained from the fact that it was a period in which a quantity of utopian and near-utopian literature was published. A comprehensive bibliography of such literature compiled by Frances Theresa Russel lists forty-seven utopias that were first published during the nineteenth century, all but seven of which appeared after 1850. Twenty-nine of these

appeared in 1883 and the subsequent years of the century; and forty-four utopias were published between 1900 and 1932.¹ Utopian thought is not usually regarded as a part of sociology, strictly speaking; accordingly, no extended survey of the history of utopian thought is included in the present volume. There can be little doubt, however, that the formulation of so many imaginary descriptions of ideal societies is symptomatic of a widely prevalent state of mind, the existence of which was one of the causes of the rapid development and popularity of scientific sociology. With the aid of these utopian writings, on the one hand, and a considerable body of literature pointing out the evils of existing society, on the other, the humanitarians of the nineteenth century were easily able to visualize the possibility of a better earthly society than they were living in; while the criticisms of the economists and biologists stimulated them to seek for a more adequate knowledge of the means by which their hopes could be realized.²

News, which had reached American reformers and philanthropists, of the formulation of a "new science" called "sociology" must have played a part in the shaping of this same critical tendency. Doubtless, too, Small is partly right in his contention that the acquaintance with the newer, nonclassical and non-individualistic political economy, which a number of the younger university professors brought to this country from Germany, also operated in the same direction. Be that as it may, a number of developments, primarily in the realm of philanthropic and reform discussion, which took place in the period between 1850 and the publication of Ward's *Dynamic Sociology* in 1883, may

¹ *Touring Utopia*, pp. 27-37, New York, 1932. Among other useful secondary literature, see particularly Joyce O. Hertzler, *The History of Utopian Thought*, New York, 1923, and Lewis Mumford, *The Story of Utopias*, New York 1922, and London, 1923. Russell gives a comprehensive list of such works, *op. cit.*, p. 37.

² At least one utopia and one book of social criticism written in the United States late in the nineteenth century had very wide circulation. Edward Bellamy, *Looking Backward*, according to Hertzler, sold more than half a million copies within a few years (article on Bellamy in *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*, vol. 2); while Henry George, *Progress and Poverty*, first published in a commercial edition in 1880, sold two million copies by 1905, according to a note written by Henry George, junior, for the 25th ed. (50th anniversary ed., p. xii, 1933).

be counted among the immediate antecedents of the American sociological movement.

The struggle, during this period, of philanthropy and social reform to become intelligent gave rise to a self-conscious but vague body of thought and publication for which the name "social science" was adopted. The precise origin of the use of this term with this particular meaning is unknown to the writer; however, in 1858-1860, Henry C. Carey, who had already won considerable reputation as an economist, published the three volumes of his *Principles of Social Science*. This treatise contains more economics than anything else, and, as Bernard remarks, it is "rather rambling and repetitious" but is more general and inclusive than a technical treatise on economics.¹ It was perhaps due in a measure to Carey's use of the term social science that the name "American Social Science Association" was adopted by an organization that was formed in 1865 to promote and rationalize philanthropic and social reform activities. The association continued to exist for over forty years, though it does not seem to have been very active or influential toward the last; and it may be regarded as one of the most definite antecedents of organized sociological interest in the United States and of present-day organized social work. The American Sociological Society and the National Conference of Social Work (formerly the Conference of Charities and Corrections) may both be regarded, in a sense, as offspring of the American Social Science Association.² At all events, the conception of social science as a rational and systematic body of knowledge relating to the

¹ *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*, vol. 1, p. 339.

² To be quite accurate, the National Conference of Charities and Corrections was founded as a division or department of the American Social Science Association in 1874 and became independent of it in 1879. The American Historical Society was launched under the auspices of the American Social Science Association in 1884; while the American Economic Association was founded more or less independently of the American Social Science Association, but by no means uninfluenced by it, in 1885. The American Sociological Society originated in 1905 at a meeting of the American Economic Association and the American Political Science Association (which had had a similar origin meanwhile). Thus, the National Conference of Charities and Corrections (later the National Conference of Social Work) arose from the American Social Science Association somewhat more directly than did the American Sociological Society. See A. W. Small, *Fifty Years of Sociology in the United States*, pp. 773-785.

problems of philanthropy and social reform was quite familiar in American academic circles in the second half of the nineteenth century. By 1885, courses in "social science" had been given at Williams College, the University of Pennsylvania, the University of Missouri, Columbia University, and Cornell University; and by 1890, similar courses, *i.e.*, courses dealing with social problems and social reform, though not under the title "social science," had been given in the Harvard Divinity School, Andover Theological Seminary, the Yale Divinity School, Hartford Theological Seminary, Chicago Theological Seminary, and Johns Hopkins University.¹

With certain exceptions to be noted later with reference to the pioneer work of Giddings, Sumner, and Ward, it seems to have been this social-science movement of the sixties, seventies, and eighties of the past century that exercised the greatest direct influence in getting something that was eventually called "sociology" accepted by American colleges and universities as a proper subject for the curriculum. (It is certain that a large proportion of the courses being offered under the name sociology in this country as recently as the second decade of the present century dealt mainly with "social problems"; *i.e.*, they covered such topics as poverty, crime, and the treatment of the "dependent, defective, and delinquent classes.") No doubt the effort was made, by most of the instructors teaching such courses, to get beyond mere common-sense remarks and ethical exhortations and to achieve something that approached the character of fundamental scientific knowledge, but this effort was not in most cases highly successful. Some indication of the trend of interest

¹ Jessie Bernard, "The History and Prospects of Sociology" (Chap. I, pp. 4-8, in George A. Lundberg and others, *Trends in American Sociology*, New York, 1929). See also, in the same volume, Harold A. Phelps, "Sociology and Social Work" (Chap. VIII), and Read Bain and Joseph Cohen, "Trends in Applied Sociology" (Chap. IX); also A. W. Small, *Fifty Years of Sociology in the United States*; F. L. Tolman, "The Study of Sociology in the Institutions of Learning in the United States," *American Journal of Sociology*, vol. 7, pp. 797 ff.; and Sanborn, paper, *American Journal of Sociology*, vol. 15, pp. 591-595. A valuable source of material for the study of the history of the social-science movement in the United States is the *Journal of the American Social Science Association*. See also James H. Bossard, "Robert Ellis Thompson, Pioneer Professor in Social Science," *American Journal of Sociology*, vol. 35, pp. 239-249.

is given by the following titles of books, all of which were more or less widely used as textbooks or required collateral reading in these social-problems courses: Richmond Mayo-Smith, *Statistics and Sociology* (1895); Frederick H. Wines, *Punishment and Reformation* (1895); Robert A. Woods and others, *The Poor in Great Cities*, (1895); Amos Warner, *American Charities* (1894);¹ Charles Richmond Henderson, *Dependents, Defectives, and Delinquents* (1901); Edward T. Devine, *Misery and Its Causes* (1909); Charles A. Ellwood, *Sociology and Modern Social Problems* (1910). Simon N. Patten (1852-1922), professor of economics at the University of Pennsylvania from 1888 to 1917, like Carver of Harvard, was classified throughout his career as an economist but became interested in sociology and wrote on the subject from the social-reform point of view. His little book *The New Basis of Civilization* (1907) is an interesting example of the literature of the transition period that we have been considering. Robert Hunter's *Poverty* (1904) and Father John A. Ryan's *A Living Wage* (1906) should also be mentioned in the same connection.

On the other hand, Lester F. Ward's *Dynamic Sociology* (1883) and later works, Small and Vincent's *An Introduction to the Study of Society* (1894), Giddings' *Principles of Sociology* (1896), Ross's *Social Control* (1901), and his *Foundations of Sociology* (1904) were also more or less popular at that time as college textbooks, but these books are relatively free from direct references to philanthropic and reform questions. It may also be said that, from the middle of the nineteenth century or earlier, courses of instruction following the pattern of Guizot's *History of Civilization* and other works in the general tradition of *Kulturgeschichte* and philosophy of history were offered in American colleges.² (In short, sociology as a subject of instruction and publication in the United States in the nineteenth century was a protean phenomenon; its history for a considerable period is

¹ Warner's *American Charities* has a twofold interest for the student of the history of sociology; not only was it one of the earliest books to be used as a textbook in sociology and social-problems courses, but, as was indicated by a previous citation, it reviews the early development and antecedents of the charity-organization movement of this country. It is still popular, having been revised by Queen and Harper in 1930 as *American Charities and Social Work*.

² Jessie Bernard, *op. cit.*, pp. 8-11.

largely the story of several currents of thought flowing side by side, relatively undisturbed by each other. By the last quarter of the century, there were two such currents that were particularly strong: one represented by the books and courses that may be said to have had social problems for their principal content, and the other consisting of teaching and publication influenced most directly and obviously by the previous works of Spencer, Schaeffle, Gumplowicz, and Ratzenhofer; while Ward and Sumner, who belong on the whole with the latter group, appear to have developed their sociology somewhat independently of European antecedents.¹

¹ There is evidence that Sumner was considerably influenced by Lippert's *Kulturgeschichte der Menschheit*.

CHAPTER XIX

SOCIAL FORCES AND INSTINCTS

The development of sociology in the United States may be traced from several semi-independent origins. Of these, the early philanthropic and social-reform interest and the pioneer use of ethnological materials are dealt with in other chapters; in still another chapter, the beginnings of university instruction in sociology at the University of Chicago and other institutions will be described. Scarcely any factor in the development of American sociology was more prominent than the work of one man, Lester F. Ward. Ward developed a comprehensive system of sociological thought, but he is known particularly for one feature of his work, *viz.*, his treatment of the "psychic factors in civilization" and, most of all, his formulation of the "social-forces" concept, which, owing partly to his influence, played a prominent part in American sociological theory for two or three decades when the science was just gaining a foothold in the universities of this country. We may, without distorting the historical facts too much, treat Ward as a pioneer in one particular phase of the development of sociology in the United States—that which originated with his treatment of social forces, and which included also the emphasis on instincts which characterized the sociology of certain American writers early in the twentieth century.

Lester Frank Ward was born in Joliet, Illinois, June 18, 1841, of a New England family of English descent. His father was a mechanic and something of a rolling stone. Having moved his family from New York to Illinois, he moved again, after the birth of his sons, to Iowa, where he died in 1857. The family then returned to Illinois; and from there Lester F. Ward went to Pennsylvania, where he was employed at various occupations, including farming and school teaching. During this period of his life, he completed his preparation for college at an academy in Towanda, Pennsylvania; but in 1862, he enlisted in the union

army. He served until 1864, when he was discharged on account of a disabling wound received at the Battle of Chancellorsville. From 1865 until 1906, Ward was employed in the national civil service, chiefly in Washington, in several different capacities. In 1881, he entered the United States Geological Survey; and in 1892, he became chief paleontologist in this service, specializing in paleobotany. He was the author of numerous scientific papers in this field. In these years of his residence in Washington, he devoted his leisure to study at Columbian University (now George Washington University) and received from that institution the following degrees: A. B., 1869; LL.B., 1871; A. M., 1872; LL.D. (*honoris causa*) 1897; also a diploma in medicine. He never practiced medicine or law. In 1906, at the age of sixty-five, he left the government service to become professor of sociology at Brown University and served in this position until his death, which occurred in April, 1913.

Ward's interest in sociology seems to have been of gradual development, growing out of earlier general interests in the sciences and an enthusiasm for the possibilities of improving the general welfare of mankind by education. For a time, while he still resided in Washington and was employed in the government service, Ward edited a periodical called *The Iconoclast*, which was intended to promote general enlightenment and critical thought. His contributions to this journal, like his other writings during the middle period of his life, had a distinct antiecclesiastical tendency; however, his younger colleague and successor at Brown University, James Q. Dealey, asserted that Ward was, in a broad sense of the term, a deeply religious man. He read widely and carefully in the works of philosophers and scientists, such as Comte, Haeckel, and Spencer; and it was probably from this reading that he received the specific impulse to contribute something to the formulation of the new science of sociology. He published a number of important books in the field; served as president of the *Institut International de Sociologie* in 1900-1903; and, in 1906-1907, became the first president of the American Sociological Society.¹

¹ For further biographical details, see J. Q. Dealey, chapter on Ward, in Howard W. Odum, ed., *American Masters of Social Science*, New York, 1927; also Emily Palmer Cape, *Lester F. Ward*. Ward assembled materials for a kind of spiritual autobiography, which was published after his death

It has been remarked by students of Ward's writings that practically everything that he had to say about sociology was included in his first book, *Dynamic Sociology* (1883). The two volumes of this massive work are sufficient to contain a comprehensive system of sociology, in spite of the fact that Ward wrote in the tradition of Comte and Spencer, and the book has, to a considerable extent, the character of a treatise on cosmic philosophy. A considerable part of volume I is taken up with matters that cannot by any stretch of the term be regarded as "sociology." None of Ward's sociological works has had a very large circulation; but *Dynamic Sociology* was diligently studied by the few who were becoming interested in the possibilities of a science of sociology at the time when it appeared, and it is probable that, with the exception of Spencer, no other one man exercised more influence on American sociology during its formative period than did Ward. Apparently no other teacher presented to his students a system of sociology closely resembling that given at Brown University by Ward; nevertheless, practically all the other pioneers were admittedly influenced by him.

Although it is probably true, as has been said, that Ward anticipated in *Dynamic Sociology* nearly everything that he subsequently said in other books, *Pure Sociology* (1903) is a much better organized, more compact, and readable work and may be recommended to students as the one of his books most worth reading. The following brief summary of Ward's sociological ideas is based mainly on *Pure Sociology*.

First of all, Ward regarded sociology as an evolutionary science; social evolution, in his view, is a phase of the broader process of cosmic evolution. In this, he followed Comte and Spencer. Undoubtedly, too, his early studies in the biological and geological sciences affected his viewpoint here. He set forth with emphasis the theory that all evolution is "sympodial"; it trends first in one direction and then in another, like the growth of many vines;

under the title *Glimpses of the Cosmos*, 6 vols., abridged from 12 originally planned. This contains all Ward's publications of less than book length. See also Bernhard J. Stern, ed., *Young Ward's Diary*, New York, 1935.

The sociological books written by Ward are as follows: *Dynamic Sociology*, 2 vols., 1883; *Psychic Factors in Civilization*, 1893; *Outlines of Sociology*, 1898; *Pure Sociology*, 1903; with J. Q. Dealey, *Textbook of Sociology*, 1905; and *Applied Sociology*, 1906.

and to this general rule social evolution is no exception.¹ "Pure sociology" studies the origin and spontaneous development of social phenomena; "applied sociology" is a term used by Ward to designate the changes in human society that are affected artificially, by human purpose and effort. He indicates also, however, that the essential subject matter of sociological science is human achievement, or function (page 15). Ward held that those sociologists were mistaken who had occupied themselves primarily with the study of social structure. He was careful to establish in detail the proposition that achievement is not a matter of the accumulation of material goods but is rather the accumulation of knowledge; it is accomplished by an unending series of inventions, using the term in a broad sense. Achievement implies social continuity, or social inheritance, which is something quite distinct from biological inheritance and has not been characteristic of all races and peoples but only of what may be termed the "historic races," i.e., the peoples that have a history. Individuality is a factor in social achievement, and unusual genius must be taken into account in any valid explanation of social evolution, but all men, cooperating, have accomplished what no one of them could have done, for different men contribute different and various things to the advancement of civilization (pages 31-36).

The method of sociology, according to Ward, is essentially a matter of logic. It involves generalization; little can be accomplished by reasoning directly from accumulated facts. The development of sociological knowledge is brought about through the establishment of general laws. The most fundamental of these is the law of parsimony: men seek their greatest advantage or, in the terminology of economics, their marginal interest—interest being understood broadly and not as mere pecuniary gain (Chap. IV, *passim*). In this discussion of methodology, Ward reveals clearly his tendency to conceive sociology as a branch of philosophy. According to his view, there are really no separate sciences, but only one inclusive body of scientific knowledge, a "synthetic philosophy," somewhat as it had been conceived by Comte and Spencer. He insisted that sociology

¹ *Pure Sociology*, pp. 74-96, *passim*, pp. 228, 230. In the remainder of this summary, references to *Pure Sociology*, 2d ed., 1907, will be given in parentheses in the text.

does not consist of facts; it is a body of generalizations and abstractions intended to make the facts intelligible; and in order to develop these generalizations, it must be based on the other sciences (pages 4-6). This is, of course, the reasoning by which Ward justifies the inclusion of a considerable body of cosmic philosophy, *i.e.*, a summary of the findings of the older sciences, in each of his two most general sociological treatises, *Dynamic Sociology* and *Pure Sociology*.

The dynamic agent, or "force," in social phenomena, and especially in social change, or evolution, is feeling. In the last analysis, all feeling ought to be conceived as one general force, but it manifests itself in various forms, or modalities, which may for convenience be referred to as "social forces" (page 99). In common parlance, the term "desire" is used to refer to these modalities of human feeling; the common desires of associated men are the social forces (page 102). Hunger and love are the strongest and most obvious desires; "in society, they become the social forces and the foundations of sociology" (page 107). In discussing this topic, Ward remarked that it had been treated by various philosophers and other writers but most expressly by Schiller. This remark may be a clue to the origin of the notion of social forces which has played so prominent a part in American sociology. Ward's presentation of the matter definitely anticipated that of Sumner and seems to have suggested it; later, W. I. Thomas repeated the thought that hunger and love are the elemental desires of men. Ward made use of Ratzenhofer's idea of "interest," as Small did later, but Ward indicated, much more clearly and unequivocally than Small, that desire and interest are practically synonymous terms (page 108). These spiritual, or psychic, forces should not be conceived in theological or mystical terms; they are true natural forces (page 167). In another connection, Ward discussed the classification of the social forces, or desires. After reviewing the classifications that he had proposed in his earlier books, he presented the following in *Pure Sociology* as his latest revised scheme (page 261):

Physical forces (function bodily)	{	ontogenetic forces	{ positive, attractive (seeking pleasure)
			{ negative, protective (avoiding pain)
		phylogenetic forces	{ direct, sexual
			{ indirect, consanguineal

Spiritual forces (function psychic)	{ sociogenetic forces	{ moral (seeking the safe and good) esthetic (seeking the beautiful) intellectual (seeking the useful and true)
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Because of the poverty of the available vocabulary for expressing feelings, Ward used functional terms in this classification, but he insisted that the essence of the social forces is feeling, not function. He remarked that the social forces, of course, reside in individuals and become social by interaction (page 261). He made an effort to relate the terms of his classification to the structure of the human body, and located them in specific organ systems (pages 262-263).

The concept of social forces afforded Ward a point of departure for a discursive treatment of "social mechanics," or "psychics" (in contrast to "physics"), and "social statics," the science of social structures and institutions (Chaps. IX, X). As these chapters in *Pure Sociology* are read, an impression is gained, on the one hand, of the way in which Ward turned to account the study that he had made of the works of his predecessors and, on the other hand, of the extent to which he anticipated the subsequent work of Sumner, Thomas, and others. Small freely admitted his indebtedness to Ward.

Just as in various matters, for example in his discussion of institutions, Ward anticipated Sumner, so in his discussion of "social assimilation" (pages 193-216) there is a clear anticipation of Park and Burgess' treatment of similar topics. It was in this connection that Ward made the remark, referring to the contacts of races and peoples, "Interest unites while principle divides" (page 208). In his discussion of the effect of propinquity, he anticipated Park's treatment of the effect of personal contacts on assimilation (page 209).

One of the most interesting and unique features of Ward's sociology is his treatment of the relations of the sexes. These relations, he says, may be explained by either of two theories: the "androcentric theory" and the "gynaecocentric theory" (pages 291-377, *passim*). According to the androcentric theory, the male sex is the more important, and the female only incidental, though biologically necessary. His gynaecocentric theory, on the other hand, holds that the female sex is primary and basic and that the prepotent role of the male in human society

is accidental, a fortuitous variation which is destined to be replaced eventually by a regime in which there is true equality of the sexes. The latter theory is Ward's own; he freely agreed to accept credit or blame, as his readers chose, for having formulated it. He supported it by elaborate biological arguments.

While *Pure Sociology* is, by definition, a book devoted to the natural, or spontaneous, growth and development of society, Ward included in the volume a short section (Part III) entitled "Telesis," in which he outlined in general terms the artificial or purposive aspect of social development. He was much interested in this topic, and in some of his other publications he asserted with great emphasis, and sought to support with scientific evidence and logical reasoning, the proposition that social achievement is possible within indefinite limits by means of education. While, as has been said, Ward assigned a definite role to genius in the process of social achievement, he held with Galton and others that genius constitutes only one-tenth of 1 per cent of the entire population, while defectives form about one-half of 1 per cent; the other 99.4 per cent of an ordinary population he regarded as of relatively equal ability. Or, to be precise, he asserted that latent genius and special talents are to be found in at least half of this large residue, rather evenly distributed throughout the whole, while the transition from defectives to normal is abrupt, not gradual.¹ Obviously, this theory tends to support Ward's faith in education; and one may conjecture that his theory was due to "wishful thinking" and not to a dispassionate survey of the available evidence. He conceived education as the transmission and diffusion of social achievement; and achievement, in his view, consists essentially of knowledge. This view of the nature and possibilities of education is a part of the broader conception of "social telesis" which has been regarded by many as the most distinctive feature of Ward's sociology. He held that social evolution is distinguished from biological evolution by the fact that, in the latter, environment transforms the organism; while, in the former, man transforms the environment, and this process is, to a large extent, telic, *i.e.*, purposive. It is effected by means of man's power to imagine ends to be attained and to calculate means by which those ends

¹ "Eugenics, Euthenics, and Eudemics," *American Journal of Sociology*, vol. 18, pp. 737-754, 1913.

may be realized. Education, described in terms of this theory, perhaps includes the transmission to successive generations, and diffusion to the masses, of the ends, or aims, that genius has conceived, but it is primarily the transmission and diffusion of knowledge of the means whereby human purposes may be realized.¹

Ward's theories of social telesis and education doubtless had a great deal of influence on his contemporaries and successors in American sociology, but apparently this influence was general and indefinite. It is impossible to discover any other prominent sociologist who has taken over these theories, unless Dealey may be said to have done so.² However, the concept of social forces that Ward formulated was a prominent feature of American sociological theory during the first two decades of the twentieth century and has by no means lost its influence today.³

Apparently, the first significant use of the "social-forces" concept after the publication of Ward's *Dynamic Sociology* in 1883 occurred in *An Introduction to the Study of Society* (1894), by Profs. A. W. Small and G. E. Vincent of the University of Chicago. This was one of the earliest textbooks of general sociology, as distinguished from "social problems" or "charities and corrections," that was published in the United States; and during the next ten or fifteen years it seems to have been extensively used in American colleges and universities. In this pioneer textbook, there is a passage in which it is stated that

. . . as a result of individual desires, regulated by the common body of psychical force which society possesses, certain general activities or functions, essential to the maintenance of individual existence, and to the preservation and progress of social life, are constantly carried on in a bewildering multiplicity of forms.

¹ For secondary accounts of the sociological theories of Ward, see, in addition to the article by J. Q. Dealey previously cited, *The Substance of the Sociology of Lester F. Ward*, summarized by Clement Wood, New York, 1930; Elsa Peverly Kimball, *Sociology and Education: An Analysis of the Theories of Ward and Spencer*, Columbia University Studies in History, Economics, and Public Law, New York, 1932; J. P. Lichtenberger, *The Development of Social Theory*, Chap. XIII, New York, 1923.

² See Ward and Dealey, *Textbook of Sociology*, 1905; J. Q. Dealey, *Sociology* 1909; J. Q. Dealey, *Sociology: Its Development and Applications*, New York, 1920.

³ F. N. House, "The Concept 'Social Forces' in American Sociology," *American Journal of Sociology*, vol. 31, pp. 145, 347, 507, 763, 1925-1926.

A classification of these "social functions" which reminds one of Ward's classification of social forces, but which more closely anticipates Small's list of "interests" set forth by him in *General Sociology* (1905), is offered. Not a great deal of emphasis is placed on the idea of desire or motive in this book; the concept "function" is much more prominent.¹

Small and Vincent's *An Introduction to the Study of Society* continued to stand alone as a textbook suitable for use in elementary college courses in sociology until, in 1898, Giddings' *Elements of Sociology* and Ward's *Outlines of Sociology* and, in 1899, the American translation of Gumplowicz' *Outlines of Sociology* were published. The social-forces concept was developed and discussed at length in 1896, however, by Prof. Simon N. Patten in a monograph entitled *The Theory of Social Forces*.² This monograph was not suitable for use as a textbook in college classes but was undoubtedly assigned to students in such classes as collateral reading. While Patten evidently accepted the implications of Ward's thesis that "the social forces are the desires of men," the treatment of the social-forces concept in *The Theory of Social Forces* is notable for the way in which, in this monograph, Patten falls into line with the philanthropic and social-reform trend which, as we have seen, affected the development of American sociology late in the nineteenth century. In a passage in the early part of the little treatise, it is clearly implied that the purpose of the study of social forces is to make possible an analysis of social conditions and happenings on the basis of which intelligent reforms may be planned.³ Patten is known in the history of social science for his theory of a transition from a pain to a pleasure economy. The natural order of things in human society, he thought, is one in which people are motivated by positive, pleasure-seeking motives; but in the course of social evolution, mankind has swung off on a kind of detour from the normal course of development, and, during this detour phase of

¹ *Op. cit.*, pp. 240-241. It is a significant fact that the terms "desire," "social forces," and "interests" are lacking from the index of this book, evidence that Small and Vincent, at the time, had not come to think of any such concept as part of the technical vocabulary of social science.

² Published as a supplement to the *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* for January, 1896.

³ *Op. cit.*, pp. 20, 133.

human history, behavior has perforce been motivated chiefly by negative, pain-avoiding forces. Patten believed that humanity was about to return to the main line of its social development, where the positive forces would once more operate. In this discussion, he seems to have anticipated to some extent the "situational" theory of social behavior which was developed much later by William I. Thomas. Attitudes and wishes, Thomas said, in substance, are relative to the situation in which one is placed, as he defines it or has it defined for him by the traditions of his group. Patten was generalizing the same idea when he intimated that the social forces, *i.e.*, the desires of human beings, would operate quite differently and, therefore, in effect, would have a different meaning in a pleasure economy than in a pain economy.

As to the three elementary textbooks of sociology mentioned in a previous paragraph as having been published in 1898 and 1899, we have noted in an earlier chapter Gumpłowicz' thesis that the sex instinct and the instinct of self-preservation are the original drives in the social process. Ward, in his *Outlines of Sociology*, naturally set forth substantially the same treatment of social forces that is found in his *Pure Sociology* and other books. Giddings makes little use of the social-forces concept in *Elements of Sociology*; however, the book does include an early section headed "The Motives of Activity," in which it is asserted that "all the conscious activities of mankind spring from certain internal motives, such as passions, appetites, desires of various kinds, and ideas."¹ Thus, it may be said that during a period of more than a decade following the publication of Ward's *Dynamic Sociology* in 1883, there was no influence conspicuously affecting the elementary teaching of theoretic sociology in the United States that would tend to oppose the interpretation of social phenomena in terms of fundamental human desires.

The same tendency continued in the early work of E. A. Ross, who may be listed with Ward, Sumner, Giddings, and Small as the fifth influential pioneer of American sociology. In Ross's *Social Control* (1901), which was largely based on Tarde's theory of imitation, the idea of desires as social forces is scarcely visible, although, as we have seen, it was definitely anticipated by Tarde.²

¹ F. H. Giddings, *Elements of Sociology*, pp. 45 ff., New York, 1898.

² *Supra*, p. 190.

But in Ross's "Moot Points in Sociology," which appeared serially in the *American Journal of Sociology* in 1903 and 1904 and was reprinted in substance as *Foundations of Sociology* in 1905, Ward's treatment of desires and their classification was taken over almost bodily, though with some modification of the terminology and classification.¹ A concept of "interests," similar to that developed by Small in *General Sociology* (1905), and presumably suggested to Ross either by Small or by Ratzenhofer, was also included in *Foundations of Sociology*. He defined interests as "huge complexes of goods which serve as a means to the satisfaction of a variety of wants."² This same concept was one of the most prominent features of Small's *General Sociology*, where it appears in the course of an interpretation of Ratzenhofer. "An interest," Small said, "is an unsatisfied capacity, corresponding to an unrealized condition, and it is predisposition to such rearrangement as would tend to realize the indicated condition." The similarity of the term "interest," thus defined, to Ward's term "desires" is evident and, indeed, is frankly admitted by Small.³ The importance of the concept in his system of sociological theory is indicated by the proposition that follows shortly after the definition just quoted: "The whole life process, so far as we know it, whether viewed in its individual or in its social phase, is at last the process of developing, adjusting, and satisfying interests."⁴ Small's classification of interests is, ostensibly at least, much simpler than Ward's classification of desires as social forces and is expressed in more commonplace language. He lists six interests: health, wealth, sociability, knowledge, beauty, and rightness.⁵ This list was adopted to some extent by other writers, which was not true of Ward's classification of desires.⁶

The next person after Ward, Giddings, Ross, and Small who issued a book which was rather widely used as a textbook for general sociology courses in colleges and universities was Prof.

¹ *Foundations of Sociology*, Chap. V.

² *Ibid.*, loc. cit.

³ *General Sociology*, Chap. XXXI, Chicago, 1905; see particularly p. 436 and footnote, p. 445.

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 433-434.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 198; repeated elsewhere in the text.

⁶ Small's list of six interests is accepted by E. E. Southard and Mary C. Jarrett in *The Kingdom of Evils*, pp. 404 ff., New York, 1922.

Thomas Nixon Carver of the economics department of Harvard University, who started a course in sociology in that department some time before 1906. At the latter date, he published *Sociology and Social Progress*, a collection of readings for which he wrote a general introductory chapter setting forth some of his conceptions of the science of sociology. Carver apparently had no use for the idea that a list of fundamental human desires should be used as a basis for the interpretation of society; for nothing of the sort appeared in his book. However, it is possible to trace in *Sociology and Social Progress*, and particularly in his introductory chapter, a general line of reasoning bearing considerable resemblance to that of Ward. Carver used the term "social forces" freely but in a general, nonspecific sense, seemingly as an equivalent for the expression "factors of social progress." He grouped such factors in four divisions: (1) physical and biological, (2) psychical, (3) social and economic, and (4) political and legal. Under "psychical factors," such categories as sympathy, foresight, religious beliefs, genius, and imitation are represented by selections from the works of various authors. Ward is represented in this volume by two selections, neither of which emphasizes his conception of desires as social forces. In recent years, Professor Carver has not been a conspicuous figure in American sociology; he has chosen to concentrate his efforts almost entirely on economics. However, several of his former students at Harvard University have become professors of sociology, among them L. M. Bristol, of the University of Florida,¹ and F. A. Bushee, who will be mentioned later in this chapter. Carver's sociology resembles that of Ward, particularly in so far as it is a theory of social evolution, or "progress." He held that the method of sociology must be based on the study of forces and factors now at work in the society around us; sociology can contribute to the interpretation of history more directly than history can contribute to sociology.

While the publications mentioned in the foregoing paragraphs were taking shape, something resembling Ward's treatment of desires as social forces was gaining ground independently, *viz.*, the theory of human instincts. In 1890, William James published the two volumes of his *Principles of Psychology*, and the work soon acquired the rank of a classic. In it, he included a

chapter on human instincts and a tentative list of these instincts. This was possibly the first definite assertion by a reputable American psychologist that instinct is a factor in human behavior; certainly, it was the first assertion of this thesis to attract general attention in England and the United States. Hitherto, the assumption had been that the lower animals have instincts, that, in fact, their behavior is largely if not entirely instinctive, but man is a reasoning animal, and instincts play no great part in determining his behavior, if, indeed, human beings may be said to have instincts at all. It was probably the influence of the evolutionist doctrine in biology that led to the change; the idea gained currency that there was no very profound difference of kind, for there was no break in the chain of descent, between man and the lower animals; and, therefore, man's behavior was determined in the same general manner as that of other animals. James did not assert that instincts are the sole motive force in human behavior; he seemed to take the position that it is only partly instinctive. His chapter on instincts, however, seems to have been chiefly responsible for McDougall's use of the concept as the basis of a very inclusive theory of the dynamics of human behavior.¹

Ward did not seem to be greatly concerned with the precise relation of the original nature of man to the "desires" which he designated as the social forces; he simply accepted as a fact that desires were a manifestation of the feeling aspect of human nature and, by implication, that they had a conative, or "will," tendency. The view of Small and other pioneer American sociologists was apparently similar. But when McDougall defined an instinct as an elemental motive force of behavior that was feeling, thought, and will at the same time,² the concept made a powerful appeal to sociologists, who were trying to trace social phenomena to fundamental and universal human motives, or behavior tendencies. It seemed to afford a psychological basis for social dynamics, and, while it is difficult to find sociological literature in which it is frankly asserted that the

¹ *Supra*, p. 212. Bernard credits the German psychologists with the original instinct interpretation of human behavior and traces James's treatment of the topic to German influence. See L. L. Bernard, "Instinct," *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*, vol. 8; see also the same author's *Instinct: A Study in Social Psychology*, New York, 1924.

² *An Introduction to Social Psychology*, 13th ed., pp. 27-30, Boston, 1918.

instincts of men are the fundamental social forces, the thesis is implicit in a great deal of the literature that appeared after 1910. Discussion of the matter became active and culminated in a well-defined controversy over the existence and nature of human instincts, which began about 1922 and continued for two or three years. The general result of this discussion was that American sociologists abandoned for the most part the attempt to correlate human behavior with specific instincts and that if, like Thomas, they continued to use for heuristic purposes some list of fundamental desires, they did so without making any representations concerning the relation of these desires to the original nature of man.¹

In John Dewey's *Human Nature and Conduct* (1922), he asserted flatly that there are "no separate instincts" and emphasized instead the role of habits, which are by definition plastic and modifiable. However, Dewey found it necessary to make use of a concept of "impulse" to take the place of the instinct concept in referring to the dynamic forces that are inherent in the biological nature of man, though he avoided attributing to impulses any specific directional effect upon human behavior, and, by identifying habit with custom, he was able to emphasize the proposition that habits are in existence before any particular individual arrives on the scene.²

Meanwhile, the social-forces concept flourished for a time. It was prominent in Charles A. Ellwood's *Sociology in Its Psychological Aspects* (1912), in his *Introduction to Social Psychology* (1917), and in Blackmar and Gillin's *Outlines of Sociology* (1915, 1923, 1930, based on Frank W. Blackmar, *Elements of Sociology*, 1908). In 1908, Graham Wallas gave an impetus to the instinctivist point of view through the publication of his *Human Nature and Politics*; and this tendency was reasserted in his *The Great Society* (1914), in which he set forth the thesis, taken from Freudian psychoanalysis, that we cannot entirely repress our instincts.³ A somewhat similar influence was exercised upon sociopsychological thought by John B. Watson's contribution to *Suggestions of Modern Science concerning Education* (1917), a symposium in which he collaborated with H. S. Jennings and

¹ For bibliography, see Bernard's article previously cited.

² *Infra*, Chap. XXVI.

³ *Op. cit.*, pp. 64-65.

others. In this paper, Watson made known to the public the findings of his studies of newly born infants; he observed in these babies a few specific, presumably innate, reaction patterns. As is well known, Watson eventually exerted his influence in favor of the theory of the modifiability of these original "reflexes," following Pavlov's studies of "conditioned reflexes"; but at the time his studies of human infants were first reported, they impressed some students as partial confirmation of the instinct theory.

The instinct psychology attracted the attention of American economists, who had begun to have some misgivings concerning the validity of the rationalistic presuppositions of the orthodox, or "marginalist," economic theory. The psychological essays of Carleton H. Parker, posthumously published in the little volume *The Casual Laborer and Other Essays* in 1920, attracted the attention of economists to the conceptions of instinct and repression that had been agitating the psychologists and sociologists; while the older point of view was, on the whole, defended, and the availability of the instinct psychology for the uses of economists was discredited by Z. C. Dickinson in his survey of the problem reported in *Economic Motives* (1922). In *The Instinct of Workmanship* (1914), Thorstein Veblen elaborated and made explicit the assumptions relating to the instinctive motives of economic activity which had been implied in his *Theory of the Leisure Class* (1899) and other works. Since about 1925, however, American economic theory has not been greatly affected by any particular psychological theories but has rather become increasingly committed to statistical methods of studying the actual behavior of human beings in economic society.

The social-forces concept was given a fresh lease of life in American sociological circles by the prominent place that it occupied in two popular textbooks, E. A. Ross's *Principles of Sociology* (1st ed., 1920; rev. ed., 1930) and Park and Burgess' *Introduction to the Science of Sociology* (1921). In the latter book, the authors gave prominence to Thomas and Znaniecki's theory of attitudes and values and the "four wishes"¹ but with some critical modification of these concepts, the interrelation of which they attempted to define. A rather brilliant presentation of the social-forces theory was made by Prof. F. A. Bushee of the University of Colorado in his *Principles of Sociology* (1923), a

¹ Chaps. XXIII, XXVI, *infra*.

work influenced by Ward and also by Carver. Bushee offered his own classification of desires but devoted his attention chiefly to an elaborate exposition of the operation of these forces in social evolution.

The social-forces concept and the instinct concept as used in American sociology reflect the effort of sociologists to systematize their science by developing a method for the analysis of social phenomena into a few kinds of universal elements. This was the development that was suggested by the analogy of the older sciences; chemistry had its elements and its atoms, physics its molecules, and biology its cells. That social forces were conceived not only as elements into which social phenomena might be analyzed but also as dynamic forces or human motives may be regarded as a result of the precedent set by Ward, who may have gained the idea from Gumpłowicz, and of the interest in evolution which resulted from the fact that sociology took shape as a science just when the biological theory of evolution was becoming well established. The idea of evolution seemed to demand a sociology that would account for social action and change, as well as social structure. It is still the essential program of the social sciences, as some one has aptly said, "to explain why people act as they do." Sociology undertakes to explain, in the most general way, the associated, or collective, behavior of human beings; while psychology seeks primarily to describe the subjective, or the physiological, mechanism determining behavior in its individual aspects. The notion of instinct, or some similar concept, such as Ward's "desires" or Small's "interests," could not fail to be appealing to sociologists at a certain stage in the development of their theories, because it was so simple. If any feature of human behavior proved difficult to analyze, one needed only to postulate a specific and presumably innate instinct or desire to account for it.

The pioneer works of American sociologists, mentioned in this chapter, contained many other significant features in addition to the social-forces idea—notably the idea of social interaction under that name or some other—but perhaps it is not too serious a distortion of the historical facts to characterize a period in the development of American sociology, extending, say, from 1883 to about 1918, as a period when the social-forces and instincts concepts were dominant.

CHAPTER XX

THE "AMERICAN SCIENCE"

As we have previously noted, sociology has sometimes been referred to in Europe as the "American science." This allusion has probably been provoked by the fact that the subject is nowhere else so well established in colleges and universities as it is in this country. No authoritative information is available to the writer concerning the number of persons who occupy regular, full-time positions, designated for teaching and research in sociology primarily, in the colleges and universities of the United States. It is certain, however, that the number is considerably in excess of 200.¹ This is undoubtedly several times the total number of persons occupying such positions in the colleges and universities of all the remaining countries of the world. The opinion may safely be ventured also that, without reference to their occupancy of teaching positions in institutions of higher learning, the number of persons in the United States who have sociology as their primary intellectual interest is larger

¹ As a basis for a crude estimate, the writer examined the membership list of the American Sociological Society for 1931—the latest full membership list to be published by the society up to the time of writing—and counted the names of persons on that list whom he personally knew to be engaged primarily in teaching and research in sociology in American colleges and universities. The number thus established was 182. How many other persons should have been counted is, of course, uncertain; however, it is morally certain that the number would be increased to over 200 by the inclusion of names of individuals actually occupying college or university positions in sociology but not definitely known to the writer to be so occupied. The total membership of the American Sociological Society on Nov. 30, 1930, was 1,588, but of this number it is well known that the great majority might not be said to have sociology as their principal interest. On Nov. 30, 1933, owing to the economic depression, the number of members of the society had fallen to 1,149; and it is probable that the number of full-time teachers of sociology in the colleges and universities of the United States had also fallen off somewhat since the 1931 membership list was published, though probably not in the same proportion that the total membership of the society had declined.

than in any other country. The latter fact is not so directly related to the subject with which we are concerned in this chapter as is the former, but the two are obviously connected.

As we have seen, sociology gained some recognition in the United States as a distinct science or discipline before it was recognized in any college or university as a subject of sufficient importance to be represented by a chair or instructorship. The publication of Spencer's *The Study of Sociology* in 1872 and of Ward's *Dynamic Sociology* in 1883 serves to date the beginnings of that extra-academic recognition; while the first university chair to be created with sociology designated by title as part of the professor's teaching responsibility was probably that established at the University of Indiana in 1885, when Arthur B. Woodford became "professor of economics and sociology." It appears from the catalogue of the university, however, that Woodford actually offered only one course in sociology, whereas one such course had been given in each of a number of other American colleges and universities several years earlier.¹

It is impossible to say, without qualification, exactly when or where the first university department of sociology, independent of economics, history, and political science, was established. A case can be made out for the University of Chicago where, in the autumn of 1893, a department of "sociology and anthropology" began to function when the new university opened its doors to students. The department had a staff of six, including two full professors of sociology, Albion W. Small and Charles R. Henderson; while George E. Vincent and William I. Thomas offered courses in sociology as "assistant" and "fellow," respectively. The claim of this department to rank as the oldest department of sociology in the United States is obviously qualified by the fact that it was designated for sociology and anthropology; however, the inclusion of anthropology in the same department with sociology has been more or less standard in American universities where anthropology has been taught at all. Columbia University may be said to have had a two-man "department" of sociology in the year of the opening of the

¹ A. W. Small, *Fifty Years of Sociology in the United States*, pp. 732-733, 746-747, 759 ff. See also Jessie Bernard, "The History and Prospects of Sociology in the United States," in George A. Lundberg and others, *Trends in American Sociology*, New York, 1929.

University of Chicago, with seven courses offered by Professors Mayo-Smith and Giddings; however, a department of sociology was not formally set off from the so-called "School of Political Science" in which these sociology courses were offered.¹

It would be possible to expand an account of the beginnings of sociological instruction in the colleges and universities of this country almost indefinitely, if it were felt worth while to make the detailed examination of old catalogues of these institutions that would be necessary. However, such an exhaustive investigation has never been made; or at least the findings of such an investigation have not been published; and for our purposes it is scarcely necessary.² From inquiries that have been undertaken at different times, the following facts have appeared: (1) Folkmar reported in 1894 that twenty-nine colleges had courses in sociology, including courses in charities and corrections; while twenty-four had courses in sociology in the narrower sense. Investigations by L. L. Bernard show that Folkmar's figures were incomplete.³ (2) In 1902, Tolman reported that 150 men's colleges were offering the equivalent of at least one course in sociology and that 16 women's colleges were treating the subject to some extent. Forty-five colleges were offering three or more courses each.⁴

Vigorous beginnings of organized sociological instruction were made fairly early in several state universities west of Chicago.

¹ Small, *op. cit.*, pp. 746-747, 761-762.

² In addition to Small's *Fifty Years of Sociology in the United States* and Mrs. Bernard's chapter previously cited, the following reports of investigations of the existing status of sociology in American colleges and universities have been published in the *American Journal of Sociology* as indicated: Frank L. Tolman, "The Study of Sociology in Institutions of Learning in the United States," vol. 7, pp. 797 ff., vol. 8, pp. 85 ff., 251 ff., and 531 ff.; Frederick R. Clow, "Sociology in Normal Schools," vol. 16, pp. 253 ff.; same subject and author, vol. 25, pp. 584 ff.; L. L. Bernard, "The Teaching of Sociology in the United States," vol. 15, pp. 164 ff.; Dwight Sanderson, "The Teaching of Rural Sociology," vol. 22, pp. 433 ff.; L. L. Bernard, "The Teaching of Sociology in Southern Colleges and Universities," vol. 23, pp. 491 ff.

Professor L. L. Bernard has made extensive investigations of the beginnings of sociology in the United States; it is hoped that he may be enabled to publish his findings soon.

³ Jessie Bernard, *op. cit.*, p. 17.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 18.

The writer is not in possession of exact information concerning the beginnings of this instruction; however, the following data, which in each case relate to men who became prominent in American sociological circles, give some indication of the progress of the movement: Prof. Ulysses G. Weatherly became professor of economics and sociology at the University of Indiana in 1899; he had been appointed assistant professor of history in the same institution in 1895; and there is a record of continuous instruction in sociology at the University of Indiana beginning with 1885. Frank W. Blackmar went to the University of Kansas as professor of "history and sociology" in the autumn of 1889 and began to teach sociology that fall, "though it was largely overshadowed by history and political economy."¹ Like other pioneer professors of sociology, Blackmar was essentially self-taught in the subject; however, he eventually built up a considerable department of sociology, independent of history, economics, and political science.

In 1894-1895, Charles H. Cooley, who had taken his doctorate in economics at the University of Michigan at the end of the preceding session, began to give at that institution three lectures a week on sociology throughout the year. The following year he was made full-time instructor in sociology, in 1899 assistant professor, in 1904 associate professor, and in 1907 full professor. Beginning with the session of 1913-1914, Cooley was assisted with the program of instruction in sociology at the University of Michigan by a full-time instructor; and in recent years, the department has grown to include five or six full-time staff members.²

In 1907, J. M. Gillette, who had received his doctorate in sociology at the University of Chicago in 1901, became professor of sociology at the University of North Dakota. Meanwhile, Charles A. Ellwood had gone to the University of Missouri in 1900, having taken his Ph. D. in sociology at the University of Chicago in 1899. Ellwood's work at Missouri presently grew into a department with several full-time staff members. Edward A. Ross went to the University of Nebraska as professor of sociology in 1901; later George Elliott Howard, author of *A*

¹ Small, *op. cit.*, p. 760.

² Charles H. Cooley, *Sociology and Social Research*, pp. 6, 10, 13, New York, 1930.

History of Matrimonial Institutions (1904) and former professor of history in that institution, who had been meanwhile professor at Leland Stanford University, took the position vacated by Ross at the University of Nebraska. Ross became professor of sociology at the University of Wisconsin in 1906; there he was joined in 1912 by J. L. Gillin (Ph. D., Columbia, 1906); and the department has since become one of the strongest in the United States. In 1907, E. C. Hayes (Ph. D., Chicago, 1902) went to the University of Illinois as professor of sociology; the Illinois department has since become one of the largest in the country, particularly as measured by the number of students enrolled in undergraduate classes. A similar development has taken place at Ohio State University under J. E. Hagerty and others. The universities of Iowa and Minnesota have offered considerable instruction in sociology since early in the 1900's; however, it is impossible from information available to the writer to date the beginnings of this instruction. More recently, instruction and research in sociology have begun to flourish in southern universities, particularly at the University of North Carolina, where Howard W. Odum (Ph. D., Columbia, 1910) has built up, since 1920, a strong teaching and research department with the aid of grants from the Rockefeller Foundation. The North Carolina department and the affiliated research institute and university press have been known for the quantity and quality of publications that they have issued in the field of social science and sociology in particular. Still more recently, an active department of sociology has been developed at Vanderbilt University. Notable work is also being done at Tulane University, the University of Kentucky, and the University of Virginia.

By the turn of the century, then, or shortly after that time, sociology was established as a recognized subject of instruction in a considerable number of colleges and universities in the United States; and in at least two institutions, the universities of Chicago and Columbia, fairly adequate graduate instruction was offered before 1900. As late as 1920, these two remained the only universities in the United States (or elsewhere) that had granted more than a very few doctorates in sociology; and at about this time (1920), interest in sociology seems to have waned somewhat at Columbia University. It is probably true that in 1935, more than half of the people who gave instruction in

sociology in institutions of higher education in the United States, and who held doctor's degrees with sociology as their principal subject of study, received those degrees at the University of Chicago, where the one-hundredth doctor's degree in sociology was granted in August, 1931. It is safe to assert that as early as 1915, one or more courses in sociology were offered regularly in nearly all American colleges, universities, and normal schools and in a number of theological seminaries; while in the majority of these institutions at least one member of the faculty was giving his principal attention to sociology. In several of the older institutions near the Atlantic seaboard, however, sociology is either excluded entirely or taught, to a minimum extent only, in some other department such as economics, political science, history, or philosophy. In a few denominational colleges, sociology is given qualified recognition by placing it in a department of double title, such as "sociology and social ethics." In some of the institutions, such as Williams College and Princeton University, where sociology is taught to a minimum extent only, if at all, the most obvious reason for the lack of recognition of the subject is the tendency to cling to the tradition of a "classical" curriculum. Doubtless the opposition of older departments, the members of which do not wish to see available money and students divided with a new department, also plays a part in this situation; however, there are still members of college and university faculties who oppose the introduction or expansion of instruction in sociology on the ground that "there's no such thing"; i.e., they do not grant that sociology is a science or that it is a subject that needs to be taught in college in addition to the older social studies or that proper standards of work can be maintained.

Subject to the qualifications that have been indicated, it may be said that sociology has had for some time a definite and positive status in the colleges and universities of the United States. To be a sociologist is to have a recognized profession. This state of affairs has had important consequences for the development of sociological thought and research in this country. Here the development of sociology has been fostered, in some respects, by the amount of university recognition that the subject has received. A university professorship offers leisure for research and writing such as is afforded by few other occupations; and it

may be added that even the college professor who has a rather heavy load of teaching and other duties is under some pressure to contribute to the advancement of his subject by the preparation of textbooks and other publications which he considers satisfactory for the use of his own classes. Then, too, as everyone knows, the publication of scholarly and scientific writings has long been recognized as a road to advancement in the academic world. Effective teaching is doubtless desired by all college presidents, but the efficiency of a professor's teaching is not easy to ascertain, whereas his publications are an established fact. Certainly, it cannot be regarded as a mere coincidence that by far the greater part of the sociological literature that has been published in the United States in the past two decades has come out of the universities.

However, not all contributions to the development of sociology have come from this source. Neither Comte nor Spencer ever had a university connection; and Ward accepted such an appointment only near the end of his life, after the outlines of his sociological thought had become well established. W. I. Thomas has published significant works since leaving the University of Chicago. If we take into account publications which perhaps are not commonly regarded as contributions to sociology, but which can plausibly be so classified, the works of Walter Lippman, M. P. Follett, and Eduard C. Lindeman, among American writers, may be mentioned.

The question suggests itself, though it is a difficult one to answer, whether the establishment of sociology as a recognized university subject has not had a stereotyping effect upon the development of the science. To be sure, college and university instruction in sociology in the United States is far from being uniform today, somewhat to the dismay of those who have to assume the responsibility for teaching general introductory courses; for it seems that the first college course in a subject should be standardized sufficiently to make it possible, when a student transfers from one school to another, for his professors in the latter institution to know approximately the scope of the instruction to which he has already been exposed. Such standardization of introductory and even intermediate college courses exists to an appreciable extent today in chemistry, physics, mathematics, biology, psychology, and the foreign languages, but

it does not exist in sociology. On the other hand, it may be argued that establishing a subject as a university discipline does have the effect of creating a kind of orthodoxy in that subject. At any rate, it has been suggested that men in university positions are under some pressure, definite or indefinite, to keep their instruction and their publications free from ideas that would commonly be regarded as subversive of the existing social order; whereas it is precisely in the field of the social sciences that such ideas are likely to arise, and the promulgation of these may conceivably be, in certain instances and from a long-run point of view, a way of contributing to the development of the science. Up to now, it is not self-evident, to say the least, that the establishment of sociology in the colleges and universities has had a particularly stultifying effect upon the progress of the subject, although some writers have contended that such has been the case.

Perhaps it may be argued, finally, that the establishment of sociology in the universities has advanced its development on the side of systematization. In the long run, it is essential to the full development of any science that the concepts and hypotheses, which are in one sense, its substance, shall be so formulated that they constitute a system having a reasonably self-evident unity or harmony. Only when the science assumes this form can it serve as an efficient organon for dealing with the problems with which it is concerned. Doubtless the most significant contributions to the systematization of any science or discipline will be made, eventually, by persons who have unusual aptitude and the best of training for abstract and logical thinking. However, the demands of college instruction may have an appreciable effect in the direction of systematization. Instructors in charge of college classes find that they are compelled to reduce their subject to orderly and logically unified form in order to be able to present it effectively to immature students as anything but a collection of unrelated items. It is no mere coincidence that the outstanding general treatises on sociology that have been produced in the United States in recent years have been written by authors who were also university professors and who had in view, in the preparation of their treatises, the needs of college classes.

CHAPTER XXI

CLASSES AND CLASS STRUGGLE IN PIONEER AMERICAN SOCIOLOGY

In the period of the development of American sociology, which may be dated from 1918, the subject of social classes, class struggle, the sociological aspects or implications of socialism, and similar or related themes cannot be said to have had a prominent place. Perhaps we may go further and say that these topics have never been placed by American sociologists in the center of their field of interest. It is a fact, however, that sociology took shape and gained a foothold as a recognized academic discipline during precisely the period when, owing partly to the impressive works of Karl Marx, socialism and the principal questions with which it was understood to be concerned were attracting a great deal of interest on the part of educated people. In so far as socialism was understood to be an inquiry into the probability or the desirability of the transformation of "the means of production" from the category of private property to that of public or collective ownership, it seems to have been true from the beginning that sociologists were disposed to leave the discussion to the economists and political scientists; and perhaps the same may be said, with reservations, of their attitude toward the subject of class struggle, which occupied so prominent a place in Marxian socialism. It was impossible, however, for those who were trying to define and develop the new science of sociology to escape entirely the view that the analysis of society into its component or constituent elements, such as social classes, must constitute an essential feature of their task or the related view that, in so far as scientific sociology is properly concerned not only with social structure but also with social process, the conflict or other interaction of social classes must be recognized as one fairly common and conspicuous feature of that process.

There were, in fact, at least two different historical influences bearing upon pioneer American sociologists and leading them to

pay some attention to questions relating to social classes, class conflicts, and related questions. One was the general philanthropic and social-reform movement which, as we have seen, was so important a factor in the background and antecedents of academic sociology in the United States. The other may be more narrowly and precisely defined as the theory of conflict (as the chief social process) developed by Ludwig Gumplowicz and Gustav Ratzenhofer. At the time of the beginnings of academic sociology in the United States—say, from 1883 to 1918—the literature that exponents of the new discipline could draw upon for suggestions in the shaping of their own ideas was scanty at best, and it was natural that works as impressive and carefully reasoned as those of Gumplowicz and Ratzenhofer should be used as a source of ideas. This influence affected Small of Chicago more strikingly than it did any other prominent pioneer of American sociology, but since the University of Chicago became and remained for over thirty years the principal university center of development of sociology, the ideas that affected and were in turn promulgated by the head of the Chicago department of sociology could not but exercise a wide influence.

We find, then, that while socialism, social classes, and class struggle were perhaps never generally recognized by American sociologists as topics of central importance in their field of interest, these topics occupied a fairly important marginal place in their field of attention and inquiry throughout the pioneer period and have since then. The theme was by no means ignored by American sociologists from the beginning. It was touched upon repeatedly by Lester F. Ward; and, while William Graham Sumner maintained toward the whole subject the *laissez-faire* or "individualistic" point of view, he recognized its importance.¹ No satisfactory data are available to show how extensively the subject matter with which we are here concerned was made the content of special courses given in departments of sociology in American colleges and universities previous to 1918;² however, it

¹ See his *What Social Classes Owe to Each Other*, 1883, and his shorter essay "The Forgotten Man," in *The Forgotten Man and Other Essays*, ed. by A. G. Keller, New Haven, 1918.

² See, however, Jessie Bernard, "The History and Prospects of Sociology," in George A. Lundberg and others, *Trends in American Sociology*, especially pp. 30-31, 39-40, 1929.

can be shown from various sources that it was not unknown for the early professors of sociology to offer courses in socialism, classes and class conflict, and the like. An outstanding example is afforded by the University of Chicago, where Prof. Albion W. Small offered at intervals for a number of years a seminar on Marx, supplemented, during the later years of his teaching, by a less advanced course entitled "The Conflict of Classes."

Indeed, the theme of class conflict occupied a central place in Small's system of sociological theory as developed in his *General Sociology* (1905); and in his handling of the subject in this volume the influence of Ratzenhofer is explicitly acknowledged. Gump-lowicz, for whose ideas Small seems to have had little use, was in fact more definitely instrumental than any other one man in introducing into sociological theory the concept of social process (as interaction), but for Gumpłowicz the social process appeared primarily as the conflict of "ethnic groups," while Ratzenhofer, the younger associate and follower of Gumpłowicz, based on the ideas of the latter the somewhat different conception of the social process as one constituted, in considerable part, by the struggles of "interest groups" for power and influence within states. Small drew heavily on Ratzenhofer's conception of "interests" and, less consciously, on his implied concept of the social process, which he interpreted largely as the equilibration and adjustment of conflicting interests.¹

The subject of social classes occupies a sufficiently prominent place in the writings of other American sociologists of the pioneer period. It is much in evidence in the early works of Prof. F. H. Giddings of Columbia University² and in those of E. A. Ross. The consideration of social classes and their interrelations may be said to have formed a fundamental theme in Thomas Nixon Carver's *Essays in Social Justice* (1915). C. H. Cooley's treatment of social classes, in which he emphasized the distinction between "closed" and "open" classes, is noteworthy.³

¹ *General Sociology*, *passim*.

² See his *Elements of Sociology*, Chaps. X, XI, XXIV, New York, 1898.

³ "Personal Competition," *Economic Studies*, American Economic Association, vol. IV, No. 2, 1899, reprinted as Chap. IV in Cooley, *Sociological Theory and Social Research* (posthumous, ed. by Robert Cooley Angell, 1930); *Social Organization*, Part IV, 1909; *Social Process*, *passim*, 1918.

It should be constantly borne in mind, in studying the development of sociology in the United States, that the new discipline took shape, in part, as the result of a movement of criticism and secession among some of the political economists. One might describe the situation that existed in the eighties and nineties by saying that there were in this country at that time a considerable number of people—probably several hundred of them at least—who were interested in discovering or in developing a body of knowledge that would afford guidance in dealing with practical social problems, particularly those associated with poverty, but who were dissatisfied with the interpretations offered by the economists, both because of the one-sidedness of those interpretations and because of the laissez-faire conclusions of the then prevailing, or “orthodox,” political economy, which still merited the name the “dismal science.”¹ In such a situation, it was not surprising that the members of the group in question who had the necessary patience and intelligence undertook to examine the ponderous and obscure works of Karl Marx² to see what they contained that was relevant to the interest in hand. (Present-day American sociology contains little, in its central trends of thought and research, that can be regarded as a direct outgrowth of any phase of Marxian theory, but the opinion seems justified that pioneer American sociologists owed to Marx, to some extent, their interest in the general theme of social stratification and class conflict.) The conclusion could scarcely be avoided—though many university professors who were interested in social problems would probably have evaded it if they could—that the problem of poverty must bear some relation to the larger problem of the distribution of wealth and income among the various socio-economic classes of which a modern population is composed. The admission of this possibility implied, on the one hand, inquiry into the strictly economic question of the distribution of wealth, including such topics as wages, profits, rent, and interest. It also implied, however, inquiry into the whole subject of social

¹ Cf. A. W. Small, *Fifty Years of Sociology in the United States* (whole number of *American Journal of Sociology* for May, 1916), pp. 767–768, 784–785.

² The *Communist Manifesto* appeared in 1848; *Das Kapital*, vol. I, was first published in German in 1867; an English translation of vol. I was made in 1887, and one of vols. II and III in 1907–1909.

classes, their nature, the determination of their personnel, and similar and related matters. This latter subject of investigation seemed to transcend the logical scope of strictly economic inquiry and to fall squarely within the field of sociology.

It is, however, to Thorstein Veblen, who regarded himself as an economist and has been generally so classified, that we owe the most sophisticated contributions to a general theory of social classes that have been made up to now by any American writer. Born in Wisconsin in 1857 of Norwegian parents, educated at Carleton College, Johns Hopkins, Yale, and Cornell, Veblen occupied teaching positions after 1892 at the University of Chicago, Stanford University, the University of Missouri, and the New School for Social Research. Never successful as a classroom teacher or lecturer, he won a distinguished reputation with a few discriminating students and readers, especially after the first publication of his *Theory of the Leisure Class* in 1899; and this reputation became rather suddenly and almost inexplicably extended to a larger circle of admirers late in Veblen's life, from about 1918. A number of the younger serious students of economics of the time seem first to have discovered Veblen just at the close of the World War and quickly became very enthusiastic about his writings.¹

According to an apt statement formulated by Alvin Johnson:²

As an evolutionary philosopher Veblen saw the whole history of civilization characterized by the conflict between the predatory and the industrious, this conflict, however, shifting its forms with protean

¹ See Joseph Dorfman, *Thorstein Veblen and His America*, New York, 1934; Alvin Johnson, article on Veblen in *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*, vol. 15; Florence Veblen, "Thorstein Veblen: Reminiscences of His Brother Orson," *Social Forces*, vol. 10, pp. 187-195, 1931. All of Veblen's books, which are not listed here, are of significance to the student of his place in the history of social science. Those of greatest importance for sociologists, however, in addition to *Theory of the Leisure Class* which is by far the most important and contains practically all his theoretic contributions in the germ, include *The Instinct of Workmanship and the State of the Industrial Arts*, 1914; 2d ed., 1918, and *The Place of Science in Modern Civilization*, 1919. It is not the intention of the present writer to adjudicate the question whether these works may be properly classified with the literature of sociology; certainly many sociologists have been disposed to claim them for their own discipline, but it seems quite certain also that Veblen was not inclined to regard himself as a sociologist.

² *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*, vol. 15, p. 234.

facility and varying from phase to phase in the degree of naked force and fraud displayed or in the ingenuity with which predation is veiled by an appearance of ethical legitimacy and observance of the general interest.

He devoted himself throughout the latter half of his life to the elaboration of this view and its implications, and in practically all of his writings he rang the changes on this one central theme. It seems to be the case that no other American writer, and few who have written in any language, has dealt at any length with questions pertaining to social classes and class struggle with the degree of personal detachment that Veblen consistently maintained. He concealed his own ethical evaluation of the features of the life of society, which he brilliantly described and interpreted, so completely and so consistently that opinions differ to this day concerning the degree to which his intentions were ironical. As Alvin Johnson's statement implies, however, one cannot escape, in the *Theory of the Leisure Class*, Veblen's interpretation of Western culture from barbarian times onward, in terms of the social predominance of a scale of values in which "exploit" has ranked highest among manifestations of personal and class worth, to the prejudice of skill and efficiency in purely productive, or "industrial," activities. He links with this distinction, implicitly in *Theory of the Leisure Class* but quite explicitly in some of his later works, the thesis that the general welfare of society, so far as it is secured by material production, is proportionate to the industriousness, skill, and technical knowledge possessed and exercised by the individual members of society. In one of his later and briefer works, *The Vested Interests and the State of the Industrial Arts*, he developed the idea that in contemporary society, where distinctions between classes and all "invidious" distinctions of worth between the individual members of society are based on property and income, "property" amounts to a "vested interest" in the accumulated technical knowledge possessed by a society.¹ All such reasoning can be regarded as an extension and refinement of a line of analysis appropriate to the special social science of economics; and undoubtedly Veblen and others have so regarded it. In so far as it sheds a great light on the process by which the dividing lines

¹ Cf. the similar reasoning of John R. Commons, *The Legal Foundations of Capitalism* and later works.

between social classes are determined, maintained, and revised and, incidentally, upon the relation of law and the mores to the actual structure of a society, this reasoning is, however, of indisputable importance to sociologists. Veblen is reported to have studied the works of Karl Marx intensively and rejected them in the main. In the features of his theory that have been briefly indicated in the foregoing sentences, however, there is more than a little suggestion of Marx's treatment of the relation between the "economic basis" of social organization and the social superstructure, consisting of religion, morality, law, and institutions generally. Veblen may correctly be rated as a penetrating critic of the details of Marxian theory, but it can scarcely be denied that, in a broad classification, he can be placed in the Marxian tradition.

Owing to the studied detachment of his style, and the very unusual and intimidating vocabulary in which he expressed himself, Veblen's works have generally been found difficult by students and have never had a wide circulation among the reading public. His influence on social thought in the United States has been considerable, however, and is by no means attenuated to a mere historical memory at the present day. One may conjecture that, whenever the sociologists of the future reach the point where they are inclined to devote more attention to questions pertaining to social classes and class struggle than has been the prevailing fashion in sociological circles in the recent past, they will find that suggestive construction lines for the development of a sociology of classes and economic institutions have to a considerable extent been mapped out by Veblen.

CHAPTER XXII

THE SCIENCE OF CULTURE

In the beginnings of sociology in the United States, one of the first tendencies to be noticed is the use of ethnological materials as a source of sociological generalizations. This tendency is very marked in the early work of Sumner and Thomas and has been continued by younger writers. The fact suggests at once some investigation of its origins or antecedents, some of which we have noticed in earlier chapters but for the most part only incidentally. (Ethnology, or "cultural anthropology," to use the term prevailing in the United States in recent years, is a well-established academic discipline and field of research; it has existed as a recognized science for a slightly longer period of time than sociology. On the other hand, the boundaries between sociology and cultural anthropology are by no means clearly drawn. We may undertake here, accordingly, a brief survey of the development of cultural anthropology, because of its bearing on some features of the work done by those who prefer to call themselves sociologists. Since the history of anthropology is a long story, we can treat it here only in a superficial and cursory fashion, with especial reference to the development of anthropological theories and points of view.

In a short chapter on the history and prospects of anthropology, Goldenweiser has, in an admittedly arbitrary fashion, referred to Adolph Bastian (1826-1905) and Friedrich Ratzel (1844-1904) as the pioneers.¹ We have paid some attention to the work of both these men in previous connections. Actually, a number of other men were doing significant work at about the same time or before Bastian and Ratzel began their publications; among them were the American anthropologist Lewis Henry Morgan (1818-1881); Johann Jakob Bachofen (1815-1887) of

¹ Harry Elmer Barnes, ed., *The History and Prospects of the Social Sciences*, Chap. V, New York, 1925.

Switzerland; John Ferguson McLennan (1827-1881), Scottish anthropologist and barrister; and Herbert Spencer (1820-1904). The multiplicity of more or less independent pioneers in cultural anthropology reflects the fact that, in its beginnings, it really consisted not of one but several specialties. The fact that Bastian is counted among the pioneer anthropologists reflects the fact that anthropology is rooted in travelers' tales about the queer, "savage" peoples found in out-of-the-way parts of the world; Bastian was himself a great traveler;¹ and his folk psychology may be regarded as an effort to interpret some of the facts that he had learned from his own travels and from others' reports of theirs, concerning the great variety of human customs and institutions found in different parts of the world. The interest of European thinkers in the customs and institutions of exotic peoples began as early as the eighteenth century; at that time, it was the fashion to deal with political, religious, and moral problems by means of comparisons with what was known or imagined concerning the different ways in which the Chinese or the Mohammedans or hypothetical "primitive" savages met the same issues.² This tendency, highly speculative at first, doubtless had something to do with the later impulse to ascertain the facts about the customs, ideas, and institutions of the peoples of remote parts of the earth.

The origin of cultural anthropology in an interest aroused by travelers' tales accounts for the fact illustrated by Ratzel's double role as founder of anthropology and of geography; he was interested in correlating and interpreting what he could learn about the distribution of peoples and cultures over the surface of the earth. Studied from one point of view, these data yielded anthropogeography; treated in a somewhat different way, it gave rise to cultural anthropology. Ratzel's *Völkerkunde* (translated as *History of Mankind*) is, as Goldenweiser says, neither history nor a study of social evolution but simply a descriptive account of many peoples at different stages of the development of civilization.³ Because in this work and in his *Anthropogeographie*, Ratzel brought into juxtaposition a mass of

¹ Goldenweiser, *loc. cit.*, p. 210.

² J. B. Bury, *The Idea of Progress*, pp. 168-169, New York, 1932.

³ *Loc. cit.*, p. 213.

culture facts, with the implication that they might be studied comparatively, he is listed among the pioneers of cultural anthropology.

As early as the first publications of Bastian, and apparently quite independently of them, Lewis H. Morgan, an American lawyer, became interested in the institutions of the American Indians. On the basis of facts that he had learned while acting as counsel for the Seneca Iroquois, he published in 1851 his *League of the Ho-dé-no-sau-nee, or Iroquois*, in which he paid particular attention to the peculiar fashion of tracing kinship found in the Iroquois tribes; and from this beginning he branched out into a comprehensive investigation of kinship systems, resulting in a volume entitled *Systems of Consanguinity and Affinity of the Human Family* (1870). Finally, in his *Ancient Society* (1877), he set forth his evolutionary theory of human cultural origins, according to which all peoples have passed through the same successive stages of savagery, barbarism, and civilization.¹ It is probable that Morgan's *Ancient Society* has had a wider circulation than any other anthropological treatise. It may be regarded as one of the works that were responsible for launching the two rival theories of cultural origins with which anthropologists have been preoccupied for more than a generation: the "evolutionary" and "diffusionist" theories. Morgan was a pioneer evolutionist.

Although Herbert Spencer is ordinarily thought of as a philosopher and sociologist, he is also credited with having helped to establish the science of cultural anthropology and particularly what has come to be known as the "comparative method" in anthropology. As we have seen, in preparing for his *Principles of Sociology*, Spencer hired assistants to assemble the great masses of data on the customs and institutions of different peoples which were published in his *Descriptive Sociology*. The assumption underlying this procedure was that by comparing the different manifestations of the same type of cultural phenomenon, one might arrive at some knowledge of its nature and the process of its development and change. In general, the use of the com-

¹ Bernhard J. Stern, article on Morgan in *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*, vol. 11; see also the same author's *Lewis Henry Morgan: Social Evolutionist*, Chicago, 1931.

parative method has been associated with the evolutionist theory of cultural origins, which is, briefly stated, the theory that similar culture traits have similar or identical psychological origins and that their similarity is to be accounted for in terms of the "parallel evolution" of the different cultures of the earth. The comparative method and the evolutionary theory of cultural origins were followed in the main by (Edward Westermarck; and the whole controversy is intelligently discussed in the later editions of his *History of Human Marriage*.¹

It might be gathered from the foregoing that the early history of anthropology was characterized to a marked extent by theoretic controversies, and such an impression is not entirely without foundation. Indeed, it may be said with some truth that controversial interests in rival theories of social and cultural origins played a large part in stimulating the pioneers in this field to undertake research which would otherwise have been much slower to develop. Valuable ethnographic investigation was done by men who were interested in following up, and if possible verifying, certain explanatory hypotheses that they had formulated. This is strikingly illustrated by the story of the hypothesis of primitive promiscuity, which, as we have noted, figured prominently in Westermarck's early interest in the history of human marriage. This hypothesis was central in a pioneer work which we have not yet noted, J. J. Bachofen's *Das Mutterrecht, Eine Untersuchung über die Gynaiokratie der alten Welt* (1861). Bachofen came into the field of anthropology by way of a previous interest in Greek and Roman antiquities, a subject that he had studied under Savigny at the University of Berlin. He became convinced, as a result of some of his researches, that the patriarchal type of society, which Maine and others were supposed to have regarded as "primitive," was in fact everywhere preceded by a "matriarchal" type of social organization or, at any rate, by a social order in which descent was traced only through the mother. From this he inferred that mankind had once lived in a state of promiscuity, in which uncertainty as to the paternity of children led naturally to the tracing of descent through the female line only. Regardless of the soundness of

¹ 5th ed., New York, 1922. "Introduction, On the Method of Investigation." See also G. Elliott Smith and others, *Culture: The Diffusion Controversy*, New York and London, 1927.

this hypothesis, its striking and novel character aroused a great deal of interest in anthropological research.¹

At about the same time that Morgan, Spencer, and Bachofen were working toward a science of ethnology, or cultural anthropology, independent beginnings in the same field were being made by a Scotch lawyer, John Ferguson McLennan (1827–1881). His interest in anthropological problems, like that of Morgan, arose from his interest in law.

While writing the article "Law" for the eighth edition of the *Encyclopaedia Britannica* he became interested in the Spartan and Roman marriage ceremony of collusive abduction, which he interpreted in terms of the evolutionary hypothesis that symbolical forms of behavior were survivals of previous actual relationships.²

This seems to have been one route by which the concept "survivals" found its way into the vocabulary of anthropologists; and it continued to play a part in their methods of investigation and interpretation for a long time. It is interesting to speculate whether McLennan's use of the concept of cultural survival may have been due in any way to Vico's much earlier suggestion of a similar interpretation of certain of the data of history. Certainly the idea was not altogether novel when McLennan used it; however, he seems to have been particularly instrumental in giving it currency among the anthropologists. According to Stern, McLennan also advanced the theory of original promiscuity and related notions, independently of Bachofen and Morgan.³ At all events, McLennan must be enumerated among the pioneers of modern anthropology.⁴

Pioneer work of a somewhat different character was done by Sir Edward B. Tylor (1832–1917), who may be counted as the first great systematizer of anthropological science. Perhaps it is not going too far to say that he was responsible, more than any other one person, for the fact that cultural anthropology became a separate discipline, rather than a branch of sociology or of

¹ See Heinrich Cunow, article on Bachofen in *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*, vol. 2.

² Bernhard J. Stern, article on McLennan in *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*, vol. 10.

³ *Ibid.*, loc. cit.

⁴ McLennan's most important works are *Primitive Marriage*, Edinburgh, 1865; *The Patriarchal Theory*, London, 1885; *Studies in Ancient History*,

history. Bachofen, Bastian, Morgan, and McLennan probably thought of their works, in the beginning, as contributions to history; Ratzel apparently did not greatly concern himself about the classification of his work in the system of the sciences, particularly in so far as it was anything more than a foundation for a new science of anthropogeography, which, in turn, he would probably have classified as a branch of biology. As we have seen, Spencer's contributions to anthropology were made incidentally to his efforts to develop a general science of sociology. Tylor, on the other hand, after he had written an epoch-making synthetic work entitled *Primitive Culture* (1871), in which he explicitly indicated the scope and point of view of anthropology as a distinct science, published what seems to have been the first general textbook of anthropology in English, *Anthropology, An Introduction to the Study of Man and Civilization* (1881).¹ Tylor's works had great influence, due partly to the fact that he wrote with balanced judgment and impartiality and avoided all extreme doctrinaire positions while at the same time he did not shrink from the attempt to draw the findings and concepts of anthropology into a rational and more or less theoretic synthesis. He is credited by Goldenweiser with the origination of the anthropological application of the concept "survivals"; however, it is not clear that in this he anticipated or influenced McLennan.² He is perhaps most widely known for his animistic theory of religious origins, which he developed at length in the opening chapters of *Primitive Culture*.

It was no doubt inevitable that, when anthropology took shape as a distinct science of social and cultural origins, the problem of religious origins would occupy a large place in the researches of those who devoted themselves to the new science. Actually, it may be argued that cultural anthropology arose out of antecedent interests in religious origins in somewhat the same way that it grew out of a specific interest in the origins of modern marriage and kinship. We have noted in a previous connection that the collective psychology of Durkheim was concerned, to a considerable extent, with the problem of (religious origins) and pro-

¹ He had published *Researches in the Early History of Mankind* in 1865, before he wrote the first edition of *Primitive Culture*.

² A. A. Goldenweiser, "Cultural Anthropology," in Harry Elmer Barnes, ed., *History and Prospects of the Social Sciences*, pp. 216-217.

vided the interpretive hypothesis used by Jane Harrison in her account of the social origins of Greek religion in *Themis*. It might have been mentioned in that connection, and in connection with the natural history of institutions, that the work of Durkheim and Harrison on religious origins was anticipated in part by William Robertson Smith (1846–1894). Robertson Smith developed his interest in the origins of Semitic religions on the foundation of a training and interest in Old Testament studies. His *Lectures on the Religion of the Semites* (Edinburgh, 1889) set forth the theory that, in the development of religion, rites and ceremonies, rather than myths and doctrines, were primary. Although this theory resembles that of Durkheim, and although *Lectures on the Religion of the Semites* was published long before Durkheim wrote his *Elementary Forms of the Religious Life*, there is not in the latter book any acknowledgment of indebtedness to Robertson Smith for basic ideas. At all events, the social theory of religious origins set forth by Robertson Smith and, much later, by Durkheim in some respects rivals and in other respects supplements the animistic theory of religious origins developed by Tylor. The effort to verify one or another of these and other hypotheses, like the effort to verify the hypothesis of primitive sexual promiscuity, has had its part in stimulating ethnological and archaeological investigation.

Since the beginnings made by these men, the study of cultural anthropology has been prosecuted by a large company of distinguished persons. So numerous are they that it is scarcely feasible here even to list the outstanding names and indicate their importance. The history of anthropology has become a subject for separate consideration, although, as we shall see, its relation with sociology has been close.¹ In Great Britain, besides the men whom we have already mentioned, important work has been done by Sir John Lubbock (1834–1913),² Sir J. G. Frazer (1854–),³ Andrew Lang (1844–1912),⁴ W. H. R. Rivers

¹ See A. C. Haddon, *History of Anthropology*.

² See Bernhard J. Stern, article, *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*, vol. 9. Lubbock's principal works are *Prehistoric Times*, London, 1865; *The Origin of Civilisation*, London, 1870.

³ Principal works: *The Golden Bough* (1st ed., 2 vols., London, 1890; subsequently revised and greatly enlarged); *Totemism and Exogamy* (4 vols., 1910).

⁴ See article by R. R. Marett in *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*,

(1864–1922),¹ Edwin Sidney Hartland (1848–1927),² Alfred Cort Haddon (1855–), William James Perry, G. Elliott Smith (1871–), and R. R. Marett (1866–). Perry and Smith are known, with the German anthropologist F. Graebner, as the most radical exponents of the “diffusion” theory of cultural origins, in which the concept of parallel evolution is rejected almost entirely, and occurrences of the same culture trait in different locations, however widely separated, are explained in terms of transmission from some common point of origin. W. H. R. Rivers is also classified with the diffusionist school, but he was distinctly less extreme in his position.³ It should be remarked here that Westermarck and Hobbhouse are considered among the leading English contributors to the literature of cultural anthropology, though Westermarck is, as we have seen, of Finnish nationality, and Hobbhouse has usually been classified primarily as a philosopher. Somewhat similarly, in recent years, Bronislaw Malinowski, though of Polish birth, has been ranked as an outstanding British anthropologist. He is known for his study of the natives of the Trobriand Archipelago and for the extent to which he has been willing to formulate generalizations from ethnological data, in some contrast to most of his colleagues.

In Germany, influential pioneer work in cultural anthropology was done by Julius Lippert (1839–1909),⁴ and Franz Carl

vol. 9. Principal works, *Myth, Ritual and Religion*, London, 1887; *The Making of Religion*, London, 1898; *Social Origins*, 1903; *The Secret of the Totem*, 1905.

¹ Principal works, in addition to important monographs reporting field data: *Psychology and Politics*, 1923; *Studies in Evolution and Eugenics*, 1923; *Social Organization*, 1924; *Medicine, Magic and Religion*; *Kinship and Social Organization*, 1914. Rivers was perhaps the most outstanding figure in British anthropological circles from the opening of the twentieth century until his death.

² See article by R. R. Marett in *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*, vol. 7. Principal works: *The Legend of Perseus*, 3 vols., London, 1894–1896; *Primitive Paternity*, 2 vols., London, 1909–1910; *Primitive Society*, London, 1921; *Primitive Law*, London, 1924.

³ See Goldenweiser, *loc. cit.*, pp. 235–241.

⁴ See article by George P. Murdock in *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*, vol. 9; also autobiographical sketch in *American Journal of Sociology*, vol. XIX, pp. 145–165, 1913–1914. Lippert's principal works are *Allgemeine Geschichte des Priestertums*, 2 vols., 1883–1884; *Die Geschichte der Familie*, 1884; *Kulturgeschichte der Menschheit in ihrem organischen Aufbau*, 2 vols.,

Müller-Lyer (1857–1916).¹ In their works may be observed the relationship of cultural anthropology to historiography and the philosophy of history. The titles of their books suggest this relationship; and Lippert was as much historian as anthropologist. Müller-Lyer devised what he considered to be a new method of interpretation of culture history, the "phaseological method," which, however, does not seem to be wholly different from the method employed by Morgan and others in depicting the evolution of culture as a series of stages. Müller-Lyer may have recognized more clearly than earlier writers had done that different elements of a culture move at different rates. Salomon says of him, "In his sociological work he merged the social evolutionism of nineteenth century sociologists and the historical materialism of Marx. By his 'phaseological method' of research he distinguished, described, and correlated general successive stages through which human societies had passed."²

At the present time, those who call themselves anthropologists or ethnologists have at least two, and in some respects three, quite different objects of attention. Clark Wissler is authority for the statement that "anthropology's favorite definition of itself is the 'science of man, his origin, career, and distribution over the earth.'³ As he says, this definition strikes out a

1886–1887, trans. by G. P. Murdock as *The Evolution of Culture*, New York, 1931.

¹ See article by Gottfried Salomon in *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*, vol. 11. Important works: *Phasen der Kultur und Richtungslinien des Fortschritts*, 1908, trans. by E. C. and H. A. Lake, London, 1920; *Der Sinn des Lebens und die Wissenschaft* 1910; *Formen der Ehe, der Familie und der Verwandtschaft*, 1911; *Phasen der Liebe*, 1913, trans. by T. C. Wigglesworth as *The Evolution of Modern Marriage*, London, 1930; three other vols., 1914, 1918, and 1924—the whole series bearing the general title *Entwicklungsstufen der Menschheit*.

² *Loc. cit.*

³ "Recent Developments in Anthropology," Chap. II, in E. C. Hayes, ed., *Recent Developments in the Social Sciences*, p. 63, Philadelphia, 1927. There is no very clear or consistent distinction of usage among the terms "anthropology," "ethnology," and "ethnography"; furthermore, the British usage does not agree with that prevailing in the United States. For the purposes of the present discussion, it has been assumed that ethnology and "cultural anthropology" are synonymous terms; while ethnography refers more particularly to the descriptive, fact-finding phase of ethnological, or anthropological, research. In the strictest sense of the terms, ethnology is the

very broad claim, over territory much of which is also claimed by other sciences. However, it does serve to call attention to one peculiarity of anthropology, viz., the fact that, as "physical anthropology," it has been concerned with the study of man as a member of the animal kingdom, or, as Huxley phrased it, "man's place in nature." This phase of anthropology dates, mainly, from Darwin's *Descent of Man* (1871). Since the appearance of that book, it has been elaborated and refined by the efforts of a large number of scholars, including Thomas Henry Huxley (1825-1895), friend and protagonist of Darwin, who probably did more than any other one person to bring about through effective polemics the acceptance of Darwin's theories by men of science and educated people generally. Even to indicate by a mere catalogue the principal contributions that have been made to physical anthropology since the time of Darwin and Huxley would transcend the scope of this work. Physical anthropology is, on the whole, much less closely related to sociology than is cultural anthropology. The latter takes for granted man's animal characteristics, or his "original nature"; recent students of cultural anthropology have seemed to avoid questions of original nature, heredity, and the like and limit themselves in the main to the strictly historical and factual investigation of culture.¹ Between the fields of physical and cultural anthropology lies the whole subject of race, which may be regarded as the third great object of attention in the anthropological field.

The development of anthropological research, writing, and teaching in the United States has involved all three of these phases of the subject, and nowhere else has cultural anthropology undergone a more elaborate and systematic development. The pioneer work of L. H. Morgan does not seem to have inspired other American students during his lifetime; indeed, it won for him more recognition abroad than at home. According to Wissler, anthropology gained its first foothold in this country and elsewhere as a field of inquiry auxiliary to the formation and operation of museums and the assembling of collections for wealthy men. It was, accordingly, affected by a marked preoccupation with the material facts of dead cultures—skeletal

study of races and peoples, in distinction from one another and, by implication, the study of their customs, institutions, and folklore.

¹ Wissler, *op. cit.*, pp. 63-64.

remains and artifacts. Beginning in 1876, however, the work that grew into the Bureau of American Ethnology was started by the U. S. Geological Survey, under the leadership of Maj. J. W. Powell (1834-1902), who had become interested in the living Indian tribes.¹ Ten years later, Daniel Brinton (1837-1899) was appointed professor of linguistics and archaeology in the University of Pennsylvania; and at about the same time F. W. Putnam, a museum director, became a professor at Harvard.² A great part of the more recent anthropological work that has been done in the United States has resulted directly and indirectly from the research of the Bureau of American Ethnology and from the teaching of one man, Prof. Franz Boas (1858-), who joined the faculty of Columbia University in 1896. The majority of the leading anthropologists who have been active in teaching and research in this country in recent years are former students of Boas or of students of his. Although he has not been an extremely prolific writer, his influence exercised through his students has been great. His published works include, in addition to monographic studies of culture areas, *Changes in the Form of Body of Descendants of Immigrants* (1911), *The Mind of Primitive Man* (1911), *Kultur und Rasse* (1913), *Primitive Art* (1927), and *Anthropology and Modern Life* (1928).

In the work of Boas and his students, physical anthropology, the theory of race, and cultural anthropology are brought into a definite relationship with each other, with the result that there emerges the hypothesis that the facts of culture constitute a distinct realm and are, so to speak, self-determining. They must be studied on their own account, and their origins must be determined historically; no theory of race, heredity, or "evolution" will account for them. In *Changes in the Form of Body of the Descendants of Immigrants*, Boas placed in exhibition evidence that tended to show that the physical characteristics of race, those ordinarily regarded as most unmistakably "hereditary," are progressively modified as the result of migration to a new country. His findings in this study have been challenged, but they served, at any rate, to direct attention away from racial

¹ See W. H. Hobbes, "John Wesley Powell," *Scientific Monthly*, vol. 39, pp. 519-529, 1934.

² Wissler, *op. cit.*, pp. 53-56.

facts and upon the facts of culture as such. In *The Mind of Primitive Man* and in various monographs and journal articles, Boas reiterated the same point of view. The result of the efforts growing out of this new American point of view has been the development of the so-called "American historical school" of anthropology and the formulation of a number of technical concepts. Chief of these concepts are the obvious terms "culture trait" and "culture complex" and the subtler concepts "culture area," "type of culture," and "center of diffusion."¹

Among other prominent American anthropologists of recent years may be mentioned Ales Hrdlicka (1869–), Clark Wissler (1870–),² John Reed Swanton (1873–), A. L. Kroeber (1876–) Alexander Goldenweiser (1880–), Robert H. Lowie (1883–),³ Edward Sapir (1884–), Fay-Cooper Cole (1881–), and Ernest Albert Hooton (1887–). Since all of these men have considered themselves to be anthropologists primarily, not sociologists, and since it can be said with some justice that they have contributed to sociology only incidentally or indirectly, their names may be passed over here with bare mention.

American sociologists have drawn upon the work of the anthropologists extensively for data but only to a very limited extent for ideas. However, Melville J. Herskovits and Malcolm M. Willey, individually and in collaboration, have been particularly instrumental in placing before the sociologists the abstract idea of "pattern," drawn from the American anthropological conceptions of culture trait, culture complex, and culture area. Willey has been active, with others, in fostering a special form

¹ These conceptual terms are well defined in Clark Wissler, *Man and Culture*, New York, 1923. See also Franz Boas, "Anthropology," in *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*, vol. 2; also Bronislaw Malinowski, "Culture," in *ibid.*, vol. 4.

² Principal works: *North American Indians of the Plains*, 1912; *The American Indian*, 1917; *Man and Culture*, 1922; *The Relation of Nature to Man in Aboriginal America*, 1926; *An Introduction to Social Anthropology*, 1929. Wissler has probably done more than any other American anthropologist to define cultural anthropology as a general or abstract science, closely related to sociology and perhaps overlapping it.

³ Author of the following works, in addition to monographic studies: *Primitive Society*, 1920; *Primitive Religion*, 1924; *The Origin of the State*, 1927; *Are We Civilized?* 1929; *Culture and Ethnology*, 1917.

of sociological study and exposition called "cultural sociology." This specialty has flourished in a number of universities in the United States since about 1925. It was anticipated somewhat by courses of instruction given at the University of Chicago by Ellsworth Faris and by W. F. Ogburn in his *Social Change* (1922).¹ Professor L. L. Bernard has offered similar courses of instruction at the University of North Carolina and Washington University. Professor Howard W. Odum of the University of North Carolina, with his colleagues and graduate students, has been publishing a series of studies in a general field which he calls "folk sociology." He has not defined precisely the concept "folk" implied in this term; however, he obviously distinguishes between a folk and all kinds of small, specialized, part-groups, on the one hand and between a folk and all formally organized political societies, or states, on the other. (A folk is the group that corresponds, approximately, to the sociogeographic concept "region.")²

Logical distinctions and relations between the concept of culture, with related and derivative concepts, and other sociological concepts and categories are still imperfectly defined. It is impossible at present to state with any approach to finality the scope or limits of this phase of the American sociological movement. In Germany, recently, there has been an effort on the part of a certain school of writers to define culture as the central concept of sociology. An interesting recent trend of development of the study of culture in the United States is exemplified in the writings of Margaret Mead and Robert Redfield, each of whom has published studies of contemporary culture groups. Their work is distinguished by the success with

¹ See Melville J. Herskovits and Malcolm M. Willey, "The Cultural Approach to Sociology," *American Journal of Sociology*, vol. 29, pp. 196 ff., 1923; Melville J. Herskovits, "Social Pattern: A Methodological Study," *Social Forces*, pp. 1 ff., vol. IV; Malcolm M. Willey, "Society and Its Cultural Heritage," in Jerome Davis, Harry Elmer Barnes, and others, *Introduction to Sociology*; Book II, Part IV, Boston, 1927; Joseph K. Folsom, *Culture and Social Progress*, New York, 1928.

² See especially Odum's presidential address before the American Sociological Society at Cleveland in December, 1930, "Folk and Regional Conflict as a Field of Sociological Study," *Publication of the American Sociological Society*, vol. 25, No. 2, pp. 1-17, 1931. The literature of this movement led by Professor Odum has been published, largely, by the University of North Carolina Press; and the catalogue of the press may be consulted for titles and authors.

which they have depicted particular cultures concretely and organically, as active patterns of life; and by the attention paid to the influence of contemporary—European and American—“civilization” upon previously uncivilized or little-civilized culture groups. In their hands, the study of culture tends to become, in part, the investigation of concrete manifestations of what sociologists have discussed more abstractly as “assimilation.”

CHAPTER XXIII

THE SOCIOLOGY OF WILLIAM GRAHAM SUMNER

In the preceding chapter, little more was given than a survey of the background for an inquiry that concerns students of the development of sociology. Our question is How has the work of the anthropologists affected the development of sociological thought and research? The answer to this question, briefly stated, is that the chief thing that the sociologists have gained from anthropologists is facts, or data, useful for what we can learn from a comparison of the society around us with remoter and simpler societies. Such a comparison is obviously desirable as a means of testing sociological generalizations, but the factual data assembled by anthropologists do not necessarily contribute very much to the formulation of those generalizations. Anthropologists have not concerned themselves greatly, in recent decades, with theoretic questions. Two such questions, and on the whole only these two, have interested anthropologists down to the present time, *viz.*, What has been the process of social evolution, and particularly cultural evolution; and what is the process by which culture traits are transmitted from one social group to another? These are important and fundamental questions, and they are important not only to anthropologists but to sociologists. Furthermore, ethnological data seem to be the most useful data which can be had for sociological research and which are, or can be made, reasonably objective in character. It is not surprising, therefore, that contributions of outstanding importance have been made to sociology by men who took ethnology, chiefly, as their point of departure. In addition to a number of younger men who are active in teaching and research today, two great American sociologists have paid a great deal of attention to ethnology: William Graham Sumner and William I. Thomas. It would be difficult to name anyone who has played a larger part in the development of sociology in the United States than either of these men. Because of the magnitude and impor-

tance of their contributions, a separate chapter will be devoted to each of them.

William Graham Sumner was born in the United States in 1840, of English parents. After an uneventful youth, he graduated from Yale College in 1863; from then until the summer of 1866, he was in Europe. He visited in England, studied French and Hebrew in Geneva, then devoted his attention for a time to German, theology, and social science in Germany and finally returned to England, where he spent some months at Oxford, studying Anglican theology and reading Hooker's *Ecclesiastical Polity*. In 1866, he became a tutor at Yale, giving instruction in mathematics and Greek. During this period of his life, he was active in the "Young Yale" movement for the reform of the government of the college. Having long had an inclination toward the ministry, he was ordained a deacon in the Episcopal Church in 1867 and was raised to the priesthood in 1869. He served as editor of a church paper for one year (1869-1870); then for two years (1870-1872), he was rector of an Episcopal church at Morristown, N. J. In 1872, after considerable controversy had taken place in the Yale faculty over the choice between him and another candidate, he was elected professor of political science in his alma mater; this position he held, with some modification of title, until shortly before his death, which occurred in 1910. Throughout his life, Sumner was an ardent advocate of policies in which he believed and was active in politics and public affairs. He was an alderman of New Haven from 1873 to 1876 and a member of the Connecticut State Board of Education from 1882 until his death. The most persistent of his political enthusiasms, however, was free trade; he spoke and wrote for the free-trade cause repeatedly. In 1874, he became involved in a controversy with President Porter of Yale, arising out of the fact that Sumner had used Spencer's *The Study of Sociology* as a textbook. Since Spencer bore the reputation of an atheist, this was objected to by members of the Yale constituency on religious grounds. Although it seemed for a time that Sumner would have to leave the institution, the controversy was finally settled, somewhat ambiguously but on the whole in his favor, and in spite of his uncompromising attitudes and controversial habits he was never again seriously menaced in his tenure. His teaching became one of the traditions of Yale;

during his later years there, it was the fashion for every student in his senior year at Yale (then Yale College) to take "Billy" Sumner's course in the science of society. At the time of his retirement, Yale University conferred upon him the honorary degree of LL. D.; this was the first time that an honorary degree had been conferred by Yale upon a member of its own faculty.¹

As a sociologist, Sumner was essentially self-taught; there were no courses in sociology in universities, in the United States or abroad, at the time when he was a student; and while he was carrying on his graduate studies in England and Germany, he was interested chiefly in theology. Except during the last years of his life, when his health was seriously impaired, he was a tireless worker. Besides the Latin, Greek, French, and German that he acquired while still a university student, he is said to have mastered two Scandinavian languages, Dutch, Spanish, Portuguese, Italian, Russian, and Polish. The voluminous notes that he accumulated bear witness to the diligence with which he read everything that he could lay his hands on that seemed to have value for his purposes. As time went on, he seems to have read chiefly for facts, rather than for ideas. In the early part of his career as professor at Yale, while holding a chair of "political science," he actually taught political economy chiefly; and throughout his life he was a convinced advocate of the laissez-faire school of economic thought. It was perhaps for this reason that he drew his sociological ideas chiefly from Spencer, Lippert, Gumpłowicz, and Ratzenhofer.² All of these, with the possible exception of Lippert, were writers who emphasized in one fashion or another the competitive aspect of the life of society. Their writings were, accordingly, congenial to Sumner, whose position on practical social problems, great and small, was consistently near the extreme remove of individualism from socialism.

¹ See Harris Starr, *William Graham Sumner*, New York, 1925; also Albert Galloway Keller, *Reminiscences (Mainly Personal) of William Graham Sumner*, New Haven, 1933.

² Keller tells in his *Reminiscences of William Graham Sumner* (p. 74), apropos of a discussion that he had with Sumner concerning the desirability of Keller's studying in Germany, that Sumner expressed a poor opinion of German scholarship except for Lippert, Gumpłowicz, and Ratzenhofer. Simmel was not mentioned, although Sumner must have known of his work through translations which had appeared in the *American Journal of Sociology*, if not otherwise.

As has been indicated above, Sumner evidently got one of his first definite ideas of a science of society¹ from Spencer's *The Study of Sociology*, which he began to read with a class formed for the purpose in 1873-1874, while the book was being published serially in its first edition. Doubtless, he already had some acquaintance with Spencer's earlier works, including *Social Statics*. In the late eighties, he read Lippert's *Kulturgeschichte der Menschheit* and adopted it as one of the three textbooks, in English, French, and German, respectively, that might be used by the students in his general course. Sumner's liking for this book is interesting in the light of the fact that he was consistently opposed to the idea of "social evolution," which he identified with "progress." Lippert's *Kulturgeschichte* is a distinctly evolutionary interpretation of human history; however, it emphasizes the principle that cultural phenomena must be explained historically, rather than in terms of biological forces such as race.² Sumner himself became one of the first sociologists to offer a cultural interpretation of social phenomena.

The essential features of Sumner's sociology, as revealed in parts of his *Folkways* and in his shorter essays,³ can be rather simply stated. The whole scheme revolves around the distinction between the in-group and the out-group and the concepts of folkways, mores, and institutions. Although the concepts of the

¹ Sumner had a persistent dislike for the name "sociology" and made some effort in his classes to substitute the term "societology."

² This is Murdock's interpretation in his article on Lippert in *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*, vol. 9. George P. Murdock, one of the former students and successors of Sumner at Yale, translated Lippert's *Kulturgeschichte der Menschheit* into English with the title *The Evolution of Culture*, New York, 1931. For a brief account of the development of Sumner's course in "The Science of Society" at Yale, see Keller's Introduction in W. G. Sumner, *War and Other Essays*, pp. xviii-xix.

³ *Folkways* (1st ed., Boston, 1906; numerous reprints) was the only book of sociological importance that Sumner managed to complete during his lifetime. See the complete bibliography of his writings published as a concluding section in William Graham Sumner, *War and Other Essays* (ed., with a biographical introduction, by Albert Galloway Keller), New Haven, 1911. In this and subsequent volumes, Keller has collected the significant scattered writings of Sumner. To what extent Sumner and Keller, *The Science of Society* (3 vols. and casebook, New Haven, 1927), represents the intention of Sumner for the completion of his system of sociology it is, of course, difficult to say. See, however, Keller's very candid Preface in vol. I.

folkways and mores are most conspicuous in Sumner's thought, the distinction between the in-group and the out-group is fundamental to his theory of culture.

The conception we ought to form of "primitive society" [he said] is that of small groups scattered over a territory. . . . A differentiation arises between ourselves, the we-group, or in-group, and everybody else, the others-groups, or out-groups. The insiders in a we-group are in a relation of peace, order, law, government, and industry, to each other. Their relation to all outsiders, or others-groups, is one of war and plunder, except so far as agreements have modified it.¹

Sumner nowhere expressly stated that this generalized description of "primitive society" constitutes a foundation for a comprehensive theory of culture and social organization; however, it serves this purpose in his system of sociology. It is not only primitive society but practically all human society that Sumner conceived, by implication, (as a conglomerate of groups, the members of which stand in a different sort of relationship to each other from what they do to outsiders and are governed by a different pattern, or rule of behavior, in their dealings with each other from that which governs them in their treatment of members of the out-group. The folkways and mores, in short, are attributes of specific groups and not of society in general; they require one to treat his neighbor, his kinsman, his compatriot in a certain way, but they do not require him to treat an outsider in the same way; indeed, they may require virtually the opposite. Sumner did not devote much space in his writings to this aspect of the life of society. Had he lived to develop the science of society as he wished, it is probable that he would have given more attention to the matter.² As he left his sociology, however, it is concerned chiefly with the culturally patterned activities of human beings, the functional specializations of human behavior, and the processes by which cultural patterns are made and changed. At all events, to such topics as these *Folkways* is devoted. Perhaps it is because Sumner was so consistently individualistic in his ethical philosophy that the sociological investigation of the group structure of society and collective

¹ *Folkways*, pp. 12 ff.; see also *War and Other Essays*, pp. 6 ff.

² In the three main volumes of *The Science of Society* as completed by Keller, relatively little attention is paid to the structure of society conceived as a matter of groups, associations, and their reciprocal relations.

behavior apparently interested him little. He did, however, make some of the most pointed remarks concerning the nature and working of human institutions that we have in the literature of sociology; and institutions constitute a highly evolved form of collective behavior.

Aside from his brief remarks about the in-group and the out-groups, Sumner's contributions to scientific sociology are almost exclusively concerned with cultural behavior patterns. Folkways, mores, institutions, and fashion: these are the topics with which the pages of *Folkways* are chiefly occupied. Sumner did not trouble himself greatly to formulate precise logical definitions of his terms; and it is necessary to take some liberties of interpretation with his text in order to state succinctly what his fundamental notions evidently were. For example, it is not entirely clear from his own words whether he intended the concept "folkways" to include or exclude the mores. Assuming the former, it may be said that the folkways are simply the customs of any group of people. Sumner offered a brief, frankly speculative account of the process by which folkways are formed,¹ but for his purposes the important thing is that the actual behavior of people is largely determined by custom; it is a matter of conformity to folkways. "Mere" folkways, or "usages," as distinguished from mores, are those patterns of action habitually followed by the members of a particular group, but without any particular sense of rightness or obligation; they are regarded simply as the natural, convenient ways of doing certain things, so far as anyone ever thinks about them at all.² They take shape in action; and human activity is motivated by four basic cravings: hunger, love, vanity, and fear (of ghosts and spirits).³ This list of motives, supplemented by the remark that under each of these motives there are "interests" and that life consists in satisfying interests, constitutes Sumner's sole contribution to the literature of "social forces." In the short paragraph that he devotes to the matter may be noticed a striking anticipation of Thomas' fourfold classification of "wishes"; also, it appears

¹ *Folkways*, pp. 2-4, 7-8, 19-20. I have used an edition printed about 1930, undated except for copyright. The pagination seems to be identical in all printings up to this date.

² *Ibid.*, p. 57.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 18-19.

that in his reference to interests, Sumner may have been influenced by Small's treatment of that topic or by Ratzenhofer's or both.

When folkways include the judgment that they are the right ways, standards of conduct departure from which would be "wrong," and that in some fashion or other conformity to them is essential to the welfare of the group, they have become mores. It is with the nature and effect of the mores, rather than with mere folkways, that Sumner is chiefly concerned. The mores of a group are what, from their own point of view, its members call "morals"; in other words, mores are morals regarded with detachment, descriptively. The difference between popular conceptions of morality and Sumner's conception of the mores is emphasized by his chapter "The Mores Can Make Anything Right and Prevent Condemnation of Anything,"¹ a feature of the book that has attracted more attention from readers outside academic circles than any other. *Folkways* is, in large part, a collection of more or less systematically ordered data, chiefly ethnological, illustrating the operation of folkways and mores in various provinces of life, such as economic activities, sex and marriage, and religion, and showing what divergent and even contradictory patterns of behavior may be sanctioned by the mores of different groups.

In addition to this survey of the mores of the peoples of the earth from the standpoint of functional content, Sumner laid down two elementary propositions concerning the process of the change or modification of the folkways and mores and formulated definitions of two other related concepts: institutions and fashions. The folkways are, through the pleasure and pain that they evoke in those who follow or violate them, subject (1) to a "strain of better adaptation of means to ends" and (2) to a "strain of consistency with each other."² Although Sumner resisted the use of the term "evolution" in reference to society and culture—apparently because he identified evolution with progress, conceived as betterment, and he did not believe that society was demonstrably getting better—after Sumner's death his pupil and successor A. G. Keller elaborated a theory of social evolution from the foregoing propositions concerning the

¹ *Ibid.*, Chap. XV.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 5-6.

"strains" of modification to which the folkways are subject, supplemented by other features of Sumner's reasoning.¹

An institution [according to Sumner] consists of a concept (idea, notion, doctrine, interest) and a structure. The structure is a framework, or apparatus, or perhaps only a number of functionaries set to cooperate at a certain juncture. The structure holds the concept and furnishes instrumentalities for bringing it into the world of facts and action in a way to serve the interests of men in society.²

Except for "enacted institutions," good examples of which are hard to find, institutions develop out of the folkways and mores, by the addition of specifications and apparatus. In that case, Sumner refers to them as "crescive" institutions, *i.e.*, those that come into existence by a process of growth.

Although, as has been said, Sumner was on the whole individualistic, and although, consistently with his general attitude, he displayed relatively little interest in groups or in that aspect of sociology that others have called "collective behavior," or "collective psychology," he did explicitly state that folkways and mores are "mass phenomena,"³ and, in the section of *Folkways* in which he discussed fashion, he made a brief statement which implies that folkways and mores might be placed in a series with such phenomena as fashion, fads, and affectations, which illustrate "the coercion of all mass movements over the individual."⁴ The discussion of fashion which accompanies this general indication of a point of view will not be reviewed here; however, it is one of the best treatments of the subject that has ever been written, though Sumner did not quite arrive at the distinction made by Tarde between fashion as the imitation of contemporaries and custom as the imitation of the past or of elders.

In addition to the topics reviewed in the foregoing pages, Sumner made significant contributions to sociological knowledge and ideas with reference to war,⁵ revolution and reform,⁶ and

¹ Albert Galloway Keller, *Societal Evolution*, New York, 1915, rev. ed., 1931.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 53-54.

³ *Op. cit.*, pp. 2, 8, 19-20, 34-35, etc.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 184.

⁵ "War," reprinted as the opening essay in *War and Other Essays*. See also the many citations under "war" in the index of *Folkways*.

⁶ *Folkways*, pp. 86-87, 113-114, 117-118.

social classes.¹ In fact, few subjects of fundamental interest to sociologists are not mentioned in the pages of *Folkways*. Though not in intention a general textbook or treatise of sociology, it does, in a rather unsystematic sort of way, outline a comprehensive system of sociological theory.

Thinking of Sumner as one who formulated, however imperfectly, a system of sociology, one may ask concerning him the most fundamental question that can be asked concerning any sociologist: What was his conception of society? One cannot find in *Folkways* a passage in which he specifically said, "Society is such-and-such a thing." Such a statement is closely approached, however, in one of the longer sections into which the book is divided, under the heading "Scope and Method of the Mores." Here Sumner says:

The life of society consists in making folkways and applying them. The relations of men to each other, when they are carrying on the struggle for existence near each other, consist in mutual reactions (. . .), from which result societal concatenations and concretions, that is, more or less fixed positions of individuals and subgroups toward each other, and more or less established sequences and methods of interaction between them, by which the interests of all members of the group are served. . . . The structure thus built up is not physical but societal and institutional; that is to say, it belongs to a category in which custom produces continuity, coherence, and consistency, so that the word "structure" may properly be applied to the fabric of relations and prescribed positions with which societal functions are permanently connected.²

Just where Sumner should be classified as a sociologist, on the basis of such statements as this, qualified as they are by his statements in regard to "mass phenomena," it is not easy to say. On the face of the matter, one is inclined to group him with Giddings and Tarde, the sociological nominalists, who apparently conceived society primarily as collections of like-minded individuals, rather than as groups of individuals characterized by the capacity for concerted action. It will be noted, however, that the term "interaction," on which Simmel and, much later, Park and Burgess placed so much emphasis, occurs in the passage

¹ *What Social Classes Owe to Each Other*, New York, 1883. See also *Folkways*, pp. 39-53, *et passim*.

² *Folkways*, sec. 40, pp. 34-36.

just quoted. Perhaps it is fair to say that Sumner had a "realist" conception of society but that, in the latter part of his life, when he devoted his studies primarily to sociology, he became much preoccupied with the cultural aspect of the life of society and the processes by which culture traits are made and changed. Certainly no other man has had a greater influence on the shaping of sociological thought in the United States; and probably no other man has had so much influence on social thought outside college and university circles as Sumner exercised through his contact with his students in Yale College, who, as alumni, became leading citizens of a later generation.

CHAPTER XXIV

THE POLISH PEASANT

An American sociologist who ranks second only to Sumner, and in some respects excels him, for his use of ethnological materials and his development of a "cultural" point of view is William I. Thomas. In collaboration with Florian Znaniecki, in *The Polish Peasant in Europe and America*, he took the significant step of applying the general viewpoint of ethnology to the study of the customs, traditions, and social organization of contemporary peoples living at a comparatively advanced stage of civilization. Anthropologists have almost invariably defined their science in such a way that it includes the study of the culture of civilized peoples, but in practice they have been reluctant to enter this field of research. In *The Polish Peasant*, Thomas and Znaniecki undertook an investigation of the culture of Polish peasants quite comparable to that which a sophisticated ethnographer would make of the culture of a savage tribe. Like the later American anthropologists of the "historical school," they avoided the weakness commonly charged against the exponents of the "comparative method," viz., that of losing the significance of culture traits by abstracting them too casually from their context. For these reasons, and for the important contributions to sociological theory which it includes, *The Polish Peasant* marks an epoch in the development of sociological thought and research in the United States.

William Isaac Thomas was born in Russell County, Virginia, in 1863. He was graduated from the University of Tennessee in 1884 and served as instructor in English and modern languages in that institution from 1884 to 1888. In 1888-1889, he studied at the universities of Berlin and Göttingen; then he served on the faculty of Oberlin College, as professor of English, 1889-1894, and as professor of sociology, 1894-1895. He was instructor in sociology at the University of Chicago in 1895-1896, when the new university and its department of sociology were just getting

underway; and in 1896, he became the fourth person to receive the doctorate in sociology from that institution. He was immediately appointed to the regular faculty of the University of Chicago, where he was assistant professor of sociology, 1896-1900; associate professor, 1900-1910; and professor, 1910-1918. Since leaving the University of Chicago in 1918, he was connected for a time with the New School of Social Research as lecturer but has been chiefly occupied in research. He was president of the American Sociological Society in 1927.¹

Even less than Sumner has Thomas given us, in his published writings, anything that even approximates the character of a general treatise on sociology. Furthermore, he seems to have modified his ideas substantially during his productive career. The concepts relating to culture and the interpretations of ethnological materials found in his *Source-book for Social Origins* (1909) are not the same as those in *The Polish Peasant*; and he has modified his views noticeably since publishing *The Unadjusted Girl*. Accordingly, one can scarcely attribute a system of sociological theory to him without running the risk of misinterpreting his intentions. The difficulty of identifying his most fundamental contributions is rendered the greater by the fact that *The Polish Peasant*, in which many of them occur, is the product of a collaboration.² In any case, however, certain ideas that were first set forth in *The Polish Peasant* ought to be noted in a study of the development of sociology, for they have had a considerable influence upon recent trends of sociological thought and research in the United States.

The most conspicuous characteristic of this massive publication is its use of "personal documents," a feature so novel when the

¹ Besides a number of significant shorter publications, Thomas is author of the following books: *Sex and Society*, 1907; *Source-book for Social Origins*, 1909; *Standpoint and Questionnaire for Race Psychology*, 1912; with Florian Znaniecki, *The Polish Peasant in Europe and America*, 1st ed., 5 vols., 1918-1921, 2d ed., 2 vols., 1927; *The Unadjusted Girl*, 1923; with Dorothy Swaine Thomas, *The Child in America*, 1928. It is an open secret that *Old World Traits Transplanted*, published in 1921 over the signatures of Robert E. Park and H. A. Miller, was the product, chiefly, of the work of Thomas.

² Znaniecki has published systematic presentations of his own theories in English in *The Laws of Social Psychology*, Chicago, 1925; "The Object-matter of Sociology," *American Journal of Sociology*, vol. 32, pp. 529-584, 1927; *The Method of Sociology*, New York, 1934.

work was first published that it earned for Thomas and Znaniecki the credit of giving to the established historiographic method of "documentation" a new sociological application. To the professional historians, and to a degree only slightly less to the economists and political scientists, the documents that have seemed valuable for research purposes have been, almost exclusively, official documents—preferably governmental, but at any rate documents officially issued or filed by some formally organized association. In *The Polish Peasant*, Thomas and Znaniecki placed in exhibition series of personal letters, exchanged between the members of Polish peasant families, and an extended and very candid autobiography written by a Polish immigrant in the United States. From these documents they were able to demonstrate a good many significant facts about the cultural patterns of Polish peasant life in its original setting, the modifications that they undergo as the result of urbanization in Poland or immigration into the United States, and the way in which they determine wishes and attitudes, on the part of the Polish people, which are only with difficulty intelligible to those whose cultural background is quite different. This work, of over two thousand pages, was the most illuminating example of disinterested but penetrating analysis of a set of interrelated cultural phenomena that had been published in any language up to that time. Anthropologists had been content, for the most part, simply to record facts about the cultures of different peoples; and, while Durkheim, Jane Harrison, and other students of the history of Greece, Rome, and the Near East had accomplished brilliant feats of interpretation of cultures more or less different from their own, it seems safe to say that none of these earlier writers succeeded so well as Thomas and Znaniecki did in making human behavior intelligible in terms of its cultural determination.

The Polish Peasant is notable for several other things besides its contribution to the study of culture. It contains important contributions to social psychology and to the general logic and methodology of social science. In the Methodological Note with which volume I begins, and in the Introduction to the "Life Record of an Immigrant,"¹ there are thought-provoking

¹ "The Life Record of an Immigrant" forms the entire third volume of the original 5-vol. ed.; in the 2-vol. reprint of 1927, in which the order of the parts is changed and the pagination differs accordingly from that of the

discussions of the general viewpoint and objectives of social science, the distinctions between sociology and social psychology, and the relations between social science and practical social problems. In these passages occur also the discussions of attitudes, values, and wishes and the fourfold classification of human wishes, which have become classical. The most important hypothesis that is presented in these passages is, perhaps, that human behavior cannot be adequately explained either in exclusively social, *i.e.*, cultural, terms or in exclusively individual terms; every conscious act may be conceived to have two components: an attitude (subjective) and a value (objective). One's behavior in a given case depends both upon his previously existing attitudes (his tendencies to act in certain ways with reference to particular kinds of objects) and upon his conception of the object or situation with reference to which he is acting. An object that has a meaning to some one is, for him, a "value." Values are, in general, cultural; they are determined for the individual by the tradition of some group of which he is or has been a part. In other words, values may be regarded as the social components of behavior. Attitudes are primarily individual and subjective. Every attitude, however, is the product of the interaction of an attitude and a value; and every value, as it exists at a time for some person, is likewise the product of the interaction of an attitude and a value.¹ This doctrine seems to most people rather abstruse; and it has been sharply criticized by Ellsworth Faris, who is, on the whole, an admirer and follower of Thomas.² It was sufficiently novel and stimulating when first published, however, to attract a great deal of attention.

first edition, it forms the concluding part of vol. II. The 2-vol. edition has been used for the page citations given here.

¹ *Op. cit.*, vol. I, pp. 38-68, 1927; vol. II, pp. 1831-1850 *et passim* to p. 1907. The reasoning summarized above occurs most explicitly in the earlier passage cited (in the Methodological Note in vol. I); however, it is necessary to compare the Introduction to "The Life Record of an Immigrant" in vol. II, for the sake of certain modifications in the theory which are stated there, the later passage first published (in vol. III of the 5-vol. ed.) some time after the Methodological Note.

² "Attitudes and Behavior," *American Journal of Sociology*, vol. 34, pp. 271-281, 1928. See also Ellsworth Faris, "The Concept of Social Attitudes," and Robert E. Park, "Human Nature, Attitudes, and the Mores," (Chaps. I, II, respectively), in Kimball Young, ed., *Social Attitudes*, New York, 1931.

A number of other interesting and significant theoretic points are developed in the two long passages of *The Polish Peasant* that have been cited; space limits preclude our reviewing them all here. The other feature that has attracted widest attention is the list of four fundamental desires, or fourfold classification of human wishes: desire for new experience, desire for stability, desire for response, desire for recognition.¹ Practically everyone who has written at length on social psychology in the United States in the period following the publication of *The Polish Peasant* has felt compelled to refer to this classification, even though he did not agree with it or did not believe that any such list of fundamental human motives was of value for scientific purposes.

From the comparative evidence afforded in Thomas' *The Unadjusted Girl* (1923) and Znaniecki's *Laws of Social Psychology* (1925), there is reason to believe that the theory of attitudes and values set forth in *The Polish Peasant* is due mainly to Znaniecki, while the four desires were Thomas' contribution. In *The Unadjusted Girl*, the entire first chapter is devoted to "The Wishes," i.e., to the formulation and definition of the four categories of desires named above, illustrated from concrete cases; while Chap. II continues the theme under the title "The Regulation of the Wishes." Another idea that looms large in Thomas' later writings is indicated by the terms "situation" and "definition of the situation." These concepts occur in *The Polish Peasant* and in Znaniecki's *Laws of Social Psychology*, but in these works the emphasis seems to be chiefly subjective and individual or even metaphysical; while in *The Unadjusted Girl* and later publications, Thomas emphasizes the definition of the situation in which one is placed at a time, not so much by him, subjectively, though that is of course involved, but for him, by the culture of his group. It is significant that the third chapter of *The Unadjusted Girl*, following that in which Thomas discusses the definition of the situation, is entitled "The Individualization of Behavior." The implication of this sequence of topics is that, in a stable social environment, individual behavior is shaped objectively, so to speak; it is almost mechanical, because

¹ *Op. cit.*, vol. II, pp. 1859, 1882. This is the later formulation of the list; a somewhat different formulation occurs in the Methodological Note, vol. I.

all the situations that commonly occur are defined for the individual by the culture of his group. Individualization, *i.e.*, definition of the situation and consequent determination of behavior by a private, subjective process comes later, in a social environment in which different cultures have become mixed together, and the individual, perhaps after a period of personal confusion and demoralization, has the opportunity of choosing among alternative courses of action.¹ What has come to be termed "the situational approach" in sociology and social psychology, a viewpoint briefly sketched in the foregoing sentences, has engaged Thomas' attention further in recent years; he made it the subject of his presidential address before the American Sociological Society in 1927.²

Thomas and Znaniecki made still another important contribution to the theory of culture and social organization, by their treatment of social disorganization. It is implied in the foregoing summaries of other aspects of their thought but merits separate mention. As has been noted in previous chapters, sociological thought and research in the United States had their origins, in considerable part, in the effort to contribute something to the understanding of those features of the life of society commonly regarded as "problems," or as pathological. Great difficulty had been experienced, however, in defining or identifying pathological social phenomena objectively. Thoughtful students of the matter saw the tendency to classify as abnormal or pathological all those forms of human behavior of which society does not approve, in other words, those which do not conform to the mores of the group with which we identify ourselves. Various solutions of the methodological problem thus posed were attempted by American sociologists in the early years of the twentieth century; for example, it was held by a number of writers, expressly or by implication, that we may

¹ *The Polish Peasant in Europe and America*, vol. I, p. 68, vol. II, pp. 1847 ff., 1859, 1874-1875. Florian Znaniecki, *Laws of Social Psychology*, pp. 79 ff. William I. Thomas, *The Unadjusted Girl*, Chaps. I, II, III as indicated above; see especially pp. 42 ff. (Chap. II).

² William I. Thomas, "The Behavior Pattern and the Situation," presidential address, *Publication of the American Sociological Society* (proceedings of annual meeting of December, 1927), vol. 22, pp. 1-13, 1928. See also W. I. Thomas and D. S. Thomas, *The Child in America*, *passim*, especially p. 561, New York, 1928.

regard as abnormal or pathological any social conditions, and any behavior of individual members of society, in which individuals are prevented from attaining outlet or expression in some form for their fundamental desires. This criterion of social abnormality, however, did not prove to be one which could be used with any great degree of objectivity; practically, it did not as a rule involve much more than the definition of abnormality by the test of one's own mores. Many writers on social problems evaded the question by proceeding in their discussion of social problems from some enumeration of existing social conditions which it was assumed that everyone would concede to be undesirable and hence abnormal or pathological.

In this dilemma, Thomas and Znaniecki came forward with a new concept, obviously relevant to the study of social conditions which would ordinarily be regarded as abnormal, *viz.*, the concept "social disorganization."¹ Using the term to refer primarily to a process rather than to a state or condition, they defined social disorganization as "a decrease of the influence of existing social rules of behavior upon the individual members of the group." Restated so that it will connote a state rather than a process, and modified to bring out some of its implications more clearly, this definition would read as follows: Social disorganization is that state of affairs in a society that is characterized by the relative lack of social rules, customs, traditions, or evaluations which are recognized and accepted by all members of the society, and which tend to define the situation in every contingency and prescribe what shall be done or what attitude shall be taken. Reflection will show that this concept affords a point of view from which the whole range of social phenomena that attract attention as abnormal, pathological, or maladjusted can be studied; it offers the opportunity for a relatively objective identification of such phenomena. So long as one classifies social conditions and personal behavior as pathological simply by the test of their nonconformity to the customs or traditions of one's own society, nearly the whole world must seem out of joint. Thomas and Znaniecki's concept of social disorganization posits a quite different criterion, *viz.*, conformity to the customs, mores, and institutions of the group to which the individual or subgroup in question belongs. A society, thought of as the environment of the indi-

¹ *The Polish Peasant in Europe and America*, vol. II, pp. 1127-1134.

viduals, families, and other part-groups within it, is conceived from this point of view as more or less well organized according as it functions with greater or less efficiency as a set of instrumentalities for the satisfaction of the wishes of its members. The disintegration of such a society is a fact that can be judged by different observers with relative consistency. This concept is not one of ethical evaluation primarily; as its authors have pointed out, a society may maintain its stability largely at the cost of the self-realization of its members, by confining their activities within very narrow channels. But, at any rate, social disorganization as here defined can be studied; and the concept promises to function increasingly, as time goes on, to unify and objectify our knowledge of phenomena hitherto regarded as socially pathological but explained only within the limitations of subjective bias.¹

Since *The Polish Peasant* and *Old World Traits Transplanted*, Thomas has not published any works that deal primarily with culture. *The Unadjusted Girl* (1923) may be described as an application of the concept of social disorganization to a particular problem, while *The Child in America* (in collaboration with Dorothy Swaine Thomas, 1928) is essentially a survey and critical interpretation of recent research in the field of child study. In recent years, Thomas has devoted considerable time to researches in the Scandinavian countries, and it is to be hoped that he will embody the results in a series of volumes comparable to *The Polish Peasant*. To a large degree, his later research efforts have been exerted in the field of social psychology, which is largely represented by *The Child in America*, and which furnished the theme for his presidential address before the American Sociological Society in Washington in 1927.

¹ In their *Social Pathology*, New York, 1925, Stuart A. Queen and Delbert M. Mann have made some effort to survey the field of social problems from the point of view afforded by Thomas and Znaniecki's concept of social disorganization. More recently, the same effort has been made by Elliott and Merrill in *Social Disorganization*, New York, 1934, and Queen, Bodenhafer, and Harper in *Social Organization and Disorganization*, New York, 1935.

PART V

**SPECIALIZATION AND RESEARCH IN AMERICAN
SOCIOLOGY**

CHAPTER XXV

THE DIFFERENTIATION OF THE SOCIOLOGICAL FIELD

It has been characteristic of the development of every science and discipline that, in the course of time, it has shown a tendency to proliferate and divide into narrower specialties. Sociology, although it is one of the younger sciences, is no exception to this rule. As a matter of historical fact, it may be said to have originated, partly, as a result of the synthesis of several related but distinguishable intellectual interests. This synthetic character of the science is illustrated by the list of courses offered in "sociology and statistics" at Columbia University according to the catalogue of 1893-1894, *viz.*, physical geography and anthropology, practical statistics, the science of statistics, sociology, socialism and communism, crime and penology, and seminarium in social science.¹ The list of the courses offered by the Department of Sociology and Anthropology at the new University of Chicago when it opened its doors to students in the autumn of 1893 presents a similar appearance. In other words, the specialization and division of the field called "sociological" in the United States in 1893 reflected, in part, the formation of sociology by the putting together of a variety of existing subjects of study which were not strongly claimed by existing departments of universities. These interests were, as we have seen, largely of a practical, reformist and philanthropic character; to some extent, however, they were theoretic; for example, the courses offered by Small in the early years at the University of Chicago reflected his conviction that the mission of sociology was to make history intelligible. Under the influence of Ward, there was some tendency from the beginning to devote special attention to the psychological aspects of social phenomena. Thus, sociology, from its origins as a university subject in the United States, was a more or less divided field, containing a number of poorly defined specialties. One or two other divisions of the sociological field

¹ Quoted by Small in *Fifty Years of Sociology in the United States*, p. 747.

became apparent quite early; thus, at the University of Chicago in 1894-1895, Prof. Charles Richmond Henderson offered a course in "rural sociology," devoted primarily to the practical problems of rural life. During this early period, a kind of specialization of courses of instruction seems to have been brought about by the ecclesiastical bias with which the majority of American colleges and universities were affected; thus, courses in social ethics, "Biblical sociology," and social philosophy were fairly common;¹ later, however, these courses largely disappeared.

For convenience, the history of American sociology may be divided into two periods: (1) from the publication of Ward's *Dynamic Sociology* in 1883 to the publication of the first volumes of Thomas and Znaniecki's *The Polish Peasant* in 1918 and (2) from 1918 to the present. The publication of *The Polish Peasant* serves to signalize the shift of American sociological thought from a speculative to a research basis, although, to be sure, this shift is not complete at the present time and perhaps never will be or should be completed. At the opening of the first period, specialization in sociology was in the condition that has been roughly sketched in the foregoing paragraphs. Aside from general developmental tendencies, however, a particular influence affecting the directions of sociological specialization for the time being may be noted in this period, viz., the publication of more or less specialized books which commended themselves to instructors in the colleges and universities as suitable for use in courses in sociology. There is some reason to think that college courses in "social control" were offered in a number of institutions following the publication of E. A. Ross's book of that title. The appearance of courses in urban sociology, problems of city life, and the like probably reflects to some extent the availability of Charles Zueblin's *American Municipal Progress* (1902) and a number of other interesting but less comprehensive books dealing with city problems. The disposition to offer courses in "Christian sociology," "Biblical sociology," and the like may have been intensified by the publication of Louis Wallis' *Sociological Study of the Bible* (1912).

¹ Jessie F. Bernard, "The History and Prospects of Sociology in the United States" (Chap. I in George A. Lundberg and others, *Trends in American Sociology*, New York, 1929), pp. 29-31.

During this early period, the division between general sociology, or "principles of sociology," and social problems, or "applied sociology," was well-nigh universal. Criminology had from an early date had some standing as a separate science and was accordingly established as one of the special divisions of sociological research and teaching from the beginning. The study of the family, likewise, was recognized as a sociological specialty from the beginning of our first period. At the same time, the sociologists began to dispute with economists the claim to population theory and problems, and the closely related subject of immigration became the subject of a number of books of general and systematic character before the end of the period.

Throughout the period from 1883 to 1913, however, the subdivision and specialization of the field of sociology were patently due, in the main, to the supposed market for books of sociological character and to the exigencies of college and university teaching. Both of these were affected, in turn, by the demand in certain quarters for guidance in dealing with practical social problems. In the beginning, the tendency was to improvise the guidance to meet the need, on the basis of common sense and the mores. At the present time, the specialization of sociology continues to be dictated, to a very large degree, by practical "problem" interests, but, beginning about 1918, there was a distinct shift to more disinterested, or "objective," research efforts. Since then, the specialized divisions of the field of sociology that have been recognized have been determined in considerable part by research considerations, although this has not involved radical changes in the categories. The divisions of the sociological field that have been determined by research interests rest on practical considerations and are correspondingly tentative and experimental, rather than theoretical. It has frequently been remarked in the past few years, that the specialization of individual sociologists' research interests has tended to follow "problems" rather than theory. Accordingly, the working specialties, not only of sociology but of social science generally, are by no means firmly established but are in a state of constant flux and change and are likely to remain so for some time to come. Whether this tendency to organize the social sciences primarily with reference to practical research interests and reform possibilities fosters the development of adequate and sound scientific knowledge

is a question which is still debated. At present, however, those who favor the emphasis of problems rather than logical divisions of subject matter dominate the American social-science organizations.

With these preliminary considerations in mind, we may say that a considerable number of specialized fields of research, teaching, and speculation, within or marginal to the larger field of sociology, are quite definitely recognized today, either by the existence of reputable literature dealing with these topics in a specialized way or by the fact that individuals are restricting their efforts, more or less, to these specialties. The American Sociological Society, in taking its annual census of members in connection with the collection of dues, asks them to indicate their special interests among the following thirteen categories: (1) general and historical sociology, (2) social psychology, (3) social research, (4) educational sociology, (5) social biology, (6) statistical sociology, (7) rural sociology, (8) community problems, (9) sociology and social work, (10) the teaching of social sciences, (11) the family, (12) sociology of religion, and (13) sociology and psychiatry. It is the judgment of the writer that one or two of the terms in this list do not designate branches of sociology to which any considerable number of persons devote concentrated attention, *e.g.*, sociology and psychiatry; while social research is an ambiguous heading. Nevertheless, the list is some evidence of consensus among American sociologists concerning the specialties within their field. Approaching the matter from a different angle, we may observe that each of the following sociological specialties has the recognition that is implied by the existence of one or more teaching and research positions in American universities designated, by implication, at least, for one of them: (1) social psychology, (2) rural sociology, (3) statistical methods, (4) population problems, (5) sociology and social work, (6) criminology, (7) educational sociology. It is also pertinent to remark that each of the thirteen "interests" recognized in the annual census of members of the American Sociological Society was represented by one or more "section" or "division" meetings, at the annual meeting of the society held in Philadelphia in 1933, except general and historical sociology, which has been so represented in recent years and will probably be represented on the program again in the future. In addition,

there were division meetings on human ecology¹ and social institutions.

On the basis of the evidence just cited, and for other reasons that will appear later, it is the judgment of the writer that the following, at least, may be enumerated as sociological specialties recognized in the United States at present: (1) general theory and history of sociology and logic of the social sciences; (2) historical sociology, theory of social evolution and progress; (3) methods of sociological research (including statistical methods as a more or less distinct subspecialty, marginal to sociology and other social sciences); (4) rural sociology; (5) urban sociology; (6) sociology and social work; (7) criminology; (8) child study, with special reference to "problem children" and juvenile delinquency; (9) the family; (10) "collective behavior"—crowd psychology and public opinion—(11) "cultural sociology" (marginal to the presumably distinct science of anthropology); (12) educational sociology; (13) population problems and social biology; (14) races and nationalities, race relations, race prejudice; (15) social psychology (marginal to sociology and psychology); (16) "human ecology," regional sociology, and social geography. Obviously, several of these categories can be subdivided, and for some purposes they should be subdivided; obviously, too, they are by no means logically disjunctive categories; they reflect strongly the tendency to specialize by "problems," rather than on theoretical grounds. They vary greatly as to the amount of research and writing that has been devoted to them, but each of them is recognized in American sociological circles as a distinct specialty which a sociologist may properly pursue, though not all of them are recognized equally by all American sociologists.

For the purposes of the present study, then, it will be assumed that the sixteen sociological specialties enumerated above are those that have become established in the United States; and in this and other chapters, the development and present status of each will be briefly reviewed.

Obviously, general sociology may be regarded as the main trunk of which the various sociological specialties are branches, or

¹ The development of human ecology, in so far as it can be distinguished from urban sociology, rural sociology, and social biology, has been reviewed in Chap. XII; the earlier development of collective psychology, in Chap. XVII; and the development of cultural sociology, in Chaps. XXII-XXIV.

divisions; however, the general, synthetic, and systematic study of sociological theory, and of questions concerning the logical distinctions and interrelations of its terms, tends to persist, in the view of some sociologists, as a subject in which a few persons may properly specialize to a greater or lesser degree. Until recently, the history of theoretic sociology has been equivalent to the history of sociology in general; that interest in general sociology has not been entirely obliterated by the development of the more specialized branch interests is shown, however, by the publication, from time to time, of books, as well as journal articles, dealing with general and theoretic sociological questions primarily and in a more recondite way than would be suitable for textbook use or for collateral reading in a "general introductory course" in sociology in colleges. In 1922, Giddings, who had developed a rather elaborate and comprehensive system of sociology on the foundation of Spencer's writings and his own original concept "the consciousness of kind,"¹ restated his theories in several papers which he brought together under the title *Studies in the Theory of Human Society*. Considerable interest was aroused by this book and by the previously published journal articles of which it was in considerable part made up. In the same year, *An Introduction to the Science of Sociology* was first published by Prof. Robert E. Park and Ernest W. Burgess of the University of Chicago. This book, which may be described as a carefully selected collection of readings in theoretic sociology, framed in a series of chapters each of which contained an original introduction of considerable length and a discussion of research problems connected with the topics dealt

¹ Besides the volume mentioned above, the sociological books written by Franklin Henry Giddings (1855-1931) were as follows: *The Theory of Human Society*, supplement to the *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, July, 1894; *Principles of Sociology*, New York, 1896; *Elements of Sociology*, New York, 1898; *Democracy and Empire*, New York, 1900; *Inductive Sociology*, New York, 1901; *Readings in Descriptive and Historical Sociology*, New York, 1906; *The Scientific Study of Human Society*, Chapel Hill, N.C., 1924; *Civilization and Society* (Howard W. Odum, ed.), New York, 1932. For accounts of his life and work, see J. L. Gillin, "Franklin Henry Giddings," (Chap. VII in Howard W. Odum, ed., *American Masters of Social Science*, New York, 1927); also C. H. Northcutt, "The Sociological Theories of Franklin H. Giddings," *American Journal of Sociology*, vol. 24, pp. 1-23, 1918-1919.

with in the chapter, enjoyed an enviable popularity. It was designed for use as a textbook in college courses and has been extensively used in this way; however, undergraduate students have found it very difficult, owing to the divergence of theories and terminologies involved in the selections from many different writers which are incorporated in the book as "materials." In the long run, the Park and Burgess *Introduction* will probably prove to have had great importance as an outline of sociological theory extensively studied by graduate students and teachers of sociology in the United States. As such, it has been influential in placing before the American sociological public a number of fundamental concepts, such as social interaction, communication, social process, competition, conflict, assimilation, accommodation, personality, and collective behavior; also, it has served to focus attention upon the need and problems of a conceptual framework for sociology.

More recently, at least three books of some importance which can be classified primarily as contributions to general and theoretic sociology have been published in the United States: R. M. MacIver, *Society—Its Structure and Changes* (1931); Howard Becker's adapted translation of Leopold von Wiese, *Allgemeine Soziologie* (published in the United States in 1931 under the title *Systematic Sociology*); and Earle E. Eubank, *The Concepts of Sociology* (1932).

In the United States, teaching, writing, and research pertaining to the general theory of sociology have been closely associated with an interest in the history of the science. The precedent for this was set by Small in his graduate courses given at the University of Chicago from the opening of that institution; his historical approach to the study of sociological theory was brought to the attention of a wider public by the publication of his *General Sociology* (1905), which combined the historical with a more direct form of exposition. Small also contributed to the literature of the history of sociology *Adam Smith and Modern Sociology* (1907), *The Cameralists* (1910), *Origins of Sociology* (1924), and his monograph "Fifty Years of Sociology in the United States," which he published as the whole number of the *American Journal of Sociology* for May, 1916, and which reached the dimensions of a moderate-sized volume. Aside from the other writings of Small and some of his former students, found

largely in scattered contributions to the *American Journal of Sociology*, the American literature of the history of sociology has been enriched chiefly by a series of Columbia University doctoral dissertations in the form of monographic studies of the lives and works of a number of great European sociologists.¹ The following general works should also be mentioned: *History and Prospects of the Social Sciences* (1925), by several authors, edited by Harry Elmer Barnes; J. P. Lichtenberger, *The Development of Social Theory* (1923); E. S. Bogardus, *A History of Social Thought* (1st ed., 1922; 2d ed., greatly enlarged, 1928); *Recent Developments in the Social Sciences* (1927), by several authors, edited by E. C. Hayes; P. A. Sorokin, *Contemporary Sociological Theories* (1928); and George A. Lundberg and others, *Trends in American Sociology* (1929). If the field of sociology be defined broadly and inclusively, Franklin Thomas, *The Environmental Basis of Society* (1925), should also be listed as a contribution to the history of the subject.

The logic, or "methodology," of sociology, and of the social sciences generally, is a field of inquiry and discussion so closely related to the general theory and history of sociology that it is impracticable to separate them entirely; questions of general sociological theory and questions of the logic or, in the general and fundamental sense, the method of sociology are practically the same thing. There is a certain amount of literature, however, that can be distinguished as primarily logical or methodological; most of this consists of journal articles.² Small's *The Meaning of Social Science* (1910) is a little volume which attempts to deal with logical and methodological questions in a simple and common-sense manner, and which was read with pleasure and profit by many advanced students during the decade following its publication. Much more recently, the following volumes of

¹ Owing to space limitations, these monographs are not listed here. The relevant titles can readily be abstracted from the "dictionary-catalogue" issued by the Columbia University Press under the title *Columbia Books*, 1893-1933.

² The writer's article "The Logic of Sociology," published in vol. 32 of the *American Journal of Sociology*, pp. 271-287, 1926, contains a selected bibliography of literature published up to that time. Among the important articles published since then is Herbert Blumer, "Science without Concepts," *American Journal of Sociology*, vol. 36, pp. 515-533, 1931; see Chaps. XXXIV-XXXIX, *infra*.

more or less similar character and emphasis have appeared in the United States: Arthur F. Bentley, *Relativity in Man and Society* (1926); E. E. Eubank, *The Concepts of Sociology* (1932); Frederick J. Teggart, a series of three related works entitled *Prolegomena to History* (1916), *The Processes of History* (1918), and *Theory of History* (1925); Charles A. Ellwood, *Methods in Sociology* (1933); Florian Znaniecki, *The Method of Sociology* (1934). Much of the literature concerned with methods of research in the narrower, more specific sense deals also with questions of logic and general methodology. At the present time, there is considerable divergence of opinion among American sociologists regarding the importance of studying sociological theory, the history of sociology, and the logic of the social sciences. At one extreme may be grouped several American sociologists who think that such questions are of great importance and would like to see them emphasized in the literature of sociology and in the graduate curriculum. At the other extreme, at least one American sociologist of considerable prestige and influence makes no secret of his opinion that questions of sociological theory and logic, and the history of the subject, are of so little importance, in comparison with specific research problems, that no time should be allotted to these topics in a sound program of studies for candidates for higher degrees in sociology. There seems to be, also, a strong current of opinion among contemporary American sociologists which might be formulated approximately as follows: Questions of fundamental sociological theory and logic are important, and the study of the history of sociology is a useful means of dealing with such questions; however, students who expect to become professional sociologists should be directed to begin their graduate studies with concrete research problems and should acquire their grasp of sociological theory by a spontaneous exploration of the literature that they find necessary to illuminate the research problems with which they are concerned. By such a procedure, it is argued, a student who devotes himself to sociological research will eventually build up an adequate and comprehensive grasp of the theory of the subject.¹ Only on the

¹ The above is the writer's own formulation of a point of view that he believes to be quite common, and perhaps preponderant, among contemporary American sociologists, but for which he can cite no documents. The viewpoint was stated quite clearly by Malcolm M. Willey in a paper read

basis of more experience than now exists will it be possible to determine the merits of the question thus defined.

There is perhaps no recognized sociological specialty that is more closely allied to general sociological theory than collective psychology, or the study of collective behavior. Indeed, the designation of collective psychology as a recognized division of sociology is more questionable than is true of any other term in the list of sixteen such divisions given above; the science as a whole may be described as the study of collective behavior. As we have seen, however, at the turn of the century this subject engaged the attention of several brilliant writers, most prominent among whom were Gustave Le Bon, Gabriel Tarde, Scipio Sighele, and E. A. Ross.¹ Since then, a number of popular writers have contributed to the literature of the subject, but academic sociologists have apparently felt either that everything had been written that could be said concerning collective psychology or that the subject did not readily lend itself to research. Tarde had pointed out, however, that there was a logical connection between collective psychology and the important topic of public opinion; and in 1921, this point, with other aspects of the subject, was reemphasized by their inclusion in chapters of the Park and Burgess *Introduction to the Science of Sociology*.

R. E. Park, senior author of the book referred to, had previously developed an interest in the general subject of collective behavior, which he expressed in his *Masse und Publikum* (1904)² and in a course that he offered to graduate students in sociology at the University of Chicago. The interest in the subject that was aroused by this course has not, up to now, given rise to a great deal of completed research or publication;³ however, the importance of collective behavior as a fundamental sociological problem has been recognized, to some extent, by the inclusion of chapters similar to those in the Park and Burgess *Introduction* in several textbooks of more recent date written by former University of Chicago students and others.

before the section on the teaching of sociology at the annual meeting of the American Sociological Society in Cleveland, December, 1930 (see *Publication of the society*, Vol. 25, No. 2, p. 199, 1931).

¹ *Supra*, Chap. XVII.

² German Ph. D. dissertation, privately printed at Bern.

³ See, however, Lyford P. Edwards, *The Natural History of Revolution*, Chicago, 1927; E. T. Hiller, *The Strike*, Chicago, 1928.

Meanwhile, the interest in public opinion as a topic for scientific study continued, stimulated by the obvious bearing of the topic on important problems of politics and public affairs. Books dealing with public opinion have been published since 1920 by a number of authors who would not ordinarily be classified as sociologists.¹ These books have served as teaching materials in college and university courses in sociology and political science, the popularity of which gives some promise of the further development of collective psychology as a sociological specialty. At the present time, the topic is not recognized by section or "division" meetings in the annual sessions of the American Sociological Society, nor does it appear as a heading in the society's annual census of special interests of members. The inclusion of collective psychology in the above list of sociological specialties must be justified, if at all, mainly on logical grounds.

The inclusion of "cultural sociology" in the list may also be questioned.² There are reputable American sociologists who virtually define sociology as the science of culture; from their point of view, cultural sociology is all sociology, and, accordingly, to list it as a division of the sociological field is meaningless. The question may be raised, too, concerning the difference between cultural sociology and cultural anthropology. These are primarily questions of logic; and logic has not been the principal force determining the specialization of sociologists' interests and research activities. Actually, as we have noted, there has been, in recent years, a noticeable tendency on the part of a number of reputable American sociologists, and at several important universities, to develop a specialized field of instruction and research which is sometimes frankly called cultural sociology; in other cases, it is designated "social origins."

¹ See especially Everett Dean Martin, *The Behavior of Crowds*, New York, 1920; Walter Lippman, *Public Opinion*, New York, 1922, *The Phantom Public*, New York, 1925; John Dewey, *The Public and Its Problems*, New York, 1927.

² See Chaps. XXII-XXIV, *supra*, especially pp. 270-271.

CHAPTER XXVI

SOCIAL EVOLUTION AND PROGRESS

The earliest systems of sociological theory formulated in Europe and the United States did not contemplate a science that would be anything else than a theory of social evolution, or progress, or a philosophy of history. Comte, Spencer, Ward, Carver, and, with qualifications, Small and Giddings, conceived sociology primarily as the science, or theory, of social evolution. And if it is true that in the work of Gumpłowicz and Ratzenhofer, sociology began to be treated as the theory of social process, rather than as the theory of social evolution, at least their conception of sociology clearly implied the continuous, irreversible transformation of human society. That human society and the environment in which its life goes on change continuously is a fact, whether or not it is legitimate to refer to that change as "evolution" or as progress; and the fact of social change has been particularly conspicuous during the century that has elapsed since sociology was first announced as a separate science by Comte. It is not surprising, therefore, that the pioneers who attempted to formulate the outlines of a science of society conceived that their science must somehow take into account, and if possible explain, the fact of continuous social change. This tendency of sociological theory was accentuated by the fact that Darwin and Wallace formulated their specific theory of organic evolution shortly after the science of sociology had begun to take shape.

In the beginnings of the American sociological movement, then, from the publication of Ward's *Dynamic Sociology* in 1883 until a quarter of a century later, the subject may be said to have been conceived by most authorities as the theory of social progress, or social evolution. The only conspicuous exceptions to this trend were the theories of Sumner and Ross. So long as this view prevailed, the theory of social evolution naturally did not play the role of a specialized division of the larger subject.

In fact, down to 1918, there seem to have been published in the United States only six books the titles of which implied definitely that they were concerned with social evolution, or progress; this was an average of only one in six years during the period beginning with Ward's *Dynamic Sociology* in 1883.¹ In the period 1918-1934 appeared at least twelve books the titles of which indicated rather explicitly that they dealt with progress, social evolution, or social change.² If these periods were to be dated from 1883 to 1912, inclusive, and from 1913 to 1934, inclusive, the contrast would be even more striking; in the earlier period of thirty years, there were published in the United States only two books of sociological character having titles that indicated that they were concerned especially with social evolution or progress, viz., *Social Evolution*, by Benjamin Kidd, an English writer; and Carver, *Sociology and Social Progress*. In the period 1913-1934, on the other hand, twenty-two years in all, there were at least sixteen such books published by American authors.

In other words, while in the United States sociology has ceased to be conceived primarily or exclusively as the science or theory of social evolution, or progress, or as philosophy of history, the interest of American sociologists in these matters has persisted, as is shown by the number of books on the subject that have been published in recent years.³ There are those American sociolo-

¹ Benjamin Kidd, *Social Evolution*, London and New York, 1895; Thomas N. Carver, *Sociology and Social Progress*, Boston, 1906; Frederick Stuart Chapin, *Social Evolution*, New York, 1913; Albert G. Keller, *Societal Evolution*, New York, 1914; L. M. Bristol, *Social Adaptation*, Cambridge, Mass., 1915; Maurice Parmelee, *Poverty and Social Progress*, New York, 1916.

² Arthur J. Todd, *Theories of Social Progress*, New York, 1918; William F. Ogburn, *Social Change*, New York, 1922; Theodore de Laguna, *The Factors of Social Evolution*, New York, 1926; Ulysses G. Weatherly, *Social Progress*, Philadelphia, 1926; Charles A. Ellwood, *Cultural Evolution*, New York, 1927; Joyce O. Hertzler, *Social Progress*, New York, 1928; F. Stuart Chapin, *Cultural Change*, New York, 1928; Joseph K. Folsom, *Culture and Social Progress*, New York, 1928; Clarence Marsh Case, *Social Process and Human Progress*, New York, 1931; Hornell Hart, *The Technique of Social Progress*, New York, 1931; Albert G. Keller, *Societal Evolution*, rev. ed., New York, 1931; *Recent Social Trends in the United States*, 2 vols., New York, 1933.

³ At least two popular college textbooks of sociology that have appeared in recent years treat the subject chiefly as the study of social evolution, viz., F. H. Bushee, *Principles of Sociology*, New York, 1923; and F. H. Hankins, *Introduction to the Study of Society*, New York, 1928.

gists who hold that, strictly speaking, "social evolution" and "progress" are not problems for scientific sociology but are primarily philosophical problems. On the other hand, a number of other prominent American sociologists evidently take the position that the interpretation of social evolution is one of the most important and fundamental tasks of sociology. It seems possible to classify the theoretic, or methodological, positions taken toward social change by contemporary American sociologists in five categories, as follows: (1) Progress is conceived as the fundamental object of attention for sociology; (2) social evolution, but not progress, is conceived as a fundamental topic for sociology; (3) anthropologists of the so-called "American historical school" tend to maintain the position that it is impossible to establish other than historically relative knowledge of human society and culture, and this position is shared, apparently, by a few American sociologists; (4) "social process" is conceived as the sociological concept most nearly equivalent to the philosophical concepts of social evolution and progress; (5) social change is conceived as something to be accepted as a fact by sociologists and taken into account, particularly as the background of social disorganization. These positions do not seem to be strictly disjunctive; at any rate, in more than one case, the same writer has seemingly committed himself to more than one of them simultaneously. Let us examine each of these recent sociological conceptions of social change in somewhat greater detail.

The contention that progress is the chief sociological problem is not supported by many American sociologists at the present time; perhaps it cannot be shown to be explicitly supported by any of them. It is associated particularly with the name of Prof. Thomas Nixon Carver of Harvard University, who edited in 1906 a volume of readings, intended for use in lieu of textbook in a college course in principles of sociology, to which he gave the title *Sociology and Social Progress*. At the time, it seems to have been Carver's assumption that the principal business of sociologists was to explain social progress; however, in fairness to him, it should be said that, in his use of the term, progress was practically synonymous with social evolution. Carver conceived of progress, doubtless on the foundation of Spencer's theories, as the continuous, "progressive" adaptation of associated human

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social evolution, perhaps because critics and book reviewers have been inclined to impute a very specific meaning to the term evolution, a meaning based on the use of the term in biology and not acceptable to the sociologists. Even more influential in repressing the use of the term social evolution, probably, is the fact that it has acquired peculiar and controversial connotations in the diffusion controversy which has been raging among the anthropologists for several years. In the "evolution" theory of cultural origins, which a number of American and British anthropologists have been accused of holding, the term has an implication of inevitability and invariability; social evolution is supposed to mean the irresistible march of some predetermined sequence of developments, through which all human societies everywhere have passed. As apparently no contemporary American sociologist wishes to endorse this conception of social evolution, the disposition has been to avoid the use of the term.¹

One can scarcely name with confidence an American sociologist who, in an important volume, has adhered to the position of the American historical school of anthropologists. The position has been stated from time to time by sociologists in journal articles, however; and there is at least one important American social theorist, Prof. Frederick J. Teggart of the University of California, who would perhaps classify himself as a sociologist and would be accepted as a sociologist by others, if he did not maintain, in effect, the position of thoroughgoing historical relativism in what he writes about social change. In his *Theory of History* (1925), a closely reasoned essay on the history of history and of social science which merits more consideration by sociologists than it seems to have received, Teggart developed into a neat synthesis the ideas that he had adumbrated in earlier studies.² Here he argued, first, that traditional historiography has been distinguished from natural science by the fact that it has conceived its task as that of explaining "situations" in terms of the motives of the actors, very much as the author of a novel or drama deals with his materials, rather than as "conditions,"

¹ Note, however, that in 1927 C. A. Ellwood published his *Cultural Evolution*.

² *Prolegomena to History*, vol. 4, No. 3, University of California Publications in History, Berkeley, Calif., 1916; *The Processes of History*, New Haven, 1918.

to be accounted for in terms of the gradual changes that the entities of which they are composed have undergone.¹ The latter, which Teggart regards as the characteristic viewpoint of natural science, implies that change is always gradual, being due to the continuous working of timeless natural forces and processes.² The business of science, according to this conception, is to show "how things work in the course of time."³ Teggart holds, however, that the assumption that change is always and invariably gradual, specifically postulated in the biologists' axiom that "nature never makes leaps," is contrary to the facts of biological history and of human history. He emphasizes the distinction, made by other writers, between "events" and "things" and suggests that natural science has been conceived as the study of things which change only gradually, in ways that may be stated in timeless laws; but that history brings to light the fact of events, and an event, in his conception, is in the nature of an "intrusion" into the continuity, or gradual change, of things. Science, in attempting to explain how things work and change in the course of time, must take into account the fact of intrusive changes, which can be known only historically.⁴ This is a much more subtle and discriminating line of reasoning than that usually put forth in support of historical relativism. The latter usually rests simply on the contention that the world, including human society, is constantly changing, constantly becoming something different from what it ever was before, and that, accordingly, no sociological "laws" or generalizations of timeless validity can be stated. At best, the study of the long-run change of things can exhibit only trends which, presumably, may be expected to continue in the proximate future. This is the general assumption of the philosophy of history, and it is noteworthy that it has been expressed by numerous writers as a frankly philosophical, rather than scientific, viewpoint for the study of social change.

¹ *Op. cit.*, pp. 72-75.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 87, 127.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 127.

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 138, 143-149. See also F. N. House, *The Range of Social Theory*, New York, 1929: Chap. 37, "Social Change and Social Science," preprinted in substance in *Social Forces*, vol. 7, pp. 11-17, 1928; also a discussion of this article by F. J. Teggart, entitled "Notes on 'Timeless Sociology,'" *Social Forces*, vol. 7, pp. 362-365, with a rejoinder by F. N. House, pp. 365-366.

Just how it has come about one can scarcely say, but there has gradually evolved, in American sociological circles, a point of view that contrasts more and more sharply with those formulated in the preceding paragraph. It centers in the concept social process, which was apparently first introduced into sociology by Gumplowicz but was first emphasized in the United States by Small, in *General Sociology*, and by E. A. Ross, in *Foundations of Sociology*. Down to the present time, the concept social process is represented in American sociological literature chiefly by occasional journal articles and by the emphasis placed on the topic in a number of popular textbooks of general sociology.¹ In 1918, however, C. H. Cooley dealt with the concept at length in his book entitled *Social Process*. Small seems to have been right, on the whole, in his contention that the main trend of thought in American sociology, from a comparatively early date, lay in the direction of a greater emphasis on social process.² The term social process seems to have been used by sociologists with at least two different meanings. On the one hand, following the lead of Gumplowicz and Simmel, it has been taken to mean, primarily, some particular pattern of interaction among human beings or groups, one that is susceptible of being described in general terms. On the other hand social process has been used by some sociologists to refer primarily to a generalizable sequence of social developments, or changes. It was in the latter sense, chiefly, that Small used the term, and this is, on the whole, the sense in which it was used by Cooley in his *Social Process*. In either case, however, the approach to the study of social change which is mediated by the concept of social process is an effort on the part of sociologists to get away from the philosophy of history and to state a theory of change in conformity with the general viewpoint of science. The essence of the effort is either to substitute a conception of repetition and consequent comparability

¹ See especially E. A. Ross, *Principles of Sociology*, *passim*; 1st ed., 1920; Park and Burgess, *Introduction to the Science of Sociology*, Chaps. VI, VIII-XI, 1921; F. E. Lumley, *Principles of Sociology*, Chaps. VII-XII, 1928; Dawson and Gettys, *Introduction to Sociology*, Part II, 1929; E. B. Reuter and C. W. Hart, *Introduction to Sociology*, 1933.

² See his unpublished manuscript, "The Sociological Movement in the United States," Chap. XIII, mimeographed for the use of graduate students at the University of Chicago, autumn quarter, 1923.

for the historical conception of unique events or to explain change as the effect of the working of changeless forces.¹

There is no logical inconsistency between some of the other theories of social evolution and social process which have been formulated by American sociologists and the theory that there is a particularly important connection between social change and disorganization. At any rate, the theory that social change bears a fundamental causal relation to social disorganization has been known to sociologists in the United States for some time and seems to be receiving fresh emphasis recently. Professor A. G. Keller of Yale University, the pupil and successor of Sumner, was perhaps the first to suggest, on the foundation of Sumner's ideas, that social change naturally produces maladjustment, since the folkways and mores of a group change at differing rates and thus, while they are subject, as Sumner said, to a "strain of consistency," they are also continually getting out of adjustment.² Some years later, in 1922, W. F. Ogburn restated, in *Social Change*, what was in effect the same theory previously formulated by Keller. Ogburn helped to popularize the theory, however, by expressing it with the aid of a felicitous phrase, "the cultural lag." There is, he said, a lag in the rate of change of some features of a system of culture when compared with other features, and the result is maladjustment and tension. In the meantime, Maurice Parmelee, who, like Keller, had studied at Yale and may have drawn some of his ideas from the same source as did Keller, had given, in his *Poverty and Social Progress* (1916), a concrete and practical application of the theory that social maladjustment is incidental to social evolution, or "progress." Recently, Prof. C. A. Dawson and Warner E. Gettys, in their *Introduction to Sociology* (1929), have emphasized the same viewpoint by the organization of their book, in which social disorganization, along with social reorganization, is treated in a

¹ Sociological literature dealing with social process(es) in a reflective and systematic way is surprisingly meager. See, however, E. C. Hayes, "Some Social Relations Restated," *American Journal of Sociology*, vol. 31, pp. 333, 346, 1925-1926; F. N. House, "Social Relations and Social Interaction," *ibid.*, pp. 617-633; the works of Florian Znaniecki cited elsewhere, especially *The Laws of Social Psychology*, Chap. I. Clarence M. Case, *Social Process and Human Progress*, is suggestive as an indication of the trend of sociological thought in this connection.

² *Societal Evolution*, *passim*, 1914.

division of the text bearing the general title "Social Change." In fact, the assumption that social disorganization is an incident of social change seems in a way to become generally accepted by American sociologists who write general treatises and textbooks on social pathology and similar topics.

In closing this chapter, we should take notice of a tendency in American sociology, fostered especially by W. F. Ogburn and F. S. Chapin, to make social change the subject of careful fact-finding study, which may be carried out with little reference to any particular theories about social change. Chapin's *Cultural Change* (1928) is a book written largely in this fact-finding spirit. Beginning in July, 1928, Ogburn has edited each year one special number of the *American Journal of Sociology* devoted to the social changes that have occurred in the previous year. Ogburn's interest in this type of inquiry found more impressive expression in the work of the President's Research Committee on Social Trends, for which he was director of research. This committee sponsored the research which resulted in the publication of the massive report entitled *Recent Social Trends in the United States* (1933) and a series of *Recent Social Trends Monographs*. Although the emphasis in these studies was placed on fact finding, the responsibility for theoretic analysis of the findings was by no means evaded. The work of the contributors on special topics combines fact finding with theoretic analysis in varying proportions; and the committee as a whole sponsored an otherwise anonymous introduction which, while it is primarily a brief summary of the facts established, also embodies some degree of theoretic interpretation.

CHAPTER XXVII

AMERICAN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY¹

In previous chapters, we have traced the origin and early development of a number of the concepts and points of view of social psychology, particularly the conception of desires and instincts as social forces; the treatment by Tarde of human behavior as the product of desires and beliefs; and the sophisticated discussion by Thomas and Znaniecki in *The Polish Peasant* of some questions of social psychology. Fairly early in the history of American social science, these matters began to be regarded, by some authorities at least, as the province of a more or less distinct, specialized science, called "social psychology." In fact, this term was specifically used as a chapter title in Small and Vincent, *Introduction to the Study of Society* (1894). The new specialty has had an impressive career on its own account. Although no data are available to prove the statement, it is probable that, at the present time, at least one separate course in social psychology is offered in each of the majority of the colleges and universities of the United States. The status and classification of the subject, however, have been uncertain. At one time, courses in social psychology were being offered simultaneously in four different departments at the University of Chicago. It would be possible to distinguish almost as many conceptions of the nature of social psychology as there are authorities on the subject. For present purposes, however, conceptions of social psychology may be said to range between two poles, or extremes, represented, for example, by the writings of Floyd W. Allport and Charles A. Ellwood, respectively. The theories of the former typify what we may refer to as "individualistic," or "psychological," social psychology; while Ellwood, who has

¹ For a more detailed treatment, see Faye B. Karpf, *American Social Psychology*, New York, 1932; also Jesse B. Sprowls, *Social Psychology Interpreted*, Baltimore, 1927; John F. Markey, "Trends in Social Psychology," in George A. Lundberg and others, *Trends in American Sociology*, New York, 1929; L. L. Bernard, "Social Psychology," *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*, vol. 14; Edward Sapir, "Personality," *ibid.*, vol. 12.

made some use of the phrase "psychological sociology" to describe his own work, may, for our purposes, be taken as a representative of what we shall call "sociological" social psychology.

The social psychologists of the one school of thought regard their subject essentially or chiefly as the application of principles of psychology to sociological problems, while social psychologists of the other school tend to regard their subject either as a relatively independent science, having a distinct object matter and principles of its own, or as a branch of sociology. The divergence of viewpoints reflects the persistence of the social-philosophical problem of the one and the many, society and the individual. The sociological social psychologists emphasize the groups in which people live and act and tend to insist on the fact that groups, with their various cultural heritages, exist antecedently to particular individuals; the personal characteristics of the individual are formed in a social environment. The psychological, or individualistic, social psychologists, on the other hand, emphasize the individual members of society; they tend to proceed on the assumption that social phenomena can be sufficiently explained in terms of the individual, and presumably innate, characteristics of the members of social groups.

This divergence of theories has about as long a history as has social psychology itself; in fact, it appeared in the formative period of the science. The two schools of thought may be said to take their origin, to a considerable extent, from the work of the same man. It was largely from the chapter on instincts in William James, *Principles of Psychology*, that the individualistic social psychology evolved, although it was reenforced by the conceptions of mental testing and individual differences that were first popularized in the United States by J. McKeen Cattell, H. H. Goddard, E. L. Thorndike, and others. On the other hand, the sociological social psychology, with its emphasis on the social and cultural determination of personality, takes its origin largely from James's chapter on the self, in which he set forth, possibly for the first time, the idea that the human self is mainly a social product.¹

Individualistic, or psychological, social psychology has been, primarily and logically, the concern of psychologists rather than

¹ Vol. I, pp. 29 ff., New York, 1890. See also Karpf, *op. cit.*, pp. 263-265.

of sociologists, though a number of American sociologists have written textbooks the content of which is chiefly of this type. For this reason, and in order to keep the present survey within reasonable limits, we shall not pay a great deal of attention to it here, except to note some of its more recent tendencies. That which we have already noted concerning the role played by conceptions of human instinct, "interests," and fundamental desires in American sociological theories really belongs under this heading. The development of sociological social psychology, however, constitutes one of the most important phases of the development of sociology in the United States.

The latter type of social psychology has proved to be concerned, eventually, in large part with the formulation and elaboration of a sociological theory of personality, in other words, a concept of personality that would be satisfactory from the point of view of sociologists and useful for their purposes. As has been indicated, the development of this concept may be dated, on the whole, from the writings of William James. In his *Principles of Psychology* (1890), James laid down two important propositions concerning the nature and formation of human personality, though, like others who wrote in his time and for some years afterward, he did not use "personality" as a technical term. He did, however, have much to say concerning the "self"; and if we may proceed on the assumption that the self is the subjective aspect of personality, it is of interest to note that James defined it as all that an individual incorporates into his idea of himself, or all that he identifies with himself—wife and children, friends, property, achievements, beliefs, and so on indefinitely. A special feature of James's treatment of the self is his discussion of the "social self," which he defines tersely as the "recognition which [one] gets from his mates." He points out that, in one sense, one may be said to have as many social selves as there are persons who carry an image of him in their minds, but these persons who have an attitude toward a given individual are, as a rule, of only a few classes or groups; hence, for practical purposes, a person may be said to have as many social selves as there are in his environment groups of people about whose opinion of him he greatly cares.¹

¹ William James, *op. cit.*, pp. 291 ff.; see also Karpf, *loc. cit.*

James did not develop the implications of these ideas very fully; his treatment of the self is little more than a brilliant anticipation of ideas which were to play an important part in the later history of psychology and the social studies. In what he said, however, the groundwork was laid for a sociological theory of personality which was to become one of the main features of American social psychology. His general concept of the self contains implicitly the idea, which other writers were to formulate later, that personality may be regarded as the "subjective aspect of culture." His concept of the social self implies that personality is a social product, as well as a factor in social interaction, and in this respect the work of James formed the point of departure for the treatment of personality of Baldwin, Cooley, and Dewey.

Not long after James first published his *Principles of Psychology*, James Mark Baldwin (1861-1934), in his *Mental Development in the Child and the Race* (1896), presented his theory of the "dialectic of personal growth," which may be regarded as an elaboration of the implications of James's concept of the social self. Baldwin based his theory on the facts of child psychology which he had established through intensive studies of his own children. As a result of his observations and speculations, he identified three stages in the formation of personality. In the "projective stage," the child becomes conscious of other persons and of differences among them. In the "subjective stage," on the basis of a native tendency to imitate the others and as the result of the experiences of effort, pleasure, and pain associated with his own activities, he becomes conscious of himself, as an entity like the others. Finally, in the "ejective stage," the child attributes to the others the subjective experiences that he has had, and his conception of personality is accordingly completed. The self, as the result of this whole sequence of developments, is formed in the image of the other, but one's conception of personality in the others is formed and enriched by his subjective experience of the activities initiated in himself by imitation of the others. It is a single process, "dialectic" throughout, in which consciousness of self and the conception of personality in others are formed.¹

¹ This account of Baldwin's theory of the dialectic of personal growth is based primarily on his concise formulation of it in *Social and Ethical Interpre-*

Because of the prominent part that the concept of imitation played in this theory, Baldwin has been regarded by some of his critics as having done little more than restate and elaborate some of the ideas of Tarde, indebtedness to whom, indeed, he freely acknowledged. His contribution in this particular connection consisted chiefly in his interpretation of imitation as a "circular reaction"; the child, he said, imitates himself as well as others, repeating his own acts and thus perfecting the patterns that are being formed and transmitted by his imitation of others.¹ While imitation thus played a prominent part in his theory, Baldwin was justified in his statement that he would rather be known as the author of a "self" theory of social organization;² the central feature of all his works that deal with social psychology and sociology seems to be a theory of a personality. Although the term "culture" scarcely appears as a technical term in Baldwin's earlier works, it is present implicitly, and, in fact, is emphasized, under the name "social heredity." In the elaboration of his sociopsychological theories, the conception of the development of personality in a social or cultural environment plays a very prominent part, perhaps the most prominent part of any fundamental idea. In the treatment of this subject, Baldwin may be said to have laid the foundations for the type of social psychology later developed by John Dewey, particularly in *Human Nature and Conduct* (1922). Although some of the original insights can be traced to William James, and perhaps to earlier writers, particularly Wundt and his predecessors of the "folk-psychology" school, it may be said with substantial truth that modern American social psychology was founded by Baldwin.

In undertaking to trace the development of social psychology in the United States since 1900, one faces a dilemma. On the one hand, there is reason to follow the account of Baldwin's contributions by some treatment of those later developments which most definitely follow the lines marked out by him; this is partic-

tations in Mental Development, pp. 13-15, 1899, rather than on his earlier formulation of it in *Mental Development in the Child and the Race*, 1896. See also Karpf, *op. cit.*, pp. 279-280.

¹ *Mental Development in the Child and the Race*, Chap. IX; see also Karpf, *op. cit.*, p. 276.

² *Social and Ethical Interpretation in Mental Development*, Preface to 1st ed., p. viii, quoted by Karpf, *op. cit.*, p. 290.

ularly the case with the social psychology of Cooley and Mead. On the other hand, beginnings in sociopsychological thought and research, of somewhat different character from those of Baldwin, were being made at the same time that he was writing his pioneer works; and there is reason for believing that later social psychologists were influenced to some extent, in nearly every case, by the other pioneers as well as by Baldwin. For present purposes, the chronological order will be followed for the most part, in order to consider some of the significant contributions to the new specialty approximately in the sequence in which they appeared.

In spite of what has been said about Baldwin, a case could be made out for the proposition that John Dewey (1859—) was the first modern social psychologist. At all events, in his textbook *Psychology* (1886), which antedates James's *Principles of Psychology* by about four years, Dewey emphasized the role of activity in human behavior, a theme that was to be the keynote of his social psychology and philosophy for the next fifty years. This early textbook cannot properly be described as a contribution to social psychology. It simply defined rather loosely a point of view and an emphasis in psychology that Dewey was to employ later, after restating it in a series of important journal articles and modifying his position, to a degree amounting to reversal, on human instincts, as the point of departure for definite and important contributions to social psychology, culminating in his *Human Nature and Conduct* (1922).¹

The psychological point of view taken by Dewey in this early phase of his thought was adopted and concisely restated by Charles A. Ellwood in his University of Chicago doctoral dissertation *Prolegomena to Social Psychology* (1901). This apparently served as the first formal notification to the academic public that Dewey's psychological writings contained the foundations of a social psychology. For convenience, we may derive a brief statement of this early position taken by Dewey from the compre-

¹ The early refinements and modifications that Dewey made in his theory of individual psychology are stated briefly in the following articles: "The Theory of Emotions," *Psychological Review*, vol. 1, pp. 553-569, 1895; "The Reflex Arc Concept in Psychology," *ibid.*, vol. 3, pp. 357-370, 1896; "Interpretation of the Savage Mind," *ibid.*, vol. 9, pp. 217-230, 1902; and various papers later collected in the little volume *How We Think*, 1910.

hensive formulation of it undertaken by Ellwood. It is, as Ellwood says, a "functional" psychology, in contrast to the structural psychology developed by Wundt and Titchener; and it became the basis of the functional school of psychological thought later represented by James Rowland Angell and Charles H. Judd. Structural psychology conceives the mind as a sum of fairly distinct elements—sensations, feelings, images, and so on—which can be studied separately. Functional psychology, on the other hand, emphasizes, first, the integrated activity of the whole organism; second, the fact that the organism is always doing something and that, to all appearances, the purpose of its activities is to effect an adaptation between the organism and the environment; third, the fact that such coordinated activity always involves the environment as well as the organism.¹ Implicit in this theory is the view that human nature cannot be analyzed into specific elements, such as instincts; however, Dewey did not draw this inference until later; in his earlier writings, he adopted and emphasized the concept of instinct. As late as 1916, in an article entitled "The Need for Social Psychology,"² he gave a prominent place to the instinct concept—in striking contrast, superficially at least, to the position that he took in *Human Nature and Conduct*. For a considerable period, the psychological writings of Dewey operated to reinforce others' efforts to develop a social psychology centering largely in some such doctrine as Ward's "social forces" or Small's "interests."

As has been indicated, Dewey's early psychological writings and teaching served to inspire Ellwood's interest in the possibilities of social psychology, but this interest eventuated in substantial books only after several years. Meanwhile, still following a chronological order, let us notice other origins of American social psychology. In 1901, Edward A. Ross (1866–) published in book form his *Social Control*, which may be classified as an essay on social psychology, especially in view of the fact that much of the substance of the earlier volume was subsequently incorporated in the author's *Social Psychology* (1908).

¹ Ellwood, *op. cit.*, pp. 12–14, Chicago, 1901. See also Karpf, *op. cit.*, pp. 329–330.

² *Psychological Review*, vol. 24, pp. 266–277, 1917; address before the American Psychological Association in December, 1916. See also Karpf, *op. cit.*, pp. 331–332.

The historical significance of these books consists partly in the fact that they mark the entrance of Tarde's theory of imitation, practically in its original form, into American social thought. Baldwin, as we have seen, was influenced by Tarde, but he gave Tarde's concept of "imitation" a novel meaning and application. In Tarde's own works, the concept imitation was primarily one of social interaction, involving no very definite psychological theories; while Baldwin introduced it into the very heart of a psychological doctrine. Ross's *Social Control* followed the original thought of Tarde so closely that it may be regarded, in part, as a free translation of passages from Tarde's *Laws of Imitation*.

Social psychology, as defined by Ross, is the study of those uniformities of thought and action that come into existence among human beings as the result of social interaction.¹ By implication, therefore, Ross's social psychology was a collective psychology, or theory of collective behavior. The social psychology of Baldwin, Dewey, Cooley, and Mead, in contrast, is a social theory of individual behavior, or personality, though it has implications for the interpretation of collective behavior. Ross further describes social psychology as the study of "social planes and currents." He adds that the subject has two very unequal divisions: social ascendancy and individual ascendancy, or the control of society over the individual and the influence of outstanding individuals upon the life of society. Of the two, social ascendancy is the more important; at least it demands the greater amount of space for its explanation, but individual ascendancy is an indispensable part of social life and progress.² It is evident that Ross's "social psychology" is little more than a branch of sociology. Indeed, he eventually incorporated the substance of his *Social Psychology* into the text of his *Principles of Sociology* (1920). The earlier book has the distinction of having been the only systematic textbook of social psychology written by an American sociologist before 1917; and during the period of approximately eight years which elapsed between its publication and the appearance of Ellwood's textbook, *Introduction to Social Psychology* (1917), it was, with McDougall's *Introduction*, the only material available for textbook use in courses in social

¹ *Social Psychology*, p. 1, quoted by Karpf, *op. cit.*, p. 314.

² *Social Psychology*, Chap. I; Karpf, *op. cit.*, pp. 314-315.

psychology. It seems to have been very extensively used in college courses in the United States during this period. However, McDougall's *Introduction to Social Psychology* was published in the same year as Ross's *Social Psychology*, and it, too, was widely used as a textbook in college courses in the United States.

Shortly after these two pioneer textbooks were first published, there appeared another book of great importance in the history of social psychology, Charles H. Cooley's *Human Nature and the Social Order* (1902). Cooley was born in Ann Arbor, Mich., in 1864, the son of a professor of law in the University of Michigan; spent practically his entire life at this institution as student and faculty member; and died there in 1929. A man of relatively few published works, handicapped by deafness and other physical infirmities, not very impressive as a teacher of undergraduates, Cooley nevertheless made a strong impression on American sociology, and his writings have been highly esteemed by his colleagues. His earliest publications were in the field of economics; as a sociologist, he was, like other pioneers, essentially self-taught.¹ With the appearance of *Human Nature and the Social Order*, however, he came into prominence as a social psychologist. He followed mainly in the footsteps of Baldwin, both as to fundamental theory and in regard to the method of study of his own children. One of the most distinctive ideas set forth in this book was that of the "looking-glass self," which contains, as Cooley said, three principal elements: the imagination of one's appearance to some other person; the imagination of the other person's judgment of that appearance; and some sort of self-feeling, such as pride or mortification.² He points out that one's mirrored self, thus determined, varies according to the onlooker. By this and other devices, he emphasized strongly, as

¹ See articles on Cooley published shortly after his death, as follows: George H. Mead and Arthur E. Wood, *American Journal of Sociology*, vol. 35, pp. 693-706, 707-717, 1930; Robert Cooley Angell and Walton H. Hamilton, *Social Forces*, vol. 8, pp. 340-347, 183-187, 1930; Walton H. Hamilton in *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*, vol. IV. See also the posthumous collection of Cooley's briefer writings entitled *Sociological Theory and Social Research*, New York, 1930, containing, with other matter, an autobiographical sketch entitled "The Development of Sociology at the University of Michigan," pp. 3-14.

² *Op. cit.*, pp. 151-152.

Baldwin and James had done, the social determination of the self. During his lifetime, Cooley published two other important treatises, *Social Organization* (1909) and *Social Process* (1918), also a volume of personal essays and similar matter entitled *Life and the Student* (1927).

In addition to his contribution to the theory of the social self, Cooley is important in the history of American sociology and social psychology chiefly for his writings on four other topics of fundamental importance: (1) the organic conception of society—"Mind is an organic whole made up of cooperating individualities, in somewhat the same way that the music of an orchestra is made up of divergent but related sounds."¹ This rather vague and metaphysical version of the organic analogy runs through Cooley's three principal books like a refrain; it is clearly stated in *Human Nature and the Social Order*, it became the dominant note in *Social Organization*, and it is reiterated in *Social Process*. His position on this point is probably sound, but his formulations of the matter are not particularly illuminating; to critical readers insistently recurs the question, Just how is it that the individuals are able to cooperate? Or, if the group be regarded as the more self-evident fact, How is individual self-determination possible? (2) Closely related to his conception of the organic nature of society is Cooley's treatment of the social process, which, by his own account, was first suggested to him by his reading of Darwin, and which he finally sought to clarify as much as possible in *Social Process* (1918). His theory of the social process may be briefly described as a translation of the biological conception of natural selection and adaptation into sociological terms. (3) Cooley has probably influenced sociology in the United States more by his concept "primary groups" than by any other feature of his thought. It was first clearly stated in Chaps. III, IV, and V of his *Social Organization*, along with the related concept of "primary ideals"; however, it may be said to be adumbrated in *Human Nature and the Social Order*; at least, there is in this earlier volume an implied emphasis on the more intimate, or "personal," sorts of social contact and interaction. In *Social Organization*, he briefly describes primary groups as face-to-face groups, of which the commonest kinds are families, neighborhoods, and play-groups of children. He calls them "primary"

¹ *Social Organization*, opening sentence, New York, 1909

because they are the first groups in which the individual gets an experience of social unity. The primary ideals, all of which are phases of the single ideal of a moral unity, include such conceptions as loyalty; lawfulness, or justice; and freedom. They are formed chiefly in the primary groups, and it is in these groups, mainly, that they are transmitted to successive generations; they are not, strictly speaking, elements of the original nature, or biological heritage, of human beings, and in the absence of primary group experience they will decay. Although Cooley does not specifically say so, one may infer from his treatment of these matters that he felt that the primary groups were important chiefly because of their relation to the primary ideals. (4) Less conspicuous in Cooley's writings, but still of considerable importance, is his treatment of institutions, formalism, and disorganization.¹ He was one of the first American writers to attempt a theoretic discussion of institutions, and although his treatment of the subject in *Social Organization* appeared subsequent to Sumner's treatment in *Folkways*, it was apparently independent of the latter. Cooley's interpretation of institutions is definitely psychological; "an institution," he says, "is simply a definite and established phase of the public mind, not different in its ultimate nature from public opinion, though often seeming, on account of its permanence and the visible customs and symbols in which it is clothed, to have a somewhat distinct and independent existence."² Formalism is obviously a concept related to, and in some sense derivative from, that of "institutions," formalism being, so to speak, the extreme of institutionalization. Cooley's distinctive contribution, however, was his thesis that formalism and disorganization are not opposite conditions but are closely related; formalism, he said, is mechanism supreme, and disorganization is mechanism going to pieces.³ But social mechanism is likely to go to pieces when it has become complete and rigid.

Cooley's treatment of these topics exemplifies the general trend of most of his contributions to social science. His sociology verges on philosophy; he was not greatly inclined to systematic

¹ "Institutions," *Social Organization*, Part V; see also *Human Nature and the Social Order*, Chap. XI.

² *Social Organization*, p. 313.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 347.

factual investigation or even to systematic and extensive reading in the technical literature of his field of interest. His works are studded with allusions and citations to such writers as Emerson and Goethe; he mentions these writers as among those to whom he owes most for the development of his own thought. His influence upon American sociology and social psychology has been very great, but it was chiefly philosophical and fundamental, rather than technical, or, in the superficial sense, methodological.

From about 1880, there developed, first of all in France and then in Austria, under the leadership of Charcot, Janet, and later Freud, Breuer, Alfred Adler, Carl Jung, and others, a somewhat novel conception of personality as a subjective unity, the nature of which is made intelligible by the study of its disintegration and dissociation in mental disease. The primary animus of these studies was psychiatric and therapeutic, but the theories evolved by Freud, Adler, and Jung in Vienna, by Ribot and others in Paris, and, presently, by William James, Morton Prince, and others in the United States, partly as a foundation for therapeutic techniques, proved to be of considerable interest to students of general and social psychology. The publication of Morton Prince's *The Dissociation of a Personality* in 1908 may be taken as an indication of the entrance of this factor into sociopsychological thought in the United States. At about the same time, G. Stanley Hall, the distinguished American psychologist, who was then president of Clark University, convoked at that institution an international congress of psychologists which was attended by Freud and several other Europeans of the newer schools of psychiatric theory; and this event helped to attract attention to the possibilities of the psychiatric approach to the study of personality. This approach served to some extent as an added corrective, or offset, to the ultraphysiological and analytical tendencies of psychological thought derived from the teachings of Wundt. As we have seen, the social psychology of Baldwin and, later, that of Cooley and Mead were based on the assumption that an individual personality is a psychic unity; and the same point had been stressed by Dewey and Ellwood, who insisted that behavior is a function of the total organism; but all of these writers took the unity of the personality for granted, without offering much explanation of the nature of the unity. Such an explanation the theories of the psychoanalysts and

Prince afforded; or at any rate these theories, and the clinical observations on which they were based, reinforced the postulate that human personality is normally a unity, by placing in exhibition abnormal cases in which the unity was patently lacking or impaired.

As a matter of fact, the psychology of Freud, Adler, and Jung has another bearing upon social psychology; these psychiatric doctrines were inherently sociopsychological. It was in terms of the interaction of the original nature of man with the forces of the social environment that Freud and those whose doctrines resembled his sought to account for functional mental disorders. Their theories formed the principal source of the conception of mental conflict which eventually came to occupy a considerable place in the literature of social pathology.¹

During this same general period, extending from the publication of Ross's *Social Psychology* in 1908 to the publication of Ellwood's *Introduction to Social Psychology* in 1917, still another factor took shape which was to have considerable influence upon the subsequent development of social psychology in the United States, viz., the "behaviorist" movement. Originating in the work of Bekhterev and Pavlov in Russia, the movement in the United States may be dated from the publication of John B. Watson's *Behavior—An Introduction to Comparative Psychology* in 1914. This phase of psychology was hardly in any sense social psychology, as sociologists understood social psychology. Nevertheless, it exercised considerable influence upon the latter specialty, at first rather negatively, by strengthening the physiological point of view, and later more positively, through the concept of the "conditioned reflex" which Watson and others took over from the Russians, and which a number of American writers on social psychology sought to adapt to their needs. This concept seemed to offer an explanation of the psychological mechanism by which human nature and personality are shaped in social interaction. In his lectures in advanced social psychology, given in the department of philosophy at the University

¹ See W. A. Healy, *Mental Conflicts and Misconduct*, Boston, 1917; also W. A. Healy, Augusta F. Bronner, and A. M. Bowers, *The Structure and Meaning of Psychoanalysis*, New York, 1930; Stuart A. Queen, Walter B. Bodenhafer, and Ernest B. Harper, *Social Organization and Disorganization*, New York, 1935; see especially "Personalities," Part IV.

of Chicago for many years, Prof. George H. Mead proceeded from a position that he called "behaviorist," but he virtually gave to the concept of behaviorism a new and distinctive content.¹

Mention may be made at this point of still another phase of developing general psychological thought which eventually had a large influence on social psychology, *viz.* the intensive study of original nature and individual differences. The possibility of measuring the traits of human beings, and their differences, by mental tests attracted the attention of American psychologists very early;² however, this phase of psychological thought and research does not seem to have affected the thinking of American sociologists or social psychologists until after 1917.

We may regard, as the next major step in the development of social psychology in the United States, the renewed effort at systematization and synthesis which may be dated from the publication of Ellwood's *Introduction to Social Psychology* in 1917. This was the first general textbook of social psychology to appear after the pioneer works of Ross and McDougall; from this time on, however, such works began to appear with relative frequency.³ Social psychology, while it had not exactly come of age, had at any rate reached its adolescence. It cannot be said

¹ See the posthumous volume of Mead's lectures entitled *Mind, Self, and Society*, Chicago, 1934, edited, with an Introduction, by Charles W. Morris; see particularly pp. xvi-xxvi of Morris' Introduction and "The Point of View of Social Behaviorism," (Chap. I). As examples of the more direct influence of Watsonian behaviorism in American social psychology, see J. K. Folsom, *Culture and Social Progress*, New York, 1928, and *Social Psychology*, New York, 1931; also Kimball Young, *Social Psychology*, New York, 1930. Young is influenced by Mead as well as by Watson.

² J. McKeen Cattell, "Mental Tests and Measurements," *Mind*, vol. 15, pp. 373-380, 1890.

³ The following, at least, were published before 1930: E. S. Bogardus, *Essentials of Social Psychology*, Los Angeles, 1918; Irwin Edman, *Human Traits and Their Social Significance*, Boston, 1920; Morris Ginsberg, *The Psychology of Society*, London and New York, 1921; J. M. Williams, *Principles of Social Psychology*, New York, 1922; John Dewey, *Human Nature and Conduct*, New York, 1922; Robert Gault, *Social Psychology*, New York, 1923; Floyd W. Allport, *Social Psychology*, Boston, 1924; E. S. Bogardus, *Fundamentals of Social Psychology*, New York, 1924; Florian Znaniecki, *The Laws of Social Psychology*, Chicago, 1925; L. L. Bernard, *Introduction to Social Psychology*, New York, 1926; Knight Dunlap, *Social Psychology*, Baltimore, 1927; Jesse W. Sprowls, *Social Psychology Interpreted*, Baltimore, 1927; J. K. Folsom, *Culture and Social Progress*, New York, 1929.

that Ellwood's *Introduction* was particularly successful in giving a stable and logical content to the science of social psychology. The book bears clear internal marks of the struggle in the author's own mind between two views of the nature of social psychology: first, that it consisted essentially of principles of psychology (and biology) that were applicable to the problems of sociology; and, second, that social psychology was no more than a name that happened to have become current for what were in fact simply some of the more fundamental principles of sociology. In *Prolegomena to Social Psychology*, Ellwood had been committed quite definitely to the former view, under the influence of Dewey; much later, when he published *The Psychology of Human Society* (1925), he had come over fully to the latter view, which, indeed, was already adumbrated in his *Sociology in Its Psychological Aspects* (1912). That both of these views played a part in determining the content of *Introduction to Social Psychology* (1917) is apparent even from the Table of Contents, which lists, along with chapters such as "Instinct and Intelligence in the Social Life," "Imitation and Suggestion in the Social Life," and "Sympathy and the Consciousness of Kind in the Social Life," other chapters that are distinctly sociological in character, for example, "The Nature of Social Unity," "The Nature of Social Continuity," "Social Order," and "Social Progress."

This problem concerning the nature and scope of social psychology which Ellwood encountered, and met in his *Introduction to Social Psychology* mainly by bringing together two quite different kinds of material in one medium-sized volume, was handled in the following decade by a different procedure. It is from the date of Ellwood's *Introduction*, approximately, that we can trace the tendency of social psychology to become two different subjects; one set of writers, including Edman, Gault, Allport, Dunlap, and Folsom, treated it as a branch of psychology; while the writers of another group, including Bogardus, Williams, Dewey, Znaniecki, and Bernard, treated it mainly as a branch of sociology. To be sure, practically no one who grappled with the problem neglected altogether to consider questions concerning the other phase of the subject than that with which he was primarily concerned; and none of the textbooks, accordingly, was entirely free from the character of arbitrary synthesis which Ellwood's *Introduction* seemed to display. The book that did

more than any other, during the period in question, to formulate a penetrating treatment of social psychology was John Dewey's *Human Nature and Conduct* (1922).

Meanwhile, there had been accumulating in the hands of the professional psychologists research material which seemed to strengthen their assumption that the problems of social psychology could be handled mainly by the methods and from the data of general psychology. As we have noted, the possibilities of "mental testing" for the study of intelligence had been brought to the attention of American psychologists by Cattell as early as 1890. Professor Edward L. Thorndike, who has been active in this special field of inquiry ever since, published in 1904 a work entitled *Mental and Social Measurements*. For some time, the field of investigation and discussion thus mapped out does not seem to have attracted a great deal of attention, but gradually the tentative and experimental use of mental tests, first in the study of feeble-mindedness and then in reference to problems of education and vocational placement and guidance, gave rise to a rich body of data which had the peculiar advantage of amenability to statistical manipulation; and the comprehensive mental-testing program used in the American army during the World War greatly increased this body of data. The general result was that a strong current of interest was created in the interpretation of the social behavior of human beings in the light of such data; and it may almost be said that social psychology came to be conceived by some psychologists as the study of the way in which the inherent endowments of individuals, and their differences, as revealed by these tests, condition their participation in the life of society. In the field of education, the tendency was very strong to proceed on the assumption that we can, by proper tests, determine what children can do, what they are fitted for, and that then we have only to train them accordingly.

Owing to the fact that general psychology became widely committed to a biological, physiological, or "behavioristic" conception of its subject matter, while the sociologists were not so generally committed to any such point of view, the struggle over the scope, problems, and methods of social psychology took on a new character in the period which may, for convenience, be dated from the publication of Dewey's *Human Nature and*

Conduct in 1922. A clash took place between those who wished to define the problems of social psychology in physiological or behavioristic terms and those who contended for the validity of a frankly subjective approach to the problems of the subject. The discussion of the relevant questions has not tended to clarify the issue or the terminology of the debate; as a result, there is great difficulty in stating clearly and simply what it is all about. Briefly, however, we may say that on one side of the controversy we find those who strive constantly to reduce their descriptions of human behavior, including social behavior, to neurological terms and to treat the phenomena of consciousness as mere epiphenomena. On the other side, we find those who emphasize the proposition that the individual reacts to objects and situations in accordance with the experience that he has of them and that this experience is largely defined for the individual by cultural forces, which, of course, are inherently social. The tendency of social psychologists of the latter school of thought, among whom may be named Dewey, Znaniecki, Faris, Young, Mead, and Cooley,¹ is evidently to reduce all psychology, so far as it is anything more than physiology, to social psychology and to make social psychology a science of the way in which the individual's conceptions of his world and of himself are socially, *i.e.*, culturally, determined. Writers of this school have in common the tendency, originated by William James and John Dewey, to regard action as the basic fact for the social psychologist. From their point of view, thought is a process that arises when action is impeded or balked; it is the continuation in imagination of acts begun in the physical realm. The tenets of this school are brought to a high degree of sophisticated expression in the

¹ See, among others, the following references: Florian Znaniecki, *The Laws of Social Psychology*, Chicago, 1925; Kimball Young, ed., *Social Attitudes*, New York, 1931, especially papers by Faris, Park, and Young; George H. Mead, "Social Consciousness and the Consciousness of Meaning," *Psychological Bulletin*, vol. 7, pp. 397-405, 1910; George H. Mead, "The Mechanism of Social Consciousness," *Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Methods*, vol. 9, pp. 401-406, 1912; George H. Mead, "The Social Self," *Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods*, vol. 10, pp. 374-380, 1913; George H. Mead, *Mind, Self, and Society*, Chicago, 1934; Charles H. Cooley, "The Roots of Social Knowledge," *American Journal of Sociology*, vol. 32, pp. 59-79, July, 1926 reprinted in Cooley's *Sociological Theory and Social Research*, pp. 289-309, New York, 1930.

posthumously published lectures of George H. Mead, entitled *Mind, Self, and Society* (1934).

On account of the difficulty and the remoteness from common-sense knowledge of some of these tendencies and issues of recent American social psychology, a more adequate treatment of the matter is impossible within the scope of the present work. It may be remarked, however, that the issue briefly outlined above parallels, more or less, the disputes and misunderstandings that have existed among American sociologists in recent years regarding the respective uses and limitations of statistical and "case-study" methods of research, a topic with which we shall be concerned in a later chapter. It should also be noted that the Gestalt theory of psychology has been felt by some to lend support to the case for the acceptance of subjective data and methods in social psychology. There seems to be much in common between the concept "definition of the situation" employed by Thomas and other social psychologists of the sociological school and the fundamental thesis of the Gestalt psychologists—that behavior is invariably a reaction to a total situation and not to single objects, or "stimuli," contained in the situation.

A large amount of attention has been paid to questions of social psychology during the recent period of the history of American sociology, and it may be inferred that the future development and tendencies of sociology are correspondingly bound up with the course that will be taken by social-psychological theory and research in the next few decades.

CHAPTER XXVIII

SOCIAL PATHOLOGY AND CRIMINOLOGY

As has been pointed out in previous connections, the interest of American sociologists in problems relating to philanthropy and social reform—in other words, what is now known as the field of social work and public welfare service—is as old as sociology itself; in fact, American academic sociology largely grew out of this interest. Since sociology began to be recognized as an academic subject, beginning about 1885, there has been a considerable and fairly continuous output of literature dealing with problems basic to social work, public welfare, and social reform; and much of this literature has been produced by writers who have been classified, by themselves and others, as sociologists. The scope of the present volume precludes a detailed review of this literature; even to place in exhibition a moderately complete bibliography would require too much space.¹ During the past two or three decades, when the distinction has been more and more definitely made between sociology as a theoretic science and social work as practical melioristic effort, there has also taken shape a fresh development of American sociologists' interest in problems related to social work and social reform, evidenced by the formation of a section on "sociology and social work" in the American Sociological Society and also by the frequency of college courses in "social problems," "social pathology," and the like, given in departments of sociology. A number of textbooks for such courses have been published since 1920.

The amount of attention paid by sociologists to practical social problems has been sharply criticized by some members of the American Sociological Society, on the ground that it tends to destroy the scientific character and objectivity of sociology.²

¹ See Chap. XVIII, *supra*.

² Beginning early in 1931, there went on in the society for two or three years a definite movement of critical attack upon the prevailing policies of the organization, especially the conduct of its annual meetings, led by Maurice Parmelee. Among the criticisms voiced by Parmelee was one

The interest of sociologists in these matters, however, has become increasingly a research interest, ostensibly at least, and has been focused largely upon two reciprocally related questions: concerning the value of the case records of social-welfare agencies and institutions as raw materials or data which might be used in scientific sociological research; and concerning the possibilities of basing social work and social reform more definitely and explicitly upon scientific sociological knowledge. Obviously, if the latter is desirable and possible, a mandate is imposed upon sociologists to develop the appropriate scientific knowledge; for it can scarcely be said to exist now except in a very fragmentary form. There are American sociologists who hold that research should be directed, largely, along lines that promise to be practically useful, that the ideal of science for its own sake is a vain one, and that problems relating to social work tend to define one of the desirable objects of sociologists' research efforts. It is also pointed out, however, that social work ought not to be conceived simply as "applied sociology"; like any practical art, it tends to become the application of the knowledge developed and refined in a number of fields of "pure science."

Actually, American sociologists in recent years, have developed at least three more or less distinct, but not necessarily incompatible, points of view from which practical social problems may be studied. Of these, the oldest, on the whole, seems to be derived from the conception of desires as social forces which was formulated by Ward and restated by Thomas in terms of the so-called "four wishes." The findings of modern psychiatric research and clinical experience have seemed to afford some basis for the theory that the failure of any of the fundamental and presumably universal wishes of human beings to find adequate expression brings on restlessness and maladjustment. This is, primarily, a maladjustment of individual members of societies, but the maladjusted behavior of individuals constitutes, in proportion to its intensity and the number of persons affected, maladjustment of the community. In *The Unadjusted Girl* and other writings, Thomas has made some effort to formulate a general theory of social pathology in terms of the balking or

directed at the excessive amount of attention given to "melioristic" questions, i.e., topics relating to social work and the like, in the annual meeting programs.

thwarting of the wishes, and the simplicity and seeming obviousness of this interpretation has commended it to many other writers.¹ A second point of view has been outlined elsewhere in this volume under the heading of theories of social change, *viz.*, the viewpoint from which social maladjustment is interpreted as the outcome of change and "cultural lag." A third point of view, also summarized previously, is that defined by Thomas and Znaniecki in terms of "social disorganization." This concept seems to have been coming into use rapidly in the last few years.²

The general trend of sociological thought relating to these topics has involved an effort to synthesize a theory of social pathology that shall include all these interpretations, as well as those which have been developed by biologists in terms of adaptation, by economists and socialists in terms of economic maladjustment, and by psychiatrists in terms of mental disorder. Particular interest attaches to the question of the reciprocal relations which have been held to exist between disorganization of the personality, or mental disorder, and social disorganization; and it seems to be just where the sociological and the psychiatric points of view converge that the greatest gains have been made in recent years in the understanding of the phenomena of human maladjustment.³

¹ Stuart A. Queen and Delbert M. Mann, *Social Pathology*, New York, 1925, is written mainly from the viewpoint indicated above.

² It is particularly well exemplified in Stuart A. Queen, Walter B. Bodenhafer, and Ernest B. Harper, *Social Organization and Disorganization*, New York, 1935.

³ A useful point of departure for the investigation of the recent development of the sociological theory of disorganization, and related topics, can be found in the reports of the annual section meetings of the American Sociological Society which have been devoted to sociology and social work, beginning with the St. Louis meeting of December, 1926. For the most part, the papers and discussions presented at these meetings have been reported only in abstracts, if at all, in the annual *Publication* of the Society; however, the papers presented in the section on sociology and social work have, so far as possible, been printed in full in *Social Forces*. See also Herbert N. Shenton, *The Practical Application of Sociology*, New York, 1927; Ellsworth Faris, Ferris Laune, and Arthur J. Todd, ed., *Intelligent Philanthropy*, Chicago, 1930; Harold A. Phelps, "Sociology and Social Work," and Read Bain and Joseph Cohen, "Trends in Applied Sociology," in George A. Lundberg and others, ed., *Trends in American Sociology*, New York, 1929; R. M. MacIver, "Maladjustment," *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*, vol. 10.

Although for the purposes of the present discussion we are regarding social pathology as a special division of the general science of sociology, social pathology is itself a broad field of study; and it displays a distinct tendency to subdivide into such specialties as the study of poverty and dependency, the study of personal maladjustments and disorganization of the personality, and the study of crime and delinquency. Of all such specialties, the study of crime and delinquency has been most highly developed along scientific lines, though the literature relating to poverty and social case work may be more voluminous. Taking both terms in their most conventional sense, we may say that criminology is older than sociology. Sociology, as we have seen, may be dated from Comte's *Positive Philosophy* (1830-1842); while the existence of a science of criminology can be traced at least as far back as the publication of Beccaria's *Crimes and Punishments* in 1764, followed by certain writings of Jeremy Bentham later in the same century. As soon as the idea of a systematic and fundamental science of sociology became established under the influence of Comte and Spencer in the nineteenth century, however, there was a tendency to classify criminology as a sociological specialty. A treatise now regarded as a classic is the *Criminal Sociology* written by the Italian jurist Enrico Ferri and first published in 1884. Since that date, while much criminological literature has been written from a point of view primarily legalistic, and the term has also been used to designate the special study of problems relating to the detection of crime, the prevailing theoretic trend of criminology has been more or less sociological. In so far as criminology is conceived to be concerned with the problem of the causes of crime and the effects of various methods of dealing with convicted offenders, the investigation of its problems seems to fall rather more within the field of sociology than of any other "pure," or general, science. In fact, as the concept of social disorganization has become current among American sociologists, it has been increasingly clear that crime and delinquency can be fruitfully studied from the point of view defined by the concept. Indeed, crime and delinquency illustrate social disorganization much more obviously than does poverty. Two of the outstanding contemporary writers on criminology, Edwin H. Sutherland and John L. Gillin, are also eminent members of the American

Sociological Society. Sociologists have developed research methods for the study of criminological problems, particularly within the past two decades; and these methods are generally recognized as fruitful. At least three such techniques developed by sociologists for the investigation of crime and delinquency can be distinguished: (1) the study of the spatial distribution of crime and delinquency, particularly its distribution in and around large cities, as measured both by the places of residence of offenders and by the places where crimes have been committed; (2) case studies of offenders, particularly juvenile delinquents and those older offenders whose personal history from an early age can be ascertained; such studies shed light upon the problems of criminology in a number of ways but especially upon the nature of the processes by which individuals become delinquent and the motives and conceptions of things by which criminal behavior is, subjectively, determined; (3) studies of organized crime, criminal gangs, professional criminals, and related topics. The study of the distribution of crimes and of the places of residence of offenders has been largely an outgrowth of the development of the special fields of "human ecology" and urban sociology at the University of Chicago and elsewhere by the students of R. E. Park and E. W. Burgess.¹ The application of the case-study method to the study of crime may be said to have been originated by Dr. W. A. Healy, who is not ordinarily classified as a sociologist; however, the technique has been systematically developed by sociologists, who regard this method of investigation as one falling within the logical scope of their science.² The study of organized crime and criminal gangs has

¹ The outstanding examples of the use of this method up to now are found in the publications of Clifford Shaw and associates, at the Institute for Juvenile Research in Chicago, working under the general advice and counsel of Prof. E. W. Burgess of the University of Chicago. See Clifford Shaw and others, *Delinquency Areas*, Chicago, 1929; also *The Causes of Crime*, Part II, Clifford Shaw and Henry D. McKay, *Social Factors in Juvenile Delinquency*, National Commission on Law Observance and Law Enforcement (commonly known as the Wickersham commission), *Report 13*. In this latter study, the method that was developed for a local Chicago study and reported in *Delinquency Areas* was extended to a number of other American cities.

² W. A. Healy, *The Individual Delinquent*, Boston, 1915; see particularly Book II, pp. 183 ff.; see also Healy's paper, "The Contribution of Case Studies to Sociology," *Publications of the American Sociological Society*,

been developed chiefly by one man, John Landesco, former graduate student of the University of Chicago and member of the staff of the Illinois Crime Survey.¹ Because of the interest attaching to the topic, however, contributions of some value have been made to the literature of the subject by journalistic writers and professional "authors," and the personal narratives of a number of professional criminals have been published.

There are now in existence a number of recent general textbooks of criminology written by American sociologists, and courses in criminology are offered in departments of sociology in the majority of American universities and in some of the larger colleges. Such courses seem to be popular with students, including college undergraduates, who are probably influenced in part by rather morbid interests in the topic. There has also been a tendency to develop the study of juvenile delinquency as a semiseparate sociological specialty, and at least one textbook for use in courses on this subject has lately been published by two American sociologists.²

Because those who have particularly concerned themselves with the study of crime are nearly unanimous in their judgment that a more adequate body of data, particularly statistical data, is needed as a basis for further research, and the collection of that data is not in any peculiar way a sociological task; and because the problems of crime have important legalistic and administrative aspects, there is a persistent tendency to the development and maintenance of criminology as a distinct science—perhaps we should say an "applied science"—rather than as a branch of sociology. While, as has been said above, a number of the leading American criminologists classify themselves and are accepted by other members of the fraternity as sociologists,

vol. 18, pp. 147-155, 1924. For later applications of the method, see especially the following three publications of Clifford Shaw: "Case Study Method," *Publications of the American Sociological Society*, vol. 21, pp. 149-157, 1927; *The Jack-roller*, with a discussion by E. W. Burgess, Chicago, 1930; with Maurice E. Moore, *The Natural History of a Delinquent Career*, with discussions by E. W. Burgess and Judge Mary M. Bartelme, Chicago, 1931.

¹ John Landesco, "Organized Crime in Chicago," *The Illinois Crime Survey*, Part III, Chicago, 1929.

² Walter C. Reckless and Mapheus Smith, *Juvenile Delinquency*, New York, 1929.

others are not sociologists by training or by their own classification but are lawyers and administrators or, simply, "criminologists," confining their professional interest rather narrowly to their own distinctive problems. In the latter case, they find support for their claims to a distinct field of research in a voluminous literature and in the work and reputation of a rather long line of predecessors.¹

¹ The history of criminology is briefly recapitulated in a number of modern treatises and general textbooks. See, for example, John L. Gillen, *Criminology and Penology*, Chap. XV *et passim*, New York, 1926; Harry Elmer Barnes, *The Repression of Crime*, Chap. V, New York, 1926.

CHAPTER XXIX

URBAN SOCIOLOGY AND RURAL SOCIOLOGY

In the light of certain facts of common knowledge, it might be expected that urban sociology—the specialized study of city life and problems—would be a more highly developed branch of sociology than rural sociology is. Actually, such is not the case. Evidence can be cited to show that American sociologists began to pay some attention to the special problems of city life quite early, virtually from the beginnings of the American sociological movement. (In fact, the nineteenth century interest in philanthropy and social reform, discussed elsewhere in this volume, was to a considerable extent focused upon the striking manifestations of “social problems” that occurred in large cities, particularly in the slums; and, as Nels Anderson remarks, “we cannot separate the beginnings of urban sociology from the perennial battle to wipe out the slum.”¹ This interest in the peculiar social problems of city life gave rise to a number of books which, if they may not be classified precisely as “sociological,” were at any rate influential in their day and served as stimuli for the arousal of what became the American sociological movement.² This interest in the problems of city life, and particularly in the city slum, had been clearly manifested and expressed by publications of some importance for several years when, in 1894–1895, Prof. Charles Richmond Henderson offered at the University of Chicago the first course in rural sociology to be given, so far as is known, at any American college or university. The giving of this course seems to have been about the first evidence of specialized interest in

¹ “Trends in Urban Sociology,” George A. Lundberg and others, *Trends in American Sociology*, p. 270; see also pp. 267 ff.

² See, for example, Jacob A. Riis, *How the Other Half Lives*, 1890, and *The Making of an American*, 1901; Robert A. Woods, and others, *The Poor in Great Cities*, 1895; Robert A. Woods, *The City Wilderness*, 1898; Charles Zueblin, *American Municipal Progress*, 1902.

"rural sociology," or rural-life problems. Books in this field did not begin to appear until a few years later; J. M. Williams' *An American Town* (1906) and W. L. Anderson's *The Country Town* (1906) were perhaps the first.

Once it was fairly launched, however, rural sociology developed rapidly and became what may be regarded as the most popular and flourishing of all the separate sociological specialties that can be distinguished from one another today. Without much doubt, it is represented by more professorships designated for teaching and research in the specialized field than is any other branch of sociology. This state of affairs is due largely to the fact that the development of teaching, and especially of research, in rural sociology has been strongly fostered by subsidies provided by the federal government and made available, mainly, to the "land-grant," or agricultural, colleges of the several states.¹ The subsidization of research and, to a lesser degree, teaching in the field of rural sociology undoubtedly reflects the long-standing consensus of opinion of persons who have given some thought and study to the matter, that rural life in the United States has for some decades been affected by rather serious practical problems, or evils; and that it is desirable for the sake of the general welfare of the nation to study these evils, to discover their causes if possible, and to do something to correct them. The subsidies that have been provided by the federal government to support such work are, of course, still more directly due to the concern that congressmen feel for the "farmer vote." Rightly or wrongly, it has been felt by the rural inhabitants of the United States that they were a class relatively neglected by the federal government or, at any rate, that they labored under adverse social forces which were not of their own making and that the powers of government were not being exercised as they might be to counteract these forces. Because the rural vote is the largest single, more or less homogeneous, category of voting population in the country

¹ The principal part of these subsidies was provided for by the Purnell Act of 1925, which appropriated to each agricultural experiment station, of those located at the agricultural colleges, a subsidy rising to \$60,000 annually, for research in the social sciences of rural life. Teaching and research in rural sociology had been supported at the land-grant colleges previous to this date, however.

and is presumably likely to be swayed this way or that in an election by the farmers' opinion of the concern that the candidates and the party organizations have shown for their welfare there has been a strong tendency on the part of every government, or party in power, to "do something for the farmers." Because it has not been clear what could be done by the federal government that would demonstrably benefit the farmers as a class directly (except for protective tariffs on certain farm products such as sugar), there has been a disposition to support agricultural instruction, agricultural research, and various forms of "extension work," in the hope that such measures would be of some value to farmers as a class and, at any rate, would placate the farmer vote. Doubtless the tendency was strengthened by the fact that many Congressmen and Senators were of rural birth or ancestry and have accordingly had a peculiar sentimental feeling for rural life.

Since Professor Henderson offered the first course in rural sociology at the University of Chicago in 1894-1895, instruction in this branch has become widespread. A number of textbooks for college courses in rural sociology have been published,¹ and today it is safe to say that courses in rural sociology are offered in the majority of colleges, universities, and agricultural colleges in the United States, though for the most part only one such course is given. In most, if not all, agricultural colleges, at least one full-time member of the staff devotes himself to rural sociology exclusively; however, many of these persons are expected to devote themselves primarily to research and the writing of bulletins intended to contribute to the existing knowledge of rural conditions and problems or to diffuse enlightenment on these matters. There are now in print over a dozen textbooks for use in college courses in rural sociology; and there is a great body of monographic material, consisting largely of small, paper-covered experiment-station bulletins. In 1931, however, the University of Minnesota Press completed the publication of a substantial three-volume *Systematic Source-book in Rural Sociology* by P. A. Sorokin, C. J. Galpin, and C. C. Zimmerman,

¹ The earliest were John M. Gillette, *Constructive Rural Sociology*, 1913; Paul L. Vogt, *Introduction to Rural Sociology*, 1917; C. J. Galpin, *Rural Life*, 1918. Since 1925, a considerable number of such textbooks have been published.

which brings together in convenient and accessible form a mass of relevant and valuable material for the study and teaching of the subject.

In its beginnings, rural sociology, like much of the rest of what passed for sociology in the United States, consisted largely of ethical evaluations and practical proposals for the improvement of rural life, based on a mixture of common sense and the authors' own speculative opinions. As Zimmerman says, rural sociologists in the past have attempted to plan the reforms that they felt were needed in rural life before they had developed the principles on which these reforms might be based.¹ Gradually, this content of speculation and common sense has been supplemented by a considerable body of knowledge, consisting mainly of fairly accurate and illuminating descriptions of particular rural communities and other rural areas, based on careful field studies. These data have grown out of the pioneer work of Galpin at the University of Wisconsin² and the example provided by J. M. Williams' *An American Town* (1906). Relevant statistical data have also been accumulated, and quite recently there has been a sustained effort, particularly on the part of Professors Sorokin and Zimmerman, to develop a body of abstract and general knowledge relevant to the needs and problems of rural sociology.³ Zimmerman defines the field of

¹ "The Trend of Rural Sociology," in George A. Lundberg and others, *Trends in American Sociology*, p. 223. This chapter constitutes one of the most adequate surveys of the development and status of rural sociology now existing.

² "A Method of Making a Social Survey of a Rural Community," University of Wisconsin Agricultural Experiment Station, *Circular of Information* 29, January, 1912; C. J. Galpin and G. W. Davies, "Social Surveys of Rural School Districts," *ibid.*, *Circular* 51, October, 1914; "The Social Anatomy of an Agricultural Community," *ibid.*, *Research Bulletin* 34, May, 1915; *Rural Life*, especially Chap. IV, "The Structure of Rural Life," New York, 1918. See also Dwight Sanderson, "Locating the Rural Community," published by the New York State College of Agriculture at Cornell University, Cornell Reading Course for the Farm, *Lesson* 158, June, 1920; J. H. Kolb, "Rural Primary Groups," University of Wisconsin Agricultural Experiment Station, *Research Bulletin* 51, December, 1921; Carle C. Zimmerman and Carl C. Taylor, "Rural Organization, A Study of Primary Groups in Wake County, N. C.," North Carolina Agricultural Experiment Station, Raleigh, N. C., *Bulletin* 245, August, 1922.

³ See their *Principles of Rural-urban Sociology*, New York, 1929, as well as the *Source-book* previously mentioned. Professor L. J. Kolb of the

rural sociology as one having for its central concept the mechanism and effects of urbanization and ruralization upon a population. Later, in the same context, he elaborates this definition to include the study of rural-urban differences in behavior and the explanation of those differences in terms of environmental causation and selection, as well as the mechanism of urbanization and ruralization.¹ The emphasis thus indicated characterizes the volume *Principles of Rural-urban Sociology* (1929), on which Zimmerman collaborated with Sorokin. Other rural sociologists have been inclined to treat rural social organization as the central concept of the field. There has also been in recent years a noticeable tendency to develop a science or body of knowledge called "rural social economics," which incorporates topics lying in the marginal field between sociology and economics but emphasizes practical considerations and problems of public policy.²

Exactly what the future of rural sociology will be it is of course impossible to predict. It is evident, however, that there will long continue to be a considerable proportion of the population of the United States (and other countries) living on farms in the open country or in small villages and that rural communities and rural people will have somewhat distinctive characteristics and problems. It is also true, up to now, that the rural areas of the United States produce an appreciable part of the population that eventually becomes urban. So long as these conditions continue to exist, there will be grounds for the specialized study and teaching of rural sociology, though the opinion may be expressed that the subject ought not to be treated with as little reference to the city-centered character of modern rural life as has largely been the practice heretofore. ("Rural-urban sociology," to be an adequate science, ought to treat not only the characteristic differences between rural and urban populations and the currents of migration between country, town, and city but also the causal interaction of town and country.) There are signs of a development of theory and research along these lines

University of Wisconsin should also be credited, among others, with work along this line.

¹ *Loc. cit.*, pp. 254, 256.

² Professors Thomas Nixon Carver and J. D. Black of Harvard University may be named as leaders in this direction; see also Prof. Wilson Gee of the University of Virginia, *The Social Economics of Agriculture*, 1932.

in the recent writings of those who have interested themselves in "human ecology" and regional studies.

Urban sociology cannot be said to be so highly developed a specialty as is rural sociology. One reason is that it has not been fostered by governmental subsidies. Furthermore, the general tendency of the studies of modern urban communities that have developed under the leadership of a few great teachers has been such as to make these studies contribute to a unified science of sociology, rather than to a distinct branch of the science. There are now in existence, however, at least four general textbooks of recent date intended for use in college courses in urban sociology, and separate courses on the subject are fairly common in American universities.¹ A considerable body of monographic literature and published research data is now available to students in this field; the city-planning movement has given rise to elaborate studies of existing conditions; and detailed statistical studies have been made of at least two American cities, Chicago and Cleveland, from the 1920 and 1930 census data, using the census tracts as the units of observation and tabulation.² Without doubt, the study of urban conditions and problems is fostered and given interest by the fact that, in our times, the great cities so strikingly dominate the scene, that it seems as if practically all important happenings and developments were taking place in the great cities first. Young people in colleges and universities

¹ Nels Anderson and Eduard C. Lindeman, *Urban Sociology*, New York, 1928; Niles Carpenter, *The Sociology of City Life*, New York, 1931; Maurice R. Davie, *Problems of City Life*, New York, 1932; Noel P. Gist and L. A. Halbert, *Urban Society*, New York, 1933. For a general survey of the development and present status of urban sociology, see Nels Anderson, "The Trend of Urban Sociology," George A. Lundberg and others, *Trends in American Sociology*, pp. 261-296.

² For monographic literature, see particularly the University of Chicago Sociological Series and other monographic studies of urban conditions published by the University of Chicago Press; see also the *Regional Survey of New York and Environs* and the *Regional Plan of New York and Environs*, with supplementary volumes and bulletins issued by the New York Regional Planning Association; and the *Tri-state Regional Plan of Philadelphia and Vicinity*; also R. D. McKenzie, *The Metropolitan Community*, a Recent Social Trends Monograph, 1933. The statistical studies referred to are Howard Whipple Green, *Population Characteristics by Census Tracts—Cleveland—Cleveland*, 1931; Ernest W. Burgess and Charles W. Newcomb, ed., *Census Data for the City of Chicago*, vol. I, 1920, vol. II, 1930.

are, as a rule, eager to study the city, but it is likely to require special pressure or inducement to enroll them in courses in rural sociology. (There is a trend, however, toward the broadening of the scope of research and interpretation, from the city to the urban region. Students of urban sociology are increasingly emphatic in their statements of the principle that the basic object of attention should be the city plus its "hinterland," the region of which it is the center. We may expect that, in the proximate future, regional studies will, to a considerable extent, supplement and even supplant the urban studies of the past two decades.

CHAPTER XXX

POPULATION AND RACE RELATIONS

As we have seen, systematic study and discussion of the subject of population originated at an earlier date than did sociology, considered as a separate science; and the same may be said of the study of the races of man. Thus, though problems of race and population are frequently treated as if they constituted a branch of sociology, and a number of American scholars who are classified primarily as sociologists have written textbooks and other works on these subjects, it is also true that points of view for the study of race and population had taken shape when general treatises on sociology first began to be published, and it may be added that the study of these matters has been strongly affected down to the present time by practical considerations. In logic, the study of population may be regarded as "human biology," as a branch of economics, or as a phase of human geography, and by none of these classifications does it fall squarely within the field of sociology. On the other hand, as the study of population is developed, with due regard to the concrete and practical considerations which prove to be involved, sociological questions are encountered; and this is even more strikingly true of the study of race. In American colleges and universities, courses in population problems are usually offered in departments of sociology; while these departments share with the departments of anthropology the subject of race. In view of these circumstances, it is appropriate that some account of the history and trend of population theory and related topics, including race, should find a place in this volume.

Although discussion of the subject of race has gone on continuously since the time of Aristotle, the scientific study of race may be dated from the publication of Linnaeus' system of classification of zoological species in 1758. In this system, he included a simple classification of the races of mankind, and the problem

of the classification and discrimination of races has received fairly continuous attention ever since.¹ Discussion of this phase of the subject will be deferred to a later point; the study of race has been conducted mainly by biological or pseudobiological methods until recently. Modern population theory, as we have noted in an earlier chapter, began with Malthus' first *Essay on the Principle of Population*, which was published in 1798. Down to the present time, the theory of Malthus, considerably modified and elaborated, has served as the point of departure for all theoretic study and discussion of the problems of population. The thesis of Malthus that population is limited by the means of subsistence has never been controverted successfully, although in modern population theory it is qualified with reference to the reciprocal relation between population and a number of other factors. Among these factors are birth rates, death rates, migration, standards of living, commerce, and "the state of the industrial arts." Considered broadly in this way, recent interpretations of Malthusian population theory obviously open up a wide range of topics for investigation. The study of the subject has been further complicated by growing recognition of the fact that the study of population has at least three quite distinct phases, which may be briefly designated as (1) the relation of the total number of inhabitants of an extensive area, such as a nation, to other factors; (2) the distribution and movements of population in space; and (3) the quality of population—the differential fertility and rate of increase of races, classes, or other distinguishable elements in the total population of an area. The bearing that theories and problems of population have upon the practical problems of war, economic prosperity, and birth control have also complicated and lent interest to the study of population. In view of all these considerations, it is somewhat surprising to discover that comparatively little attention was paid to the subject of population by American social scientists until after 1910. To be sure, the conclusions of Malthus and inferences drawn from them were discussed and disputed throughout the nineteenth century, and Spencer's rival theory of "individuation and genesis" was hailed by the American economist Henry C. Carey as disproof of Malthus and vindication of the religious

¹ Franz Boas, "Race," *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*; this article is supplemented by an extensive bibliography.

principles which Malthus' theory was supposed to contradict.¹ In 1899, Francis A. Walker promulgated his famous theory that immigration into the United States had not affected the growth of population but had operated to diminish the birth rate of the native-born proportionately.

Professor Carver of Harvard seems to have been responsible, to a considerable extent, for drawing fresh attention to the subject of population through his university courses and his *Essays in Social Justice* (1915), in which he reemphasized the bearing of population and its increase upon the distribution of wealth. In 1914, Warren S. Thompson, who has since become one of the outstanding American writers on population, published his Columbia University doctoral dissertation entitled *Population: A Study in Malthusianism*. At about the same time, the subject of population was emphasized in a number of textbooks for use in "social-problems" courses, including H. P. Fairchild's *Outline of Applied Sociology* (1916) and A. B. Wolfe's *Readings in Social Problems* (1916); it was treated in an elementary way in C. A. Ellwood's *Sociology and Modern Social Problems* (1910).

Since 1920, population problems have received considerable attention in the United States. F. A. Bushee's *Principles of Sociology* (1923) devotes considerable space to the problems and theory of population; and in the same year in which this textbook was published there appeared what seems to have been the first American textbook devoted exclusively to population, E. B. Reuter's *Population Problems*. In the preceding year, Raymond Pearl published under the title *The Biology of Death* the lectures that he had delivered at the Lowell Institute in Boston in 1920; in this volume, he first made available to a wide public his now well-known theory that, in the absence of significant disturbing forces, any population tends to increase according to a "logistic curve," i.e., first very slowly, then at an increasing rate, and eventually at a decreasing rate until its rate of increase approaches zero. Pearl's theory of population may be interpreted as a refinement of Walker's; however, an interesting fact about the theory is that the author based it on purely biological reasoning

¹ Wolfe, A. B. "Population—Theory" in *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*, vol. 12. Carey discussed the problem of population at some length in *Principles of Social Science*, 1858. Francis A. Walker, *Economics and Statistics*, 1899.

and supported it by the evidence of laboratory experiment, as well as from the analysis of human population statistics.¹ In 1926, Louis I. Dublin edited a collection of papers by various authors, also entitled *Population Problems*; and in 1930, W. S. Thompson published under the same title the most comprehensive textbook that had appeared up to that date in the United States. Meanwhile, in 1929, H. G. Duncan's more elementary textbook, entitled *Race and Population Problems*, made its appearance. Among the more conspicuous publications other than textbooks for college courses that appeared during the period 1920-1930 may be mentioned Edward M. East's *Mankind at the Crossroads* (1923), E. A. Ross's *Standing Room Only* (1927), and Warren S. Thompson's *Danger Spots in World Population* (1930).

As has been said, the tendency of modern American population theory and research has been in the direction of the elaboration of the theory of Malthus to take into account the effect of a number of factors which Malthus either did not mention or touched upon only in very general terms. Interest in population problems in the United States since the opening of the century has undoubtedly been due, in part, to the changing situation with regard to immigration. As many writers on the subject have pointed out, down to late in the nineteenth century, the people of the United States were disposed on the whole to welcome immigration as an aid to the development of the country, but for several decades the attitudes of the American people in this matter have tended to become reversed. Immigration has been regarded, more and more, as a force tending to subvert American standards of living, as the source of a competitive labor supply likely to displace the native-born worker from his job and as a channel by which subversive political and economic doctrines are brought into the country. The legislative policy of the federal government concerning immigration has been virtually reversed in the course of a half century. These changes have naturally been accompanied by considerable research and theoretic discussion of the fundamental problems of population, including race problems; for race prejudice, or prejudice directed

¹ Pearl's theory is presented in the greatest technical detail in his *Studies in Human Biology*, Baltimore, 1924. See also his *Biology of Population Growth*, New York, 1925; also J. S. Sweeney, *The Natural Increase of Mankind*, Baltimore, 1926.

against certain European nationalities supposed to differ racially from the earlier American settlers, and misgivings concerning the possibility of assimilating this "new immigration," as well as the Oriental immigration that had come in across our western borders, has played a considerable part in determining the legislative immigration policy of the United States government during the past half century. It has been remarked from time to time in recent years that the immigration restrictions adopted by this country since 1921 have, in effect, based an American immigration policy upon Walker's theory; and it might also be said that the quota laws have been based on the tacit assumption that there is a fundamental difference of kind, presumably racial, between the "old immigration" and the "new immigration." The events of the World War also had the effect of arousing great concern over the assimilation, or "Americanization," of immigrants, which led to a considerable increase of research and theoretic discussion relative to the questions involved—race differences, cultural differences, the relations of races and nationalities, and the process of assimilation.

As a matter of fact, American interest in the subject of race differences and race relations is of much longer standing than the American conception of an "immigration problem" as understood in recent decades; until about fifty years ago, the "American race problem" was the problem of the relations of the white and Negro races in this country. The earliest American treatises that purported to deal with the new science of sociology, Henry Hughes's *Treatise on Sociology* (1854) and George Fitzhugh's *Sociology for the South* (1854), were, in substance, discussions of the race problem, intended to rationalize the institution of Negro slavery. The emancipation of the slaves at the time of the Civil War and the events of the Reconstruction era did not solve the problem, of course, but served only to reopen it in a new form; for the status of the Negroes had to be determined all over again. Accordingly, the period of American history beginning in 1865 has witnessed the publication of a large volume of literature dealing with the "Negro problem"—in some cases, quite objectively and in the spirit of scientific inquiry; in many cases, controversially, in the spirit of special pleading. At about the end of the nineteenth century, a new factor was introduced into the discussion of race relations in the United States, in the shape

of an argument for "Nordic" superiority and supremacy which originated in Europe, apparently chiefly in Germany, but was brought to the attention of the American reading public by a series of books, of which Madison Grant's *The Passing of a Great Race* (1916) and Lothrop Stoddard's *The Rising Tide of Color against White World-supremacy* (1920) are characteristic examples.

For a long time, the scientific study of race problems took the form, almost exclusively, of an investigation of race differences, designed to clarify the biological problems of classification and descent and to reveal the differences of behavior tendency and capacity that were assumed to exist between the races. In the second decade of the present century, extensive efforts were made to apply the techniques of mental testing in this connection. The results of this research, however, have been rather inconclusive.¹ So far as current social conditions and problems are concerned, the available concept of race proves to be a statistical one, rather than a simple and fundamental biological category. It has become increasingly clear, first, that there are no pure races in the world today and, second, that, in the actual processes of civilized social life, groups of people whose differences are primarily cultural may, if those differences are rather conspicuous and not easily eradicated, take much the same attitudes toward each other that characterize the races when they come into contact. These considerations tend to bring the so-called race problem squarely within the field of sociology, and in recent years a considerable literature has been produced by American sociologists to meet the newer conception of the subject.² The

¹ Franz Boas, *loc. cit.* See also F. N. House, "Viewpoints and Methods in the Study of Race Relations," *American Journal of Sociology*, vol. 40, pp. 440-452, 1935.

² See particularly various authors, *Americanization Studies*, 11 vols., financed by the Carnegie Foundation and directed by Allen T. Burns; also H. A. Miller, *Races, Nations, and Classes*, New York, 1924; preliminary reports of the Race Relations Survey of the Pacific Coast published in *Survey Graphic*, May, 1926, under the editorial direction of R. E. Park; E. B. Reuter, *The Mulatto in the United States*, Chicago, 1918, *The American Race Problem*, New York, 1927, *Race Mixture*, New York, 1930; Charles S. Johnson, *The Negro in American Civilization*, New York, 1930; Donald Young, *American Minority Peoples*, New York, 1932; *Race and Culture Contacts*, (papers presented at the 28th annual meeting of the American Sociological Society, E. B. Reuter, ed., New York, 1934. See also A

general trend of this recent sociological treatment of the subject of race has been in the direction of primary emphasis on inter-racial attitudes and their formation and on race relations and the transformations that those relations undergo in the course of events.¹

A striking characteristic of research in the field of population problems and related matters, in the United States in recent years, has been the tendency, as in other topics of social science, to subdivide the original subject into narrower specialties. This specialization is dictated, in the main, by the interest in particular problems, also, to some extent, by the possibilities and limitations of particular research techniques. The latter sort of specialization is illustrated by the development of population study as a statistical specialty. The effort to verify the theory of Malthus and the various qualifications and elaborations of that theory that have been proposed in the last century, and to apply such theories in concrete estimates of the future growth of population, has led to the expenditure of a great deal of research labor upon the available data concerning actual population and birth and death rates of the various countries of the world. Developed in this way, population studies tend to assume the form of analyses of (census data) and (vital statistics.) In fact, the development and elaboration of governmental census taking may in itself be regarded, in part, as a special form of research into population problems. Such research may be described as a development of social science at one of the two poles between which its studies are arrayed, the abstract and the concrete. Treating society as population simply, *i.e.*, as something that may be studied by purely statistical methods, involves the reduction of the actual data of experience to the abstraction of mere numbers, and in this both the methodological advantages and the limitations of the procedure are determined. The census

Bibliography of the Negro in Africa and America, compiled by Monroe Work, New York, 1928.

¹ A noteworthy publication is The Chicago Commission on Race Relations, *The Negro in Chicago*, Chicago, 1922. See also Bruno Lasker, *Racial Attitudes of Children*, New York, 1929, and other works on immigration by the same author; E. S. Bogardus, "Measuring Social Distances," *The New Social Research*, Chap. X, Los Angeles, 1926. The publications of the Institute of Pacific Relations are relevant.

reduces the infinite variation of kind among human beings to a few abstract categories, such as age, sex, and nationality, and it tends to neglect entirely the interaction between individuals and groups by which society, in the concrete sense of the term, is constituted. Similarly, the statistical treatment of race problems tends to involve the assumption of racial purity or, at best, as in census data concerning the negro population of the United States, it recognizes one general category of persons of mixed blood. The special advantage of such methods, of course, is that they put the data in a form in which the mind can deal with them comprehensively, in their totality.

An interesting variation of the census method of studying population is illustrated by the attempt that has been made by American anthropologists to estimate the aboriginal population of North America as it was when Europeans first arrived.¹ The importance of such studies consists mainly in the contribution that they make to a phase of modified Malthusian theory which deals with population in relation to the state of the industrial arts. It is assumed that the aboriginal population of northern North America represented virtually a saturation of the environment, when the existing methods of gaining a subsistence are taken into account. The study of population problems, in fact, leads by a direct transition to the investigation of the supporting powers of the environment. The estimates worked out by O. E. Baker of the total agricultural resources of the United States are noteworthy in this connection.²

The study of the spatial distribution of population has not received such attention, up to now, as would justify us in classifying this subject as a separate branch of the larger field. However, consideration of the geographic aspects of population

¹ James Mooney, "The Aboriginal Population of America North of Mexico," *Smithsonian Miscellaneous Collections*, vol. 30, No. 7, pp. 1-40, 1928. See also Clark Wissler, *An Introduction to Social Anthropology*, New York, pp. 29-32, 1929.

² "Population, Food Supply, and American Agriculture," *Geographical Review*, vol. 18, No. 3, pp. 353-373, July, 1928. See also Warren S. Thompson, "Population Growth and Agriculture," *Population Problems*, New York, 1929; rev. ed., 1935, Chap. XIV. Thompson's *Danger Spots in World Population*, New York, 1929, is an attempt to apply the same procedure, in a superficial and preliminary way, to the world as a whole. See also E. F. Penrose, *Population Theories and Their Application, with Special Reference to Japan*, San Francisco, 1935.

problems began definitely with Malthus and has continued ever since. Paul Vidal de la Blache, whose contributions to human geography have been noted in a previous connection, gave particular emphasis to the fact that population is distributed very unevenly over the land surface of the globe and suggested that the details of this distribution constitute one of the natural starting points of research in human geography.¹ Meanwhile, there had gradually taken shape at the hands of other students and writers on human geography the concept of the region as the natural unit of area to be used for the purposes of most geographic studies. Implicit in this concept was the thesis that the relation between population and the means of subsistence pointed out by Malthus may be most realistically studied with reference to these natural regions. Lately, however, social scientists, particularly in the United States, have been using the regional concept in a fresh application, to refer particularly to the territory the economic and social life of which centers in one or more great cities, or metropolises.² This gives a new focus and objectives to studies of the distribution of population. On the other hand, when the distribution of population is studied with reference to political boundaries, as well as natural resources, it affords a significant background for the study of international rivalries and wars; war, regarded in this light, tends to appear as the distinctively human form of the struggle for existence, a more or less inevitable result of the pressure of population upon national resources, unless the increase of population can be checked, and its distribution, perhaps, made the subject of rational agreements among the great powers.³

When considered from the viewpoint and in the framework of neoclassical economic theory, population appears as a factor

¹ "Distribution of Population," *Principles of Human Geography*, trans. by Millicent Todd Bingham, Part I, New York, 1926.

² Perhaps the first American publication in which this thought was clearly expressed was N. S. B. Gras, *Introduction to Economic History*, New York, 1922, especially "Metropolitan Economy," Chaps. V, VI.

³ The essential problem involved was discussed by Buckle in his *History of Civilization in England*, 2 vols., London, 1857-1861; it was restated, with greater emphasis on war, by Edward Van Dyke Robinson, in "War and Economics in History and in Theory," *Political Science Quarterly*, vol. 15, pp. 581-622. T. N. Carver incorporated Robinson's paper and significant passages from Buckle in his *Sociology and Social Progress*, Boston, 1905. See also James Fairgreve, *Geography and World Power*, London, 1915; Warren S. Thompson, *Danger Spots in World Population*, New York, 1929.

closely correlated with, and more or less determinative of, "labor supply"; a large and growing population, in relation to natural resources and the state of the industrial arts, means an abundant labor supply relative to the other factors of production, and accordingly a tendency for wage rates to be low. This point of view has been set forth repeatedly by American economists in standard treatises and textbooks of economics and labor problems.¹

Recently, the discussion of population problems, in the quantitative, Malthusian sense by American authors has taken a new direction, amounting almost to the reversal of earlier treatments in the minds of some authorities, since census figures and vital statistics have seemed to show conclusively that the increase of the population of the United States is approaching an end, as was predicted by Raymond Pearl some years ago. This prospect, taken in connection with the generally admitted fact that, in our generation, the superior families have the lowest birth rate and, probably, the lowest rate of reproduction (birth rate minus death rate), has caused various writers to express grave apprehensions concerning the future quality of the population. There is, furthermore, some tendency to argue on the a priori assumption that a declining population is a mark of the decadence of a nation or a civilization. Military apprehensions are expressed, also, concerning the consequences of a stationary or declining population in a world in which the population of a number of aggressive states is still rapidly increasing.

The whole subject has attracted a great deal of interest and research attention in the past decade, and a great deal of substantial literature has appeared dealing in various ways with the problems involved.²

¹ The possible bibliography here would be very extensive. See, for outstanding instances, Thomas Nixon Carver, *Essays in Social Justice*, Cambridge, Mass., 1915, and Frank W. Taussig, *Principles of Economics*, vol. II, New York, 1911.

² See particularly articles on "Population" in *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*, vol. 12; also *Population*, Harris Foundation Lectures, Chicago, 1929; Warren S. Thompson and P. K. Whelpton, *Population Trends in the United States*, Recent Social Trends Monograph, New York, 1933; Frank Lorimer and Frederick Osborn, *Dynamics of Population, Social and Biological Significance of Changing Birth Rates in the United States*, New York, 1934 (the most significant book in its special field published to date)

CHAPTER XXXI

THE FAMILY, THE CHILD, AND THE SCHOOL

Professor R. E. Park has suggested that, in the earliest period of its development, sociology was conceived "in the grand style," as a philosophy of history or a science of progress; in this period, sociological attention was focused upon "society" in general, which was implicitly conceived as an entity more or less coextensive with the state. Subsequently, there ensued a period in the history of sociology that was characterized by the prevalence of "schools" of sociological thought, each one of them committed to some particular conception of the science and its scope and point of view. Only after these two stages in its development did sociology enter upon a period of investigation and research, in which attention was directed to a considerable extent upon specific, relatively limited, and concrete research problems.¹ If this is accepted as a reasonably correct brief summary of the history of sociology, it affords a partial explanation of the fact that early modern sociologists paid relatively little attention to any of the three topics with which this chapter is concerned, and which have played prominent roles in American sociology in the period since about 1920: the family, the preschool child, and the school. When sociology was conceived as the science of "the progress of human society," and when society was conceived a priori as a term for large and inclusive social groups, more or less identical in personnel with the state, attention was naturally and logically directed away from the smaller, more intimate groups and person-to-person relations by which "society" is, in the last analysis, constituted. It was only after the rival schools of sociological thought began to debate the scope and viewpoint of sociology that certain pioneers, notably Baldwin and Cooley, began to emphasize the importance of the family and the rearing of the child, for the life of society.

¹ "Sociology and the Social Sciences," *American Journal of Sociology*, vol. 27, pp. 169-170, 1921, reprinted as Chap. I in R. E. Park and E. W. Burgess, *Introduction to the Science of Sociology*, Chicago, 1921, 1924; see especially p. 44.

Of the three special fields of study: the family, child study, and educational sociology, the first-mentioned was, on the whole, the earliest to attract the attention of American sociologists. F. L. Tolman, in his study of the teaching of sociology in American colleges and universities in 1902, found four courses being given which he classified as "sociology of the domestic group";¹ while Bernard, in a similar study made for the academic year 1907-1908, found twenty-one courses which he classified as "family and ethical problems."² As early as 1889, C. N. Starcke had published a volume entitled *The Primitive Family in Its Origin and Development*, which was, of course, an expression of the continued ethnological interest in the family and its origins, but which, being published in the United States, must have played some part as material for the use of the pioneer professors of sociology in the institutions of this country. In 1904, G. E. Howard's monumental *History of Matrimonial Institutions Chiefly in England and the United States* was published in three volumes. Since 1910, contributions by American sociologists to the study of the family have been relatively frequent and abundant.

It is necessary, in order to present these topics clearly in the present context, to make a distinction between the history of the family, the child, and the school as special topics in the field of interest and research of sociologists and the history of the same topics as they have been treated by scholars, thinkers, and investigators generally, regardless of their interest in any general social science. (Like a number of the other specialized and more or less concrete topics to which American sociologists have devoted considerable attention in recent years, those with which we are concerned here have a history that is longer than the history of sociology.) As has been noted in a previous connection, the study of the family in a relatively disinterested way began with the anthropologists and archaeologists, who undertook to study the "primitive" family and the family of ancient times, and whose work may be said to have reached a climax in Wester-

¹ Jessie Bernard, "The History and Prospects of Sociology in the United States, Chap. I in George A. Lundberg and others, *Trends in American Sociology*, p. 29; New York, 1929, quoting F. L. Tolman, "The Study of Sociology in Institutions of Learning in the United States," *American Journal of Sociology*, vol. 8, pp. 88 ff.

² Jessie Bernard, *Op. cit.*, p. 30.

marck's *History of Human Marriage*.) When American sociologists began to think of the family, with related topics, as a subject that belonged logically within the scope of their science, they found a large body of research material already at hand. Too, an interest in the disorganization of the family, as manifested in the rising divorce rate, was taken over by the sociologists from the nineteenth century philanthropic and social-reform movement.¹ This movement may be regarded as the source of a volume entitled *The Family: A Historical and Social Study*, which was published by Charles F. Thwing and Carrie F. B. Thwing in 1887, and which doubtless served widely as reading material for the early courses on the family given by sociologists.²

Historically, the serious study of the school and the school child is considerably older than any comparable study of the preschool child; and the latter specialty has been, to a considerable extent, the outgrowth of the former.³ Both were well developed as independent subjects and as special branches of psychology ("educational psychology," "child psychology") when American sociologists began to take an interest in them, on the ground that, whatever might be found true in the end regarding the factors of original nature or heredity, the formation of personality and the development of character in the child were the outcome of a process of social interaction, in which cultural factors played a determinative part.

So far as the development of educational sociology and child study as special branches of scientific sociology is concerned, then, the story is not a very long one. While child study from a

¹ In 1891, Walter F. Willcox published *The Divorce Problem: A Study in Statistics*, Columbia University Studies in History, Economics, and Public Law, vol. I, New York. This appears to have been the first serious study of the matter to be published in the United States, aside from mere compilations of data. The Bureau of the Census had issued, in 1889, its first special report on the subject, entitled "Marriage and Divorce in the United States, 1867-1886."

² There is probably a relation, not definitely known to the writer, between the production of this book by Mr. and Mrs. Thwing and the activities of the National League for the Protection of the Family, which issued a series of *Reports* from Boston during the years 1888-1903. Dr. Thwing was pastor of a church in Cambridge, Mass., from 1879 until 1886.

³ Arnold Gesell, "Child Psychology," a division of the general article "Child" in *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*, vol. 3; see also articles under the heading "Education," *ibid.*, vol. 5.

point of view essentially sociological may be traced from the beginnings made by J. Mark Baldwin in the nineties, and was furthered by Cooley's *Human Nature and the Social Order* (1902), educational sociology was, on the whole, the earlier of the two to develop. It may be dated from the publication of John Dewey's *School and Society* in 1899. (The idea that education is a subject of great sociological importance had, to be sure, been anticipated definitely enough by Herbert Spencer and Lester F. Ward,¹ but Dewey was perhaps the first, unless we make some exception for Baldwin, to undertake a somewhat extended inquiry into the functions of the schools from a point of view that may be described as sociological. According to Kulp and Clow, Dewey's *School and Society* was anticipated to some extent by a pamphlet issued by the University of Chicago Press in 1897, containing an article by John Dewey entitled "My Pedagogic Creed" and one by A. W. Small called "The Demands of Pedagogy on Sociology," with an introduction by S. T. Dutton. The pamphlet emphasized the proposition, which has been fundamental to educational sociology ever since, that the school is a social institution and that its management and methods should be dominated by this idea.² Within two decades, several books of similar nature and purpose appeared from American presses; among them were S. T. Dutton, *Social Phases of Education in the School and the Home* (1899); C. A. Scott, *Social Education* (1908); M. V. O'Shea, *Social Development and Education* (1909); Irving King, *Social Aspects of Education* (1912); and G. H. Betts, *Social Principles of Education* (1912). Kulp regards these works as collections of suggestions from existing sociology concerning the possibilities of regarding education as a social process and determining school objectives and methods with reference to social backgrounds.³

A fresh impetus was given to educational sociology by the publication of Dewey's *Democracy and Education* in 1916. The

¹ See Elsa Peverly Kimball, *Sociology and Education: An Analysis of the Theories of Spencer and Ward*, Columbia University Studies in History, Economics, and Public Law, No. 369, New York, 1932.

² F. R. Clow, "The Rise of Educational Sociology," *Journal of Social Forces*, vol. 2, pp. 332 ff., 1924, quoted by D. H. Kulp, II, "Educational Sociology," in George A. Lundberg and others, *Trends in American Sociology*, p. 300.

³ *Loc. cit.*, p. 302.

opening chapter of this book was a penetrating description of education as a social process and has become classical. This date (1916) may be taken as the opening of a period in the development of educational sociology characterized by the relatively large amount of attention paid to the subject.¹ In 1923, the National Society for the Study of Educational Sociology was organized at the annual meeting of the American Sociological Society; and this organization has since met regularly in connection with the American Sociological Society and the Department of Superintendence of the National Educational Association. Since 1928, this society has issued an annual *Yearbook*; and in the same year, the publication of the *Journal of Educational Sociology* began.

Rather obviously, educational sociology, like rural sociology, flourishes primarily because there is a good market for it. Under the influence of the general movement of social and educational thought, some of the features of which have been briefly indicated in the foregoing paragraphs, there has been a strong tendency in recent years to specify at least one course in educational sociology as one of the requirements for degrees in "education" granted by teachers' colleges and by the departments or schools of education connected with universities. Quite commonly, too, one or more courses in educational sociology are

¹ The following textbooks and treatises, at least, have been published in the United States since 1916, in addition to a great many journal articles and research studies: Edwin A. Kirkpatrick, *Fundamentals of Sociology, with Special Emphasis upon Community and Educational Problems*, 1916; Walter R. Smith, *Introduction to Educational Sociology*, 1917, *Principles of Educational Sociology*, 1927; Charles L. Robbins, *The School as a Social Institution*, 1918; William E. Chancellor, *Educational Sociology*, 1919; Joseph K. Hart, *Democracy in Education*, 1918, *The Discovery of Intelligence*, 1924, *Social Life and Institutions*, 1924, *Inside Experience*, 1927, *A Social Interpretation of Education*, 1929; David Snedden, *Sociological Determination of Objectives in Education*, 1921, *Educational Sociology*, 1922, *Educational Sociology for Beginners*, 1928; Ross L. Finney, *Elementary Sociology*, 1923, *A Sociological Philosophy of Education*, 1927; Charles C. Peters, *Foundations of Educational Sociology*, 1924; F. R. Clow, *Sociology with Educational Applications*, 1920; Ernest R. Groves, *Social Problems and Education*, 1925; Alvin Good, *Sociology and Education*, 1926; E. George Payne, *Principles of Educational Sociology*, 1928; George S. Counts, *School and Society in Chicago*, 1928, *Dare the School Build a New Social Order?* 1932; Willard Waller, *The Sociology of Teaching*, 1932.

listed among the required subjects or electives by which candidates for teachers' certificates qualify in the various states. The demand for educational sociology represented by these requirements is not clearly specified as anything more than a demand for sociological instruction especially adapted to the needs of prospective teachers and for research to support and enrich that instruction. (Theoretically, educational sociology might be defined as either of two things: the specialized study of education as a social process or the study of those aspects of general sociology that presumably have a particular value to teachers because they have a bearing on the problems of school administration and teaching.) In practice, educational sociology has, until recently, leaned toward the latter alternative.) To some extent, the term has served as a convenient label for research and propaganda relating to some of the underlying problems of educational policy, as distinguished from the problems of formal organization and administration of the schools and the problems of teaching method, with which the curriculum of departments of education and teachers' colleges has been largely occupied until lately. There has been some disposition to claim, as the field of educational sociology, the basic problems of primary- and secondary-school curriculum making, on the assumption that the principal requirement to which the curriculum should conform is that it serve to adapt the pupil to life in the society in which he is placed and that this is something for sociologists to determine. There is a fairly close, though unacknowledged, connection between what passes for educational sociology in the United States and the "progressive" movement in education.¹

In some respects, "child study" is the most doubtful category of all those included in our tentative list of sociological specialties. On the one hand, it may be questioned whether child study is logically included in the broader field of sociology, and, on the other hand, it can scarcely be asserted that child study has been definitely recognized by sociologists as part of their science. It must be remembered, however, that Baldwin and Cooley performed effective and influential pioneer work demonstrating

¹ For a penetrating critique of American educational sociology, see Kulp's chapter (previously cited) in George A. Lundberg and others, *Trends in American Sociology*.

the relevance of the study of young children to the fundamental problems of sociology and social psychology, and there are signs of a recent revival of interest in this specialty on the part of a number of reputable sociologists. For some time after Cooley's *Human Nature and the Social Order* was first published, in 1902, there were few indications that other sociologists were impressed by his demonstration of the value of the study of young children as a method of sociological research. The exploitation of ethnological materials, community studies, and studies taking their departure from practical "social problems" seemed to be preferred by American sociologists. Child study was left to psychologists and educators.)

It is not difficult to show, however, that studies of the behavior and the mental processes of young children may have either of two purposes or some combination of both. The purpose may be to establish as accurately as possible the knowledge that psychology naturally seeks concerning the original nature of man, on the assumption that this original nature is more directly manifested in young children than elsewhere and that if we can observe certain types of behavior in young children on their first occurrence, it may be that we are observing original nature virtually free from conditioning by social or other environmental factors. Psychologists' studies of young children, which have been much more numerous and more carefully executed than those made by sociologists up to now, seem to have been made on this assumption primarily. On the other hand, studies of young children may be undertaken primarily or partly for the purpose of establishing knowledge of elemental social processes—the formation of attitudes and the shaping of personality in and by social interaction—through the observation of those cases in which, presumably, such processes can be found in their simplest form. (In short, the assumption may be made that the development of children is a sociogenetic as well as a psychogenetic phenomenon and may be profitably studied as such. It is very difficult to be thorough in the analysis of social situations and processes involving adults, because such subjects bring into the situations in which they act so much that cannot be determined by the research student.)

Aside from the continued latent influence of the pioneer work of Baldwin and Cooley, it was probably the publications of

Freud and other analytical psychiatrists that were chiefly instrumental in reviving the interest of sociologists in child study. As we have noted elsewhere, sociologists began to feel that the analytical psychology of Freud, Adler, and Jung was in essence a social psychology, that it based the interpretation of personal maladjustments and neuroses on a theory of the interaction of the individual with a social environment. Too, these psychiatrists emphasized strongly the importance of the experiences of very early life in the shaping of personality. There was a period in the history of American sociology, beginning about 1920, when a number of sociologists were reading with great interest the works of these analytical psychiatrists and attempting to assimilate their findings and theories into the existing body of socio-psychological theory. Although it is scarcely possible to prove the point, it is likely that this influence had much to do with the redirection of sociologists' attention upon the possibilities of child study.

Meanwhile, as a concomitant of criminological research, attention had been drawn to the subject of juvenile delinquency. It was increasingly emphasized that the young delinquent is an adult criminal in the making and that from the study of juvenile delinquents to the study of young "problem children" was a natural and easy step. From this direction too, then, forces have operated to revive the sociologists' interest in child study.

For some time, the interest was not manifest except in scattered journal articles. Through the Annual Meeting of December, 1934, no section or division meetings of the American Sociological Society had been devoted specifically to child study, although it may be said that to some extent the section and division meetings on "social research" afforded an opportunity for such interests to find expression and a forum for discussion.¹ Rather curiously, no relevant papers or research reports seem to have

¹ See particularly Walter C. Reckless, "Case Studies Built around Observations of Individual Foster Children in the Playground of a Receiving Home," *Publication of the American Sociological Society*, vol. 24, No. 2, pp. 170-173, 1930, paper read in the Division on Social Research at the Annual Meeting of the Society at Washington, December, 1929; Mapheus T. Smith, "The Social Behavior of Institutional Children in the Playground Situation," *ibid.*, vol. 26, No. 3, pp. 150-154, 1932, paper read in the Division on Social Research at the Annual Meeting of the Society in Washington, December, 1931.

been presented before the section on the family in recent years. It has been due especially to the influence and prestige of W. I. Thomas that the field of child study has begun to receive renewed recognition in American sociological circles. In his presidential address before the American Sociological Society in Washington, in December, 1927, entitled "The Behavior Pattern and the Situation,"¹ he emphatically stated the possibilities of sociological research in the special field of child study; and in the following year appeared his volume *The Child in America* (in collaboration with Dorothy Swaine Thomas), in which the literature and research findings of child study were reviewed at great length.² Since its publication, this book has been extensively used as a textbook in courses given in departments of sociology in American colleges and universities. From a somewhat earlier date, Prof. Ellsworth Faris has been influencing his graduate students at the University of Chicago to pay attention to the possibilities of child study as a special field of sociopsychological research. The trend toward child study by American sociologists had not been so strong, up to 1928, but that Thomas could observe that the research of greatest sociological importance in the field of child study had been done not by sociologists but by psychologists, educators, and psychiatrists.³ Up to 1935, in fact, it was still true that the contributions of American sociologists to this field consisted chiefly of a relatively small number of journal articles.⁴

¹ *Publication of the American Sociological Society*, vol. 22, pp. 1-13, 1928.

² See particularly "The Sociological Approach," Chap. XII.

³ *The Child in America*, p. 506.

⁴ See, for example, besides papers previously cited, F. Stuart Chapin, "The Child's Enlarging Social Horizon," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, vol. 151, pp. 11-19, 1930; Martin H. Neumeyer, "Conscience Behavior of Children," *Sociology and Social Research*, vol. 14, No. 5, pp. 570-578, 1930; H. C. Brearly, "Genetic Sociology," *Sociology and Social Research*, vol. 16, pp. 463-465, 1932. See also, however, for book-length publications, Herbert Blumer, *Movies and Conduct*, New York, 1933; and Herbert Blumer and Philip M. Hauser, *Movies, Delinquency, and Crime*, New York, 1933.

For a representative bibliography of child study at the preschool level, see Ruth R. Pearson, "The Behavior of the Pre-school Child" (a Topical Survey of Current Literature), *American Journal of Sociology*, vol. 31, pp. 800-811, 1926.

The interest of sociologists in juvenile delinquency is now represented by one substantial textbook, *Juvenile Delinquency*, by Walter C. Reckless and Mapheus T. Smith.¹ Mention should be made also in this connection of Frederic M. Thrasher's *The Gang*² and the extensive researches into children's gangs and play groups in New York City conducted under Professor Thrasher's direction in recent years. These studies of juvenile delinquency are, however, only marginally related to the field of child study as here conceived.

In recent years, the study of the family has been much more definitely recognized, within and without the sociological fraternity, as a sociological specialty. Beginning about 1917, a course in the family was given at the University of Chicago by Prof. E. W. Burgess and was taken by nearly all candidates for higher degrees in sociology; and, since, as has been noted, more graduate work in sociology has been done at this institution than at any other American university, the influence of this course became considerable. Burgess also contributed several significant papers to the literature of the subject;³ and it was in his graduate course that Ernest R. Mowrer, who has since become one of the recognized sociological authorities in this field, began his researches.⁴ A recent period in the sociological study of the family may be dated from the publication of Mowrer's *Family Disorganization* in 1927. Without making too fine a distinction, it may be said that this was the first American book dealing with the family from a strictly sociological point of view to appear in a number of years.⁵ Earlier works on the family had been quite numerous, but for the most part they had been written from a

¹ New York, 1932.

² Chicago, 1927.

³ See particularly "The Family as a Unity of Interacting Personalities," *The Family*, pp. 3-9, March, 1926; "The Family" (Topical Summaries of Current Literature), *American Journal of Sociology*, vol. 32, pp. 104-115, July, 1926; "The Family and the Person," *Publications of the American Sociological Society*, vol. 22, pp. 133-143, 1928.

⁴ See his *Family Disorganization*, Chicago, 1927; with Harriet R. Mowrer, *Domestic Discord*, Chicago, 1928; *The Family*, Chicago, 1932.

⁵ Some exception to this statement should be made for the following at least: James P. Lichtenberger, *Divorce, A Study in Social Causation*, 1909; Arthur J. Todd, *The Primitive Family as an Educational Agency*, 1913; and Earle E. Eubank, *A Study of Family Desertion*, Chicago, 1916.

common-sense and practical point of view, or they were primarily historical, ethnological, or psychiatric studies. During the period since the appearance of *Family Disorganization*, a number of other significant sociological works on the family have been published, including Mowrer's other books. Professor Ernest R. Groves has written singly and in collaboration with his wife and with Prof. W. F. Ogburn a number of textbooks and popular works; and Prof. E. B. Reuter of the University of Iowa has published, in collaboration with his colleague Jessie R. Runner, a comprehensive volume of readings on the family for use in college courses. At about the beginning of 1935, two more textbooks, by M. H. Nimkoff and Joseph K. Folsom, respectively, came from the presses.

The publication of so many textbooks for college use in so short a period will doubtless operate to accelerate the development of instruction in this field, which of course it also measures. Fundamentally, this lively interest in the problems of marriage, parenthood, sex, and family life generally is undoubtedly a reflection of the palpable disintegration that the institutional family has undergone in the United States in recent decades. High and rising divorce rates and an increasing amount of extralegal sex activity on the part of nominally respectable people, together with a manifest decrease of the authority of parents over children, have inevitably provoked a great deal of popular discussion, which, in turn, has served as a stimulus to efforts at impartial scientific study of the forces and processes involved.

The Section on the Family of the American Sociological Society, which has a semi-independent organization of its own, has maintained a continuous existence since the annual meeting of the society in St. Louis in December, 1926. Since that time, the section has been represented by one or two "section meetings" at each annual meeting of the society. During the same period, a large number of research studies, books for the general public, and manuals of advice for married persons have been written by others than sociologists, especially by psychiatrists. One effect of the activities of the Section on the Family in the American Sociological Society has been to promote cooperation and the exchange of ideas between these other students of problems relating especially to the family and those who may be classified as sociologists primarily and as students of the family only second-

arily or by specialization. In fact, however, the study of the family by more or less objective and scientific methods is rapidly becoming an important specialty in its own right, standing in no necessary or exclusive relation of dependence to any one more general or fundamental science. A substantial volume might be written on the history and literature of this specialty alone.

CHAPTER XXXII

STATISTICAL METHODS AND CASE STUDIES¹

Along with the proliferation of sociology into a number of specialties, and the shift of American sociologists' attention in large part from speculative and philosophical to specific research undertakings, there has taken place inevitably considerable discussion and investigation of research methods. The development of sociological research methods in the United States has not been characterized by many clearly discernible trends, up to now; however, one such trend has been rather conspicuous, *viz.*, a trend of concentration upon two fairly definite techniques of sociological research, and this has involved, in turn, no little dispute concerning the respective advantages and limitations of these techniques—the statistical method and case study. At a certain period in the development of American sociology, the method of "social survey" attracted a great deal of attention from sociologists and was extensively used; however, in recent years, the prevailing trend seems to be away from the recognition of the survey method as a fundamental method of scientific research.² Quite recently, since about 1920, there has been some

¹ For other and more extended treatment of the topics involved, see, in addition to the various textbooks and treatises of statistical method, particularly the introductory chapters of such books, the following: George A. Lundberg, *Social Research*, New York, 1929; Florian Znaniecki, *The Method of Sociology*, New York, 1934; Stuart A. Rice, ed., *Methods in Social Science*, Chicago, 1931, especially analyses 36 and 40; Walter F. Willcox, Robert M. Woodbury, and Oskar N. Anderson, "Statistics," *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*, vol. XIV; Ernest W. Burgess, Editor's Preface and Discussion, pp. 235-254, in Clifford Shaw, *The Natural History of a Delinquent Career*, Chicago, 1931; W. A. Healy, "The Contribution of Case Studies to Sociology," *Publications of the American Sociological Society*, vol. XVIII, pp. 147-155, 1923; F. N. House, "Measurement in Sociology," *American Journal of Sociology*, vol. 40, pp. 1-11, 1934.

² *The Social Survey: The Idea Defined and Its Development Traced*, reprinted, with changes, from the Introduction to Shelby M. Harrison, *A Bibliography of Social Surveys*, New York, 1931. No judgment on the merits of the question of the scientific value of the social survey is intended here.

trend toward the emergence and differentiation from general sociological inquiry of another research method, sometimes called the method of cultural analysis. The method is supposed to be implied in the researches of anthropologists of the American Historical School; as yet, however, it is not very clearly defined and is difficult to describe in general terms. Practically, the statistical trend and the case-study trend, and the clash of the two, may be regarded as the outstanding features of the recent history of research methods in American sociology. Of the two, the statistical method is much the older as a self-conscious technique of research.

In the earliest use of the term, at the close of the Middle Ages, "statistics" meant facts relative to practical politics and administration in the various countries. These facts were not necessarily in any degree numerical in form but were of the kind, more or less, that are collected from year to year in the *Statesman's Year Book*. In the later sense of the term, with its definitely numerical implications, statistics is a branch of social science, and a method of inquiry, having its taproot in the "political arithmetic" of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.¹ The early writers on this topic were largely instrumental in establishing the idea that a systematic numerical investigation of social, and particularly political, phenomena was possible.

In spite of what can be said of the importance of the pioneer work of these writers on political arithmetic, however, it is largely to the writings of Adolphe Quetelet (1796-1874), Belgian astronomer and statistician, those of Frédéric Le Play (1806-1882), and to Émile Durkheim's *Les règles de la méthode sociologique* (1895) and *Le suicide* (1897) that we may trace the beginnings of the present-day conception of sociology as a statistical science. Quetelet, who had been trained in astronomy and mathematics, Laplace having been among his teachers, was active after 1826 in the statistical work of the Belgian government, and in this connection he did much to develop modern methods of

¹ John Graunt (1620-1674), *Natural and Political Observations . . . Made upon the Bills of Mortality*, London, 1662; Sir William Petty (1623-1687), *Political Arithmetick*, London, 1690; Edmund Halley, life table, London, 1692-1693; J. P. Süssmilch, *Die Gottliche Ordnung*, Berlin, 1761-1762; A. C. Moreau de Jounes, *Éléments de Statistique*, Paris, 1847; Karl Knies, *Die Statistik als selbständige Wissenschaft*, Kassel, 1850.

census taking. He concerned himself also with the extension of statistical methods from physical facts, such as population and mortality rates, to "moral" phenomena, *i.e.*, those determined by psychological factors. He put forth efforts to promote international uniformity and comparability of statistical data. Quetelet is known for his theories of "social physics," which were centered in the conception of the *homme moyen*, or average man.¹ These theories are now regarded as largely erroneous.

LePlay, who was by training a mining engineer, became interested in his observations of the status of working-class people in the different countries of Europe and finally gave up his original profession to devote himself to studies and reform efforts in this field. He evolved a method for the intensive and comparative study of working-class family budgets and a simple conceptual scheme to guide the analysis of social data. "Folk, work, place" is Geddes' rendering in English of Le Play's formula; in other words, social phenomena are to be accounted for in terms of factors of human nature (including culture), occupations or ways of getting a living, and physical environment. Le Play has been represented to be one of the founders of the modern social-survey method; however, his reputation in this respect is due largely to the fact that Patrick Geddes and Victor E. Branford were greatly impressed both by the methods of investigation and by the concepts of Le Play; and they were, in turn, influential in promulgating in England and Scotland, early in our century, a variety of sociology that rested heavily on a survey method. Le Play's most important contributions are found in *Ouvriers Européens*.²

It was natural that the viewpoint of LePlay, briefly indicated in the formula folk, work, place, appealed to Geddes, for it had the effect of assimilating sociology, in large degree, into biology. Geddes was trained as a biologist and won distinction by his publications in that field before he became interested in sociology.

¹ *Physique sociale, ou Essai sur le développement des facultés de l'homme*, 2 vols., Brussels, 1869. See Maurice Halbwachs, in article on Quetelet, *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*, vol. 13; also Frank H. Hankins, *Adolphe Quetelet as Statistician*, Columbia University Studies in History, Economics, and Public Law, No. 84, New York, 1908.

² 2 vols., Paris, 1855; 2d ed., 6 vols., Tours, 1877-1879, reprinted in part as *La réforme sociale en France*, 2 vols., Paris, 1864, 7th ed., 3 vols., 1887.

The attempt to study human society by means of the frame of reference provided by the man-environment conceptual scheme has, in fact, as we have seen, been prominent and persistent in the history of sociology because it has seemed to define an objective approach to otherwise impalpable phenomena. The numerical and statistical devices employed by LePlay in social research commended themselves for much the same reason; to subject phenomena to quantitative measurement is to make them objective, according to a conviction widely prevalent in modern scientific circles. The methods in which LePlay did pioneer work, furthermore, constituted a particularly apt approach to the ideal of quantitative social science, though he may not have been entirely conscious of their total implications; for to study social phenomena in their environmental setting tends to involve taking them in their spatial extension and distribution, and this facilitates a statistical treatment of the data.¹

The third of the outstanding beginnings of modern statistical sociology mentioned above, that found in certain works of Émile Durkheim, has been previously considered in an earlier chapter. The sociology of Durkheim is, on the whole, characterized more strongly by other tendencies than by the use of statistical methods; however, in *Les règles de la méthode sociologique*, he paid some attention to the possibilities of exact quantitative research in sociology; and in *Le suicide*, he offered a rather impressive demonstration of the possibilities of statistical method in the investigation of a phenomenon for which, on the basis of the data marshaled by such methods, a fundamental sociological explanation might be offered.

A more important pioneer use of statistical methods in social research, in some respects, than any of those mentioned was that due to the efforts of Charles Booth, who conceived and directed an elaborate study of the London poor, which served as the pattern for a number of subsequent studies of urban communities and their population.² Although Booth displayed no particular

¹ Cf. R. E. Park, "Sociology," Chap. I in Wilson Gee, ed., *Research in the Social Sciences*, New York, 1929; see particularly pp. 29-33.

² *Life and Labour of the People*, 2 vols., 1889-1891, revised, greatly enlarged, and republished as *Life and Labour of the People of London*, 17 vols. plus 1 vol. of maps, 1903.

eagerness to call his work "sociology," it was generally accepted as such; and, since *Life and Labour of the People of London* is the report of one of the most elaborate and intensive pieces of private statistical investigation that has ever been undertaken, the study had great importance as a demonstration of the possibilities of the methods used. Because of the way in which Booth and his assistants located phenomena on city maps as an incident of their statistical and other studies, this study of working-class sections of London may be regarded as one of the important antecedents of the "ecological" studies of the city which were launched at the University of Chicago, beginning about 1920.

As we have previously noted, one of the principal antecedents of academic sociology in the United States was the philanthropic and reformist "social-science" movement which went on so actively in this country during the nineteenth century. Statistical investigations developed in a natural and common-sense way in connection with this movement; so that statistical methods may be said to have found their way into the thought of American sociologists at the very beginning of their endeavors and were largely taken for granted. Recognition of the importance of statistics for various purposes was evidenced by the founding of the American Statistical Association in 1839. Fifty years later, in 1889, this organization began the publication of its *Quarterly*, later the *Journal of the American Statistical Association*. The very fact, however, that statistics was thus early established as a separate science has had an effect upon the later relations of statistics and sociology. It meant that the most technical and recondite statistical studies of social phenomena were carried out and reported, to a considerable extent, under the auspices of a distinct organization, rather than as enterprises of the sociologists. To this day, technical statistical studies and discussions of the more recondite problems of statistical method do not occupy a very large place in the pages of American sociological journals; and many studies in which sociologists might be expected to be interested are reported in the pages of the *Journal of the American Statistical Association*. The fact that statistical inquiries of any but the simplest character require special mathematical training doubtless has something to do with the fact that sociologists, who in many cases have not had such training, have not more universally carried on statistical studies.

At all events, one of the earliest courses of instruction in sociology to be offered at a leading American university was Prof. Richmond Mayo-Smith's "statistics and sociology," given at Columbia University beginning about 1880; and in 1895, a substantial textbook of the same title was published by Mayo-Smith and seems to have been used at the turn of the century for purposes of college instruction in a number of institutions. The association of Columbia University with "statistical sociology" in the minds of the initiated apparently dates from the work of Mayo-Smith; however, Giddings presently supported him in the statistical emphasis.¹ In 1899, Carroll D. Wright, former director of the Bureau of the Census, published the first edition of his *Outline of Practical Sociology*, a book obviously developed on the assumption that sociology is largely concerned with statistical data. In 1902, Prof. F. H. Giddings published his *Inductive Sociology*, which was intended as a manual of sociological research and laboratory instruction and was designed throughout to indicate how such research might be made quantitative, i.e., statistical. In this book, Giddings laid down implicitly, and almost explicitly, the proposition that runs through all his later works, that sociology is a science the method of which is essentially statistical, although it makes use of psychological interpretations of its data.² To what extent the emphasis on statistical methods which has been so characteristic of Giddings and his students reflects the influence of his predecessor and senior colleague at Columbia University, Mayo-Smith, and to what extent it resulted from Giddings' early newspaper experience it is scarcely possible to say. At any rate, from an early date in the history of university instruction in sociology in the United States, Columbia University has been known as the home of statistical sociology. W. F. Ogburn, now of the University of Chicago,

¹ The impression that Columbia stands for statistical method in sociology, Chicago for case study, cannot be conclusively documented; the writer found it widely prevalent among graduate students in sociology at the University of Chicago in 1922, although the contrast was somewhat deprecated by members of the sociological faculty there. Subsequently, during the period 1925-1927, the members of the existing sociological faculty strove to counteract the impression that Chicago sociology was in any sense anti-statistical, through the move that resulted in the addition of Ogburn to the staff.

² *Op. cit.*, see especially pp. 9, 10, 17, 20-25.

C. E. Gehlke of Western Reserve University, Stuart A. Rice of the Bureau of the Census, and George A. Lundberg of Columbia University are among the more prominent of the former students of Giddings who have carried on this tradition.¹

So strong has the tradition of statistical method in sociology been in the United States that there has been an undeniable tendency on the part of some sociologists to take the position that sociology is a science essentially statistical in method, that the extent to which its inquiries and its findings assume the numerical or quantitative form is a quite accurate and sufficient measure of the extent to which sociology has become scientific. In other words, there seems to be a disposition on the part of American sociologists of one school of thought to deny the term "scientific," except with marked reservations, to everything in sociology but statistical methods and findings. Meanwhile, the development of statistical research, and of instruction in statistical methods for students of sociology, has proceeded rather rapidly at a number of the leading American universities. By adding Ogburn to the faculty, the University of Chicago Department of Sociology took a step calculated to strengthen greatly this phase of its work, and the results of the step are already visible.

Presumably, the results of these developments will be to exploit and to test rather thoroughly the possibilities of statistical methods for the investigation of sociological problems; and these results should contribute to the advancement of the science. Up to now, there has been a notable lack of agreement as to what it is, precisely, that statistical methods and statistical data can contribute toward the ultimate objectives of sociological thought and research. This state of affairs no doubt reflects, in turn, the lack of a general consensus of opinion concerning those objectives. There is a rather wide adherence to the Comtean, positivist view that the purpose of sociological research, as of all other scientific research, is to establish somewhat generalized

¹ William F. Ogburn, "The Folkways of a Scientific Sociology," presidential address before the American Sociological Society at Washington, D. C., December, 1929, *Publication of the American Sociological Society*, vol. 24, No. 2, pp. 1-11, 1930; Stuart A. Rice, *Quantitative Methods in Politics*, New York, 1928; Stuart A. Rice, ed., *Statistics in Social Studies*, Philadelphia, 1930; George A. Lundberg, *Social Research*, New York, 1929.

statements of fact; and statistics appear as the natural outcome of this effort. Other American sociologists seem to take, in general, the position that the ultimate purpose of sociological research is to establish a knowledge of social processes and social causation, formulated in general, *i.e.*, generalized, terms; and that social causation takes place primarily on the psychic level, on the level of the action and interaction of organisms, each acting as a totality.¹ Those who maintain this position are, on the whole, disinclined to believe that knowledge of social processes can ever be grounded solely or primarily on data of the statistical type, however recondite may be the analyses to which they are subjected.

There is at present much less literature dealing theoretically and critically, but sympathetically, with any method of sociological research that can be clearly distinguished from the statistical method than there is literature on the statistical method as applied in sociology and other social sciences. In fact, no other well-defined method of sociological inquiry can be said to exist down to the present time. Nevertheless, some effort has been made, on the part of a number of American sociologists, to define and develop a method of research that is referred to as the "case-study method." The use of this term has been somewhat unfortunate and confusing, for it leads, on the one hand, to identification of the sociologists' proposals for the use of case study as a method of scientific research with the case studies undertaken by social workers for the purposes of diagnosis and treatment of social maladjustments of individuals and families. On the other hand, the proponents of statistical method as the ultimate method of sociological research have sought to identify the cases that are involved in the proposals for case study as a method of scientific research with the cases—not infrequently so designated—that serve as the units enumerated in any statistical inquiry.²

¹ Cf. Morris R. Cohen, *Reason and Nature*, pp. 334–367, especially pp. 334–336, 352 ff., New York, 1931, see also Florian Znaniecki, *The Method of Sociology*, pp. 225–235, New York, 1934; William A. White, *The Meaning of Disease, passim*, Baltimore, 1926.

² Stuart A. Rice, "Case Method and Statistical Method in History and Science," Chap. IV in *Quantitative Methods in Politics*, New York, 1928; George A. Lundberg, "Case Studies and the Statistical Method," Chap. VIII in *Social Research*, New York, 1929. Both Rice and Lundberg are

As conceived by those who have been most interested in developing it, the case-study method of sociological research is identical neither with the case studies of the social worker—though the latter may be made to serve the purposes of scientific sociological research, in some instances, if recorded with sufficient fullness—nor with the units enumerated by the statistician, no matter how many “attributes” of his cases the statistician may seek to take into account. As indicated above, case study, conceived as a distinctive method of scientific sociological research, may be described primarily as a method of establishing knowledge of the processes of social and personal behavior, a method rendered necessary or eminently desirable by the fact that such behavior can be made most intelligible to us when it is explained in terms of the psychic, or subjective, processes and motives by which it is determined.¹ There now exists a limited body of methodological literature dealing with the case-study method of sociological research from this point of view, also a number of interesting published examples of the possibilities of the method, the development of which, however, has not gone very far in comparison with what are believed to be its possibilities or in comparison with the development of statistical techniques.²

The history of sociology in the United States in the period since 1918, with which the immediately foregoing chapters have been concerned, has been in no small degree the history of the development of these two rival methods of research, the statistical and the case-study methods. So keen has been the rivalry of the two, and so ardent the desire of the proponents of each to

enthusiastic exponents of the statistical method and take correspondingly qualified attitudes of approval toward the case-study method.

¹ Cf. Werner Sombart, *Die drei Nationalökonomien*, Munich, 1930; see particularly Part III: “Die verstehende Nationalökonomie,” especially Chap. 13, pp. 192 ff., “Das Verstehen.” See also Max Weber, “Ueber einige Kategorien der verstehenden Soziologie,” *Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Wissenschaftslehre*, pp. 403–450, Tübingen, 1922.

² Clifford R. Shaw, *The Jack-roller*, Chicago, 1930, especially Chap. I and “Discussion” by E. W. Burgess, pp. 185 ff.; *The Natural History of a Delinquent Career*, Chicago, 1931, especially Editor’s Preface and “Discussion,” by E. W. Burgess, pp. 235 ff. The statements formulated by Burgess for inclusion in these two volumes, which exemplify admirably the possibilities of the case-study method, are perhaps the best extant discussions of the method.

justify their positions, that no little money and effort have been expended on research projects the principal avowed purpose of which has been to demonstrate the possibilities of certain techniques and not to produce any other kind of useful or important sociological knowledge. It is questionable whether sociological researches which promise to cost much, in time and money, should not be chosen for support primarily with reference to the need for and importance of the knowledge that they are designed to establish.¹

¹ F. N. House, "Measurement in Sociology," *American Journal of Sociology*, vol. 40, pp. 1-11, July, 1934; F. Stuart Chapin, "Measurement in Sociology," *ibid.*, vol. 40, pp. 476-480, 1935; Read Bain, "Measurement in Sociology," *ibid.*, vol. 40, pp. 481-488. The two latter papers are critical discussions of the former.

PART VI

**RECENT THEORETIC SOCIOLOGY IN EUROPE
AND AMERICA**

CHAPTER XXXIII

SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY AND SOCIAL RESEARCH

The interest in research and research methods which has been increasingly characteristic of American sociology since 1885 has not been exclusively a matter of experimentation with techniques of investigation, in the narrow sense. In fact, the drive for the improvement of research which began to be conspicuous in sociological circles in the United States at the beginning of the twentieth century was in its beginnings expressed in terms of something obscurely referred to as "methodology," and the problems of methodology were not understood to be at all the same as those involved in "statistical method," "the survey method," "case study," and the like. It is almost impossible to ascertain from the early references to methodology in the works of such authors as Small and Sumner precisely what these men meant by the term. It is fairly clear, however, in the light of German philosophical and logical works of the period, with which the pioneers of American sociology are known to have been familiar, that to them methodology meant chiefly the better, more adequate and consistent definition and use of conceptual terms.¹

In its beginnings, as Park has aptly remarked, sociology was conceived "in the grand manner," as the general theory or philosophy of a vaguely inclusive something called "society." Comte's contributions to sociology were of this type; and so were those of Spencer and Lester F. Ward, in the main. If it may be said to have been a part of their endeavor to determine the concepts of sociology, then they did not get much farther along with

¹ Christoph Sigwart, *Logic*, trans. by Helen Dendy, vol. II, p. 3, London and New York, 1895: "The general problem of methodology is to show how we may apply our natural mental activities in such a way that, starting from a given state of thought and knowledge, we may attain the object of human thought by an ideally perfect process; a process that is, in which none but fully determined concepts and adequately grounded judgments are employed." See also pp. 3-5, *passim*, 10, 19-20, 22.

the task than to define "society" as a realm of phenomena more or less distinct from physical, organic, and individual-psychic phenomena and to call attention to the fact and the importance of the interdependence and communication of human beings. The concept of "culture" was implicit in the social theories of Comte, as it had been in the theories of Vico and Montesquieu before him, but it was scarcely made explicit. In short, as long as sociology remained primarily social philosophy, it achieved little more than the incomplete determination of one or two point-of-view concepts, which served to indicate the direction of attention which sociological inquiry would have to take or to designate, vaguely, the objects of attention with which a science of sociology would have to be concerned. To define a point of view for a science is much the same thing as to define its objects of attention; the one aim is accomplished in about the same measure as the other.

Bit by bit, however, the labors of the pioneer American sociologists resulted in the further clarification of sociological concepts, and the beginnings of sociological analysis were accomplished. Sumner brought the phenomena of culture clearly into focus and pointed out that culture might be analyzed into units which he called folkways, mores, and institutions. Giddings made some contribution to an understanding of the forces constituting a society out of an aggregate of individuals, through his definition of the concepts "like-mindedness" and "consciousness of kind." Small and Ward pointed the way to an analysis of the social behavior of human beings into certain universal, basic motives, called desires or interests. Baldwin and Cooley made an important contribution to the definition of the concept of the individual-as-member-of-society, through their treatment of personality and the social self. LeBon's treatment of the crowd, available after 1896 in English translation; Sumner's discussion of the in-group and out-group; Small's generalized discussion of the group concept; and Cooley's presentation of the primary group concept helped to shift the attention of American sociologists from "society" in general to the many and various groups in which human beings live and act.

It seems to be true, however, that a greater and more important influence upon sociological methodology, *i.e.*, the definition of usable sociological concepts, was exercised at the turn of the

century through the development of interest in what has been termed the "natural history" of human society. This development has been touched upon in an earlier chapter, with particular reference to its manifestations in British literature. What it has amounted to, more and more in recent years, is the emergence of an interest in the generalized or conceptualized description of particular types of social phenomena, as contrasted with the philosophical treatment of society in general which was so conspicuous in the earlier works that were offered as "sociology." Maine's work on the history of legal institutions, Bagehot's *Physics and Politics*, the Webbs' studies of trade-unionism, Westermarck's studies of moral ideas and human marriage, and Jane Harrison's account of the social origins of Greek religion have been mentioned as outstanding examples of this tendency in British social thought; in the United States, a somewhat similar tendency was manifested after the beginning of the twentieth century in J. M. Williams, *An American Town* (1906), C. J. Galpin, *The Social Anatomy of an Agricultural Community* (1915) and subsequent studies, and R. E. Park's "The City—Suggestions for the Study of Human Behavior in the Urban Environment" (1915). The characteristic that the British studies referred to have in common, as Park pointed out,¹ is that, in turning attention from historical periods to institutions, they involve comparison, classification, the formulation of concepts, and eventually the formulation of laws, *i.e.*, the description of natural processes in general terms. In so far as the American studies of rural and urban communities mentioned involved the more or less self-conscious use and refinement of the concept "community" and subordinate or related concepts, they exemplified the same tendency—the tendency for history to become sociology, but a kind of sociology which, in contrast to the earlier philosophical sociology, involved the study of actual, concrete phenomena. It has been through the use of these methods, largely, that the concepts of sociology have been defined so that they can be used in research. The development and use of these concepts seem to constitute an advance in the methodology that American

¹ "Sociology and the Social Sciences," *American Journal of Sociology*, vol. 26, pp. 401–424, 1920–1921; vol. 27, pp. 1–21, 169–183, 1921–1922, reprinted as Chap. I in R. E. Park and E. W. Burgess, *Introduction to the Science of Sociology*; see especially pp. 16–18 in the latter.

sociologists were seeking at the beginning of the century on the basis of the suggestions gained from German philosophy and formal logic.

However, the earlier, self-conscious interest in methodology on the part of American sociologists had a career more or less independent of the development of the natural-history method. Small made an attempt to formulate some of the principles of such a methodology in a long journal article published in 1898. There is no evidence that this article ever exerted any influence, nor can it be regarded as a particularly illuminating contribution to the subject.¹ Much the same comments, with reservations, may be made concerning Lester F. Ward's chapter on "Methodology" in *Pure Sociology*. In 1902, F. L. Tolman, summing up some of the findings of a study of the teaching of sociology in American colleges and universities, made the challenging assertion:

Sociology must define itself as a body of doctrine, as a point of view, or as a method of research. It has tried to define itself as a body of doctrine, and it has failed in the attempt. If it is merely a point of view, it cannot be separated from the matter in discussion and must subordinate itself to the various social sciences. It has as yet made no serious attempt to develop itself as a method of research and must develop itself along these lines and show its fruitfulness before it can demand consideration at the bar of science.²

Whether Tolman's sweeping assertions, and in particular his summary dismissal of the possibility of defining sociology as a point of view, are tenable is a question that might profitably receive consideration. It may be plausibly contended that the basic sciences are distinguished from each other almost exclusively as points of view. These assertions were extremely challenging, but it must be admitted that for some time after they were made, no great response to the challenge was perceptible on the part of American sociologists. During the first ten or fifteen years of the twentieth century, sociology was not taught or studied in

¹ *American Journal of Sociology*, vol. 4, pp. 113-144, 235-256, 380-394, 1898-1899. On a reprint of this article, found by the writer in Dr. Small's files after his death, he had written approximately the following words: "This is the most abortive thing I ever published. It didn't amount to anything and didn't deserve to amount to anything."

² "The Study of Sociology in the Institutions of Learning in the United States," *American Journal of Sociology*, vol. 8, p. 86, 1902-1903.

the United States as a research discipline, if by "research" we understand the systematic study of concrete phenomena, or problems, without immediate reference to ethical or practical considerations. Research of a sort was going on, *viz.*, that which consisted of the critical examination, analysis, and comparison of the theories that had already been formulated by various writers, but research into concrete human situations and problems, except for investigations that were strongly motivated by immediate ethical or humanitarian aims, was almost nonexistent, and naturally there could be no fruitful consideration of the methods to be pursued in the study of such problems.

In 1901, however, Giddings published his *Inductive Sociology*, which was definitely intended to serve as a manual for use not only in the classroom but also in actual research. The author stated that the volume had taken shape gradually, in connection with the prosecution of inductive studies of rural and urban communities, carried on under his direction by graduate students of Columbia University. How much influence the book exercised is difficult to ascertain; not many well-known research publications by former Columbia University students bear any obvious earmarks of having been guided by this manual. The productivity of these students has been considerable, however, particularly along statistical lines, and no doubt Giddings' suggestions in *Inductive Sociology* are to be credited with some influence upon these studies. A noteworthy feature of the book is its general plan, according to which suggestions for specific procedures of investigation are grouped under a few conceptual headings, such as "Mental and Practical Resemblance," "The Consciousness of Kind," "Concerted Volition," and "The Character and Efficiency of Organization." In other words, the general concepts developed and elaborated in Giddings' other works are here proposed as the chief intellectual instruments of research. These concepts tend to define the objects of attention in the research suggested. This is, of course, in harmony with the general view that methodology involves the exact determination of concepts. A few years later, in 1905, Small definitely suggested, in his *General Sociology*, that the result of sociological inquiry up to that time had been, mainly, the definition of a number of concepts, or "categories."¹

¹ *Op. cit.*, Chaps. XXVIII, XXIX, pp. 397 ff.

During the period from 1910 to 1920, no conspicuous progress was made with this fundamental phase of sociological method in the United States. Exactly why this was so it is impossible to say. The preoccupation of American sociologists with investigations of the survey type, discussed in the preceding chapter, probably served to some extent to distract them from the task of defining their concepts more adequately; then, too, the incidents of the World War and the interest in Americanization arising out of the war gave a certain bent to sociologists' thought and inquiry. Since 1920, the interest in sociological research has undergone a marked increase, and, while the resulting research activities seem to have been predominantly statistical, this tendency has been paralleled by a considerable revival of interest in the definition of sociological concepts. Possibly the most important immediate causal factor in the latter development was the publication of the Park and Burgess *Introduction to the Science of Sociology* in 1921. This volume, which is characterized by the vigorous attack that it makes upon the problem of definition of concepts, was designed for use as a textbook in basic college courses in sociology, but its use in graduate classes at the University of Chicago and elsewhere was probably more influential than its use in undergraduate classes. Under this influence, a generation of University of Chicago graduate students were strongly impressed by the idea that the definition of concepts was an important part of the task of sociological research.

This recent period (since 1920) has seen the publication of a number of significant books on research methods in sociology and the social sciences generally; and in the majority of these volumes, clear recognition was accorded to the principle that the development of more adequate research in the social sciences, and in sociology in particular, involves methodological, *i.e.*, conceptual, as well as technical problems. In *An Introduction to Social Research* (1929), Howard W. Odum and Katherine Jocher reviewed the recent literature of social science with reference to its bearings on research problems and methods. During the same year, there appeared *Research in the Social Sciences*, edited by Wilson Gee, a volume made up of lectures by eminent authorities on the methods and objectives of research in the recognized social-science specialties. These lectures were concerned as much with questions of logic and methodology as

with research techniques, and this is notably true of the lecture on "Sociology" by R. E. Park. On the other hand, Professor George A. Lundberg's *Social Research*, which was published in the same year (1929), is definitely a manual of techniques of investigation and was the first book of this nature and of comprehensive scope to appear in the United States after Giddings' *Inductive Sociology*.¹

About two years later, early in 1931, appeared the most monumental contribution to the literature of social-science research methods that had been published in the United States up to that time, the volume of 800 large pages edited by Stuart A. Rice for the Committee on Scientific Method in the Social Sciences, of the Social Science Research Council, under the title *Methods in Social Science—A Case Book*. As its title suggests, it is made up largely of analyses by various American social scientists of specific pieces of research in social science. Not only sociology but economics, political science, anthropology, social work, and some aspects of psychology and history are represented in this massive volume. The attempt was made, in the studies that were included, to consider problems of logic and conceptualization as well as specific research techniques and to relate the two to each other. A number of the analyses that are included in this book are important contributions to the literature of social-science methodology.

In the following year (1932), there was published in London and New York a modest volume of slightly over 250 pages by Sidney and Beatrice Webb, entitled *Methods of Social Study*. It has a value beyond that suggested by its unpretentious title; for no other book so far published in the English language informs the student so clearly of the actual, concrete procedures followed by the authors in the execution of social-science research of a certain type, which may be loosely described as the natural history of institutions. An introductory chapter indicates that the Webbs consider their field to be sociological; however, the term is obviously used broadly, rather than in keeping with a strict logical definition of the science of sociology. In fact, this book may be regarded as an example of the characteristically British tendency to organize research in the social sciences around

¹ See, however, F. H. Giddings, *Scientific Study of Human Society*, Chapel Hill, N. C., 1924.

practical problems rather than with reference to the logical divisions of a science. The book makes practically no contribution to methodology, in the sense of definition of concepts, but it is important for the contribution that it makes to a better understanding of the task of research as the adequate description of institutions.

Since 1932, three volumes dealing with the research methods of sociology and of general social science have been published in the United States. In 1933, Prof. Charles A. Ellwood published a small volume entitled *Methods in Sociology*, with a critical introduction by Howard Jensen. It is concerned primarily with questions of the logic, objectives, and scope of sociological research, rather than with specific techniques of investigation, and is a forceful statement of a point of view far removed from that of the more enthusiastic proponents of statistical methods and "objectivity" in social research. During the same year, John J. Haden and Eduard C. Lindeman published their *Dynamic Social Research*, which is made up almost entirely of detailed, critical accounts of the methods used by them in a specific study of employee participation in the management of certain business and industrial establishments. The attempt is made to formulate the logical presuppositions and implications of the methods used. In the following year (1934) appeared Florian Znaniecki's *The Method of Sociology*, which is, in some respects, the most profound discussion of sociological methodology that has been developed to the dimensions of a fair-sized volume in the English language up to the time of its publication. Particularly notable are Znaniecki's general defence of inquiry into theoretic methodology¹ and his principle of "closed systems."² He undertakes practically no inquiry, however, into any but the most general concepts of sociology, such as culture.

On the other hand, in a substantial volume entitled *The Concepts of Sociology* (1932), Prof. E. E. Eubank has undertaken a comprehensive and critical survey of the technical vocabulary of sociology and has attempted to show how these conceptual terms may be organized into a logical system. The importance of fundamental concepts was emphasized by a committee of the American Sociological Society on the teaching of sociology in the

¹ *Op. cit.*, Preface, p. vi, New York, 1934.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 11-21.

general introductory college course. In their report, formulated in 1933, they proposed a list of approximately sixty technical sociological terms which they agreed that students completing the introductory college course in sociology should be able to understand and use intelligently.¹ Perhaps the best existing statement of the methodological importance of adequately determined concepts for the purposes of scientific sociology is that formulated by Herbert Blumer in his paper "Science without Concepts."² Professor Blumer has been working on the problem since this paper was published,³ and it is to be hoped that he will be able eventually to publish other valuable discussions.

The purpose of the foregoing survey of some features of the development of sociology in the twentieth century has been, partly, to emphasize the importance of the fact that, while in the United States the tendency has been to develop sociology increasingly as a research specialty, theoretic inquiry and discussion have not ceased to attract attention. The development of sociological theory is important because it is the development of the tools of research, in the most fundamental sense. Considerable interest properly attaches, therefore, to the more substantial contributions to sociological theory that have been published during our own century, in this country and in Europe. Some of those contributions have been reviewed in previous chapters; others, which for various reasons have been omitted from the foregoing sections of this volume, will be considered in the remaining chapters. Since 1905, there have been published a number of substantial volumes which are primarily contributions to sociological theory, to the definition of concepts and points of view. We now turn to them.

¹ *Journal of Educational Sociology*, vol. 7, pp. 81-82, 1933-1934.

² *American Journal of Sociology*, vol. 36, pp. 515 ff., 1930-1931.

³ See the brief report of his address "The Search for Method in Sociology," University of Chicago, *Bulletin of the Society for Social Research*, p. 4, March, 1935.

CHAPTER XXXIV

THE "FORMAL SOCIOLOGY" OF SIMMEL AND VON WIESE

The earliest important and influential contribution to sociological theory, other than those that have been previously discussed, was that made by Georg Simmel, in his *Soziologie*¹ and other publications. The sociological theories of Simmel were made accessible to American students, in fragments, through the publication of translations of the more important of his early scattered writings in the *American Journal of Sociology* beginning in 1895.² They were probably the most subtle and searching discussions of sociological methodology that attracted the attention of American sociologists in the nineties or for some time thereafter. In this respect, they were equaled, if at all, only by the writings of Ferdinand Tönnies which have been mentioned in a previous chapter; and it does not appear that American sociologists paid much attention to the methodological contributions of Tönnies, although his distinction between *Gemeinschaft* (community) and *Gesellschaft* (society) was known. Simmel's sociological theory and method served as the principal point of departure for the subsequent work of Leopold von Wiese, which will be considered in the latter part of this chapter, and, perhaps to a lesser extent, for the work of Alfred Vierkandt, which is discussed in a later chapter of this volume. Vierkandt and von Wiese have been two of the most important and influential German sociologists of recent decades.)

Georg Simmel was born in Berlin Mar. 1, 1858. Although he eventually adhered to the evangelical faith, he was of Jewish parentage, a fact that affected his career considerably, as it prevented him from receiving normal promotions at the Univer-

¹ 1st ed. 1908, preceded by many scattered writings dating from 1890.

² See Nicholas J. Spykman's comprehensive bibliography of Simmel's publications in *The Social Theory of Georg Simmel*, pp. 277-289, Chicago, 1925.

sity of Berlin. He received the degree Doctor of Philosophy at this university in 1881, his main field of study being philosophy, with special attention to Kant. He studied under a number of famous teachers, including Treitschke, Lazarus, and Bastian, but, except in the sense that he is classed as a neo-Kantian philosopher, his own work cannot be said to continue any particular school of thought or to be based mainly on the teachings of any one man. He began his life work as a teacher of philosophy, becoming *Privatdozent* (instructor) in the University of Berlin in 1885 and *Ausserordentlicher Professor* (associate professor) in 1900. In 1914, he became professor of philosophy ordinarius (full professor) in the University of Strassburg, where he taught during the war period until his death, which occurred on Sept. 28, 1918. According to Spykman, author of the principal English commentary on the work of Simmel, his principal works are *Einleitung in die Morawissenschaft* (2 vols., 1892-1893), *Philosophie des Geldes* (1900), *Soziologie* (1908), *Kant* (1913), *Goethe* (1913), *Schopenhauer und Nietzsche* (1907), *Rembrandt* (1916), and *Lebensanschauung: Vier metaphysische Kapitel* (1918).¹ He is reported to have been a stimulating and influential teacher, but he cannot be said to have founded a "school" of sociological thought, any more than he can be said to have continued one.

Like Tönnies and many other writers of the period, Simmel held that formal philosophy, though it is not to be identified with science, nevertheless bears a close logical relation to it. Philosophy, he said, flanks science on either side: on the one side, as the critique of the presuppositions and assumptions by which alone any particular system of scientific inquiry is made possible; and, on the other, as the more complete, though tentative, synthesis of truth concerning a certain order of phenomena, knowledge of which the science is able to establish only in a fragmentary way, up to a given time, by induction from empirical observation and laboratory experiment.² Probably he would have agreed that the need of a science to be supplemented in this way by philosophic investigation is especially great in the case of a new science like sociology, which has very imperfectly explored its own field. At any rate, it was chiefly to the two marginal

¹ Spykman, *op. cit.*, p. xxv.

² *Soziologie*, 2d ed., p. 20, Munich and Leipzig, 1922 See also Spykman, *op. cit.*, pp. 7-16, 56-58.

philosophical fields which he termed the epistemology and the metaphysics of sociology, respectively, that Simmel made his most important contributions. He did not pretend to have made contributions to sociology as a science, other than of a very fragmentary, tentative, exploratory character. His *Soziologie* is not offered as a "system," or "treatise," on the subject or as "general" sociology; on the contrary, he gave it the secondary title "An Investigation of the Forms of Socialization." As a preliminary inquiry into the nature and possibilities of scientific sociology, however, the book is sufficiently important to merit careful study.

In pursuance of his idea of inquiry into the philosophy—the epistemology and metaphysics—of sociology, as most broadly and inclusively conceived, Simmel undertakes to distinguish logically between sociology, narrowly conceived, and the other social studies: history, social psychology, and the special social sciences such as economics and politics. The question What is history? does not seem to have interested Simmel greatly. He apparently took it for granted that history, in the simplest sense of the term, is an account of social happenings, expressed in common-sense language and in narrative and descriptive form. He was greatly interested, however, in the logical characterization of historical interpretation and the philosophy of history. In the last analysis, his philosophical position, with reference to the interpretation of history, was relativistic; apparently, he did not believe that generalizations of timeless validity concerning the life of society were possible.¹ On the other hand, he designated as the objective of sociological inquiry the search for precisely such timeless laws or generalizations of the forms of social interaction—laws that would be at the same time explanations of the processes of social becoming. If there is here an inconsistency in his social philosophy, one must make the best of it. Actually, Simmel's distinction between sociology and the philosophy or interpretation of history is essentially this: Either the historical interpretation, often formulated in so-called "historical laws," is the crude, preliminary description of certain events, regarded as unitary and self-contained, without any searching analysis of the events into their real elements; or it is the projection of

¹ Spykman, *op. cit.*, pp. 5-20; see also, however, p. 267.

historical events on a plane separate and distinct from that established by sociological analysis. In either case, he holds that the concept of "historical laws" will eventually dissolve and give way to more exact knowledge of social process.¹

Simmel's distinction between sociology and social psychology and his distinction between sociology and the special social sciences such as economics and politics are alike based upon that between the form and the content of social interaction which is placed at the base of his "social epistemology." It is his thesis that society and groups exist only because, and in so far as, the individual human beings, or other elements, of which they are composed stand in a more intimate relation of interaction with one another than they do with other things in their environment. In this respect, however, social groups are not fundamentally different from physical objects. It is interaction that constitutes "things" of a certain order from the smaller units or elements into which they may be analyzed. (It is the function of sociology, as a distinct science, to investigate the characteristic "forms" of social interaction, *i.e.*, its recurrent configurations; while the special social sciences of economics, politics, and the like have the function of investigating the "content" of social interaction. Psychology is concerned with the processes in individual minds which, to be sure, constitute the content of social interaction; and social psychology is simply a branch of general psychology.²

The principal content of Simmel's *Soziologie* consists of discussions of particular forms of socialization, offered as experimental demonstrations of his method and its application. Among the particular topics with which he deals are conflict; subordination and superordination; secrecy and secret societies; the intersection of social circles; the poor; hereditary offices; the role of the stranger; and the nobility. He emphasizes the fact that a great deal of social interaction takes place in the interstices of the social order as constituted by the major institutions. Critics of his "formal sociology" have contended that, in his treatment of these topics, he does not distinguish between form and content of social interaction as his methodological propositions demand and that in fact it is quite impossible or undesirable

¹ *Ibid.*, Book I, Chap. V, *passim*; see especially pp. 64-67.

² *Soziologie*, Chap. I, *passim*; see also, on social psychology, pp. 421-425. See also Spykman, *op. cit.*, Chaps. I, II, III.

to do so.¹ The fact remains, however, that in Simmel's treatment of various topics there is much that is suggestive and revealing; and one is inclined to feel that, while his distinction between the form and the content of socialization is neither entirely intelligible nor tenable in the formulation that he was able to give to it, it nevertheless expresses a principle that the social science of the future will have to take into account. In spite of its rather vague and abstruse character, the concept of the form of a certain type of social interaction has served to guide sociological research into fruitful channels, even in the case of students who have not been consciously influenced by it.

Of all contemporary sociologists, the one who seems to have been influenced by Simmel more than any other is Leopold von Wiese, who was, for some years, professor of sociology and head of the research institute for social science at the University of Cologne, Germany. Although, in a preface to the first volume of his principal treatise,² he writes as though he had been influenced almost equally by Simmel, Waxweiler, and E. A. Ross, critics of his work have generally agreed in treating it as the development in a certain direction of the formal sociology of Simmel. To be sure, where Simmel emphasized *Wechselwirkung* (interaction) and *Vergesellschaftung* (socialization) and thus concentrated attention on the process, or dynamic aspect, of social phenomena, von Wiese employed instead the terms *Beziehung* (connection, relationship) and *Gebilde* (structure, or form), which seem to direct attention upon the static, structural, or substantive aspects. However, von Wiese makes it perfectly clear that he uses these terms of less dynamic implication simply as a convenience of expression and abstraction. He says, "Not really the relationship (*Beziehung*) but the social process is our object [of attention]."³ Wiese's "social structures" (*Gebilde*) are, simply, somewhat stable or persistent complexes of social inter-

¹ P. A. Sorokin, *Contemporary Sociological Theories*, Chap. IX, New York, 1928; Theodore Abel, *Systematic Sociology in Germany*, Chap. I; Columbia University Studies in History, Economics, and Public Law, No. 310, New York, 1929; Alfred Vierkandt, article on Simmel, *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*, vol. 14.

² *Allgemeine Soziologie*, vol. I, *Beziehungslehre*, Munich and Leipzig, 1924; vol. II, *Gebildelehre*, 1929. Freely translated and adapted by Howard Becker, as Wiese-Becker, *Systematic Sociology*, New York, 1932.

³ *Beziehungslehre*, pp. 17-18; see also note, pp. 41-42. ✓

action; in other words, they are precisely the forms of social interaction that Simmel defined as the proper objects of sociological investigation. In some contrast with Simmel, von Wiese brought the subject of motives into the foreground and referred with respect to Thomas and Znaniecki's fourfold classification of wishes, but he took pains to make it clear that he was concerned, with the analysis of social relationships or types of interaction, and with human motives only incidentally; motives must be taken into account, however, because they are the dynamic forces affecting social interaction.¹

Pursuing the same general line of thought that had been developed previously by Simmel, von Wiese devoted his efforts to the definition and systematic elaboration of sociology as a science distinct and (formally) separate from history, psychology, and the special social sciences such as economics and politics. He found the object matter for such a special science of sociology in the social processes, *i.e.*, the types of interaction, by which human beings are brought into temporary or enduring relationships (*Beziehungen*) with one another. For the practical purposes of formulation, he divided his general sociology into two main parts: the theory of social relationships and the theory of social structures, defined as relatively persistent complexes of relationships or interaction. His reaction to the persistent sociological problem of the one and the many, the individual and society, was in part the one so commonly encountered in the recent literature of sociology, *viz.*, a denial of the reality of the dilemma. The individual, he said, can be understood only by reference to the relationships one has and has had with other people; the group can be understood only with the aid of a knowledge of its members. For the purposes of his system, neither the individual nor the group is assumed to be historically antecedent to the other; both are, in a sense, timeless concepts.²

The first volume of von Wiese's (*General Sociology*) is devoted in the main to the elaboration and exposition of a systematic

¹ *Beziehungslehre*, pp. 123-124; *Gebildelehre*, pp. 14-16; see also note, *ibid.*, pp. 38-39.

² *Beziehungslehre*, p. 30; see also Chap. I, *passim*, and *Gebildelehre*, Chap. I, *passim*. Wiese's theoretic and methodological position is stated carefully in these chapters, each of which is supplemented by extensive notes at the close.

table of types of social relationships, a procedure that has been criticized by other sociologists as a relatively unprofitable expenditure of time. He held it possible, however, to reduce all social interaction to two fundamental processes, or movements: those of approach and withdrawal, binding and loosening, though many actual processes are compounded of both these tendencies. He recognized the three general categories of social structures: crowds, groups, and "abstract collectivities." His second volume, in which the subject of social structures is treated at length, is characterized by considerably greater concreteness of subject matter than his discussion of the theory of social relationships in the earlier volume; however, this difference perhaps follows naturally from the distinction that he makes between the two general topics.

It may be expected that the work of Professor von Wiese will eventually have an appreciable influence on sociological thought in the United States, due partly to the publication of Howard Becker's adapted translation of his *Allgemeine Soziologie* under the title *Systematic Sociology* in 1932 and partly to von Wiese's extended visit to the United States beginning in the autumn of 1934. Down to 1935, however, the medium through which the "formal sociology" has probably exercised the most influence upon sociological thought in the United States has been the Park and Burgess *Introduction to the Science of Sociology*, in which several extensive translations from Simmel are included, with appreciative comments, as readings.

CHAPTER XXXV

DIE VERSTEHENDE SOZIOLOGIE

In recent years, the development of sociology in the United States has been characterized by a well-marked trend toward what is variously termed "objectivity," "behaviorism," or statistical method. Proceeding from the general assumption that sociology is, or ought to be, a science and that it is the natural and proper destiny of all sciences to become increasingly quantitative, a large and influential company of leading sociologists have undertaken to develop their subject along these lines as rapidly as may be. The movement toward greater quantitateness in sociology in this country has no doubt been accelerated quite lately by the circumstances created under the Roosevelt administration, with its multiplication of administrative positions under the federal government, many of which have been filled by persons trained as sociologists. The movement seems to run parallel to the development of the formal sociology of Simmel by von Wiese as *Beziehungslehre*, a theory of human relationships. When society is viewed as something that is constituted by the attitudes and acts of approach, withdrawal, and maintained "distance" of persons toward one another, all this being quite definitely conceived in a spatial analogy, the consequence is to give sociological inquiries an "objective," external direction, in form at least. American statistical sociologists, however, do not seem to be generally aware of the possible relation between statistical methods of inquiry and the quasi-spatial conception of social relations and social interaction.¹

As we have noted in a previous chapter, this trend of preoccupation with "objective" data and statistical methods of inquiry has not been entirely unopposed within American sociological circles. Although the opposition has been somewhat inarticulate in comparison with the proponents of statistical method,

¹ Cf. R. E. Park's lecture "Sociology," in Wilson Gee, ed., *Research in the Social Sciences*, Chap. I, New York, 1929.

there has been, notably on the part of those interested in the possibilities of "case study," a disposition in some quarters to resist the movement which has tended to make sociology objective in a rather narrow and precise sense. The logical outcome of this resistance is a quest for a new and improved definition of social science in general and of sociology in particular, with reference especially to its nature, objectives, and essential methods. There is evidence that a number of American sociologists are involved in such a quest, although the very fact that it is a quest for something not yet clearly envisaged gives it the quality of inarticulateness already referred to. In view of these circumstances, a particular interest attaches to a tendency of twentieth century German sociological thought with which, owing to the lack of translations of the significant literature, American sociologists are none too familiar. The central concept of this tendency is expressed by the almost untranslatable phrase which has been used as the title of this chapter—"die *verstehende Soziologie*." A number of modern German philosophers and social scientists, of whom the most important for our purposes are Max Weber and Werner Sombart, have been developing the general thesis that, whereas "natural" science can describe the phenomena with which it is concerned only in terms of elements and factors and the processes of their interaction, the distinctive characteristic and the greatest merit of social science are that it can be built up from the understanding (*Verstehen*) of the behavior of human beings.

Like any other important movement in intellectual history, the development of this *verstehende Soziologie* has been such that one can scarcely designate an event that marks its absolute beginning. Its antecedents could doubtless be traced back indefinitely in the history of European philosophy. For practical purposes, however, the movement may be considered to have begun with the work of Wilhelm Dilthey (1833-1911).¹ Dilthey, who had a distinguished career as professor of philosophy in several German universities, culminating at the University of Berlin after 1882, attracted a great deal of attention with his

¹ Theodore Abel, *Systematic Sociology in Germany*, pp. 129 ff., Columbia University Studies in History, Economics, and Public Law, No. 310, New York, 1929. See also article on Dilthey, *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*, vol. 5.

distinction between the mental sciences (*Geisteswissenschaften*) and the natural sciences. He found this distinction in existing literature, particularly in John Stuart Mill's *Logic*, but he supported it by a line of reasoning, which seems to have been more or less original with him, concerning the differences in method between the two kinds of sciences. The term "science," according to Dilthey, is applicable to any aggregate of propositions the elements of which are completely defined concepts of established interrelation, so that they form a unified whole which serves either to give comprehensive knowledge of some aspect of reality or to regulate some phase of human behavior. The designation of the two great branches of science as "mental" and "natural" is not entirely satisfactory, for it implies too great a separation of the facts of the mental (*geistigen*) life of humanity from the physical;¹ Dilthey adopts this terminology, however, because it is already standard. It has taken shape in philosophical discussion on the basis of the conviction that in the realm of mind or spirit (*Geist*), freedom of the will and self-determination operate, in contrast to the mechanical causation which seems to prevail in the realm of nature. Metaphysics has been unable as yet to establish an adequate formulation of this distinction;² a more secure basis for it is methodological: natural science deals with the external world, known through sense perception; while mental sciences are concerned with the inner world, known to immediate experience and by reflection. This inner experience can be the object matter of experiential science, but its phenomena cannot be deduced from the data of nervous anatomy or other material facts.³ The *Geisteswissenschaften* are characterized also by the fact that they involve three classes of propositions: those that assert individual historical truths, those that express uniformities arrived at by abstraction and generalization, and those that express judgments of value. The historical and the generalized propositions are perhaps more nearly related to each other than either is to propositions that embody evaluations, which can in no case be deduced from judgments of fact; however, the *Geisteswissenschaften* place as high an

¹ *Einleitung in die Geisteswissenschaften*, Gesammelte Schriften, I Band, pp. 4-6, Leipzig, 1922.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 6-7.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 8-9.

importance on individual-historical truths as on scientific generalizations.¹

The foregoing is a summary of certain features of Dilthey's approach to his subject. Of more direct bearing upon the matters that concern us, however, is the argument that he develops in the course of a discussion of the nature and method of social science (*Gesellschaftswissenschaft, Soziologie*). Society, he contends, is a stream of socio-historical happening, constituted through the interaction of individuals. This interaction is infinitely complex and far-reaching; the comprehension of it and the formulation of the laws that govern it are attended with great difficulties. Nevertheless, the phenomena of social interaction are known to the individual as a participant, by direct inner perception. We stand outside nature and can comprehend its workings only to a limited extent, through the power of imagination. The world of society, on the contrary, is our own; we experience the interaction that goes on in it. The other individuals in society are like me, and I can conceive the workings of their inner life. I understand (*verstehen*) the life of society.²

Although the work of Dilthey seems to have been, as has been said, the starting point of the methodological development with which we are here concerned, that development has been carried to a much higher degree of refinement and logical formulation by Heinrich Rickert (1863–). On the basis of the earlier reasoning of Wilhelm Windelband (1848–1915),³ Rickert substitutes for Dilthey's distinction between *Geisteswissenschaft* and *Naturwissenschaft* two others: first, that which can be made between reality considered with respect to the individual, which is history, and reality considered with respect to the general, which is nature;⁴ second, that which can be made between "nature" as the nonevaluating (*wertfrei*) concept of reality and "culture" as reality conceived with reference to value (*wertbe-*

¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 26–27.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 36–37. *Einleitung in die Geisteswissenschaften* was first published in 1883. For the latest expression of Dilthey's ideas on the subject, cf. his *Der Aufbau der Geschichtlichen Welt in den Geisteswissenschaften*. Gesammelte Schriften, VII Band, Leipzig and Berlin, 1927.

³ *Geschichte und Naturwissenschaft*, Strassburg, 1900.

⁴ *Kulturwissenschaft und Naturwissenschaft*, 6th, 7th ed., 1926.

zogene).¹ Of these two distinctions, the latter seems more fundamental to Rickert's treatment of the nature and methods of social science and history. His work has usually been regarded as a contribution, primarily, to the theoretic understanding of historical method; however, his magnum opus, *Die Grenzen der naturwissenschaftlichen Begriffsbildung*, is an important contribution also to the theory and methodology of the generalizing social sciences. Rickert opposes the position taken, by implication at least, in the works of Dilthey, that it is a part of the task of social science to establish sound judgments of social value or policy. Understanding social phenomena does not involve adherence to any particular system of values, in his view, but the behavior of human beings in society can be understood only with reference to the meaning of things (*Sinn*). We do not have to accept as valid the goods for which individuals strive in order to understand the behavior of those individuals, but we have to know what values are accepted as valid by them. In the interpretation of history, it is necessary to know what values are commonly accepted in a society. Although, in one passage, Rickert seems to dissent expressly from the use of the term *Verstehen* by other writers, the method that he develops is essentially that of *die verstehende Soziologie* as set forth by Sombart and Max Weber. In the later editions of *Die Grenzen der naturwissenschaftlichen Begriffsbildung*, Rickert mentions the work of Weber with approval, and in one note he states of the latter's methodological contributions that they "consciously connect with my book" (*sich bewusst an mein Buch anschliessen*).²

¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 17-28. As a matter of convenience, the present account of the theories of Rickert has been drawn primarily from his concise presentation of them in the little volume entitled *Kulturwissenschaft und Naturwissenschaft* (1st ed., 1898; 6th, 7th ed., 1926, used here). The same points, with others, are treated at much greater length in his most important work, *Die Grenzen der naturwissenschaftlichen Begriffsbildung*, 1st ed., 1902, 5th ed., Tübingen, 1929.

² *Op. cit.*, pp. 262-263 (including footnote, p. 263). See also *ibid.*, pp. 567-569 (including footnote, pp. 568-569). In the latter note, Rickert discriminates carefully between his own conception of *verstehen* as applied to the cultural or social sciences and history and that which he ascribes to the exponents of the concept *Geisteswissenschaft*, and which he regards as mystical. He indicates as his own purpose the making of a few contributions to the "understanding of 'understanding'" (*"Ansätze zum Verstehen des 'Verstehens.'"*)

However great the importance may be of the theoretic foundations laid down for *die verstehende Soziologie* by Dilthey, Windelband, Rickert, and others who might be mentioned, it is to Max Weber (1864–1920) and Werner Sombart (1863–) that we are chiefly indebted for the elaboration of the possibilities of application of the viewpoint and method in our own field. Weber not only set forth at some length the methodological, theoretic presuppositions of *Verstehen* in sociology,¹ but in his writings on economic history and religion² he offered some exemplification of the method as applied to concrete research tasks. Sombart has similarly discussed the method and viewpoint of *die verstehende Soziologie* in *Die drei Nationalökonomien* (1930) and has provided us with a very impressive and important example of the possibilities of his methods in *Der moderne Kapitalismus*.³

Weber's contributions to a general theory of *verstehende* sociology antedate by some years, as the subjoined footnotes will show, those of Sombart. His reasoning is, as Rickert has asserted, quite definitely based on that previously set forth by the latter in *Grenzen der naturwissenschaftlichen Begriffsbildung*; however, Max Weber developed the implications of Rickert's theory with such clarity and with such relevance to their bearing on formal or systematic social science as distinguished from history that it is worth our while to review his presentation of them in some detail.⁴ Human conduct, he declares, manifests

¹ "Über einige Kategorien der verstehenden Soziologie," *Logos*, vol. IV, 1913, reprinted in *Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Wissenschaftslehre*, pp. 403–450, Tübingen, 1922; see also Chap. I of *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft*, "Methodische Grundlagen der Soziologie," reprinted in *Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Wissenschaftslehre*, pp. 503–523; also other papers collected in the same volume.

² *Wirtschaftsgeschichte*, Munich and Leipzig, 1923; *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft*, 2d ed., Tübingen, 1925; *Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Religionssoziologie*, 3 vols., Tübingen, 1922–1923. *Wirtschaftsgeschichte* has been translated into English as *General Economic History*. A part of Weber's *Religionssoziologie* has been translated by Talcott Parsons under the title *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*, London, 1930.

³ Three parts bound as 6 vols., Munich and Leipzig, 1928.

⁴ The following passage is an abridged free translation of the first five pages of Sombart's "Über einige Kategorien der verstehenden Soziologie," as printed in his *Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Wissenschaftslehre*, pp. 403 ff., Tübingen, 1922.

interdependence and regularity like all other happenings, but human conduct is distinguished from other phenomena in that the former is alone "understandable" (*verständlich*). An understanding of conduct, gained by interpretation, contains a certain immediate, qualitative "evidence," but that a certain interpretation possesses in especially high measure this quality of being evident does not in itself prove anything as to its empirical validity. For human acts highly similar in external appearance and in effect may result from widely various constellations of motives, of which the most "evident" is not always the actually effective one. The understanding of interdependence must be verified as far as possible by the customary methods of establishing causal connections, before a highly evident interpretation can be regarded as a valid explanation. Interpretations in terms of rational purpose possess the highest measure of evidence, and rationally purposive acts may be defined as those that are oriented by means subjectively conceived as adequate for subjectively apprehended purposes. In no sense is it rationally purposive conduct alone that is understandable to us; we understand also the typical occurrence of affects and their consequences for conduct. The understandable has fluid limits for the empirical sciences. The specific evidence of rationally purposive conduct does not have the consequence that the interpretation of conduct in such terms is to be regarded as in some special sense the goal of sociological explanation. From the role that irrational affects and feelings play in the conduct of human beings, one might very well infer the opposite, whatever may be the possibilities of further psychological explanation of these factors. On the whole, however, conduct that can be rationally interpreted often serves best, in sociological analysis, the purposes of an "ideal type"; sociology, like history, interprets its data, pragmatically, in terms of the rationally understandable interconnection of human acts. Economics operates with a rational construct, "the economic man"; *die verstehende Soziologie* similarly. For sociology has as its specific object of attention *conduct*. "Conduct," however (including intentional neglect and endurance), always means to us an understandable attitude to an object. The conduct that is specifically important to sociology is that which is (1) related to the conduct of others through the subjective intention of the actor, (2) affected in its

course by this subjective relation, and therefore (3) can be understandably explained by reference to it. Subjective meaning with reference to the physical world and especially with reference to the conduct of others can be predicated of affective acts and those "feeling states" such as pride, envy, and jealousy which are indirectly relevant. Physiological phenomena and those previously termed psychophysical, such as graphs of blood pressure and modifications of reaction time, do not, however, interest the *verstehende* sociology, nor do bare psychic data such as feelings of tension, desire, and aversion. But this sociology differentiates the phenomena with which it is concerned with reference to the typical *meaningful* (above all, *external*) associations of conduct, and for this reason the rationally purposive serves it as ideal type, for the very purpose of evaluating the force of the irrational factors. If one may be permitted to designate the (subjectively intended) meaning of its associations as the "inner" side of conduct, then one can say that *die verstehende Soziologie* observes its phenomena "from within outward" but not through the enumeration of its physical or psychic constituents. Distinctions between the psychological factors of an act are not, therefore, as such relevant to our purposes in sociology. Similarity of meaningful association (*sinnhaften Bezogenheit*) is not bound up with similarity of the "psychic" constellations involved, however certain it may be that distinctions of the former sort are conditioned by those of the latter sort. However, a category such as "the profit motive" belongs in no "psychology" properly so-called. Phenomena that do not have a meaning in reference to the conduct of others are not for this reason of no sociological importance. On the contrary, they may involve the distinguishing conditions and therefore the ground of determination of conduct. Conduct is to a significant degree correlated with the things and phenomena of the external world, which are in themselves meaningless: the theoretically constructed behavior of an economic man is, for example, exclusively so determined. But for *die verstehende Soziologie*, the relevance of phenomena lacking in subjective meaning, such as statistics of births and deaths, the process of natural selection of anthropological types, and bare "psychic" data, consists as exclusively in their role as "conditions" and "consequences"

as does the relevance to economic science of the data of climate or plant physiology.

By this line of reasoning, then, Weber seeks to define sociology as a science that takes into account the subjective meaning and intention of human conduct and the attitudes into which conduct may be analyzed, while at the same time he distinguishes sharply between sociology and psychology as commonly understood. The remainder of the paper from which the foregoing has been freely translated is, as its title implies, concerned mainly with the definition and exposition of a number of concepts that may be employed in such a sociology. Space limits prevent us from reviewing the details of this exposition. The author repeated the argument in refined and somewhat more systematic form in the introductory chapter of his *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft* (1920), which he submitted as an exemplification of the method in the special realm of "economic sociology." This distinction between "sociologies" of specialized content has been a noteworthy feature of recent German sociological thought.

Commentators have placed particular emphasis on Max Weber's definition of the "typological method" which is suggested in passing in the passage reviewed above. He appears to intend by this method (1) the abstraction from the totality of experience data of what is more or less general—common to many particular cases—leaving to history and poetry the consideration of the unique and completely individual, (2) the formulation of knowledge thus abstracted and conceptualized in such a way that it may be verified so far as possible by statistical or similar evidence. It may be questioned whether as much emphasis should be placed on this aspect of his methodology as has been suggested.¹

In *Die drei Nationalökonomien* (1929), Werner Sombart has substantially reiterated the argument of Weber for *verstehende Soziologie*. Although his primary purpose in this book was to distinguish three general types of economic theory as to viewpoints, purposes, and methods, it is noteworthy that he expressly

¹ Cf. Theodore Abel, *op. cit.*, pp. 137 ff. It cannot be denied that Abel joins issue here on a very fundamental question of logic and method in social science—the issue of the validation for scientists in general of the explanations of conduct reached by frankly subjective methods of interpretation.

classifies economics as a branch of sociology. *Die verstehende Nationalökonomie* which he advocates is accordingly, in his view, simply the application to a somewhat specialized set of problems of the viewpoint and methods of *die verstehende Soziologie*.¹ By accepting Sombart's own view in this respect, we may legitimately regard his great work *Der moderne Kapitalismus* as a contribution not simply to the interpretation of economic history but also to that marginal field of sociology which we have elsewhere referred to as the natural history of institutions.²

¹ *Op. cit.*, pp. 177-178.

² Sombart has published several other works of sociological importance, notably *Der Bourgeois* (translated as *The Quintessence of Capitalism*); *Die Juden und das Wirtschaftsleben* (translation, *The Jew and Modern Capitalism*); and a collection of papers under the general title *Soziologie*, Berlin, 1923.

CHAPTER XXXVI

SOCIOLOGICAL PRESUPPOSITIONS AND ASSUMPTIONS—SPANN, LITT, AND VIERKANDT

The work of Dilthey and that of Simmel may be regarded as the beginning of a movement of philosophical criticism in German sociological thought which, in the period following 1910, has developed in a number of forms of doctrine. The *verstehende Soziologie* of Max Weber and Werner Sombart represents simply one phase of this doctrinal evolution and the controversies following in its train. When one examines some of the outstanding contributions to sociological theory that have been made, under the impetus of this movement, by German writers, they appear to have much in common; however, their authors, to a considerable extent, insist upon the distinctiveness and mutual exclusiveness of their positions. Of none is this more strikingly true than Othmar Spann (1878—), professor in the University of Vienna, author of a general sociological treatise entitled *Gesellschaftslehre*, and originator of a sociological theory that he terms "universalism."¹ For the purposes of the present exposition, he may be thought of as the leading representative of a position in sociological theory at one extreme of a continuum, the other extreme of which is represented by the radically individualistic sociopsychological theory of Floyd Allport.

Spann's universalism is, first of all, a position taken with reference to the underlying assumptions, or the basic presuppositions, of sociology. More specifically, it is a position taken with reference to the persistent sociophilosophical problem of the one and the many, society and the individual. In sharp contrast with practically all his contemporaries in the field, as he asserts

¹ Spann's *Gesellschaftslehre* was first published in 1914. For the present review of his theory, the writer has used the 3d ed., Leipzig, 1930. Spann has sought to develop the epistemological and logical foundations of his social and economic theories in a separate volume entitled *Kategorienlehre*, Jena, 1924.

in a moderately detailed but very dogmatic review of their work,¹ he maintains that the first, primary, or original reality (in human society but also in the real world generally), from which everything else is derived, is not the individual but the whole, the society. The individual is not self-created (*autark*), as most theorists explicitly or implicitly hold, but derives his nature from the whole of which he is a part or member.² Spann calls this view universalism, though, because it has been used with a related meaning in philosophy, he admits that the term is not very satisfactory; equivalent German terms, he says, are *Ganzheitslehre*, *Allheitslehre*, and *Einheitslehre* (theory of the totality, theory of unity).³ He insists that universalism is not to be conceived as the antithesis of individualism in the sense that it holds society to be everything, the individual nothing; nor is it equivalent to altruism.⁴ Just what is left of his theory after he has conceded the reality, and even in some sense the autonomy, of the individual members of society must be left to the decision of those who make a detailed study of his work.

The elaboration of this theory in *Gesellschaftslehre* and the author's demonstration of his position against the contradictory views of others seem to be very dogmatically expressed. The impression is gained that Spann relies chiefly upon an explicit, reiterated statement of his theory to make its truth self-evident.⁵ In part, he employs arguments that resemble strongly those of Dilthey, Weber, Sombart, and others concerning the possibility of understanding (*Verstehen*) as a way of knowing the life of society;⁶ by the same token, a resemblance of Spann's reasoning and method to those of the exponents of "phenomenology," with which we shall be concerned later in this chapter, can be detected; however, he gives no credit for his ideas to any of these sources, and, aside from a general acknowledgment of the antecedence of some phases of the Greek and later German idealists, he presents his own doctrines as self-contained and independently developed. One might, not unreasonably, characterize his

¹ *Gesellschaftslehre*, pp. 9-51, Leipzig, 1930.

² *Op. cit.*, p. 100; the thought is restated in many ways throughout the volume.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 98-99.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 99.

⁵ See particularly "Verfahrenlehre," pp. 57, 533 ff.

⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 3-5.

method as essentially ontological; he seems to deduce the dependence of the parts upon the whole, and the logical antecedence of society to its individual members, from the concept of society as a whole.¹

There has been a widespread disposition on the part of critics to dismiss Spann's theory as a purely metaphysical one, which has no particular utility for the purposes of scientific sociology; and it is true that, like the exponents of *Verstehen* in social science, he maintains strongly the inapplicability of the methods of natural science to the social world. He asserts that the notion of causality has no place in the interpretation of society. On the other hand, Spann has gained a strong following in the German-speaking parts of Europe, particularly among economists. By making a fundamental distinction between the spiritual, or psychic, aspect of life (*das Geistige*, in the broad sense of the term) and action, or conduct (*das Handeln*), or between perception (*Schauen*) and action (*Handeln*), as the form elements of society (*Formelemente*), he has sought to lay the foundations for a general economic theory which he has elsewhere developed and which, like his sociology, is "universalistic." In its methodological implications, his economic theory seems to bear some kinship to that of Pareto.²

The fundamental point at issue in the controversy between Spann and other sociologists turns on the question of the objectives, possibilities, utility, and inherent limitations of the scientific way of studying the data of experience. If human society is susceptible of being understood in the manner of science, the conceptions of it that will serve that purpose will necessarily have to come within the logical limits of scientific knowledge—the limits imposed by objectivation, abstraction, and generalization. That something of the essential nature (*Wesen*) of the life of human society is excluded by this limitation can scarcely be denied. Science ought not to be conceived as the totality of valid human knowledge but only as a certain form of

¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 561 ff.

² *Op. cit.*, pp. 257 ff. For a critical discussion of the economic theories of Spann in comparison with other contemporary economic theories, see Theodore Suranyi-Unger, *Economics in the Twentieth Century*, trans. by Noel D. Moulton, New York, 1931. Consult the index for references to Spann.

knowledge which is useful because it enables us to derive from the experience of the past some apprehension of what may be expected and what can be done in the future. It is by generalization that this result is attained, by treating the happenings of which experience is composed as if they were completely determined by the interaction of invariable ultimate elements. Spann will have none of this "interaction" (*Wechselwirkung*) theory of society, presumably because it does violence to the ultimate data of human experience as he apprehends those data.

In spite of the flavor of dogmatic assertion which pervades the entire treatise, Spann's *Gesellschaftslehre* merits more attention than it seems to have received on the part of American sociologists. The continued adherence of numerous research students to the ultraindividualistic type of sociology and social psychology, which are really not sociological at all, since their assumptions belie the possibility of a scientific sociology, is evidence that the effectively formulated statement of a "realistic" concept of the social group still needs consideration which it has not, apparently, received. We are indebted to Othmar Spann for a relatively competent formulation of such statements. Whether the use of the interaction approach to sociological problems precludes the entertaining of a tenable concept of the social group as a real unity, as Spann contends, is a debatable question, to say the least.¹

At about the same time that Spann was independently developing his sociological theory of universalism, there also took shape at the hands of a group of philosophers and psychologists of whom E. Husserl was apparently the leader a general method of attack upon the problems of the social and humanistic studies, to which the name "phenomenology" was given.² Presently, Theodor Litt (1880-), in *Individuum und Gemeinschaft*;³ Alfred

¹ On sociological "realism" and "nominalism," see R. E. Park in R. E. Park and E. W. Burgess, *Introduction to the Science of Sociology*, Chap. I, pp. 27 ff., especially p. 36.

² Husserl's *Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologische Philosophie*, vol. I, Halle, 1913, appears to have been the first systematic presentation of the new "phenomenological" method; a standard reference is the same author's *Logische Untersuchungen*, Halle, 1922. Litt cites also J. Volkelt, *Gewissheit und Wahrheit*, Munich, 1918, and R. Hönlwald, *Die Grundlagen der Denkpsychologie*, Leipzig, 1925.

³ 1st ed., 1919; the 3d ed., Leipzig and Berlin, 1926, has been used here.

Vierkandt (1867–), in *Gesellschaftslehre*,¹ and Georg Stielcr, in *Person und Masse* (1929) undertook to apply the phenomenological method to sociological problems. From the formal characterizations of this method which Litt and Vierkandt have given, it appears to have much in common with the *Verstehen* which Dilthey, Max Weber, and Sombart, with others, have designated as the distinctive method of history and social science. Phenomenological sociology seems to differ from *verstehende* sociology chiefly in that its exponents have stated its presuppositions and possibilities with greater exactness. The proponents of both methods undertake to account for their findings in terms of *Einfühlung* ("a form of consciousness in which the experience of another is relived (*nachgelebt*) in such a way that the conscious life of the other is completely taken up into one's own").² Such reliving of the experiences of others (empathy) may be further accounted for by the assumption that has been said frequently to underlie all sociology—that human nature in its fundamentals is the same in all persons. Vierkandt seems almost to assert this ground for his use of the phenomenological method, through the fact that he devotes the opening pages of his *Gesellschaftslehre* to an elaborate review of the psychological factors of social behavior.

Litt characterizes the method of phenomenology as follows: It is applicable to those phenomena of a psychic nature which are so constituted that a structure, or inner arrangement (*Gliederung*), is visible in the single experience and points the way to an analysis—a structure, furthermore, is immediately evident as such, which is not peculiar to the case in hand but has general significance. Thus, the essence, or, more exactly, the essential structure, of a whole class of experiences becomes apparent from a single case. The experiences that are susceptible of conceptual investigation are precisely those with which social science is primarily concerned: those that ordinary speech designates as "spiritual" or "mental" (*geistig*). In them, the "I" that experiences and the "something" that is experienced occur in the single experience characteristically distinguished from each

¹ 1st ed., 1922; 2d ed. (used here), Stuttgart, 1928.

² Georg Stielcr, *op. cit.*, pp. 24–35. Cf. Max Weber, in *Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Wissenschaftslehre*, p. 504. Stielcr does not expressly adopt the phenomenological method; however, his book is dedicated to Edmund Husserl, who is regarded as the principal founder of phenomenology.

other and yet bound together and afford the point of attack for an analysis which not only is not furthered by the use of other materials but would be confused thereby.¹

Vierkandt has defined the phenomenological method similarly, but more systematically, as follows: First, it concerns itself with final concepts, *i.e.*, concepts that cannot be derived from others. From this there follows the second peculiarity of the method: A knowledge and ordering of these concepts are possible only from the data of experience (*auf dem Wege der Anschauung*), *i.e.*, by making clear the specific essence of the concept in a (real or imagined) example by means of one's own inner contemplation of it (*durch innere Anschauung*). Comparison with nearly related concepts (and the conditions of fact to which they correspond) is especially helpful. Third, insight into the essence of such concepts is attained, as has been indicated, through the consideration of a single case (which does not need to be a real case). Thus, the insight is not won by the comparison of a rather large collection of cases, or induction. In contrast with induction, this procedure has been called ideational abstraction (*ideierende Abstraktion*.)²

Since considerable discussion of the possibility of generalizing from a single case has taken place in American sociological circles, and the possibility has usually been ridiculed, it is of no little interest to find such a procedure frankly proclaimed by the German phenomenologists. Of course, the skeptic can still question whether the insights gained by "ideational abstraction" from single cases do not actually involve the conscious or sub-conscious comparison of the case in hand with more or less similar cases, or the bringing to bear upon a case in hand of knowledge gained from previous experience.

It is not particularly surprising to find that Litt and Vierkandt, proceeding by this phenomenological method, begin the presentation of their sociological theories with a consideration of the simplest of all groups or social relationships, the group of two persons. In fact, their phenomenological sociology starts with an extended consideration of the social nature of the I and of the

¹ Freely translated and condensed by the writer from *Individuum und Gemeinschaft*, pp. 5-6.

² Translated and condensed by the writer from *Gesellschaftslehre*, 2d ed., pp. 19-20, Stuttgart, 1928.

fact that the "you" of a simple dual relationship (such as friendship) is really a part of the I. On the other hand, it is remarkable that Spann, who speaks of phenomenology with implied depreciation, begins his sociological inquiries in his *Gesellschaftslehre* in much the same way. His most fundamental sociological concept, aside from the presupposed concept of the whole (*Ganz*), is the concept "community" (*Gemeinschaft*); in place of this term, however, and apparently as a complete substitute for it, he prefers to employ the term *Gezweiung*, which is practically untranslatable, but which undeniably implies primarily the relationship of one person to one other person; just as, with the phenomenological sociologists, emphasis is placed on the incorporation of the other into the self.¹ This procedure is the more notable in that Spann so vehemently rejects the interaction concept of Simmel and von Wiese.

At all events, the most characteristic feature of the social theory of the writers with whom we are primarily concerned in this chapter is the attention that they pay to the way in which society is given as a datum of the inner, subjective experience of individuals. All three of the men with whom we are chiefly occupied—Spann, Litt, and Vierkandt—start with the most intimate human relationships and, following an extended consideration of these, attempt to differentiate between them and the more formal, distant, rationally purposive types of association. Tönnies' distinction between *Gemeinschaft* and *Gesellschaft* appears to have served in some fashion as point of departure or suggestion for the work of all three, and all refer to Tönnies with respect, though with marked reservations in the case of Spann. Vierkandt devotes particular attention to the intermediate, or marginal, forms of social connection which may be classified between the extremes of intimacy and formality; he speaks of relationships that approximate the communal character (*Gemeinschaftsnahe*) and those that resemble the case of "community" only remotely (*Gemeinschaftsferne*). Both Vierkandt and Litt refer to the phenomenon in which the relation of one person to another takes on the form of a relation of a person to a thing.² This case constitutes the logical extreme which defines and limits the range of variation of social relationships, the other extreme

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 108, and many other passages.

² Litt, *op. cit.*, p. 193; Vierkandt, *op. cit.*, pp. 158 ff.

of which is characterized by the maximum of intimacy. Within this continuum they seek to distinguish, by means of the phenomenological method, the more important forms of association. Both take their departure from the presuppositions of the "formal sociology" of Simmel, but both are disposed to deny that form and content of social interaction or social relationship can be separated as completely as Simmel seemed to think possible. In both of these treatises, accordingly, a certain amount of systematic discussion is devoted to the typical historical forms of human association, distinguished from one another with reference to content; and the same distinctions are emphasized by Spann, who in any case repudiates the assumptions of the formal sociology.¹

Supplementing his phenomenological analysis of the I and the you, Litt develops as a fundamental sociological concept "the closed circle," which exists wherever more than two individuals stand in such an essential relationship that each of them includes all the others in his own perspective.² "Reciprocity of perspectives" is the suggestive phrase by which he expresses a basic datum of his phenomenological analysis of the I with reference to the you; and in his account of the closed circle, he undertakes to show how the same reciprocity of perspectives is extended to include a third person, or a considerable number of additional persons, in the I-you relationship. So brief an indication serves but poorly to give an impression of the interpretation of social phenomena which Litt presents as the result of his phenomenological inquiry, but the limitations of space preclude a fuller review of the matter here. Without basing the statement on any specific passage in the volumes by Litt and Vierkandt with which we are primarily concerned here, we may venture the remark that phenomenology, as these authors use the term, is substantially equivalent to systematic, critical introspection by the student of the data provided by his own social experience and memories.

¹ Litt expressly classifies his own contribution in *Individuum und Gemeinschaft* as formal sociology (*op. cit.*, p. 2); Vierkandt, by implication, tends to accept the same classification, in part, for the content of his *Gesellschaftslehre*; however, Vierkandt found his way into sociology by way of the study of culture (*cf.* his *Stetigkeit im Kulturwandel*, 1908), and accordingly he defends in some detail the conception of sociology as the study of culture (*op. cit.*, *Einleitung*, 1, "Gegenstand und Gliederung der Soziologie").

² *Op. cit.*, p. 239.

Insistence upon the value of imaginary cases as distinguished from those concretely given in present experience or memory is, however, a characteristic feature of the method as formally defined.

Alfred Vierkandt is perhaps somewhat less consistently phenomenological in his inquiry in *Gesellschaftslehre* than Litt is in *Individuum und Gemeinschaft*. The former work should have a peculiar interest to American sociologists, however, in that Vierkandt has written here a treatise on sociology of somewhat the same systematic, comprehensive type as those that have found favor in this country. Too, he has formulated his conclusions and theories in relatively simple, intelligible language which, to an American reader, contrasts favorably with the abstruse metaphysical terminology of Spann and Litt. Like them, on the other hand, he evidently accepts the presupposition that a valid and useful sociology must be based on philosophy, at least in the sense that it is the necessary task of philosophy to define the basic concepts with which scientific sociology is to operate.¹ It is precisely this painstaking, reflective labor of scrutiny and criticism of fundamental concepts, presuppositions, and assumptions that constitutes the great service that has been rendered to scientific sociology by a number of capable European writers, including among others Simmel, Max Weber and his less known brother Alfred Weber, Werner Sombart, Othmar Spann, Theodor Litt, and Alfred Vierkandt. The contribution of Vilfredo Pareto, with which we shall be concerned in the following chapter, may be credited with a somewhat similar value.

¹ Apropos of the metaphysical character which American sociologists find so unacceptable in the sociological treatises of German authors, it may be worth while to record a remark concerning Husserl, the founder of phenomenology, which was made to the writer by Alfred North Whitehead in a brief conversation. Whitehead said, in substance, "What he [Husserl] calls phenomenology I call metaphysics." The remark was not intended to be depreciatory, since in making it Whitehead was by implication classifying his own work as metaphysical and acknowledging a considerable resemblance between the two types of philosophy.

CHAPTER XXXVII

THE LOGICO-EXPERIMENTAL SOCIOLOGY OF PARETO

It may be defined as the purpose of all sciences, in a relatively strict sense of the term, to establish knowledge of the world of experience by means of operations of generalization and abstraction performed upon the data of experience. The ultimate purpose is such control over the experience of the future as may be attainable and, beyond that, prevision of what may be expected in given cases, so that individuals and groups may be enabled to adjust themselves to events that cannot be avoided. So far as immediate aims are concerned, however, the sciences tend to make the knowledge that they seek to establish an end in itself; for it is widely believed by scientists that only in this way can the bias and prejudice which derive from practical aims be minimized. In the procedures by which scientific knowledge is established, two kinds of mental operations, in principle quite sharply distinguished from each other, are necessarily involved: on the one hand, there is the operation of observing, experimenting, scrutinizing the data, for the sake of establishing and recording them with as great precision as may be possible and with a degree of completeness that seems adequate to the purposes of the inquiry in hand. On the other hand, there are operations of comparison, classification, enumeration, measurement, and abstraction, to which, in practice, not a little speculative use of the imagination is added; the purpose of these latter operations is, of course, the formulation of some sort of generalizations, by which alone the experience of the past can be made to yield more or less reliable knowledge of what may be expected, under circumstances, in the future.

A survey of the literature of any science, but particularly a relatively new and undeveloped science such as sociology, seems to show that, to a large extent, the more fundamental works of particular writers have, as a rule, been characterized by the attention that they have devoted to the one or the other of these

two great tasks of scientific research: the establishment of accurate data, as complete as are needed for the purpose in hand; and the formulation of generalizations, the ideal for which is that they be expressed in mathematical form. Among recent European sociologists, Max Weber, Werner Sombart, and in some respects Spann, Litt, and Vierkandt are notable for their efforts to describe adequately the primary experience phenomena that sociology undertakes to explain. They may be classed together in so far as all of them emphasize certain qualities or characteristics of our experience of human society which, they assert or imply, some of their colleagues have left out of account in their generalizations and abstractions. Vilfredo Pareto, on the other hand, is important chiefly for his efforts to develop a method of sociological generalization that shall conform to the mathematical ideal of modern science. Pareto himself and some of his enthusiastic admirers set great store by his "logico-experimental" methods, *i.e.*, his persistent effort to base his generalizations only on the data of experience, after the fashion of the better established sciences; the validity of the claim that Pareto has been successful in this effort will be discussed later.

Vilfredo Pareto was born in Paris in 1848, of an Italian father and a French mother. Having moved to Italy with his parents when he was eleven years of age, he completed his education at Turin, graduating from the Polytechnic Institute there at the age of twenty-two. During the next ten years, he was employed, first, as consulting engineer for the railway system of Italy; then, as general superintendent of some iron mines owned by a bank of Florence. It seems to have been from his experience in this phase of his career that he derived the interest in questions of economics and public economic policy which he retained for the remainder of his life. Pareto inherited, at the death of his father in 1882, an income sufficient to make it possible for him to live without earnings; and, accordingly, he retired from his managerial position to study economics independently. For a long time, he sought in vain a professorial position in one of the Italian universities, but in 1894, upon the recommendation of Léon Walras, the Swiss economist, in whose theories of "mathematical economics" Pareto had become interested, the latter was appointed to succeed Walras in the chair of political economy at the University of Lausanne, Switzerland. It was during the

remaining years of his life that all of his major scholarly works were written, including *Cours d'économie politique*,¹ *Les systèmes socialistes*,² *Manuale di economia politica*,³ *Le mythe vertuiste et la littérature immorale*,⁴ *Trattato di sociologia generale*,⁵ *Fatti e teorie*,⁶ *Transformazione della democrazia*.⁷ Pareto died Aug. 19, 1923.⁸

The sociological theory of Pareto has been so highly rated by a few American commentators, and their writings have made so strong an impression on the reading public, that the importance and originality of his contribution have probably been somewhat overestimated. This is unfortunate, for his treatise on general sociology is sufficiently important to have an enduring reputation,

¹ 2 vols., Lausanne, 1896-1897.

² 2 vols. Paris, 1902-1903.

³ Milan, 1906; trans. into French and rev., Paris, 1909.

⁴ Paris, 1911, new ed. 1920.

⁵ 1st ed., 2 vols., Florence, 1916; 2d ed., Florence, 1923; French trans., 2 vols., Paris, 1917; American trans. as *Mind and Society*, 4 vols., New York, 1935.

⁶ Florence, 1920.

⁷ Milan, 1921.

⁸ For the above biographical details I am indebted chiefly to Arthur Livingston, ed., "Biographical Note," vol. 1, pp. xv-xviii, *Mind and Society*. I find the same omissions in all the biographical sources accessible to me; hence, I have been unable to establish clearly whether Pareto occupied his chair at Lausanne, nominally or actively, until his death or retired some years earlier. In 1907, he inherited a considerable fortune from a remote relative; and he seems to have passed much of his time subsequently living in comparative retirement at a villa that he had taken at Céligny, near Geneva, where he devoted himself to research and writing. For an alternative biography, see G. H. Bousquet, *Vilfredo Pareto—Sa vie et son oeuvre*—pp. 15-24, Paris, 1928. In addition to the French and American translations of Pareto's general treatise on sociology and Bousquet's critical study, I have read, for the purposes of this account of his theories, the following: George C. Homans and Charles P. Curtis, Jr., *An Introduction to Pareto*, New York, 1924; Lawrence J. Henderson, *Pareto's General Sociology*, Cambridge, Mass., 1935; Talcott Parsons, article on Pareto, *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*, vol. 11; Andrew Bongiorno, "A Study of Pareto's Treatise on General Sociology," *American Journal of Sociology*, vol. 36, pp. 349 ff.; Bernard De Voto, "Sentiment and the Social Order," *Harper's Magazine*, 1934. The sociology of Pareto has been strongly publicized by several enthusiastic disciples in the United States in recent years, and a considerable number of journal articles exist dealing with his theories. The present treatment has been made briefer than would otherwise be the case, did not so much other material exist in forms available to American students.

even if no exaggerated claims for it, accompanied by depreciatory remarks concerning all other recent and contemporary sociologists, had been published. The nature and tone of much that has been published about Pareto in the United States are such as to prevent his work from receiving the consideration that it merits from serious students of sociology.

This massive treatise (over 1,900 pages of text in the American edition of *Mind and Society*) contains several quite distinct contributions to sociological thought, each of them entitled to consideration on its merits. Following a suggestion made by Henderson, we may profitably notice, first, a conception that underlies Pareto's whole sociological theory, though he did not state it very completely or explicitly at any point in his general treatise:¹ the conception of society as a "system" or as an "equilibrium" of forces and bonds. The ultimate source of this conception is undoubtedly the theory of equilibria that is used in theoretic mechanics, a realm of thought with which Pareto was familiar by training and early experience. Its more immediate origin, however, is to be discovered in the "mathematical economics" which Pareto took over from Walras and elaborated on his own account. He is, in fact, regarded as the most gifted exponent of the mathematical theory of economics whose work has become well-known up to now; and in his treatise on general sociology, he presupposes acquaintance with the content of his works on economic theory. His conception of society as a system or equilibrium of forces is not difficult to understand, except as regards the recondite mathematical refinements of the conception which he suggests in certain passages and footnotes. It is quite frankly submitted as a hypothetical construction or abstraction, a scientific "fiction" in the sense in which Vaihinger develops the term. It is valid and justifiable in the measure in which it serves as a useful device to aid one in grappling with the complex facts of social experience; and as such it is offered as an improvement on the common-sense notion of causation. The only criticism to which the conception is open is that, in the existing state of our knowledge of social forces and phenomena, one can scarcely make use of the concept of a complex social equilibrium otherwise than as the basis for a quite general point of view.

¹ See, however, *The Mind and Society*, vol. 4, opening pp.

As embodied in some passages of Pareto's text, this underlying concept of a social system or equilibrium as the ultimate social fact appears to be implicitly if not explicitly nominalistic. It seems to imply the assumption that the social order exists only in and through the attitudes of the individual members of a group, that such terms as "group," "institution," "society," and "community" are simply verbal names for collections of individuals or for certain common elements in their behavior.¹ This interpretation of Pareto's basic sociological viewpoint is strengthened by the consideration of his preoccupation throughout his treatise with the qualities—sentiments, "residues," "derivations"—of the individual members of society, which in fact constitute his primary object of investigation throughout. He pays a great deal of attention, to be sure, to the interdependence of these elements and of their changes, but his approach to this topic is purely mathematical; it is a recondite application of the familiar method of calculating statistical correlations between any two or more series of phenomena. Talcott Parsons points out that there is a certain final inconsistency in Pareto's reasoning in this respect (or at least in a closely related matter): in the course of his analysis of "nonlogical conduct," he endeavors to show that ideals, ends, values, which are in fact socially generated, are of no real importance, whereas his conclusions really support the view that such socially generated elements are truly of the utmost importance, for they comprise a large part of the "residues."²

The heart of Pareto's theory is his treatment—analytical and synthetic—of human social conduct, or "actions," in which he strongly emphasizes the "nonlogical" elements of this conduct. His concepts of sentiments, "residues," and "derivations," which comprise the most frequently quoted feature of his treatise, are developed in this connection. Because this feature has been so widely summarized in American publications,³ a very brief state-

¹ In sec. 66 (*The Mind and Society*, vol. 1, p. 32), Pareto expressly asserts that a number of *individua* taken together are by no means to be considered a simple sum. "They form compounds which, like chemical compounds, may have properties that are not the sum of the properties of their components." It is perhaps significant, however, that he does not elaborate the statement.

² Article on Pareto, *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*, vol. 11.

³ See footnote, p. 414.

ment may suffice here. (It is Pareto's finding, from a procedure ostensibly inductive in nature, that the conduct of human beings living in society is of such a character that particular actions, and the more or less stable beliefs, theories, and working rules by which many of these actions are primarily determined, may be analyzed as to their motivation into two kinds of elements in each case: a relatively basic, stable tendency, which might be further analyzed by psychology, but which it is not the business of sociology to analyze; and a relatively superficial, shifting explanation or rationalization which evolves to meet people's need for (nominally) logical justification of their acts.) These two type elements of conduct might well be designated simply by otherwise meaningless symbols—letters or other symbols—the reference of which for the purposes in hand is indicated denotatively, with the aid of examples; and throughout a considerable segment of his argument Pareto does so designate them. With due warning that the terms are to be understood only in the meaning that he assigns to them, however, he eventually applies to the basic, stable nuclei of actions the term "residues" and to the (nominally) logical explanations of the actions the term "derivations." For the net product, in cases where it has the character of a relatively stable working rule, or principle of conduct, he suggests the term derivatives; however, in the course of his treatise, he finds little occasion to use this term. The residues, he states, are composed essentially of sentiments, or, rather, they are the observable manifestations of sentiments, which are themselves inaccessible to observation. While Pareto carefully guards himself against identifying the residues with any innate, hereditary factors of human nature and asserts, by implication at least, that they may be formed early in the life of the individual and may, under circumstances, be changed, he emphatically asserts that it is difficult to change the residues of given individuals. The residues of a social class, therefore, can, according to his analysis, be modified only by processes that actually modify the composition of the class ("circulation of the elite"); and throughout the argument, there runs the implicit assumption (explicitly denied) of a biological, hereditary explanation of the residues characteristic of the major classes, or strata, of which a given society is composed. One of the main contentions is that, in fact, the "derivations" are, as the name that he gives them

implies, derived from the residues, much more than the reverse is true, although a relation of reciprocal dependence exists between them. It is essentially the now familiar notion of "rationalization," which was not so commonplace as it now is when Pareto first wrote, that he makes use of to explain the derivations. A large part of the text of the treatise is occupied with a discussion of the residues and derivations and their interaction in the social equilibrium, with the aid of mathematical formulations—chiefly abstract, not numerical—of various type cases.

The feature of Pareto's treatise on general sociology that he seems to have regarded as of most importance, and the one that has attracted most attention from American commentators, is the conception of sociology as a "logico-experimental science." A very extended introductory portion of the treatise is given over to the presentation of this conception, which is also reiterated frequently in the remainder of the work, and which these remaining pages are presumably designed to exemplify, at least tentatively. Somewhat in the manner of Auguste Comte, the author has formulated his preliminary theories about sociology and its character as a logico-experimental science and the content that he offers, however tentatively, for the science, in such a way that the reader experiences difficulty in distinguishing the one from the other. Just as in Comte's philosophy of history the progress from the theological, through the metaphysical, to the "positive" stage in the intellectual development of mankind was made to appear as the central trend of social evolution, so in Pareto's treatise on general sociology the distinction between logico-experimental and nonlogico-experimental science, which he formulates at great length and with much emphasis by reiteration in order to indicate the specifications to which a scientific sociology may be expected to conform, constitutes also a very important part of his analysis of the life and history of society. At all events, his efforts to indicate the criteria of a logico-experimental science of sociology seem to have won for his work an enviable reputation among a number of specialists in other fields of research, if not among the recognized sociologists.

The question accordingly arises Is the sociology of Pareto any more experimental, in content, or in the method that he has unmistakably employed in arriving at his concepts and theories,

than the general treatises on sociology written by the outstanding authors in the field during the past twenty years? On this question, opinions might be expected to differ; and, in fact, the opinion of the present writer differs, on the whole, from that which has been held by some of the more conspicuous American commentators on Pareto. When one reads the treatise on general sociology for himself, one finds Pareto asserting categorically and repeatedly that his procedure is logico-experimental throughout, that he arrives at his generalizations and abstractions by induction, that he has no interest in what ought to be or in the proof of preconceived propositions. All of these claims may be justifiably made; or at any rate he may have as great justification for making them as others have had for making similar claims for their own work. There is not in his treatise as it lies before us in print, however, unmistakable evidence either (1) that his generalizations were arrived at by a purely inductive procedure or (2) that he was any freer from prejudices and biases which affected his sociological theorizing than are the run of highly educated men who have made sustained efforts to contribute to a science of society in recent decades. His prejudices seem to have been somewhat different from the prevalent ones; that, for example, he had a strong, even violent prejudice against the current conceptions and ideals of democracy and against all efforts to regulate the conduct or influence the thought of the upper classes in the realm ordinarily designated as "moral" his most enthusiastic admirers will scarcely deny. Nor is it much easier to deny that these and other, more or less related, prejudices played a large part in shaping the content of the treatise on general sociology.

We may venture the opinion that a considerable number of those who have written similar treatises, or sociological treatises of theoretic character but of less comprehensive scope, in recent decades, have honestly intended to offer their generalizations, mainly, in the hypothetical spirit—in the spirit of one who says, It seems to me that the social order becomes somewhat intelligible when viewed in the light of the general ideas that I am formulating here; if continued efforts to develop science and social policy further in the light of these ideas should fail, however, so much the worse for my theories; they will have to be abandoned or radically revised. The popular conception of "inductive reason-

ing" is largely a fiction, anyhow. Scientific knowledge grows mainly by accretion from previous generalizations and abstractions. It is checked, confirmed, rejected, or modified, in the end, as a result of the critical scrutiny of the data of experience to see whether they support the theory or not, *i.e.*, whether or not the theory is a usable instrument for dealing with them. In this sense, the procedure of Pareto in arriving at the ideas set forth in his general treatise on sociology was doubtless fairly logico-experimental, but so were the procedures of many other modern sociologists in the preparation of their theoretic works.

The treatise is a quite unnecessarily lengthy, poorly formulated and often obscure, dogmatic piece of literature. It seems to be also, however, a measurably honest composition and is unmistakably the work of a highly intelligent man. Pareto's treatment of the residues and derivations adds little to what we have in literature of apparently independent origin, more clearly formulated. His conception of the social equilibrium is a more important contribution; for no other sociologist, so far, has developed the same thought clearly. His suggestions for the mathematical formulation of sociological problems are probably valuable as the definition of an ideal which scientific sociology ought to work toward, but which it will not be able to realize to any great extent for many years to come.

CHAPTER XXXVIII

PRESENT SOCIOLOGICAL TRENDS AND TENDENCIES

In concluding a somewhat detailed inquiry into the history of anything, one inevitably feels called upon to undertake some discussion of the state of affairs existing at the time when the inquiry is made. It is an assumption underlying the present study that the history of sociology is of interest and importance to contemporary students of the subject chiefly, if not exclusively, as a means to the better appreciation and understanding of sociology as it now is and for what it may become. From these considerations, we might derive a plausible justification for a somewhat extended presentation of the present status of sociology, as a subject that is taught in academic institutions, embodied in a substantial literature, and urged upon the general public and their leaders as a guide for social policy and personal conduct. Some data on these points have been placed in exhibition in previous chapters, however, and in other respects the facts are difficult to establish. In this final chapter, accordingly, the effort is made to formulate an estimate of present-day sociology in terms of the trends of change and tendencies of development or functional activity by which the discipline appears to be most noticeably affected. Applying the method devised by the philosophers of history, and employed in a very sophisticated form by contemporary experts in business forecasting, we may endeavor to gain some conception of what sociology is likely to be in the proximate future from a consideration of the changes that seem to be affecting it now and the principal forces that are playing upon it. If we cannot predict with any assurance, even in broad outline, what the sociology of a quarter century hence will be, we may at any rate gain something for the better understanding of events and developments in the field with which we are concerned, as they occur. Since the history of sociology in the past twenty-five years has been preponderantly the story of its development in the United States, subject to qualifications noted in previous chapters, we shall

limit ourselves here, in the main, to the present trends and tendencies affecting sociology in the United States.

Without much question, the most conspicuous of these tendencies has been the emphasis that has been placed on research and is still very strong. This emphasis is unmistakably documented by the published proceedings of the American Sociological Society which have appeared since, say, about 1925. During this interval the annual meeting programs of the society have been put together, largely, from the data available to the officers and committees concerned with the matter, regarding the research projects planned or in progress under the direction of members of the society and others. In those large universities where such an aim was in the least feasible of accomplishment, efforts have been made to enlarge and develop the sociological faculty primarily as research staffs, rather than as teaching staffs. The emphasis on research in American sociology today is so strong that it amounts to a tendency on the part of more than one leading sociologist to assert that sociology is, essentially, a body of research methods and problems, rather than a body of knowledge or a system of concepts. This tendency to the emphasis of sociological research and research methods shows no signs of weakening; however, it should be noted that in many reputable colleges and universities in the United States, professors and instructors in sociology are employed primarily to teach the subject and are encouraged to undertake research, if at all, only in the leisure that is left them after their teaching duties have been cared for. It is almost superfluous to remark that, should the college and university presidents of the United States decide, simultaneously and unanimously, that sociology was no longer to be taught to undergraduates, the great majority of the sociologists of this country would at once find themselves unemployed, unless places were made for them on the teaching staffs of other departments. In spite of the recent trend of emphasis on sociological research, American sociology is still, practically and for the most part, a subject to be taught to college students.

As has been indicated in previous chapters, the research tendency in sociology has been, preponderantly but not exclusively, a tendency to the use of statistical and other quantitative methods. The principal exceptions to this trend are constituted by the research undertakings of staff members, students, and

former students of the University of Chicago, where under the leadership of several professors of marked ability and influence researches involving primarily the use of case-study and "natural-history" methods have been executed.¹ To a large extent, however, the research tendency and the statistical tendency in American sociology have been identical.

Sociology in the United States today is affected also, though much less generally, by a "behavioristic" tendency, derived chiefly from the psychological (?) behaviorism of Bechterev, Pavlov, and Watson and developed, apparently, as a theoretic justification for the statistical and quantitative tendency of sociological research. The names of two of the younger American sociologists, George A. Lundberg and Read Bain, have been particularly conspicuous in this tendency; however, Prof. L. L. Bernard also champions what he terms behaviorism in sociology. Apparently, to Bernard, "behaviorism" is a term of somewhat different meaning and less radically materialistic than it is for Lundberg and Bain; he has perhaps been influenced somewhat by the "social behaviorism" of the late George H. Mead of the philosophy staff of the University of Chicago; and in Mead's fragmentary publications, social behaviorism is developed as a concept the implications of which are, in some respects, at the opposite pole from those of Watsonian behaviorism. From the published reports of her recent researches that are available, one may venture to classify Dorothy Swaine Thomas, also, with Bain and Lundberg as a behavioristic sociologist; however, she seems not to be strongly inclined to classify herself as a sociologist at all. This radical behaviorism is justified, by its sociological exponents as by certain psychologists, from the difficulty and unreliability of drawing verifiable conclusions from research using "subjective" data and interpretations. On the other hand, the use of the case-study method and of life-history materials is still defended by a number of capable American sociologists, among whom E. W. Burgess stands out as a leader, although he is also greatly interested in statistical researches.

Although, as has just been noted, sociology in the United States is characterized by a strong trend of research activity, and

¹ See also, however, John Dollard, *Criteria for the Life History: With Analyses of Six Notable Examples*. New Haven, 1935

although this research trend may be said to involve a tendency to conceive "research" in such a way as to be depreciatory of all theoretic, and particularly speculative, contributions, nevertheless there is a noticeable, though apparently less potent, trend of interest in the concepts of sociology and their better definition. Professors R. E. Park and Herbert Blumer of the University of Chicago, Bogardus of the University of Southern California, Eubank of Cincinnati, and the writer may be named as exponents of the idea that concrete sociological research may be largely futile and even harmful when it is not guided by carefully conceived notions about the things to be studied. This idea has been understood to imply, among other things, the continual reconsideration of the conceptual terms that form the vocabulary and, in a certain sense, the methodological equipment of our science. In this fundamental methodological phase of sociological inquiry, the many accredited sociologists of this country have, until quite recently, lagged behind the few who have been active in Germany. Little to the credit of American writers in this special field can be favorably compared with the contributions of Tönnies, Simmel, Max Weber, and Sombart or with those of the Polish sociologist Florian Znaniecki. Gradually, however, a body of relatively short papers in journals and volumes of collected papers has accumulated and now includes at least thirty or forty items of marked importance in this respect. There are, in some of the recently published general textbooks, evidences that these scattered contributions to the conceptual organon of the science of sociology are gradually finding their way into the general system of ideas that is the common property and point of departure of most American sociologists in their teaching and research.

It is precisely these general, and usually quite elementary, textbooks of sociology the production of which constitutes one of the most conspicuous if not most important trends of contemporary sociological activity in the United States. For some time, new general introductory textbooks of sociology have been appearing from the presses at the rate of three or four a year, and this number has been increased somewhat, lately, by the publication of more or less thoroughgoing revisions of previous textbooks. This visible trend of publication is apparently proof of one thing, at least, that sociology is sufficiently popular as a subject taught

in colleges in the United States to constitute a market for textbooks that is quite attractive to publishers; they would not venture to print so many new books which must necessarily compete with one another, unless they had reason to know that the total market for such books was rather large. The popularity of college courses in sociology must mean, in turn, that a rather large and growing number of persons in the United States, former students in such classes, have some knowledge of the nature and principal topics and problems of sociology. It is probably safe to add, however, that this interest in sociology as a college subject displays a marked regional variation; the subject seems to be, on the whole, much more popular west of the Appalachian highland than on the Atlantic coast. It is probably also more popular today in the East in women's colleges than in institutions for men.

During the past decade, sociology in the United States has been subjected to a notable pressure favoring the recombination and consolidation into a single discipline of the special social sciences: sociology, economics, political science, anthropology, and even history. This pressure has been exerted most definitely, by the Social Science Research Council, a joint agency of the national organizations of the social sciences named, with psychology and statistics. The Council was formed in 1923, as the result of an initiative launched in the American Political Science Association in 1921. Since its organization, it has received substantial financial support from the Rockefeller Foundation and has employed the resources thus provided in fostering research in the social sciences in a number of ways, including the award of fellowships for advanced study, chiefly on the postdoctoral level, and the award of grants-in-aid to individuals to facilitate the completion of researches that they have undertaken. One of the most conspicuous and important activities of the council, however, has been its effort to foster cooperative research by representatives and organizations of the several recognized social sciences. It has supported in this way the experimental publication for four years of the periodical *Social Science Abstracts*, which ceased publication after 1932, owing to financial difficulties. It encouraged and aided in the publication of the *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*. Most significant in some respects of all the activities of the Social

Science Research Council, however, has been its planning and support of several large-scale research projects which involved the cooperative efforts of scholars from a number of the special social-science fields. Of these, the most notable for published results up till 1935 has been the Canadian Pioneer Belts study, which has yielded a number of monographs and other volumes.¹

So far as the purposes of the present discussion are concerned, the most important thing about this work of the Social Science Research Council is its value as a symbol and index of a tendency that has been manifested also in other ways—the tendency, *viz.*, for the differentiation that the general social-science field has undergone in the past to be reversed, to a degree, or at least to be compensated by a recent drive for the integration of the social-science field. How much effect this drive will ultimately have it is impossible to say; however, we may note that it has found support in various quarters. College and university executives and committees on curriculum and baccalaureate-degree requirements have done a great deal in recent years to foster the development of less specialized courses of instruction than have flourished in the past. Opinions have been widely expressed that the college curriculum has suffered in the past quarter century from overdepartmentalization; and there have been some intimations that the same might be said of the activities of graduate schools. Whether this agitation will prove to be strong enough to bring about an appreciable reintegration of sociology with economics, political science, anthropology, and perhaps some aspects of history and psychology into a single, general “social science” remains to be seen. Obviously, the possibility of such developments depends, in the last analysis, partly upon considerations of logic and fundamental theory as well as upon considerations of educational and research policy. If, for example, logic demands that economics be developed as a science quite separate and distinct from sociology, which may be the case, particularly when economics is conceived in the neoclassical manner as a science centering in the topic of market price or market value, then efforts to combine economics and sociology into a single science will not be entirely successful in the long run.

¹ The printed *Annual Reports* of the Social Science Research Council constitute the best single source of information concerning its activities, policies, and accomplishments.

At the present time in the United States, there is a visible quest for "applicable sociology." Those who have vested interests in the science as a university subject are admittedly concerned over the fact that, up till the present time, there has been little market for the services of persons specially trained as sociologists, except in the field of college and university teaching. So long as specialized sociological study does not prepare one, practically, for any occupation but that of the college or university teacher, evidently departments of sociology in the institutions of higher learning will languish in the competitive struggle with other academic departments the enrollment of which is supported by the fact that their courses are regarded as valuable for the preparation of young people for various recognized callings. Quite recently, American sociologists have reacted to their feeling of limitation and inferiority due to this situation by a definite effort to discover and make known new fields of employment open to trained sociologists. A special committee of the American Sociological Society was constituted for this purpose at the annual meeting of December, 1934. To be sure, a number of university departments of sociology have been able to swell their enrollments by developing within their organizations, or in close association with them, training schools for social workers. Such an arrangement makes it possible for the training school to require of all its candidates for degrees or certificates certain courses in sociology, including even courses primarily theoretic in character. It can scarcely be denied, however, that the organized and group-conscious social workers of the United States have, on the whole, manifested a majority opinion unfavorable to the study of sociology, as ordinarily taught in college and university departments, for the purposes of professional training for prospective social workers. One reaction on the part of sociologists to the situation thus indicated has been, as was said, a "quest for applicable sociology." In other words, some sociologists have felt that the existing situation constitutes a challenge to them to develop their science along such lines that its bearing on various practical human needs and problems shall be more evident than seems to have been the case heretofore. Doubtless, the majority of sociologists firmly believe that the science has important, ultimately practical bearings on problems of citizenship, problems of personal conduct,

and on the problems encountered in various occupations; but it may be argued that class room courses in sociology have not typically been so conducted as to bring the applications of the science to the attention of students as effectively as might be the case. If this is true, a task is indicated for college and university teachers of sociology and for the writers of textbooks.

Finally, some mention should be made of the fact that the development of sociology has been strongly affected by a trend of accumulation of the literature of the subject. This is important in several ways. It means, of course, the enrichment of the resources available to students, teachers, and research workers, and the enrichment of the available resources of sociologists in this way has been very marked in recent years. It means also, however, that teachers and students are confronted with a constantly increasing difficulty in "covering the field." This difficulty has been met, in a measure, through the publication of the *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*, which includes considerable well-selected bibliography for the study of the many topics of which its articles treat. The launching of *Social Science Abstracts* was an attempt to meet somewhat the same need, with particular reference to the rapidly growing body of periodical literature pertaining to the social sciences, but, as was stated above, this enterprise was discontinued after the publication of four annual volumes and a final cumulative index. The burden of abstracting relevant periodical literature has been resumed, in part, by the journals devoted to the specialized social sciences, but they have found it difficult to carry on the work. After an attempt to resume its former abstract service, the *American Journal of Sociology* has, as these words are written, discontinued that service. At the present time, the need of better bibliographic and reference helps for students of sociology is great and is constantly growing owing to the cumulative increase of the published literature. Evidently, one task for sociologists that is indicated by this state of affairs is the writing of better books, on general sociology and the subjects that may be regarded as subdivisions of the field, in which the worth-while content of previous literature can be collected and made conveniently accessible, so that the ordinary student or reader may depend on these books and neglect, for the most part, the more scattered literature.

It is impossible, in the judgment of the writer, to say with any assurance what sort of thing sociology will be, even as soon as twenty-five years hence. Plausible arguments could be made out in support of each of several views of the future of the science. It may be regarded as reasonably certain, however, that many of the concepts and points of view being emphasized today by sociologists, and apparently relatively neglected by the exponents of other social sciences, will prove to be of lasting importance and value. Whether they will endure as the substance of a separate social science or simply as items of a more inclusive and general social science, into which the special social sciences of today will be merged, remains to be seen.

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